

STUDIES IN BUDDHISM

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
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PREFACE

It is a great privilege and opportunity provided to me by the authorities of the Saraswat Library, especially by Dr. Asok K. Bhattacharya, University of Calcutta, who asked me to make arrangement for publishing a work of late Dr. Beni Madhab Barua. I immediately contacted with Dr. Barua's worthy successors who gladly consented to this effort. I decided to compile and edit some invaluable dissertations of Dr. Barua on Buddhism under the title *Studies in Buddhism*. Of these dissertations, which comprise various aspects of Buddhism, such as, Buddha's Greatness and Role, Basic Concepts of Buddhism, Role of Buddhism in Indian Life and Thought, etc., some were delivered as lectures in India and Ceylon and some were research papers published in journals.

Dr. Barua dominated in the field of Buddhistic and Indological studies in India over quarter of a century. The depth and vastness of his erudition and scholarship is unparalleled. The very subject of his thesis for the D. Lit. degree was 'A History of Pre-Buddhistic Indian Philosophy.' From the Vedas and Upaniṣads to almost all branches of Indian civilisation was the field of his study. He was well versed in Indian art and archaeology, language and literature, philosophy and religion. Besides, he had profound knowledge in Greek philosophy,

current Western thoughts and history of the various world civilisations. A casual glance at the list of books and articles written by him makes one realise the vast acquaintance and the scientific and critical approach of this great scholar. His writings covered varied subjects—from ancient civilisation to modern atom bomb. His famous books like *Asoka and His Inscriptions*, *Gayā and Buddha-Gayā*, *Ceylon Lectures* and articles on *Indus Script and Tantric Code*, etc. reveal his comprehensive knowledge in Indian history and culture and book like *Philosophy of Progress* and article on *Atom Bomb and Its Meaning* indicate that he was equally concerned with modern world. The dissertations included in the present volume reveal how Dr. Barua was thoughtful and erudite but logical and scientific in analysing Buddhism from different perspectives.

I express my deep gratitude to Dr. Sukomal Chaudhuri, M. A., PH. D., *Tripitakācārya*, whose sincere and selfless co-operation in editing and supervising press copies has made the volume so much perfect. I am also grateful to Prof. Sukumar Sengupta and Dr. Dipak Kumar Barua who helped me in procuring some rare articles of Dr. Barua. My wife Sm. Nandita Chaudhury has prepared the Index. I would like to record my sincerest thanks to Sri Bibhash Bhattacharya for his endeavour in quick publication of such a volume.

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The 20th May, 1974

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

CHAPTER

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- II. BUDDHA'S GREATNESS AND ROLE. Lecture delivered at Colombo on March 15, 1944 under the auspices of the Buddhist Brotherhood of the University of Ceylon.
- III. BUDDHISM AS BUDDHA'S PERSONAL RELIGION. Lecture delivered at Colombo on March 14, 1944 under the auspices of the Dona Alpina Ratnayake Trust.
- IV. BUDDHISM AS INSTITUTIONAL RELIGION. Lecture delivered at Colombo under the auspices of the Buddha Sāhitya Sabhā.
- V. BUDDHA'S DOCTRINE OF THE MEAN. *Indian Culture*, Vol. XIII January-March, 1947 No. 3.
- VI. BASIC CONCEPT OF BUDDHISM, B. C. Law Volume, Part I and subsequently published as appendix to Lecture V, Ceylon Lectures.
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- VIII. MAHĀYĀNA IN THE MAKING. Sir Asutosh Commemoration Volume, III-Orientalia.
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- X. ROLE OF BUDDHISM IN INDIAN LIFE AND THOUGHT. Lecture delivered at a symposium of the Indian Philosophical Congress, Delhi, 1946 and subsequently published in *Indian Culture*.

APPENDIX

- I. BUDDHADATTA AND BUDDHAGHOSA : Their Contemporaneity and Age, *University of Ceylon Review*, Vol. 3, 1945.
- II. BOOKS OF STORIES OF HEAVEN AND HELL. An appendix to *Heaven and Hell* by B. C. Law.

I

PROLEGOMENA TO A HISTORY OF BUDDHIST PHILOSOPHY

By a History of Buddhist Philosophy we mean a scientific inquiry into successive stages in the genesis and increasing organic complexity of a system of thought in India, which inspite of its most divergent nature, may be reasonably supposed to have evolved out of the nucleus or system as afforded by the discourses of Gotama the Buddha. It implies necessarily a limitation of the subject of its investigation, a twofold limitation in place and time, without defining which we are sure to be lost in the enormous mass of facts that have accumulated through ages.

In the first place, the phrase "in India" signifies that "Buddhism" in its rather loose modern use must be said to have undergone from time to time a peculiar process of change among peoples other than Indian. "Buddhism really covers," as Mrs. Rhys Davids emphatically claims, "the thought and culture of the great part of India for some centuries, as well as that of Further India (pace China and Japan) up till the present"¹ whereas the scope of the present essay for the

simple necessity of its being limited, hardly leaves room for carrying our researches beyond India-proper.

There is a still-deeper significance of the phrase, the which we might set forth by revealing our inner attitude towards the teacher of those foreign countries where "Buddhism" was transplanted, struck firm root, and has flourished ever since, in one form or another. The countries in question may be taken in groups, and disposed of summarily as follows :—

To take into consideration the South-East group comprising Ceylon, Burma and Siam. The record of teachers in these three representative countries, who have contributed either to the interpretation or articulation of Buddhist thinking is far from the richest. Reliable traditions² place but a few philosophical manuals and commentaries on the list of the best products of Ceylon and Burma. These also belong "all of them to a time contemporary with" so-called "Dark ages" of European culture,³ "or to the epoch immediately succeeding them".

It need not detain us, then, long to estimate even the relative worth of novel theories and interpretations, if any, that these otherwise valuable treatises may still yield. Suffice it to say that from whatever standpoint their contents be judged, the historian cannot fail to discover at once the secondary character of these handbooks and expositions,

based as they evidently were on some older Indian models.⁴ A closer scrutiny also may end in this general result, that the history of "Buddhism" in the countries above-mentioned is chiefly that of a "natural religion" inseparably allied with the precepts of conduct and the rules of life, and serving as a source of inspiration to the artistic and imaginative faculties of mankind. The Buddhist teachers of Ceylon and Further India appear to be in history but so many faithful custodians of Pali literature as a whole. But even for this much we, and all those who are interested in the Buddhist thought and culture, must remain ever so grateful.

Let us now examine the North-East group represented by China, Tibet, Korea, Japan and the rest. An eminent antiquarian like Mr. Samuel Laing might well claim that "Chinese civilisation is in one respect the oldest in the world, that is, it is the one which has come down to the present day from remote antiquity with the fewest changes."⁵ True, but Mr. Laing's statement regarding what he calls "the moral and ceremonial precepts of sages and philosophers" must be interpreted with caution, because Confucius and other Chinese teachers whom he had in mind, and whom we all know to have been born before the importation of Indian culture into China, were not philosophers in the strict sense of the term. These genuine products of the Chinese soil and surroundings might claim at most the position of a Solomon or a

Cāṇakya, but not that of a Plato or an Epictetus. Indeed, in extending the name of a philosopher indiscriminately to every man of genius in the world's history we shall do well to bear in mind the distinction so sharply drawn by Socrates in his Apology⁶ between a philosopher *qua* philosopher on the one hand, and the poets, prophets and seers on the other : "I soon discovered this with regard to the poets that they do not affect their object by wisdom, but by a certain natural inspiration and under the influence of enthusiasm like prophets and seers : for these also say many fine things but they understand nothing that they say."⁷ But of the North-East group, China was the first to receive the light of "Buddhism" from India and to spread it gradually over her great neighbours, Korea and Japan, leaving alone for the moment Siberia and Java.

Tibet, including Central Asia, comes second to China in importance to the writer on "Buddhism as a religion". The original contribution of Tibetan teachers, like that of the Chinese, towards the development of Buddhist philosophy seems far from extensive. Its colour-doctrine or symbolic mysticism can strike the imagination of none but an occultist or a passionate lover of the doctrine "Secret".

So far as the North-East group of countries is concerned the history of "Buddhism" is largely that of a "Supernatural religion", fostering within

itself all the lofty but generally impracticable and not infrequently grotesque ideals of love, pity, piety and humanity that human imagination has ever conceived. Even of religion of this origin must necessarily be sought for in the writings of the Mahāyāna teachers of India.⁸

We cannot but admit that there were and probably are some great schools of thought in China, Tibet and Japan. Each school of thought implies *pari passu* existence of an academy where a certain curriculum of texts is followed. But a careful research will disclose, if it has not already disclosed, that the eminent founders of these schools and academies were some distinguished Indian teachers or a galaxy of their foreign disciples. The proof of this statement is not far to seek ; it is amply furnished by the Chinese catalogues and Tibetan histories now extant. These show that all the best known classics of Chinese and Tibetan philosophies were originally, almost without exception, translations from some Indian writers, not exclusively Buddhist. Thus for all practical purposes we may look up to the Buddhist teachers of China and Tibet chiefly as translators of Indian texts, especially Buddhist Sanskrit, most of which are now irrevocably lost in the original.⁹

“Buddhism” was after all an exotic transplanted from India into other lands. Whenever, therefore, the problem of the development of Buddhist philosophy is seriously faced, the historian must be led

back finally to India for a satisfactory solution, if such be at all possible ; from whatever point of view we look at it, "Buddhism" must be considered a purely Indian growth, if we are at all desirous of making our studies in the subject fruitful, now or hereafter. And if by "Buddhism" we rightly understand a definite and distinct movement of thought in India, then we are bound to assume *a priori* that it necessarily bears some family-relations to other earlier and contemporary movements in the same country. And all single movements constitute in our historical perspective a whole movement of thought to which the name of Indian philosophy is truly applicable.

By the testimony furnished by the Greek Ambassador¹⁰ and Greco-Roman historians¹¹ we know that in ancient times "Divine Philosophy" had chosen but two widely separated countries as her sacred homesteads of which the earlier one was India, leaving out of account the question of better, worse or equal. It would again be a great mistake to suppose that despite enormous distances, despite paucity of means of transport and communication, ancient peoples were absolutely unknown to one another.¹² Unless we presuppose some sort of knowledge of India's rich plains on the part of the Greek people, we can never explain the historical fact of Macedonian conquests in India. The Pythagorean doctrine of transmigration is generally traced back to some Eastern nations, notably

Indian.¹³ Supposing this doctrine does not afford a positive proof of communication between the two countries, we may with better justification regard Pyrrhonism as a connecting link.

Pyrrho of Elis is said to have accompanied Alexander in his Indian campaign ;¹⁴ he "studied philosophy under Indian Gymnosophists and Chaldean Magi, was the originator in European thought of a great and permanent philosophic movement."¹⁵ The illustrious Colebrooke identified the Gymnosophists in Greek records with the Jains, but they should be identified, as we have sought to establish elsewhere,¹⁶ rather with the disciples of Sañjaya, the famous Indian Sceptic, an elder contemporary of Buddha.

Thus Alexander's invasion has a double significance in history, inasmuch as it resulted in the establishment of the first time of a twofold tie between India and Greece, viz., political and intellectual. Through the Gymnosophists and Pyrrho we find a clue even to continued kinship between ancient Indian thought and some of the Great modern occidental philosophies preceding Schopenhauer's. From Schopenhauer onwards we enter upon a new period of thought-relations of India with western countries at large.

Now when in the eager hope of finding "Buddhism" in its full glory and pristine vigour, holding its own amid many keen competitors in the field, we confine for a moment our investiga-

tions to modern India (this word being considered to cover an extensive period from the fourteenth century down to the present time), we are apt to be disappointed at the outset. The feeling hard to resist from first to last is that of amazement mixed with deep sorrow. Almost all the scenes of its manifold activities are still there, while the spirit that once animated the whole landscape is gone. Even as an Indian Buddhist of to-day would flatter himself, the shrines and cairns jealously guarding the sacred relics of old can be brought to view by the energetic stroke of the "pick and shovel" of the archaeologist. Even the monumental columns signalling through the ages the triumphant sway of Buddhist thoughts and ideals over the minds of men stand rudely here and there on the surface of the earth. Even the bands of pilgrims can be seen progressing reverentially from different quarters of the globe towards the promised land. Even the traveller can come across some thousands of Buddhists holding fast the faith of their ancestors along the spurs of the Himalayas, in the Assam Valley and Chittagong : nay, the antiquarian can eventually discover in the jungles of Orissa a whole community of men rallying round the banner of Dharmarāja, apparently a later metamorphosis of Buddha.¹⁷ But yet the sum-total of impressions of an onlooker is that of desolation caused by chaotic heaps of ruins. Gotama the Buddha, who is represented in early records the Tripitaka—as a teacher of wisdom

to the gods and men, active from the first to the very last moment of his career, lives among his posterity as an idol, lifeless and inactive, like a mummy or a fossil ! His present adherents are driven, or survive in an obscure corner of the land ; his system has become a stranger at home, nay, sunk into a parasite, whereas he himself is allowed to figure in popular myths as a fabulous incarnation of God, whose principal and only message to this world was *negatively* non-injury to life (*ahimsā*), and *positively* compassion (*dayā*). Most of his learned Indian admirers run into the other extreme of error, when accepting without proper examination the authority of later legendary and poetic compositions of the Buddhists, they lay undue stress on his renunciation, and emphasize his pre-eminence above other teachers of mankind who are of humble birth, by extolling him as born an heir-apparent to a powerful sovereignty. Gotama in his own teaching used a striking simile¹⁸ to bring home to his disciples the comprehensiveness of the truth or law as he conceived it, contrasted with the littleness of grasp shown by most of his contemporaries and predecessors. This simile is singularly enough employed by modern demagogues to illustrate what they consider our right attitude towards contending systems. But how great is the contrast ! The elephant of Buddha's simile stands for the truth in its completeness, the blind men are the enquirers who approach it each

from his own point of view, each one failing therefore to grasp it as a whole, but to the idle eclectic the same image is meant to content the ignorant with the poorest eclectic notion of the whole truth as a mere conglomeration of partial truths contributed by different and opposed systems. The contrast in the teaching by the simile is fundamental. In the case of Buddha it stimulates the keen and critical search of truths, and as employed by the demagogues, it flatters the slothfulness of the mind that shrinks from the honest effort. These considerations lead us to conclude that "Buddhism" as a movement of thought has completely died out in modern India. A deeper reflection would make it evident that almost the same fatal end has befallen philosophy as a whole. The modern period, the nature of which is clearly foreshadowed in the expressions of mediaeval poetry—the Epics, Purāṇas, Āgamas, and Tantras—exhibits all the chief characteristics of a religious epoch during which India has become altogether a land of song and legend, ecstasy and devotion, and of prayer, fear and superstition. Apart from a few scholastic survivals and expositions of the classical thought, the rigorous treatment of problems and the vigorous grasp of principles are quite foreign to modern Indian teachers. It may be of course that the teachings of Caitanya yield throughout lofty and even clear conceptions of God, Soul, Immortality and love ; that the writings of his disciples together with the songs of Rām Prasāda

and the sweet utterances of Rāmakṛṣṇa are saturated with the terminology of the Sāṅkhya and Vedānta in their popular developments ; or that Vivekānanda's interpretations of the system of the Bhagavadgītā reveal the working of an original mind, and furnish a fresh stimulus to the philosophic activity in the country ;¹⁹ but there is hardly anything in them to show that methodical handling of questions after questions as they arise before the inquiring mind which characterises the quest of a philosopher.

From this it does not follow as a consequence that for us India has at any time changed once for all in her long history into a land where the philosopher is refused shelter, or where he is persecuted simply because his views and judgments of things do not fall in harmony with accepted beliefs of the age.²⁰ Quite the contrary, for nothing is more true as a general observation than that there is till now the same insatiable thirst for knowledge, the same spontaneous reverence for the wise and the learned, the same amount of freedom and facilities allowed for speculation and hairsplitting argumentation.²¹ The "philosophies", too, are studied with industry and attention, by students as well as the laity. The difference lies in the motive and in the result. The systems of philosophy (erroneously counted six)²² are seldom studied in the spirit and manner of a bold seeker after truth, to see things for himself, to formulate principles from his own

experience, to frame definitions from his own concepts, to adduce proofs from his own reason, in short, to go beyond existing systems or to evolve, if possible, a new philosophy. Perhaps the learning by rote which engenders in a great majority of cases false pride without giving understanding, and which is truly the bane of modern Sanskrit Scholarship in India, is largely responsible for it. It is so because, as we perceive, there is at the bottom of Sanskrit learning in general that reliance on authority, that veneration for traditions, which imperceptibly leads men to glorify the past without a sufficient knowledge of what the past is, or in what relation it stands to the present. This naturally begets a kind of self-satisfaction in mind, acting as a deterrent to all inquiries.

The study of philosophy is conducted nowadays in India almost invariably on the lines of Mahā Kaccāyana, the author of the Nettipakaraṇa and Peṭakopadesa. As he points out, the result of such a study as this can be at best *sutamayī paññā*, knowledge derived from the words or judgments of others (*parato ghosā*), in contradistinction to *cintāmayī* and *bhāvanāmayī paññā*, the former implying knowledge that bears throughout the stamp of one's own reflective reasoning or emerges as a consequence from self-induced activities of reason and the latter, knowledge that is co-ordinated of the aforementioned two.²³

Immanuel Kant's division of knowledge into "historical" or "cognitio ex datis" and "rational"

or "cognitio ex principiis" may be cited as an apt parallel.²⁴

"A person", says Kant in illustration of his significant distinction, "who, in the usual sense, has learnt a system of philosophy, e. g. the Wolfian, though he may carry in his head all the principles, definitions, and proofs, as well as the division of the whole system, and have it all at his fingers' ends, possesses yet none but a complete historical knowledge of Wolfian philosophy. His knowledge and judgments are no more than what has been given him.....knowledge in his case did not come from reason, and though objectively it is historical only.... knowledge which is rational objectively (i. e., which can arise originally from a man's own reason only), can then only be so called subjectively also, when they have been drawn from the general resources of reason, from which criticism, nay, even the rejection of what has been learnt, may arise,"²⁵

What is the logical consequence of such a paucity of *cintāmayī paññā* or "rational knowledge", and of such a prevalence of *sutamayī paññā* or "historical knowledge" ? Neither the hair-splitting discussions so powerfully carried on by the Paṇḍits, nor the arduous studies of famished, parrot-like Sanskrit, Pali and Prakrit scholars can give birth to a new philosophy, worthy of the name.

However the very fact that the zeal for the study of philosophy is still kept up in India infuses us with

great hopes for the future. It leads us to hold with Professor Walter Raleigh that "hundreds of them must do their daily work and keep their appointments before there can be one great man of even moderate dimensions". But what is important here to note is that, except for some valuable works on Nyāya,²⁶ the history of Indian Philosophy, which commenced at so early a period might be said to close with Sāyaṇa-Mādhava (1331 A. D.). Strictly speaking, this sad remark applies to the History of Buddhist Philosophy with which we are concerned at present. It will also be found on a closer examination that the development of Buddhistic thought in India is capable of being more narrowly circumscribed in time, extending as it does from Buddha to Śaṅkarānanda (circa 600 B. C.—1050 A. D.).

To revert to the subject of our present investigation. Whether as a movement of thought, or as a system of faith, the decline of "Buddhism" in India gives rise to a problem of the greatest historical importance. The problem has already engaged the serious reflections of an able body of scholars since the celebrated Colebrooke,²⁷ and it is chiefly in the light of the conclusions arrived at, or the suggestions offered, by them that we may venture at all to descend into hidden depths of the past. In the first place, on the evidence of some Brahmin records like the Śaṅkara Vijaya, Colebrooke and Wilson, two among the best known pioneers of the

Sanskritists in Europe, were led to believe that the disappearance of "Buddhism" from the land of its birth was the natural consequence of a furious religious persecution for which Bhaṭṭa Kumārila, a Behari Brahmin of erudition and influence, was chiefly responsible.²⁸ Indeed, the words of the Rev. W. T. Wilkins, quoted by Prof. Rhys Davids, may be taken to embody this early view :

"The disciples of Buddha were so ruthlessly persecuted that all were either slain, exiled, or made to change their faith. There is scarcely a case on record where a religious persecution was so successfully carried out as that by which Buddhism was driven out of India."²⁹

But Professor Rhys Davids who has discussed definitions and proofs, in detail,³⁰ and carefully examined the import of Brahmin records does not believe a word of the statement that he quotes. On the contrary he agrees with Dr. Hofrath Buhler in maintaining that the misconception has arisen from an erroneous inference drawn from expressions of vague boasting, of ambiguous import, and doubtful authority.³¹ He directs, therefore, his readers to seek elsewhere for the causes of the decline of the Buddhist faith ; partly in the changes that took place in the faith itself, partly in the changes that took place in the intellectual standard of the people."³²

Professor R. G. Bhandarkar accounts for the decline of "Buddhism" largely by the Mahāyāna-

Doctrine³³ of which the germs as constituted by the Bodhisattva-idea, are to be found in some of the latest canonical books.³⁴ The want of state-support or the loss of political privileges also might have accelerated the decay. Professor Bhandarkar has shown, more than any other, on the evidence of the inscriptions how gradually changes were brought about in the general attitude of king and people towards the Buddhist faith from the 2nd century A. D. onwards, which was till then a powerful rival of Brahmanism and Jainism. The changes were of course from favour to disfavour, from hospitality to hostility.³⁵

Mr. Vincent Smith does not lose sight of occasional active persecutions of the Buddhists by Hindu kings, like Śaśaṅka, which formed a factor, of however minor importance, in the movement, and the instances of which were very rare. He does not deny that the furious massacres perpetrated by Musalman invaders had a great deal to do with the disappearance of "Buddhism" in several provinces. But in his opinion, the main cause was "the gradual, almost insensible assimilation of Buddhism to Hinduism, which attained to such a point that often it is nearly impossible to draw a line between the mythology and images of the Buddhists and those of the Hindus." A striking illustration of this process of assimilation, as Mr. Smith terms it, might be cited from the present history of Nepal, the chief interest of which lies in "the opportunity

presented by it for watching the manner in which the Octopus of Hinduism is slowly strangling its Buddhist victim."³⁶

Prof. Hackmann is the single writer, so far as we are aware, who, like Prof. Rhys Davids, has given more than a passing thought to this supremely important question. There are on the whole more points of agreement than those of difference between the two writers. They agree, for instance, in holding that the decline of "Buddhism" in India was a process, slow but continuous. Both have resorted to the records of the Chinese pilgrims, Fa Hian and Yuan Chawang in particular, for an unmistakable evidence showing how tardy the process really was. They have maintained that the decline was due rather to the lack of the inner vitality of "Buddhism" than to its external conditions.

They also have shown how the introduction of foreign notions and rites by foreign nations (who adopted or favoured the Buddhist faith, but never completely renounced their old beliefs and habits) helped the movement, to no small extent, slowly to restore India to "the Brahmanical fold." For them the reign of Kaṇiṣka (circa 125-53 A. D.) was a real turning point in the history of the Buddhist faith, literature and vehicle of expression. But it is Prof. Hackmann who has indicated more than any other how the filtration of foreign ideas and cults into the Buddhist doctrine became possible, how, in other words, the manifold signs of decay, so clearly

manifest with the progress of time, could as well be traced in the teachings and concessions of Gotama the Buddha himself. Thus he sums up his views :

“Attacks from without also must have injured Buddhism in this country. A powerful tide of Brahmanism, which had long been held in check by Buddhism, now rose everywhere to a high mark. The hostile attitude of the Brahmans against their rivals can be as little doubted as the fact that the latter at this time could no more check it. The tradition telling of a sharp persecution of Buddhists by the Brahmans in the 8th century may, therefore, have historical accuracy. But it cannot be taken that this persecution or any other external cause has done away with Buddhism in India proper. It was of far greater importance that it laboured under a hopeless inward decay. Its slow destruction continued from the 8th to the 11th century A. D. When Islam penetrated at last into India (in the 11th and 12th centuries), all that still remained to be seen of the fallen religion was swept away utterly by the fanaticism of iconoclastic Moslem.”³⁷

Only one more writer remains yet to be considered. In one of his highly instructive articles,³⁸ Mr. Frazer has tentatively suggested that the principal scene of the last struggle of “Buddhism” for its existence lay in the Dravidian country or South India. The Dravidians, whose national Deity was

Śiva, stood badly in need, for reasons unespecified, of a theistic worship, which might unite them eventually into a people. But both "Jainism" and "Buddhism" miserably failed to satisfy the demand for a Deity so imperiously made.

Mr. Frazer's argument might perhaps be worked out to its logical conclusion in the following manner. The Jina-theory or the Bodhisattva-idea which the Jains or the Buddhists conceded fell short of the mark. For either of them, however modified or disguised, could hardly conceal its real character, as set forth in exalted moral attributed befitting only some human incarnations deified. The Brahmin doctrine of the incarnation had this advantage over both that it was *ab ovo* a corollary from the notion of a supreme Being who by his fancy or mercy rules equally the destinies of the universe and of human life. This may explain why such religions as Śaivism and Vaiṣṇavism, which consisted of the worship of God, and such philosophies as those of Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja, which afforded a rational ground for the theistic faith, flourished, while others fell gradually into obscurity.

In the light of such texts as the Rāmāyaṇa³⁹ and the Viṣṇupurāṇa⁴⁰ we can further see that a time came when the tendency to brand the Cārvāka, Jaina (arhata) and Buddhist (Saugata) philosophies with the flexible mark of nāstikya or Atheism asserted itself in a chronic form. Consider, for example, how quaint it is that one and the same

“Delusion the Great” (Mahāmoha, apparently Buddha), respected in popular mythology as an Incarnation of Viṣṇu, is made the representative of three separate systems viz. Lokāyata, Jaina and Buddhist. This was in no way peculiar to the Viṣṇupurāṇa, because another authority, the Rāmāyaṇa, which has been held in high esteem for its antiquity and intrinsic merit, furnishes a curious instance, where Rāma for nothing calumniates poor Buddha Tathāgata as a theivish atheist (coraḥ nāstikaḥ).

The historical manuals⁴¹ of South India throw some light on the precise nature of the movement which was going on in the country since Bhaṭṭa Kumārila, and which resulted ultimately in the complete victory of Theism or Deism over the varying forms of Atheism. All of them exhibit a battle presenting several fronts, but always with the same result. Henceforward the fundamental conception of God-Śiva or its substitute, determined the character and popularity of philosophy. The remotest suggestion of a Deity was enough to commend a system to the acceptance of the people. The lowest in the scale is the Cārvāka or Lokāyata philosophy, which naively denies the existence of soul, future state and immortality. The next higher in the scale are placed the four schools of Buddhist philosophy—Mādhyamika, Yogācāra, Sautrāntika, Vaibhāṣika—in their due order. Still higher is allowed to stand the Ārḥata philosophy, being

considered to be a transitional link between Atheism and Theism.

The Buddhist faith survived the crusade with which the incomparable Śaṅkara of Sir William Jones is credited, at least in those provinces where the victor's personal influence was least felt. It lingered, still in Bengal and Nepal (including Bhutan and Sikkim). As Mr. Hodgson points out, "the decline of this creed in the plains we must date from Śaṅkara's era, but not its fall, for it is now certain that the expulsion was not complete till the fourteenth or fifteenth century of our era."

Interesting as it is, the history of the four schools of Buddhist philosophy in Nepal conclusively proves that the demands for Deity were a world-wide phenomenon, and that the Aśvarikas were those who alone pushed the Bodhisattva-idea to the extreme. The nearest approach that the Buddhists had ever made to Theism was in their curious conception of Ādibuddha.⁴²

Swāmi Vivekānanda has truly said in his famous Chicago addresses, "On the philosophic side the disciples of the Great Master dashed themselves against the eternal rocks of the Vedas, and could not crush them, and on the other side they took away from the nation that eternal God to which every one, man or woman, clings so fondly. And the result was that Buddhism in India had to die a natural death."

The writers whose views are quoted and discus-

ssed above have sought to account for the decline of "Buddhism" as a religion, but not that of "Buddhism" as a philosophy. Their failure to separate the two problems, however inseparable they may be in fact, can well explain the incompleteness of their otherwise far-reaching investigations and conclusions. Professors Rhys Davids and Hackmann have emphasized the significance of "the changes that took place in the faith itself" or of "a hopeless inward decay", but neither their expressions nor the phases of change to which their reference is explicit seem to have anything to do with the problem of the development of thought, not only Buddhistic, but Indian. We can say, therefore, that they have not asked themselves at all how came it that the Buddhist philosophy was no longer able to hold its position, but had to give way before the advancing knowledge of the new era of speculation for which it had, in no small measure, prepared the way. There is none the less one indirect but very important suggestion in the obiter dicta of Prof. Rhys Davids, that the so-called decline of "Buddhism" in India ought to be viewed by the historian as a "process of change" rather than a "decay".⁴³

To enumerate merely the causes or circumstances determining the rise and fall of "Buddhism as a religion" would be to grope one's way. Of course a writer on "Buddhism" is justified in speaking of its "decay" or "decline", in so far as he pursues his

investigation of any single movement of thought, and that within the prescribed limits of place and time. The historian cannot satisfactorily discharge his functions otherwise by assuming and establishing that the "decay" or "decline" was no more than a link in a chain, a marked phase of the change that was necessary to the history of thought in general. The best way, then, of dealing with the problem to be solved would be to interpret the decline of "Buddhism" as merely a supersession by other systems that came forward to meet the demands of the new epoch, and were originally called forth into existence by the same laws of necessity. This is a fact which alone can decide once for all the value of enquiries concerning the evolution of Indian thought subsequent to the decadence of Buddhist philosophy, the study which is no less valuable than that of the development of pre-Buddhistic thinking.

Supposing that South India was the place which witnessed the death-struggle of "Buddhism", and that the death-blow to it was struck by Śaṅkara towards the end of the 8th century, or beginning of the 9th century, we must ask : was Śaṅkara's philosophy itself "possible or intelligible" without reference to Buddhist philosophies, the Mādhyamika in particular, which flourished in South India ? The question, as we are now persuaded, must be answered in the negative. It was not without some weighty reason that the Māyā-doctrine of Śaṅkara was stigmatised in the Padma Purāṇa as "Buddhism

in disguise" (*pracchanna-bauddham eva*). In the refutation of the dialectical scepticism of Mādhyamika philosophy lay the discovery of the philosophy of Śaṅkara.⁴⁴ The theses put forward by the Mādhyamikas aimed at most at invalidating all dogmatic pretensions.⁴⁵ But the Mādhyamikas, instead of giving a positive conception of reality, landed philosophy in the realm of universal void (*Śūnya*) or dilemma where nothing remained to fall back upon but empty concepts or ideas dressed with manner of logical subtleties. It was a most embarrassing situation in which philosophy had ever found itself. Thus we see how necessity arose for supplementing the content of Mādhyamika philosophy with some sort of positive conceptions of reality. The task naturally fell upon Śaṅkara, whose was not only a doctrine of Māyā, but also that of Brahman. The transition from the doctrine of void (*Śūnya-vāda*) to that of Māyā-and-Brahman took place in a logical order, the which we might suppose to be paralleled in its fundamental character by the transition of Bradley's thought from his book on 'Appearance' to that on 'Reality.' The two books are really complementary, representing together as they do a single work on 'Appearance and Reality'. The nature of the transition here contemplated may be brought out by means of Bradley's own words with which his book on Reality begins :—"The result of our first book (i. e. on Appearance) has been mainly negative.

We have taken up a number of ways of regarding reality, and we have found that they all are vitiated by self-discrepancy. The reality can accept not one of these predicates at least in the character in which so far they have come. We certainly ended with a reflection which promised something positive. Whatever is rejected as appearance is, for that very reason, no mere non-entity. It cannot bodily be shelved and merely got rid of, and therefore, since it must fall somewhere, it must belong to reality".⁴⁶

The same question is to be repeated with regard to the interconnection and interdependence of other philosophical speculations and systems of India, including of course the Buddhist. Is Nāgasena's theory of rebirth, as expounded in the *Milindapañho* explicable except in relation to the *Vajjiputtaka* view of human personality (*puggala-vāda*) and *Saṅk-antika* doctrine of transmigration, both of which preceded it? Can we realize the full significance of the nominalistic or conceptualistic philosophy of the *Paññattivādins* except as a protest against the "universal pessimism" of the *Gokulikas*, or *Kukkulikas*, and itself as a logical development from the vague poetical expressions of Sister *Vajirā*? In what manner did the *Paññattivādins* clear the road for the *Andhakas*, they for the *Mādhyamikas*, and the latter to some extent for the *Naiyāyikas*? What other rational explanation can we offer for Nāgasena's conception of time than that its origin

can be clearly traced in the time-theory of the Sabbatthivādins, Kassapikas and of the Andhakas, and that it stands in close relation to the time-theory in the Maitrī Upaniṣad as well as in the Yoga-system? How can we account for such development as the Nāma-rūpa-theory received from a few later thinkers like Nāgasena, Aśvaghoṣa, Buddhadatta and Buddhaghosa save as a fruitful result of an influence from outside? We need not multiply questions here. These problems await solution elsewhere. All that need be said is that the history of Buddhist philosophy means essentially this, that Buddhist speculations and systems stand in relations to other earlier, contemporary and subsequent Indian thoughts, as well as among themselves.

It may appear most absurd that we have so far freely talked of "Buddhism" in its two aspects, without deciding the vitally important question as to the real character of its content. What is "Buddhism"? Is it a mere religion, or a mere philosophy, or both, or neither? Let us first pass in review the answers suggested by previous European scholars. We may conceive of three stages in the history of the study of "Buddhism" in Europe. In the first stage are the works of the early band of European scholars, such pioneers as Sir William Jones, Messrs. Colebrooke and Wilson, M. Burnouf, Prof. Lassen, Sir Edwin Arnold, and a few others, who had to draw their materials almost exclusively from the comparatively late legendary

and poetical literature of the Buddhists, the older sources of information being for the most part inaccessible to them. While fully alive to the value of their services, and to the immensity of their labours, we must say that they all began their enquiry at the wrong end. The feature of "Buddhism" presented by those compositions at their disposal was that of a religion, an Indian faith bearing a close resemblance to Christianity. Buddha Gotama appeared to be the only son of India, an itinerant teacher surrounded by itinerant disciples, who by his mysterious birth, miracles, parables, ideals and personality stands nearest of Jesus of Nazareth. But the distinction between the two teachers of the continent of Asia was as sharply defined as that between "The light of Asia" and "The light of the world." This old-fashioned tune of Sir Edwin Arnold is still to be heard here and there. A revelation of superior kind is claimed for Jesus Christ as a Master who "spoke through the spirit", as distinguished from Buddha Gotama who "spoke through the mind".

The turning-point came when a fairly large number of translations in English of the Sacred Books of the East was published under the editorship of Prof. Max Muller, and when the Pali Texts, containing a mine of information peculiarly their own, were rendered accessible to the general body of inquirers, under the auspices of the Pali Text Society founded by Prof. Rhys Davids.

Even while the greater bulk of Pali literature remained still buried in manuscript—Dr. Oldenberg produced his “Buddha”,⁴⁷ which by its wealth of information and critical acumen, added to its fascinating style, will always command a foremost place among modern Buddhist classics. But Dr. Oldenberg who furnishes a connecting link between the old and the new arrived only at a negative conclusion, as he found in “Buddhism” ‘neither the one nor the other’, i. e. neither a religion nor a philosophy.

The third stage, which has not as yet made much headway, may be said to date from Mrs. Rhys Davids who makes out a strong case for “Buddhism” by seeking to judge its value more as a philosophy than a religion. She repudiates the commonplace view that “Buddhism” is a mere code of Ethics, an ideal of life, though she does not deny that it is not stripped of a moral aspect, a standard of “solemn judgments about life and the whole of things”.⁴⁸ It is to be confessed, however, that she is but a lucky reaper of the rich harvest sown by the pioneers in the field, notably Dr. Oldenberg, Dr. Jacobi, Dr. Rhys Davids and Mr. Shwe Zan Aung.

The followers of Buddha all agree, in one respect that they all have resorted to the teachings of Buddha as the final court of appeal, that they all have quoted him as the supreme dictator for the soundness of their method and the reasonableness of their conclusions, or that they all have held their

points of view as being implicitly or explicitly reconciled with his. If our theory has any truth in it, the question whether "Buddhism" is a religion, a code of ethics, or an abstruse metaphysics becomes reducible at last to this form : What was Buddha ? Was he a mere social and religious reformer like Raja Ram Mohan Roy, a teacher of morals and statecraft like Cāṇakya, or a daring speculator like Yājñavalkya ? This is not so easy a problem as may appear at first sight. It is on the contrary one of those fundamental problems on the solution of which depends the possibility or impossibility of a history of Buddhist philosophy, worth the name. And one cannot rest content until the contents of the whole of Piṭaka literature have been judged in their organic relations as well as in the light of the later development of Buddhist thinking. The categorical imperative of research demands that before embarking upon the study of "Buddhism", one should unlearn all the misconceptions that this prejudiced age has circulated broadcast.

In the absence of a first-hand knowledge of the Buddhist texts one may profit to some extent by the judgments of those who by their earnestness and prolonged studies have acquired rights to command attention. One of them, Mrs. Rhys Davids, esteems Buddha Gotama as "a notable milestone in the history of human ideas", "a man reckoned for ages by thousands as the Light not of Asia only, but of the world", "a teacher in whose

doctrine ranked universal causality supreme as a point of view, and a sound method".⁴⁹

Bold as her position is, it stands diametrically opposed to that of other writers in whose estimation Buddha is neither a religious reformer nor a philosopher, and for whom the great value of study of "Buddhism" arises mainly from a communion with the stupendous personality of Buddha that it unmistakably reveals.⁵⁰ Dr. Oldenberg has to admit that "hundreds of years before Buddha's time movements were in Indian thought which prepared the way for Buddhism and which cannot be separated from a sketch of the latter."⁵¹ But it is apparent from the general tenor of his argument that his motive is to prove not that Buddha is a great landmark in the evolution of human thought, but that so much had been done and achieved in the arena of Indian religion and philosophy before him that he had hardly had anything to say new. His striking personality is held out as an axiomatic truth. But it is one thing to say that Buddha was a good old man, and quite another that he contemplated the universe and human life in his own way.

We have already indicated above what should be our line of answer regarding the foregoing enquiry as to whether Buddha was a teacher of religion or a philosopher.

The author of a religion he undoubtedly was, but it must be understood that his religion was rather an accidental, secondary feature, an outgrowth

of his philosophy, when the latter was required to yield an ideal of life, employed as a mode of prevision and self-realisation of the highest spiritual side of our being which lies far above the experience of the senses and normal human cognition,⁵² and made to serve as an unfailing guide to reasoned faith (*paññānvayā saddhā*)⁵³ an inner attitude of reverence and good will towards the whole of things expressed in the gentleness of human action,⁵⁴ a consciousness of the dignity of self cognisant of dignity in others.⁵⁵

The question of realisation was pressed by him generally in connexion with the infinite, golden Brahmaloka realised in the thought (*jñānamaya tapa*) by previous thinkers and ideally deduced for ethical purpose from their inner perception or intuition (*pratibodha, cetas*) of the unity of *Ātman* or absolute self-consciousness. Whenever he was referred to grand philosophical theories of old, he impatiently broke forth in utterances reminding us at once of a modern saying, "Please do not boast that the jackfruit belonging to your uncle's orchard is delicious, but say first of all whether really you have tasted one." In the *Tevijja sutta* the young Brahmin *Vāseṭṭha* (*Vaśiṣṭha*) is represented as saying to Buddha, "The various Brahmans, Gotama, teach various paths. The *Addhariyā* Brahmans, the *Tittiriyā Brāhmaṇas*, the *Chandokā* Brahmans (the *Chandavā* Brahmans), the *Bavharijā* Brahmans. Are all those saving paths ?

Are they all paths which will lead him, who acts according to them, into a state of union with Brahmā ?” “Just Vāseṭṭha,” Buddha replied, “as if a man should say, How I long for, how I love the most beautiful woman in this land ! And people should ask him, Well ! good friend !do you know (who and what she is),.....he should answer—No.....Would it not turn out, that being so, that the talk of that man was foolish talk ?”⁵⁶

Referring to the current doctrine that all finite concrete existents with their different names corresponding to their special forms lose their identity while merged in the unity of self, as illustrated by the familiar metaphor of the flowing rivers and the ocean,⁵⁷ Buddha congratulated himself more than once upon his success in organising a Brotherhood on the model of the ultimate reality brooking no distinction whatsoever by way of caste, family and the like.⁵⁸ One might observe that the same religious consciousness or principle underlies the order of Caitanya, one of the most typical of modern religions, which like its Buddhist predecessor, does not tolerate the tyranny of caste, class, or any such social convention. We might go so far as to maintain that all Śrāmaṇic types of religion, as distinguished from Brāhmaṇic, agree in this respect, that they all reject, at least theoretically, caste, class and saṃskāra as constituting a natural basis of distinction of man from

man. Thus we can conceive the Śrāmaṇic types of religion as a continuous development. There is throughout uniformity in the course of religious evolution. But it must be remembered that similarity obtained does not amount to identity. The differences in places are so fundamental that the historian must at once reject Matthew Arnold's doctrine of an unchanging East as categorically false. For there are overwhelming facts to prove that even where the effects are same or similar, the causes, standpoints, motives and methods are at variance. Whereas in ancient religions we find efforts towards realising robust, manly philosophy, the modern religions seek only to realise Paurāṇic fiction and effeminate poetry. For instance, while "Buddhism" in its religious aspirations tried to realise the philosophy of the Upaniṣads, the Vaiṣṇavism in Bengal is an effort to realise the devotional teachings of the Bhāgavata Purāṇa. There was a marked distinction between religious order and civic society in ancient religions, whereas in the modern these do not stand apart, but are almost blended into a single system. Widely divergent in their development as the religions of past and present may seem, their continuity has been broken. For the several lines of growth have converged to a point, only to diverge again in two main directions.

This point, which is the connecting link in the chain of past and present is the teaching of the

Bhagavadgītā and the main courses of the divergence are towards Nyāya (Dialectic) and Bhakti (Devotion), the latter being a reaction against the subtlety of the former.

The foregoing observation has made it plain, that impelled by a necessity of more or less subjective character Buddha organised a Brotherhood. In connexion with it his views, at least some of them, underwent a process of modification, nay, contradicted themselves, as would naturally be the case when logical consistency has to conform to the Paradox called life. The Brotherhood brought him into close contact with the busy and blind world of mankind from which he kept himself aloof for a long time. In order to win over the people to your way of thinking you must partly accede to their wishes and in a country where mentality of the people is so very varied you must narrow the border-line between your deepest convictions and the current beliefs down to its utmost limit. Buddha Gotama, however enlightened he might be, had to pursue this policy. The result was that a new stand-point Lokiya, Sammuti or practical, supervened, compelling him to throw antithesis between it and the Lokuttara, Paramattha or transcendental standpoint into clear relief.

The history of the Saṅgha shows that at the start there were no formulated rules or laws of any kind. The first band of his disciples was recruited without any sort of formality. The persuasive

call of "ehi" (come ye) was enough for ordaining a disciple. If we look forward, a curious coincidence is presented by the history of Christianity. But as the Brotherhood grew into a society of men, the question of discipline became paramount. The rules, laws, formalities, conventions from which he recoiled in theory, followed one another in uniform succession until a complete code, the Pātimokkha, came into existence. The conflicting interests of the Saṃgha gave rise to so many complications that he had no other alternative than to accord religious sanction to this body of rules, which was primarily intended for the use and guidance of the Bhikṣus and Bhikṣuṇis.

In theory he was not prepared to admit seniority by age, and in fact he plainly told the wanderer Sabhiya that seniority went by wisdom only,⁵⁹ but in practice he had to introduce seniority by age, however different was the method of calculation.

As among the ordinary people the ethical definition of a Brahmin served as a hiding cloak for the physical definition, universally followed in practice, so as to a Bhikṣu. Under the glamour of an ideal definition of the Aryan Saṃgha—an indefinite whole, any wearer of the robe passed for a Bhikṣu. Thus in opposing the caste-system favoured and justified by Brāhmanism he came really to replace it by another, a spiritual caste, so to speak, claiming honour from a reigning king for

a Bhikṣu who was a while ago a slave in the royal household.⁶⁰ Religious sanction was accorded also to some social practices partly for the maintenance of the order. For except the liberal gifts of the faithful the Saṃgha had no other means of support.

The practice of offering food to departed spirits was justified,⁶¹ if not encouraged, though from the transcendental point of view he steered clear of the problem of a future state.⁶² We can imagine that when a cynic like the chieftain Pāyāsi seriously questioned the possibility of individual existence after death, a "flower-talker" (citra-kathī) like Kumāra Kassapa tried to convince him, at least to throw dust into his eyes, by relating fairy tales one after another. When you ask a person who is innocent of philosophy to adduce proofs for the persistence of soul after death, what else will he, or can he do than telling you all sorts of ghost-stories? We have in fact a complete anthology of such stories, the Peta-and-Vimānavatthu. Indeed, the dialogue between Pāyāsi and Kumāra Kassapa in the Dīgha-Nikāya is of a great historical value as indicating the process which led in course of time to the composition of the Birth-stories of Buddha, the geneology of the Buddhas, and the ghost-stories of other people. The Bodhisattva-idea which is so widely prevalent among the Buddhists was but a corollary, a slight modification of the doctrine of rebirth. The principal motive to the development

of the Bodhisattva-idea was perhaps furnished by the Bhikṣus of theological turn of mind, who were unwilling to credit any one but Buddha for his Bodhi-knowledge, and at the same time too clever to commit themselves to the theory of chance-becoming. As they fondly believed, the Bodhi-knowledge realised itself in and through the accumulated wisdom of a single striving self. The Apadāna, the Cariyā-piṭaka and the Buddhavaṃsa were obviously the results of such an after-thought on the part of the Buddhist theologians. At any rate, Buddhaghosa informs us that these were precluded from the list of canonical texts by the Dīgha-bhāṇakas of old.⁶³ The doctrine of karma developed in all these texts, particularly in the Jātaka literature, is hardly distinguishable from popular fatalism so sharply criticized by Buddha himself under Pubbekatahetu.⁶⁴ There were other factors contributing to the development of "Buddhism" as a religion. There were many among his disciples, not excluding Sāriputta, who were unable to resist the temptation to lavish extravagant praises upon him, though one might agree that their praises were at bottom but expressions of gratitude. There were the Brahmin teachers who on the application of the physiognomical test of a great man took him for no less than an Incarnation. There were again the people who looked upon him as a very God who might procure for them the joys of heaven by his grace, and bring

down the hosts of angels to their rescue by his lordly call. The ascetic disdain of marriage and of the animal phenomena that are inherent in it probably led his followers to believe in his "chance-birth". There were of course action and reaction of several other causes all of which we may suppose helped forward the process of deification.

It was no part of our plan to institute an enquiry into the evolution of "Buddhism" as a religion. But we launched upon it with the object of showing that in whatever manner and in whatever sense Buddha became the founder of a religion, it is undeniable that he was a philosopher. Granted that his religion, like other ancient religions of India, was essentially an attempt to mould human life after the fashion of reality, it follows that the conception of the ideal of life itself depended on the determination of the nature of reality.⁶⁵ In other words, philosophy was the presupposition of his religion. Now we shall briefly examine evidence pointing this way.

(1) A time-honoured tradition⁶⁶ bears out the fact that the philosophy was the starting point and foundation of his teaching. It tells us that the first expression of his enlightenment contained but an enunciation and emphatic assertion of the law of happening by way of cause (Paṭicca-samuppāda), the causal genesis of things and ideas, that is to say, causation both natural and logical.

(2) The central, fundamental conception of his

system was the law of causation. "Leave aside", he said to Sakulūdāyī, a wanderer who had leaning to Jaina philosophy, "Leave aside these questions of the beginning and the end. I will instruct you in the Law : If that is, this comes to be ; on the springing up of that, this springs up. If that is not, this does not come to be ; on the cessation of that, this ceases."⁶⁷

We have nothing to add to the comment of Mrs. Rhys Davids on this point. "Now in this connection," she observes, "I find a salient feature in Buddhist philosophy, namely : In place of theories on this or that agency as constituting the source, the informing, sustaining principle, and the end of this present order called world or universe, Buddhists concentrated their attention on the order of things itself. This order they conceived as a multitudinous and continual coming-to-be and passing-away in every thing. And this constant transition, change or becoming was not capricious, nor preordained, but went on by way of natural causation".⁶⁸

(3) Dr. Oldenberg's argument that "hundreds of years before Buddha's time movements were in progress in Indian thought which prepared the way for Buddhism and which cannot be separated from a sketch of the latter" cannot certainly be held as a decisive proof against Buddha being a notable milestone in the history of human ideas. For it was by these progressive movements in Indian specula-

tion that such a developed and comprehensive theory of causation as Buddhas became possible. We might here call to our aid Mr. Herbert Spencer whose pregnant words and pointed remarks can help us in realising what a long history of philosophical thinking is presupposed by development of the idea of causation. "Intellectual progress", he maintains "is by no one trait so adequately characterised, as by development of the idea of causation : since development of this idea involves development of so many other ideas. Before any way can be made, thought and language must have advanced far enough to render properties or attributes thinkable as such, apart from objects ; while in low stages of human intelligence, they are not. Again, even the simplest notion of cause, as we understand it, can be reached only after many like instances have been grouped into a simple generalisation ; and through all ascending steps, higher notions of causation imply wider notions of generality.⁶⁹

(4) A systematic study of Pre-Buddhistic thought in India is full of possibilities. One of the most fruitful results of it will no doubt be this, that it will enable us to retrace almost each step in the dubious course of philosophical speculation from its rude beginning to its mature growth, particularly in regard to development of the idea of causation. It will lay bare the intricate path of gradual evolution of the notion of cause in the light of a fairly continuous record such as represented by

Indian literature. It will show, *inter alia*, that in India, as everywhere else, scientific reflections arose, or could arise only after accumulated daily experiences of mankind had adequately brought home the notion of the uniformity of natural sequence in the Universe, which appeared to the primitive observer to be full of awe-inspiring wonders and perplexing anomalies. The world or universe is a system, where the place and function of each power or force are determined by certain definite laws, a rational order of things, a harmonious whole, within the four walls of which chance, anarchy or autocracy has no place. This is one of the permanent contributions made by Vedic Kavis to philosophy. Their expression *Rtā*, which frequently occurs in Vedic hymns and was replaced later by *Dharma*, is significant in more than one way.

For it implies not only that the visible universe is governed throughout by the principle of law in the widest sense of the term, but also that there is a rhythmic, orderly march of things in general. The morning showed the day. At the very dawn of human intelligence the far-sighted Vedic Poets went into camps, some maintaining the Postulated of Being,⁷⁰ and others, that of non-Being.⁷¹ Both schools have left their foot-prints on later Indian speculations. Speaking generally, the history of subsequent Indian philosophy has nothing more to exhibit than a gradual unfolding and expansion.

a wider application, and a continually changing connotation of the ancient antithesis between the two postulates.⁷²

In Post-Vedic thinking, generally known as the Philosophy of the Upaniṣads, we are made familiar to the fundamental notion of causation, or sequence as we now understand it : every shoot (Tūla, effect) has a root (mūla, cause), the shoot being identical with the root in substance or essence.⁷³ But it may be said without slightest injustice to them, that they show zeal rather for a knowledge of the cause of causes than a rational explanation of things, ideas and their relations in the light of a cause, as constituted by several conditions, (paccaya-sāmaggi or samavāya) both positive and negative. At no other period of Indian history was validity of the theory of causation, particularly in regard to the moral ideas of good, evil, responsibility and freedom, so openly questioned and so strongly defended as at the period of the Sophists and Mahāvīra which elapsed immediately before the advent of Buddha.⁷⁴ The Sophists, in spite of their comparative poverty in creative thought rendered an invaluable service to Indian philosophy. They by their sophistry created a demand in it for a thorough, dialectical criticism of knowledge and Being.⁷⁵ And with the single exception of Mahāvīra there is no other philosopher among Buddha's predecessors who, like him, so extensively employed causation both as a norm and as a method.

For Buddha not merely things, but ideas themselves are related and caused,⁷⁶ and therefore capable of a rational explanation ; the world is not merely a physical or an intellectual order, as contemplated by the ancients, but a moral as well as a logical order.

One must not run away with the idea that Buddha's achievement began and ended with enunciation of a theory of causal genesis. The truth of this remark may be corroborated by the following enquiry. The underlying principle of his theory of causal genesis has a twofold bearing ; logical and metaphysical. As a logical principle, it is no other than what we now call the principle of identity, the great value of which was recognised by him in the sphere of thought. Being is, non-Being is not. That which is, is ; that which is not, is not. In order to think correctly and consistently we have to think as A is A, or as A is not not-A. Thus Buddha asked Citta, a lay adherent of Poṭṭhapāda the Wanderer, "If people should enquire of you, were you in the past, or not ? Will you be in the future, or not ? Are you now, or not ? What would your reply be to them ?"

"? "My reply would be that I was in the past, and not that I was not ; that I shall be in the future, and not that I shall not be ; that I am now, and not that I am not."

"Then if they cross-examined you thus : Well ! the past individuality that you had, is that real to

you, and the future individuality and the present unreal? And so as to the future individuality that you will have and the individuality that you have now? How would you answer?"

"I should say that the past individuality that I had was real to me at the time when I had it, and others unreal; and so as to the other two cases."

"Just so, Citta."⁷⁷

In the same vein he said elsewhere, "Three are the modes of speech, the forms of judgment, the rules of nomenclature, which are not confused now, which were not confused in the past, which are not disputed, which will not be disputed, and which are not condemned by the wise philosophers." What are these?

That which has passed away, ceased, completely changed, is to be designated, termed, judged as 'something that was', and neither as 'something that is', nor as 'something that will be', and so on.

There were among the ancients some Ukkalāvassabhaññā, vaunting, mischievous theorists who denied causation, denied the ultimate ground of moral distinctions, denied the persistence of individuality after death. They, too, did not disregard these modes of speech, the forms of judgment, the rules of nomenclature, which are by their nature indisputable and unimpeachable. And why not? In fear that they might otherwise bring upon them censure and discredit.⁷⁸

The metaphysical bearing of the principle under

discussion goes at once to prove that Buddha was no mere logician. He was a philosopher endowed with keen insight into nature of reality which is change, movement, transformation, continual becoming, a change which does not however consist of disconnected events or isolated freaks of nature, as current abstract terms may generally signify, but one that presents throughout a continuous structure, a closed series of forms,⁷⁹ a concatenation of causes and effects. Not that the cause is identical with the effect, as contemplated by Uddālaka Āruṇi ; with Buddha the former constitutes but an invariable antecedent condition for the becoming of the latter : If that is, this comes-to-be ; on the arising of that, this arises. To be consistent with his general principle, that Being follows from Being, Uddālaka could not help coming to the conclusion, that there is no new creation.⁸⁰ Milk really does not change to curds, the latter just comes out of the former. Causality holds good only in so far as the former contains in it the seed, essence or potentiality of the latter, the reality being from an empirical point of view (samvṛitti) a system where the whole of nature gradually unfolds itself by means of a churning motion (manthana), stirred up by soul, the principle of all change.

Buddha employed Uddālaka's simile of the milk and the curds as an illustration of the nature of reality, as he conceived it. But like his predecessor, he did not imply by it that there is altogether no

new creation or transition from cause to effect. As he put it on the other hand, "Just as from milk comes curds, from curds butter, from butter ghee, from ghee junket, but when it is milk it is not called curds or butter or ghee or junket ; and when it is curds it is not called by any of the other names ; and so on".⁸¹

Turning at last to the main question as to the conception of three selves⁸² or the ancients, Buddha tried to guard against a possible misunderstanding. These selves came to be treated of in some circles as if they were three separate entities or self-subsistent principles. He pointed out clearly and definitely that considered in isolation, the gross, material or animal self, the rational or thinking self, or the noetic or spiritual self was a mere abstraction, there being no impassable barrier, in fact, between one self and another. "When any one of the three modes of personality is going on, it is not called by the name of the other. For these, Citta, are merely names, expressions, turns of speech, designations in common use in the world. And of these I, too, make use indeed, but am not led astray by them."⁸³

We have considered the main line of evidence proving beyond doubt that Buddha was endowed with a true philosophical insight into the nature of things. Like a prophet⁸⁴ or a poet⁸⁵ he did not build castles in the air. He did not, for example, look forward to a day of ideal perfection, when all

signs of cruelty, oppression and high-handedness would vanish from the phantasmagoria of nature. For he knew too well that the time will never come when the tiger and the buffalo, or the snake and the mongoose will drink at the same fountain or live in concord for ever. He also was aware that the pious hope cherished by a Nigantha or Jaina of being able to avoid taking life altogether was never to be fulfilled. Even in moving about a man is bound, he said, to destroy innumerable lives.⁸⁶ He was fully alive indeed to manifold limitations of human knowledge and life. Now before closing our present discussion, let us consider for a moment another line of evidence, which, circumstantial though it is, may give us a new perspective.

(1) If we look at the time, country and surroundings in which Buddha had seen the light of day, we cannot but presume that he was a philosopher in the truest sense of the word. As we all know, he was born at a time when Sophistic activities were in full swing, the whole of Northern India seething with speculative ferment. Hundreds and thousands of wandering teachers spent their time in discussing "with loud voices, with shouts and tumult" all sorts of topics, which embraced matters relating to philosophy, ethics, morals and polity.⁸⁷ There were friendly interviews, and politeness and exchange of greetings and compliments. There was at the same time an interchange of wrangling phrases in the heat of discussions :

“You don’t understand this doctrine and discipline, I do. How should you know about this doctrine and discipline?” And so on. Among these Wanderers (Parivrājakas), there were farfamed leaders of sects and eminent founders of schools, who were “clever, subtle, experienced in controversy, hair-splitters,” who went about, one would think, “breaking into pieces by their wisdom the speculations of their adversaries.” With reference to them Buddha expressed to a naked ascetic, “as between them and me there is, as to some points, agreement, and as to some points, not. As to some of those things they approve we also approve thereof. As to some of those things they disapprove, we also disapprove thereof.” Some of those profoundly learned Sophists bear evidence to the fact that Buddha was a philosopher of no mean order, an upholder of the supremacy of wisdom (ñāṇavādo), a teacher, who followed the Socratic method of questioning and cross-questioning his interlocutor in order to bring the latter round to his way of thinking. One of them, for instance, curtly remarked, “I don’t think it proper that the householder Upāli should join an issue with Samaṇa Gotama ; for he is, sir, a juggler indeed, who knows the art of confounding the disciples of other teachers.”⁸⁸

(2) At the time of the advent of Buddha India was a country where every shade of opinion was maintained, and nobody could say what exactly he

was about at two consecutive hours. Buddha came to the rescue of Indian philosophy at such a critical moment of its life. He set himself like his worthy forerunner Mahāvīra to prepare a 'Perfect net' (Brahmajāla) of dialectics for entangling in it all sorts of 'sophistry' and 'eel-wriggling.'⁸⁹ It will be a great mistake to deny him the name of a philosopher on the ground that he dismissed a certain number of problems from the domain of speculations. It is not however wholly true that he discarded or undervalued them altogether. When he said that he suspended his judgments on this or that ontological problem, he really meant us to understand that no one answer (ekamśika) can be judged as adequate for the purpose. As these problems relate to 'matters of fact' (lokiyadhammā) the 'best thing for us would be to approach each of them from more than one point of view, from several (anekamśika).⁹⁰ And judging from different standpoints the Eternalist and the Annihilationist can both be proved to be right as well as wrong.⁹¹

So far as he tended to withhold his judgments on this or that problem of Metaphysics, and craved for mental imperturbability by preserving a neutral attitude towards this or that dogmatic view, to that extent he was an Eel-wriggling, prevaricating sceptic or Agnostic.⁹² So far as he conceded that something could be said both for and against any dogmatic view, to that extent he was a 'Paralogist' (Syādvādin).⁹³ And so far as he clearly and

precisely pointed out the standpoints looking from which the dogmatist position could be both defended and overthrown, to that extent he was a Critical philosopher (vibhajjavādin).⁹⁴

(3) The Brahmins of old passed him for no less than an Incarnation of God, one who could stand the physiognomical test of a great man. The medieval myths represent him as a fullfledged Incarnation, whose principal and only message to the world was *negatively* non-injury to life, and *positively* compassion. Unfortunately this belief is still very widely prevalent in this country. This fate was anticipated by him, when he expressly said, "It is in connexion with trivialities, matters of little value, mere moral behaviour, that a man-in-the-street will praise me, if he so desires." "There are other things, profound, difficult to realise, hard to understand, tranquillising, sweet, not to be grasped by mere logic, 'subtle,' comprehensible only by the wise in respect of which that one might rightly praise me in accordance with truth."⁹⁵

Buddhist philosophy is not only an integral part of a whole, but a whole in itself. If so, the question arises, how can we distinguish this particular movement as a whole from other Indian movements with which it is correlated? It is remarkable that this question of supreme importance did not escape the notice of ancient Buddhist writers. We shall be content here with commenting on just two tests provided by them.

1. In the first place, we read in the *Netti* that the Heretics and Hedonists of other schools,⁹⁶ so far as their philosophical speculations were concerned, judged things and their relations from the point of view of *attā* or "a permanent somewhat," and the result was that they committed themselves to either of these two extremes: Eternalism and Annihilationism.⁹⁷ According to the *Petākopadesa*, the two extremes on the moral side were these: that pleasure and pain are willed by the moral agent, and that these are determined by other causes.⁹⁸ On the practical side, too, their position was in no way better. They advocated either enjoyment of the pleasures of the sense or practice of self-mortification.⁹⁹ As distinguished from them, the Buddhist Heretics and Hedonists,¹⁰⁰ in spite of their divergences, agreed in so far as they all entertained a high regard for Buddha, his teachings, and methods of self-culture.¹⁰¹

Thus the *Netti* and *Petākopadesa*, the two works ascribed to Mahākaccāyana, bring out, among others things, first, that all Buddhist teachers were, as a rule, upholders of the Middle path in matters of theory and practice (to use a vulgar expression): and secondly, that they all based their opinion on the teachings of the Buddha. The second point deserves special notice. The *Kathāvatthu* which embodies the views of various schools of Buddhist philosophy bears it out. The Buddhist teachers have freely and frankly cited the discourses of

Buddha (sutta-udāharāṇa) as a final authority in favour of their conclusions, so much so that these contending schools of opinion can be historically viewed as so many different modes of interpretation of Buddha's system. Indeed, Mahākaccāyana had to confess that his task was mainly to make explicit what is implicit in the words of another.¹⁰²

2. As regards the second test, it is stated in the Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra that although the epithets or predicates of Brahman and Nirvāṇa were for the most part same or similar, it would be a great mistake to identify the two conceptions. These were far from being identical. In order to understand truly the difference between the two, we must always bear in mind the standpoints which are diametrically opposed. Briefly speaking, the Buddhist philosophers arrived at the conception of Nirvāṇa or Tathāgatagarbha from the point of view of anattā; non-soul or Becoming, as contrasted with the standpoint of other philosophers, which is attā, Soul or Being.¹⁰³ No better characterisation of Buddhist philosophy is possible. There were among the Buddhists, Puggalavādins, even, Saṅkanti-
tikas, but there were none who committed themselves to the Absolutist position. The Tīrthakara-theory of soul has never been accepted by the Buddhist thinkers. It may be, as we are told in the Laṅkāvatārasūtra, that they adopted the language of the Soul—theorists, but they did so with the object of rendering their theory of non-soul

attractive and acceptable to the Heretics (Tīrthak-arānām ākarṣaṇārtham).

The Vajjiputtakas or Vātsīputriyas, as we said, were Soul-theories among the Buddhists, but their conception of soul or personality was quite distinct from the Sāṃkhya or the Vedānta conception.¹⁰⁴ It is truly observed by Mrs. Rhys Davids: "And it must be borne in mind that all those who were implicated in the controversies set-forth (in the Kathāvatthu) were within the Sāsana. All, as we should say, were Buddhists. They may not on certain matters have been 'of us' Sakavādins, but they were certainly not 'hence outside', ito bahiddhā, the term bestowed on teachers of other creeds. These are only once included together with Vajjiputtakas and Sammitiyas, and that is when the almost universally accepted dogma of a persisting personal or spiritual substrate is attacked." The Theravādins naturally sought for dialectical advantages in putting forward premises which would make their opponents virtually confess to the Doctrine of Being (Sakkāya-diṭṭhi), but one of a Sāsana was "anxious to repudiate any such imputation."¹⁰⁵ Buddhadatta has an interesting chapter on the refutation of a theory of Agent (Kāraṇakapaṭibedha) which presupposes a long controversy given in the Kathāvatthu (I. 1). It shows that the authorities relied on by the Vajjiputtakas and others all pertained to the Buddhist canon. These were, as such, unimpeachable, and

implied a theory or postulate of a personal entity, continually passing from one state to another. Buddhadatta is unable to dispute the authority of the passages cited. He has nothing to say against the Vajjiputtaka or Saṅkantika interpretation, except that the passages embody a common-sense view of soul, accepted by Buddha for practical purposes.¹⁰⁶

True, as M. Oltramare points out, in his valuable little book on Paṭiccasamuppāda, that the Buddhist Nāma-Rūpa-theory was tending steadily from a certain date towards the Sāṃkhya conception of Puruṣa-Prakṛti. The same remark applies well to the conceptions of avidyā and mūlaprakṛti, mūlaprakṛti and nirvāna.¹⁰⁷ But we find that the Buddhist thinkers are naturally anxious to keep their conceptions distinct.

Buddhist philosophy is a continuous development. The movement presents various phases or stages, each foreshadowing that which followed, and containing that which preceded it. Thus a history of Buddhist philosophy, to be worth the name must be divided into successive periods or epochs corresponding to those phases or stages. So far as a forecast of the plan of the work is now possible, it can be conveniently divided into four parts. The program set before us will appear to be something like this :—

Part I. First Period (Bimbisāra to Kālāsoka) :
Buddha and his Disciples.

We must begin the history with Buddha and

his Disciples, who were the real originators of Buddhist speculative movement. The main sources of information are the Pāli Tripiṭaka, together with the three works of Mahākaccāyana above referred to. The Vedas, Upaniṣads and Aṅgas will be called to our aid for a collateral evidence.

Part II. Schismatic Period (Kālāsoka to Kaṇiṣka) :

Under this head we have to enquire in what manner the eighteen schools of interpretation and opinion arose out of the original one school, and grew fewer in course, of time. The main sources of information are these : The Kathāvatthu with its commentary (now translated into English), and the works of Vasumitra, a contemporary of King Kaṇiṣka, Bhavya, and Vinītadeva. Unfortunately these works are lost in the original, but can be found in Chinese and Tibetan translations. Those who have no access to Chinese and Tibetan can read with profit Mr. Rockhill's "Life of the Buddha", and Wassilief's "Der Buddhismus".

Part III. Classical Period (Kaṇiṣka to Harṣavar-dhana) :

The period may be said to date from the Milinda in which a richer synthesis of older speculations was reached. The main subject of investigation comprises the four systems—Mādhyamika, Yogācāra, Saūtrāntika, and Vaibhāṣika, which sprang into

existence by a further reduction of the earlier schools. The sources of information are well-known.

Part IV. Logical Period (Guptas to Pālas) :

The title chosen for this part is taken from Dr. Vidyābhusan's thesis on Indian Logic, Medieval School.

It must be noted that this period partly overlaps the third. The major part of our sources of information is for ever lost in the original, and consequently we have to depend always on patient labours of the Chinese and Tibetan scholars. Only a few works have survived in Buddhist Sanskrit, but occasional glimpses of the Buddhist thought of this period can be obtained from incidental references in the contemporary Indian works.

To sum up : This introduction is not to be regarded as an epitome of the main work which is still to be written. Here we have been concerned to answer not what a History of Buddhist philosophy is, but whether and how it is possible. Although in passing we have discussed some side-issues, it is hoped that we have not failed to impress the main point. We have sought throughout to make clear what we precisely mean by a history of Buddhist philosophy as distinguished from a history of religion. This was essential especially because the philosophical aspect of Buddhism has received so little attention from the Buddhist scholars. We

have not denied at the same time that the two aspects are really inseparably connected together. Thus the distinction contemplated here is at most tentative and provisional. We also have gone the length of saying that Buddhist philosophy, in spite of its close connexion with the Buddhist religion, is capable of a separate treatment. That is to say, the religious aspect of the movement possesses a value for us, only in so far as it represents a background of certain metaphysical problems. The religious consciousness of the Buddhists, as that of others, could not feel secure, and rest content, until its objects were supported upon a solid foundation of reason.

The Buddhist philosophy has been represented not only as an integral part, and an important feature, of Indian philosophy as a whole, but a distinct movement of thought realising itself progressively through different channels. The beginning and end of this movement are unknown, perhaps unknowable, and yet for convenience' sake we have proposed to trace its origin from Gotama the Buddha, and mentioned Śaṅkarānanda as its last landmark. We have further assumed that it falls into successive periods of development, and a forecast of the work has been given together with a list of the sources of information.

Now before we conclude, a word must be said concerning the use and value of a treatise on the development of Buddhist thought in India, parti-

cularly at a time when great changes in the world's history are about to take place. It is more than a pious hope that in these general upheavals a work like this will open out a world of speculation and knowledge hitherto unknown. And if we can rightly maintain that Buddhist philosophy, like others of its kind, was a rational attempt to interpret its environment in its own way, a historical study of its onward progress will certainly disclose at each step a picture of Indian society, which is so precious and rare that without a knowledge of it we cannot say whether our life has eternally flown through time. To neglect it is to lose sight of another aspect of the intellectual life in India, another standpoint from which to judge the Indo-Aryan civilisation. Even apart from this, a history of Buddhist thought may throw abundant light on many obscure corners in the political history of the country, and suggest a sounder method of interpretation of Indian literature, religion, sciences and arts than that which is hitherto followed.

The pioneers of Indian research have achieved a good deal and much more remains yet to be achieved by us their successors. We are yet far from having a connected view of our history; there are still big gaps to fill in.

It is too gigantic a task to be accomplished by one man, and as a matter of fact, it is not a work of one man, but a joint work of many. However, each will do his or her part humbly, honestly and

hopefully, and will feel his or her labour amply rewarded, if it carries us one step forward. We must forget for the time being the pangs of our wounded vanity, leave aside for a moment our profound veneration for the historic past that we know so little, and let alone for the present our personal and sectarian differences. Let us all unite in a common cause, and calmly contemplate on the course of our thought, reflecting great convulsions in our history. By contrasting the present with the past, let us see where we stand to-day intellectually, or how we can by the aid of our ancient heritage, added to modern research, bring forth a new generation of scholars, a vigorous race of thinkers who by depth of knowledge and breadth of heart will raise once more their motherland in the estimation of the civilised world. Here we have a vast field for work, a field where our labours may produce marvellous results. We are descending into depths of the past with the torch-light of history, in the hope of finding out some hidden treasures of the human heart and intellect that may perchance enrich the East as well as the West. We long waited for a scheme of the study of our ancient history and culture under the auspices of our University. Now we have got it. We owe it chiefly to the Hon'ble Justice Sir Asutosh Mukherjee whose name has to-day become a household word, and to whom Bengāl, nay India will remain grateful for the many great works which he has ungrudgingly done

in connexion with University of Calcutta and the general shaping of the educational system in our country. But it rests with us, both teachers and students to see that the scheme proves a success in the end.

We may be permitted here to mention that the Secretary of State for India was kind enough to extend our scholarship in England to a period of one year for the purpose of collecting materials for a history of Buddhist philosophy, and we confidently look forward to the time when the work in an already finished form will justify such a generous response on his part.

NOTES

1. Buddhist Psychology, being an inquiry into the analysis and theory of mind in Pāli literature, London, 1914, pp. 1-2.

2. E. g. Those recorded in the Saddhamma-Saṅgaha by Dhammapāla, ed. Saddhānanda, J. P. T. S., 1890, p. 62 ; Gandhavaṃsa, ed. Minayeff, J. P. T. S., 1886, p. 61 ; Sāsanavaṃsa, ed. Mrs. Bode, P. T. S., 1897, pp 41 ff.

3. Editor's preface, "Compendium of Philosophy," being a translation by Mr. S.Z. Aung of the Abhidhammattha Saṅgaha, P.T.S. 1910, pp. viii—xi. The following are the Singhalese and Burmese works on Philosophy, now extant : Ceylon :—Abhidhammattha-Saṅgaha, Paramattha-Vinicchaya, Nāmarūpa-Pariccheda by Anuruddha ; Mohavicchedanī by Kassapa ; Khemapakaraṇa by Khema ; Abhidhammattha-Vibhāvanī by Sumaṅgala, etc. Burma :—Saṅkhepa-Veṇṇanā, Nāmacāra-Dīpaka and Visuddhimaggagandhi by Saddhamma-Jotipāla, etc.

4. Not to mention other works that are still later, Anuruddha's three compendia presuppose such older Indian works as Buddhadatta's Abhidhammāvatāra and Rūpārūpa-vibhāga ; Vasubandhu's Abhidharma-Kośa and Dhammapāla's Sacca-Saṅkhepa, etc.

5. Human Origins, R.P.A., 1913, p. 31.

6. Apology, 7.

7. F.-W. Rolleston's "Teaching of Epictetus" p. XXI.

8. E. g. Aśvaghoṣa, Nāgārjuna, Vasubandhu, Asaṅga, and others.

9. Vide Bunyio Nanjio's Catalogue of the Chinese Tripiṭaka, Hackmann's "Buddhism as a Religion" pp. 78-79, Vidyabhusan's Indian Logic : Medieval School, Calcutta, 1909, pp. 82-149. Among the huge collection of the Buddhist

Tripitaka in the Chinese translation we have only two distinct works of other systems, viz., Sāṃkhya and Vaiśeṣika. H. Ui., *Vaiśeṣika Philosophy*, Oriental Translation Series, Vol. XXV, P. 1.

10. Megasthenes who visited India in the 4th century B. C. See for his views on points of contact between Indian and Greek thinkers McCrindle's "Ancient India" The Sophists were the class of Indian people who were uppermost in the thought of the Ambassador.

11. E. g. Ptolemy, Arrian, Strabo, Diodorus, Pliny, Plutarch.

12. The Yavanas (Ionians or Greeks) do not seem to have played any role in the pre-Buddhistic literature of India. See Bühler's 'Manu' p. cxiv. As for the ancient Buddhist literature, we have been able so far to discover just one interesting passage in which Buddha said to Assalāyana—"Thus friend, have I heard : Yona, Kamboja and other outlying localities (neighbouring countries) there exist but two social grades, the master and the slave, flexible enough to allow men to pass easily from one into the other" (Assalāyana-Sutta, Majjhimanikāya, ed. Chalmers, II p. 149) ; of the two later treatises on 'Polity' the Bṛhaspati Sūtra (ed. Thomas III, 117-118) refers to the peculiarities of the mountainous Yavana countries and the Śukranīti to those of Yavana Philosophy. But it is no wonder that as employed in them, the name Yavana has reference to Persians or Afghans. See Vincent Smith's *Early History of India*, pp. 173, 255 and 367.

13. Von Shroeder, *Pythagoras und die Inder*.

14. W. Windelband, *A History of Philosophy* (English translation), 1910, p. 163 : "He accompanied Alexander on his journey to Asia, together with a follower of Democritus, Anaxarchus by name".

15. T. W. Rolleston's *Teaching of Epictetus*, p. XXI.

16. My "Indian Philosophy", loc. cit.
17. Census Report of 1911, part I, p. 209. "The Buddhists in Orissa are nearly all Saraks, of whom 1833 returned their religions as Buddhism. Attention was first drawn to the Buddhistic Saraks of Orissa by Mr. Gait in the Bengal Census Report of 1901".
18. Viz., that of an elephant examined by a number of people born blind, each feeling a particular part or limb of the animal, Udāna, 80 ; Similes in the Nikāyas, P. T. S. 1907, p. 11.
19. There is, perhaps, another notable exception. The merit of Bankimchandra—"The Scott of Bengal" should be judged not only as a novelist, but also as one who keenly sought to stem the tide of emotional exuberance by awakening his readers to the deepest self-consciousness of a civilised man, and to revive once more the spirit of criticism, literary or otherwise, in the land of Buddha Gotama. His criticism of the current notion of the divinity of Kṛṣṇa (Kṛṣṇa-Caritra) may be taken as an example. His other works, particularly his "Miscellaneous Essays" will be read as a literary master-piece, rich in indirect suggestion as to what should be the course of Indian philosophy, when it sinks into obscurity because of the modern predilection for the organised thoughts of the West.
20. It goes without saying that many lives in the West since Galileo have been embittered for their wisdom by the obstinacy of the narrow-minded theologians. As for India, when the unknown author of the Sūrya-Siddhānta proved that the earth is round and that it moves round the Sun, there was but one feeling throughout the country, namely that of admiration.
21. See Max Müller's bold pronouncement upon the issue raised in his "Six Systems", p. 2. Even His Excellency the Governor of Bengal and Rector of Calcutta University

observed in his famous convocation speech on March 2nd 1918 : “Whereas in the West the spirit of philosophy is counted by the learned few, she moves abroad freely among the people in this country....I should have expected to find the deep thought of India which has sprung from the genius of the people themselves, being discussed and taught as the normal course in an Indian University ; and the speculations and systems of other peoples from other lands introduced to the philosophic wisdom of his own country.”

22. Max Müller’s “Six systems of Indian philosophy.” Cf. Saṅkha’s Maṇi-Mekhalai. Alberuni’s ‘India’ and Jaina Śaṅkarāna-Samuccaya.

23. Netti-pakaraṇa, ed. Hardy, p. 8.

“....parato ghosā sutamayi paññā, paccatta-samuṭṭhitā yonisomanasikārā cintāmayi paññā, yaṃ parato ca ghosena pacattasamuṭṭhitena ca yonisomanasikārena ñāṇam uppajjati, ayaṃ bhāvanāmayi paññā.”

24. The opening paragraphs of the Peṭakopadesa refer to two kinds of knowledge—sutamayi and cintāmayi, the latter including no doubt, bhāvanāmayi paññā : Tattha yo ca parato ghoso yo ca ajjhataṃ yoniso manasikāro ime dve paccayā. Parato ghosena yā uppajjati paññā ayaṃ vuccati sutamayi paññā ; yā ajjhataṃ yoniso manasikārena uppajjati paññā ayaṃ vuccati cintāmayi paññā ti dve paññā veditabbā”.

25. Critique of Pure Reason, Max Müller’s translation, Vol. II, pp. 717-18.

26. See the powerful introduction of Babu Rajendranath Ghosh to his Navya-Nyāya, being a lucid Bengali translation of the Vyāpti-Pañcaka in the Tattva-cintāmaṇi by Gaṅgeśopādhyāya, whose fame as the founder of the Indian Neologic is recognised as a matter of course. In the opinion of so learned a judge as Prof. Brajendranath Seal, the much neglected Navya-Nyāya has a great historical

and metaphysical value in regard to the development of methodology. It “possesses”, says Dr. Seal “a great logical value in the conception to which we are made familiar in it, of quantification on a connotative basis, a great scientific value in the investigation of the varieties of Vyāpti and Upādhi, and a great epistemological value in the precise determination of the various relations of knowledge and being” (The Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus, p. 290). On the other hand Prof. Ranade finds in the great net-work of Avacchedakas woven in the New Logic of India another sad instance of the cobweb of the Logic of the Schoolmen, which inspite of the fineness of its texture, absolutely of no substance or profit (The Indian Philosophical Review, Vol. I., July, 1917, p. 85).

27. Vincent Smith’s Early History of India, p. 339.

28. Colebrooke, Misc. Essays; I. p. 323 ; Wilson, Sanskrit Dictionary, p. XIX.

29. Daily life and Work in India, London, 1888, p. 110

30. See J. P. T. S. 1876, pp. 108-110.

31. Buddhist India, p. 319.

32. Buddhist India, pp. 319-20

33. J. R. A. S. Bombay Branch, for 1900, p. 395.

34. Buddhist India, p. 177.

35. J. R. A. S. Bombay Branch, for 1901. See also Buddhist India, pp. 150-52. The passage of the Anāgata-vamsa in which the behaviour of unrighteous kings, ministers and peoples is held responsible for the disappearance of Buddhist learning, J. P. T. S. 1806, p. 35. Anderson’s Pali Reader, p. 102.

36. The Early History of India, 2nd edition, p. 339.

37. “Buddhism as a Religion,” Historical Development, pp. 62-63.

38. Hastings’ Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics, Sub voce Dravidians.

39. Gorresio's Rāmāyaṇa, II. 109.
40. Wilson's Viṣṇu Purāṇa, III, Chap. XVIII.
41. Sarva-Siddhānta-Saṅgraha, ascribed to Śaṅkara ; Śiva-jñāna-Siddhiyar by Meyākaṇḍadeva, translated by Mr. Nallasami ; Sarvadarśanasāṅgraha by Sāyaṇa-Mādhava, translated by Cowell and Gough. Kumārila's commentary on the Pūrva-mīmāṃsā, and the commentaries on the Brahmasūtra.
42. By Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja also may be consulted. Essays on the Languages, Literature and Religion of Nepal and Tibet, pp. 12, 37.
43. Buddhist India, p. 320.
44. Consult for the influence of the Mādhyamika system over Śaṅkara's Māyā-vāda "Vaiśeṣika philosophy" by H. Ui, p. 23, f. n. 2 ; de la vallee Poussin, Vedānta and Buddhism, J. R. A. S., 1910, pp. 129-40 ; Jacobi, on Māyāvāda, J. A. O. S., 1913, Vol. XXXIII, pp. 51-4 ; Walleser, Der altere Vedānta, Heidelberg, 1910, "Yat Śūnyavādinām Śūnyam Brahma Brahmapādinām ca yat", Sarva-Vedānta Siddhānta, 980.
45. Cf. Hegel's estimate of the effect and use of the Dialectical principle in its application to philosophical theories. The Logic of Hegel translated by Wallace, pp. 197-8.
46. F. H. Bradley, "Appearance and Reality", 1893, p. 135.
47. "Buddha" translated by Mr. Hoey, p. 6.
48. "Buddhism", p. 35. Buddhist Psychology, pp. 1-2.
49. Buddhism, p. 89.
50. Deussen, Outlines of Indian Philosophy, Berlin, 1907, 34-8.
51. Buddha, p. 6.
52. See the description of the Jhāna modes and stages preliminary to the realisation of Nirvāṇa commonly met with throughout Buddhist Literature.

53. The Passage quoted in the *Atthasālinī*, P. T. S., p. 69.

54. The gentleness of human action here thought of must be understood in its twofold aspect. In its purely subjective character, it finds its expression through good will (prayer in the sense of Coleridge), compassion, sympathetic appreciation and equanimity (*mettā-karuṇā-muditā-upekkhā*). Its outward expressions include politeness, good manners, cleanliness of habits, and the like. The pursuit of the higher ideals of life does not demand that we should pass stolidly on, when we are politely asked to accept alms (see Buddha's criticism of some rude ascetic practices, *Dial. B. II. pp. 223-40.*)

55. Even a menial at a royal household begins to feel one day or another: "Strange is it and wonderful..... this result of merit! Here is the king of Magadha, Ajātasattu, the son of the Videha princess—he is a man, and so am I. But the king lives in the full enjoyment and possession of the five pleasures of sense and here am I a slave, working for him, rising before him and retiring earlier to rest" (*Dial. B. II. p. 76 ; D. N. I. p. 60*). Buddha recognised divine spark flashing even in the hardened soul of a highway robber like *Aṅgulimāla*.

56. *Dial. B. II. pp. 303-7.*

57. *Chāndogya Upaniṣad, VI. 10 ; Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad, III. 8. etc.*

58. *Aṅguttara-nikāya, IV, 198-9.*

59. *Sabhiya-sutta, Sutta-nipāta.*

60. *Dial B. II. pp. 76-7.*

61. *Tirokuḍḍa-Sutta, Khuddaka Pāṭha, Petavatthu.*

62. *Majjhima, I, p. 8.*

63. *Sumaṅgala-Vilāsinī, I, p. 15.*

64. *Aṅguttara-nikāya, III. 61. 1.*

65. In this sense religion may be regarded as the art of

imitating nature—the art of the Divine. Vide for such a definition of art the Aitareya Brāhmaṇa, VI. 30. I.

66. Vinaya-Piṭaka, I, pp. 1-2 ; Udānaṃ, p. 1. Jātaka, I. 76 ; Atthasālinī, p. 17 ; Sumaṅgala-Vilāsinī, I, p. 16.

67. Majjhima-nikāya, II. 32 : “Imasmim sati idam hoti ; imass’ uppādā idam uppajjati ; imasmim asati idam na hoti : imassa nirodhā idam nirujjhati”, cp. Sthānāṅga (ed. Dhanapati), pp. 309-10 :

“Athavā he-u catuvihe paṇṇatte ; taṃ jahā :
atthi taṃ atthi so he-u atthi taṃ
n’atthi so he-u natthi taṃ atthi so,
he-u natthi taṃ natthi so he-u.”

“This is, because that is. This is not, because that is. This is, because that is not. This is not, because that is not.”
Vidyabhusan, Indian Logic, p. 5.

68. Buddhism, pp. 78-9 ; cf. p. 89.

69. The Data of Ethics, chap. IV, p. 46.

70. Sat-kārya-vāda implied in Ṛig-veda. X. 129. 1 :-nāsad āsīn na sadāsīn tadānim.

71. A-sat-kārya-vāda implied in ibid, X. 72. 2 : asato sad ajāyata.

72. Cp. the antithesis between Bhūti and Abhūti, Aitareya Āraṇyaka, II. 1. 8, 6-7 ; Tyam is from Sat, Kauśītakī Upaniṣad, 1.3 ; Katham asataḥ sajjāyetati ? satteva somya idam agra āsīt (Chāndogya Up, VI. 1,2) ; nāsato vidyate bhāvo, nābhāvo vidyate sato, Bhagavad Gītā, II (the verse is apparently missing from the Kaṭha Upaniṣad, II) ; Pakudha Kaccāyana’s postulate : no-e uppajja-e asum=nothing comes out of nothing ; sato nacchi viṇāso, asato nacchi sambhavo=what is, does not perish ; from nothing comes nothing as distinguished from Pūraṇa Kassapa’s akāraṇa-vāda (Sūtra-Kṛtāṅga, I. 1. 1. 16 ; II. 1.22 ; Buddha’s paṭiccasamuppāda as contrasted with adhiccassamuppāda ; ahutvā ahesum, Dīgha-N., I. p. ; etc.

Saccāsato hyanutapādaḥ Sāṃkhya-Vaiśeṣikāḥ smṛtaḥ,
Laṅkāvatāra-Sūtra, ed. Vidyabhusan, Fasc. I, p. 116. See
also pp. 104-5,

73. Aitareya Āraṇyaka, II. 1.8-1 ; Chāndogya Up. VI.

74. Mrs. Rhys Davids, Buddhism, pp. 79-89.

75. H. Ui, Vaiśeṣika Philosophy, Introduction.

76. Dial B. II. p. 252 ; “It is from this or that cause
that knowledge has arisen to me.”

77. cp. Dial. B. II, p. 262-63.

78. Saṃyutta-N., III. pp. 71-3 : “Tayo ime niruttipathā
adhivacanapathā paññattipathā asaṃkiṇṇā....Samaṇehi
brāhmaṇehi viññūhi.....ye pi te ahesuṃ ukkalavassa-
bhaññā ahetuvādā akiriyavādā natthikavādā te pi ime
tayo....pathā....na amaññimsu. Taṃ kissa hetu ?
nindāvyārosaupārambha-bhayā”.

79. cf. Mrs. Rhys Davids, Buddhism, pp. 143-5, which
shows that her conclusion rests on a much later authority
such as the Milinda.

80. Vide Śaṅkara's learned disquisition on this point.
His commentary on the Chāndogya Upaniṣad, VI. 2. 1.

81. Dial B. II., p. 263 ; cp. Mrs. Rhys Davids,
Buddhism, p. 145.

82. Olārika (sthūla)-atta-paṭilābho, manomaya, saññā-
maya, the first corresponding to Śārīraḥ (annamaya and
prāṇamaya ātmā), the second to manomaya ātmā, and the
third to Vijñānamaya and ānandamaya (vide Taittirīya
Up. II. Dial B. p. 253).

83. Cp. Dial B. II ; p. 263.

84. E. G. Isiah.

85. E. G. Ramā-i Paṇḍit.

86. Majjhima-Nikāyā, I., 377.

87. B. C. Law's Short Account of the Wandering
Teachers at the time of the Buddha, J. A. S. B., Vol. XIV,
1918, No. 7, pp. 399-406.

88. Majjhima-Nikāya, I., 375 : “Na Kho metam bhante ruccati yam Upāli gahapati samaṇassa Gotamassa vādam āropeyya ; samaṇo hi bhante Gotamo māyāvī, āvaṭṭaṇim māyam jānāti yāya aññatitthiyānam sāvake āvaṭṭeti.”

89. Dial. B. II. p. 54.

90. Dīgha-N., 187-8. The force of the antithesis implied between the two terms ekamsika and anekamsika is not at all clear from the rendering of Dr. Rhys Davids, Dial B. II. pp. 254-5.

91. Saṃyutta-N., II. p. 17 ; III. p. 135. Mrs. Rhys Davids, Buddhism, p. 83.

92. Dial. B. II. pp. 37-41.

93. Jacobi, Jaina Sūtras II. pp. 405-6, f. n. 1.

94. Saṃyutta-N. II. P. 17 ; III. P. 135 ; Dial B. II, pp. 26-49.

95. cp. Dial. B. II. pp. 3-26.

96. Diṭṭhicaritā, Taṇhācaritā, ito bahiddhā pabbajitā.

97. Sassata-uccheda diṭṭhi.

98. Sayamkatam, paramkatam.

99. Kāmesu kāmasukhallikānuyogo, atta-kilamathānuyogo.

100. Asmim sāsane pabbajitā.

101. The Netti, Nayasamuṭṭhāna, p. 112.

102. Peṭakopadesa, loc cit : Nibbāyitukāmena sutamayena atthā pariyesitabbā. Tattha pariyesanāya ayam anupubbikathā.

103. Laṅkāvatārasūtra, ed. Vidyābhusan, B. T. S. Fasc. II, pp. 80-1.

104. Vide, Table of Contents, Tarka-saṅgraha, noticed by Dr. Vidyabhusan, Indian Logic.

105. The Points of Controversy, Prefatory Notes, pp. xlvii-xlviii.

106. Abhidhammāvatāra, pp. 85-88 ; “Saccam, evam vuttam bhagavatā, taṇca kho sammuti-vasena, neva paramatthato”.

107. ibid, pp. 81, 84 ; Buddhacarita, xii, Visuddhimagga, ed. Buddhadatta, pp. 407-8.

II

BUDDHA'S GREATNESS AND ROLE

Buddhagunā or the attributes determining Buddha's¹ greatness are, according to an ancient declaration, inestimable, and therefore, unthinkable (acinteyyā). And yet I ventured to choose it as my subject for this lecture when it occurred to me that the contemplation of it is no bar to any person, however humble. There was even a deeper reason, which weighed on my decision, namely, that there could not be a better subject to give our anxious thoughts to now, when we are in the grip of a terrible world war and when the entire civilization of man is in a melting pot.

And I am much grateful indeed to the Buddhist Brotherhood of the University of Ceylon for kindly inviting me to come to this Island and say how I contemplate the great subject proposed. I am particularly grateful to Professors G. P. Malalasekera and H. C. Ray and Rev. Rahula who wrote to me on behalf of this Brotherhood, and I was very pleased indeed to know that the Brotherhood which is purely an organisation of the Buddhist students was composed of such serious-minded learners and youths as to be interested in a subject like this. I

can say that Mr. W. J. Fernando, its President, and the other members of the Brotherhood have not been found wanting in attention and courtesy to me and that they have done all that is possible for them to make my stay here both comfortable and profitable.

To contemplate Buddha's greatness and role is to contemplate man's potential or actual greatness and function in the universe. Can there be, I ask, a greater subject of study for mankind than man himself, either potentially or actually that he is? You and I may not be interested in any other problem of the universe or any other riddle of existence, but can we help, so long as we are thinking beings, considering our place and position as well as mission in the whole of life? The island of Ceylon, as once known to us Indians, was separated from the mainland just by a river, and yet how great is the difference which this has made to the history and civilization of Ceylon. Similarly man is separated from the rest of creation just by a few ounces of the brain matter, and yet has not this fact created a wide gulf of difference to his position and career! In course of this lecture I am to ask you to consider, in all seriousness, the problem of man's place and duty in terms of Buddha's greatness and role.

It is the common aim of the divines and philosophers to establish man's supreme position in the world and to make him fully conscious of his

potentialities and possibilities. Whether we say with the Jewish Prophets that 'God created man in His own image, after His likeness', or say with the early Greek philosophers that 'man is the measure of everything', the two statements are the same as regards their import as to man's supreme place and function. In the Rāmāyaṇa (vi. 119. 11), when the deifying agents, the Lokapālas, Indra, Varuṇa, Śiva and Brahmā, tried to flatter Rāma by reminding him of his divinity and divine mission on earth, the poet Vālmīki made him say at once, silencing them, *ātmānam manuṣyam manye Rāmaṁ Daśarathātmajam*, "I consider myself simply a man, son of Daśaratha". This was for a certainty the bold utterance of an age when man was sufficiently self-conscious of his own position as man apart from all the attribution of divinity to him. But this self-consciousness was not gained in a day. It took man millenniums to evolve into this paramountcy in self-consciousness and self-assertion.

The problem of man's place and duty may be shown indeed to have presented itself to the thinking men of all Ages and of all climes. The Brāhmins faced through their *Epics* and *Purāṇas* the problem of the successive advent of the Manus or patriarchs as divine regulators of individual, domestic as well as social life through law and justice, side by side with the problem of the successive advent of the Avatāras or Re-incarnations of Viṣṇu or Śiva, particularly of the former. The problem of the

successive advent of the Tīrthaṅkaras or Makers of the New Schools of religious thought engaged the Jaina thinkers. The Buddhist thinkers endeavoured through the Jātakas and Avadānas to offer a solution for the problem of the successive advent of the Buddhas or Enlightened ones, Tathāgatas or Truthfinders and Pathfinders, with their eminent Disciples. The Jewish thinkers sought through their *Testaments* and *Talmuds* to solve the problem of the successive advent of the Holy Prophets. Among the western thinkers, after the great Plato, one may single out the name of Pringle Pattison as one whose mind has been wholly occupied with the problem of God and man's place in the cosmos.

It may be said to the credit of our own thinkers that they, instead of setting up any arbitrary belief for our acceptance, wanted us to examine and consider the grounds on which their conclusions were based. Whether we accept or discard their findings, we are forced to admit that they arrived at certain definite conclusions after a careful and wide survey of all conceivable universes of existence, experience and action. Without leading you into the by-ways of myths and legends, poetic allegories and fancies, which often shroud serious thinking in popular literature, I would just place before you for your consideration the genuinely philosophical or scientific lines of thought followed in finding out a correct solution of the great problem before us.

The oldest known Book of Indo-Aryan Wisdom is undoubtedly and admittedly the *R̥gveda*, the hymns of which, even apart from all other considerations, may be judged as the full flowering of human speech (*puṣpitā vācā*). No other Book of the ancient world, hitherto, known, has surpassed it in its brilliance and excellence.

The Sumerian *Psalms* or the Egyptian *Book of the Dead* may have preceded it, but they are rather crude as regards their expressions and moral consciousness and man's philosophical and spiritual outlook. The inspired set of hymns in this *Veda of Vedas* came to represent a great upheaval of human mind with its vision spread over the whole of the visible universe. The brother-and-sister-marriage, for instance, was a time-honoured custom with the long succession of the Egyptian Dynasties, even down to the time of the last Pharaoh. The same may indeed have been once a universal custom among the ruling races and families. The *R̥gveda* contains a famous dialogue, the Yama-Yamī-Saṁvāda, in which Yamī, the sister, on reaching her years of discretion, approached Yama, her brother, with the proposal to take her hand, and that on this twofold ground (1) that they were born as man and wife in the very womb, and (2) that it was a time-immemorial practice. The brother, declining her offer then and there, said, "That may be so, but henceforth thou must seek some other suitor." Thus through the emphatic

“No” of Yama, the Vedic seer meant an open departure from an ageold custom, and therein lay as much his moral courage as the social and moral advance of humanity at large. This is what I mean by the great upheaval of human thought and moral consciousness in the *R̥gveda*.

Though the *R̥gveda* reveals thus a higher religious consciousness of the Indo-Aryan people and marks a real advancement of humanity, its hymns go, upon the whole, to indicate that man remained overawed by the luminaries in the heaven above and the mighty and irresistible physical forces below, preponderating over man’s happiness and destiny. The sages and seers tried by all means to secure their favour through eulogies and offerings, to approach them, or to rank and unite with them. Undeniably the idea of harmony and beauty in the universe flashed sometimes across their minds, and the most philosophic mind of the age became eager to discover the relation of the existing reality with its primordial ground through searching within the heart (*sato bandhūn asati niravindan hr̥di pratiṣya*).² And yet it looked outward to be amazed and not inward to be enlightened. With the child-like inquisitiveness and in the freshness of experiences and the vigour of life the ancient sages and seers wanted to penetrate into the mysteries suggested by the natural phenomena of daily occurrence, especially to know who or what was behind them all and whither was their

course or direction. All is still so vague and uncertain.

The *Āraṇyakas* and early *Upaniṣads* enable us to watch with interest the birth of a new religious and ethical consciousness and certainly represent the second stage of Indian thought when it became preoccupied with the question of man himself, though still in relation to the world as a whole. The thought tended to be gradually ego-centric, if I am permitted the expression. The awe generated by the rulers of the external world was gone. The thinking man, i. e., the thinking mind, was thenceforth interested in the question of man's true self, *Ātman* and the first axiom which came to be established as a definite result of earnest inquiries was : 'I am He' (So 'ham), or 'Thou art He or That' (Tat tvam asi).

This was with the progress of time followed by an age, which was characterised by a vigorous sophistic movement. Many of the old gods were dethroned from their once elevated seats, and if many of them still remained in the growing Pantheon on their high pedestals, they acquired in the meantime new attributes and new significances. The religious consciousness that emerged out of those speculative ferments with which Northern India was then seething tended to place the greatest of saints as the highest in the universe. This found in Buddha an oracular voice for the new-born assertive spirit of man which went to

reverse the relative positions of men and the gods. The result of it was that in changed situation, the gods and demi-gods, the *Rūpabrahmas* and *Arūpabrahmas* who continued to receive homage and offerings from the ignorant and weakminded, came to be placed in the role of humble and devout worshippers of the most enlightened of men. And this change in the old order of things suggests indeed a complete change in man's ideology.

The truth behind the great axiom, "I am He", or "Thou art He or That", underrated by Caird, Pringle Pattison and other Christian thinkers as pantheistic, was sought to be established by showing, on the one hand, a complete analogy or parallelism between man as microcosm and the world as macrocosm, and by proving, on the other, that the highest of men is on a par, in respect of the purity of his nature, with the highest in the universe ; in other words, by placing man on the same level with the entire world of existence, life, experience and action.

As I maintain, according to the early Upaniṣad philosophy, the advancement of individual beings as belonging to different classes is to be measured by the degree of soul-life each of them develops or manifests. Evidently on the assumption that the perfect man is the measure of every form and degree of spiritual life, nourished on the hearty enjoyment of the depth of existence or true being, it is claimed in the Taittirīya Upaniṣad that the perfect man

alone is capable of going through the whole gamut of religious experience, each scale of which has its parallel in the enjoyment of a particular individual in the hierarchy of the gods, the highest among men standing in this respect on the same level with the highest among the gods. The highest in the cosmos is Brahman³ and the highest among men is one who is free from desires (akāmahata śrotriya), the Parama-ṛṣi in the language of the Praśna Upaniṣad.

In assigning the superior place to man in the scale of beings the Aitareya Āraṇyaka holds that man distinguishes himself at once from the rest of creation by virtue of these three great possessions : (1) the gift of speech or power of self-expression (2) the power of thinking, discrimination and anticipation, and (3) the capacity to aspire for the immortal state despite his being a mortal (martyena amṛtam īpsā).⁴

This Āraṇyaka idea of man's superiority which underwent further development in the older Upaniṣads was considerably deepened by Maskarin Kauśalya who is known in Pali by the name of Makkhali Gosāla. At About the time of the rise of Buddhism, he figured as the third great leader of the Ājīvikas and was counted, therefore, among the elder contemporaries of Buddha. He appears to have been the first great biological thinker of the world. He conceived time as a cyclical order of vast geological periods called mahākālpas. He classified

the living beings, either, according to their modes of generation, into the viviparous (womb-born), the oviparous (egg-born), the moisture-born, and the chance-born or *sui generis*; or, according to their comparative capacity for movement into immobile (sthāvara) and mobile (jaṅgama); or, according to the number of senses possessed, into those endowed with one sense, those with two, those with three, those with four, those with five, and those with six. The plants were divided, according to their modes of propagation, into those propagated from seeds, those from roots, those from joints, those from cuttings, and those from graftings. The material things were divided, according to their different formations, into solids (earth-lives), liquids (water-lives), and calorics (fire-lives) and winds (air-lives). Man's life was broadly divided into eight stages or periods called the semi-conscious, the playful, the trial, the erect, the learning, the mature, the master, and the self-assertive.⁵ The souls were distinguished, according to their different moral colourings, into six types called the dark, the blue, the red, the yellow, the white, and the supremely white. He most emphatically maintained that in order to evolve into a perfect type of man, an individual has to go through a process of evolution through innumerable species (yonis) during 84,00,000 mahākālpas. As widely accepted throughout India, Maskarin's doctrine was taken to mean that to be born as man, a being

has to undergo the process of birth in 84,00,000 species.

The biological side of Maskarin's system was received in toto into the structure of the Jaina religious thought, and there it was further developed, elaborated, elucidated, richly supplemented, and fully utilised. This may be shown also to have been in the immediate background of the biological foundation of Buddhism. Maskarin's division of souls into the six colour types, for instance, exactly corresponded with Mahāvīra's division of the same into six colour affections (lesiyas), agreed substantially with Buddha's characterisation of minds by five colours,⁶ and was, to all intents and purposes, the same as pointed out in the Mahābhārata, as the Sāṃkhya division of the reflections of character on the soul into three colour types called the white, the red and the dark.⁷

The biological data thus supplied by Maskarin must have formed the basis of the following four pronouncements of Buddha in the Dhammapada :

“Difficult it is to be born as man.
Difficult it is for the mortals to live.
Difficult it is to have a chance of hearing
the good doctrine.
Difficult it is to witness the advent
of Buddhas.”

The Taittirīya Upaniṣad proposed to consider man's place and duty in five adhikaraṇas or con-

texts, which is to say, in respect of the five universes of existence, experience and action, to wit, (1) physical (*adhilokam*), (2) astronomical (*adhijyautiṣam*), (3) sociobiological (*adhiprajam*), (4) cultural (*adhividyam*), and (5) personal (*adhyātmam*). Literally, *adhilokam* refers to the physical structure of the world, *adhijyautiṣam* to the world of lights, *adhiprajam* to the world of procreation, *adhividyam* to that of learning, and *adhyātmam* to that of individuality.⁸

The process of cosmic development as a whole was carefully considered and outlined and its successive stages set out in the Aitareya Āraṇyaka. It is held that the entire process starts from Prajāpati who is the repository of the will-to-be, the will-to-create, and reaches its culmination through various intermediate stages in Brahmā representing the most intelligent cosmic agent of *karma*—thoughtful or self-willed action.⁹

As for personal development, the Taittirīya Upaniṣad opines that the process starts from the *annamaya* or physical plane of existence with material food as means of nourishment of the self, culminates in the *ānandamaya* or spiritual plane with bliss or beauty as means of nourishment, and passes through the three intervening stages represented by the *prāṇamaya* or psychophysical plane with the sensory experience and enjoyment as means of nourishment, the *manomaya* or mental plane with precepts or ideas as means of nourish-

ment, and thirdly, the *viññānamaya* or rational plane with conceptual understanding as means of nourishment.

The Upaniṣadic view of the personal development of man by means of five kinds of sustenance was accepted by Buddha when he, too, so spoke of the five kinds of food, and premised in a general way that all forms of life depend on food for their nourishment. The five kinds of food, according to Buddha, are the food for the stomach, the food for the senses, the food for the mind, the food for the intellect, and the spiritual food for emancipated consciousness. The last kind of food which is but an emotional enjoyment of the free state of consciousness goes by the name of *pīti*¹⁰ or *nibbuti*.¹¹

In accordance with the Ājīvika and Jaina scheme of existence, the lowest in the scale of evolution are the elemental lives or forms of matter. The possession of the sense of touch is the minimum requirement of individuality. The different formations of earth, water, fire and air are to be treated as individual beings in so far as they satisfy this minimum test. Like other beings, they too, are subject to the laws of birth, growth, decay and death. The four elements feed on one another, live by co-operation, and perish by the fury of the action of one on another. In short, they integrate as well as disintegrate. So long as they persist, they show an internal cohesion, which breaks down at their death. They are all contained in space

and act in time. The plant or animal organism results from a finer physical combination of them.

Though the plants stand higher in the scale than the elemental beings, they, too, are just endowed with the sense of touch. They remain fixed to the ground and are incapable of free locomotion, for which reason they are termed immobiles. The *Mahābhārata* sharply criticises the Ājīvika and Jaina opinion which endows the plants only with the sense of touch, and argues in favour of their being endowed with all the six senses.¹² Had they not possessed the organ of sight, it argues, how is it that they find their way to the place where light is, and had they not possessed the organ of hearing, why should their growth be stunted by terrific sounds? So on and so forth. According to Manu's finding, the plants are possessed at least of an internal sentience (*antaḥsamjñā*). On the cogency of this opinion and its argument I need not make any comment here.

The animals are to be distinguished from the plants as beings capable in varying degrees of locomotion or free bodily movement. They, too admit of gradations among themselves according as they possess two or more senses. Whether they are womb-born or egg-born, in matters of eating, behaviour, sleeping and procreation, their position is virtually the same as that of human beings. They are all liable, in common with men, to these six vicissitudes, contingencies or limitations

of moral existence : gain and loss, pleasure and pain, life and death. Many of them are endowed, like man with the six senses including the mind or *sensus communis*.¹³ And human beings, too, are to be placed on six grades in accordance with moral colourings of their souls, and in the three, according to Sāṃkhya.

Buddha's world is primarily the world of man which characterised by eight vicissitudes (aṭṭha lokadhammā), while Maskarin characterised the larger world of life by six. The total of eight vicissitudes was made up of the six mentioned by Maskarin and the two added by Buddha, the two additional items in connotation being praise and blame, which are absent where social life is not developed.¹⁴ The six vicissitudes of gain and loss, pleasure and pain, life and death are the common lot of all animals. Besides this difference, one may observe that Maskarin's eight stages are the eight natural stages of human life, while Buddha's eight stages are the stages of the saint's moral, intellectual and spiritual advance. The course of training prescribed by Buddha is meant as a post-graduate course, while that of others is differentiated from it as under-graduate.

We have from Buddha various classifications of human types based on moral, intellectual and spiritual grounds. In the gradation of hierarchy suggested, the perfect Buddhas are placed above the Pratyeka, the Pratyeka Buddhas above the Disciples

occupying the eight advanced ranks, they above the Gotrabhūs (Graduates), they above the four ranks of the Arūpa Brahmas, they above the four or five ranks of Rūpa Brahmas¹⁵, they above the seven ranks of Devas, the Devas above the common run of men, these men above the brutes, brutes above the ghosts and spirits, while on the lowest level stand the various grades of infernal beings.

The infra-human beings are only objects of pity and mercy. From the lowest level of men up to the highest level of the gods, the beings find their place and move about in the non-reflective sphere of mind. They are guided by their animal-like instincts, impulses and passions, or at the most, by the love of worldly power, prosperity and enjoyments.

The lowest reflective sphere of consciousness is represented by the four or five ranks of Rūpabrahmas, and the next higher by the four ranks of Arūpabrahmas culminating in graduation meaning the state of the Gotrabhū. The supramundane levels of consciousness are open to the eight ranks of advanced Disciples culminating in Arhatship. But in their case, paññā (knowledge) is primarily based upon the teaching of others ; it is sutamayā. Above them are the pratyeka Buddhas or gifted seers who are self-made men with original visions. In their case, knowledge which is a first-hand one, is inadequate for convincing and guiding others ; it is just cintāmayā, which disappears with them.

Above all stand the Perfect Buddhas who are not only the supremely gifted men with original visions and outlook but also have the wide and the most intimate knowledge of men and things, possess the capacity for originating and introducing and their own systems of thought and discipline under the weight of their stupendous personality. In their case, knowledge is *bhāvanāmayā*.

In Buddha's estimation, *Brahmā* or Brahman of the Upaniṣads (i. e. early Vedānta) stood for the highest religious experience and knowledge within the range of the sensuous—the world of mental forms, i. e., percepts or ideas. Rising up to a higher level of consciousness the earlier contemplatives of India are said to have gone through the four higher forms of psychical experience in which the vision or knowledge of the infinity of space, the infinity of the ideational phase of consciousness, there being left nothing but itself as object of consciousness, and consciousness being in its ultimate nature unpredicable in terms of perception and non-perception (*n'eva saññā nāsaññā*) dawns on consciousness. It was in the last-named state of consciousness that the earlier contemplatives had their highest psychical experience and enjoyed the bliss of *Brahma Nirvāṇa*.

But Buddha wants us to understand that even after the experience and enjoyment of this form of beauty, the human mind remains still interested in the reality and value of the world as commonly

perceived or accepted. In this sense indeed, consciousness belongs to the mundane sphere. In other words, the ineffable ultimate reality of the older Upaniṣads did not represent, in his opinion, the highest reach of psychical experience. The Brahma Nirvāṇa, as realised by the Upaniṣadic and other earlier seers, is not Buddha's Nirvāṇa,¹⁶ despite the fact that both are characterised negatively alike by "neti neti",—as that which lies beyond the reach of thought and language.

Nirvāṇa is claimed to have been experienced by Buddha on a supramundane level of consciousness, where it is a complete void in the sense that here it becomes emptied not only of all the content of sensory or perceptual origin but also of all determinations of thought and will under the influence of feeling. It is for the attainment of this highest conceivable state of trance and ecstasy called saññā-vedayitanirodha, that Buddha deserved to be eulogised as Yogīnām cakravartin in the Daśāvatāra-stotra ascribed to Śaṅkara.

While Buddha remained in this state of trance, the abhisambodhi or supreme inner enlightenment took place in consciousness. It dawned on the thought-free consciousness—the bodhicitta of Mahāyāna—as a true vision of the nature of reality. It awakened in this very state of consciousness a vivid memory of the past history of the world in so far as it was related to his conscious career. It held before it a clear view of the entire world of existence

and of life where the ups and downs of beings take place according to the laws of karma shaping their various destinies. It aroused in it the feeling and conviction about its sinlessness or pristine purity, and called up the highest emotion of joy on the penetration into the depth of its being and the attainment or experience of its thought-free and sinless state.

The nature of reality, as realised in a flash of intuition, appeared to be not a static cosmic order but a paṭicca-samuppāda or paccuppāda i. e., a dynamic order of becoming.

I may add that abhisambodhi is a great event in the life of consciousness which took place in and through a supreme yogic or mystical experience, and which made a world of difference in the life of Siddhārtha. Before he was but a mere Bodhisattva, and with and after it, he gained the status of a perfect Buddha. The inner conviction gained through this experience as to truth or nature of reality, as to his internal purity, as well as his freedom, led to self-expression, and self-assertion, which meant only the declaration of his new personality :

“Subdued have I all, all-knowing am I now.
Unattached to all things, and abandoning all,
Finally freed on the destruction of all craving.
Knowing it myself, whom else should I credit ?
There is no teacher of mine, nor is one like me ;
There is none to rival me in the world of
men and gods.

Truly entitled to honour am I, a teacher
unexcelled ;
 Alone am I a Supreme Buddha, placid and
tranquil.
 To found the kingdom of righteousness,
I proceed to Kāśī's capital,
 Beating the drum of immortality in the world
enveloped by darkness.”¹⁷

Buddha's abhisambodhi proved itself to be of far-reaching effects on man's civilization. India gained through it a dynamic view of reality in lieu of the static as in the Upaniṣads. The world got a religion without the belief in a personal God, but which fully functioned to create the ideals of character and conduct and to awaken and establish faith in their reality, and also a vigorous missionary religion, which was destined to become a living force in Asiatic and world civilization. A sound system of ethics was built upon psychological foundations, defining and raising the standards of human conduct and heightening the values of human life, efforts and experiences. It gave rise to a system of philosophy, critical in its spirit, dialectical in its mode of argument, analytical in its method of argument, analytical in its method, synthetic in its purpose, positivistic in its conclusions, mystical in its practice but rational in its structure. The people got a new vehicle of expression, which is capable of expressing all shades of experience,

forms of thought and interests of life ; an extensive literature in various languages, which is full of historical information, vivid in the description of things, technical in the employment of words and phrases, lively in human interest, inspiring in tone and dignified in expression. It has served to bring into existence a system of education encouraging originality, the spirit of enquiry, and free exchanges of thoughts and ideas ; a system of discipline, which, though thoroughgoing, is not rigid, and is intended to serve as a means to an end, and not as an end in itself. It has developed new system of jurisprudence in which man's action is to be judged mainly from its underlying motive or intention (cetanā), and the law is subsumed to be made for man, and not that man is made for the law. It has fructified itself in the foundation of a Fraternity to which admission is open to all alike, irrespective of their caste or sex, and which is democratic in its constitution and communistic in the possession, distribution and use of requisites and properties. It has advocated a grand form of imperialism, the principal aims of which are to educate the people to certain moral excellences of character, to promote the cause of piety among all nations of the earth, and, above all, to build a great nation of humanity on the basis of love, fellow-feeling, and not on that of constant strife, enmity and hostility. The last but not the least is that, it has inspired a new form of art, which is to be a tangible expression of

refined human imagination awe-inspiring and having an educative value.

If we judge Buddha simply as a human personality, he does not suffer the least by comparison ; on the contrary, he stands pre-eminent. He was born in an aristocrate kṣatriya family of Northern India and was of noble descent on both sides. He was born and brought up in the republican tradition of the Sākya. He was a full stature of growth and manhood, which was tall, stout and well-proportioned ; commanding was his figure. He stood as the finest example of a healthy mind in healthy body. His racial heritage consisted in the nobility of birth, personal dignity, manliness and social refinement. India was then the leading country of the world. The age which witnessed his advent was noted for free thinking and ardent search for truth.

As Buddha, his nature was unperturbed, placid, and calm like a deep lake. His voice was clear, distinct, audible, deep and reverberating like the lion's roar. The strength of his purpose made him steady like a rock unshaken by winds. His towering personality shone forth like the great Himalaya at the foot of which he was born. Non-harming and non-hurting was his mental attitude towards all. His heart was filled with unbounded love, sympathy and compassion. His was a most balanced mind and a judicious temperament. All the immoral motives were completely destroyed

within him. He preached what he practised, and practised what he preached. Pin-drop silence reigned wherever he appeared, so magnetic and powerful was his personality. His greatness was acknowledged by all alike. He is not known to have either prayed or cursed. All persons he met with good grace, and had no grievance against any. Just as his thoughts were well co-ordinated, so fully coherent were his words. He was always mindful and wakeful. A most active and well-regulated life was his. He did his duty till he breathed his last. He calmly faced death when it came, without a sigh. He spoke only of the fundamentals of thought and of man's virtue. He had the deepest insight into human and all nature.

As a thinker and teacher, the Socratic dialectics he occasionally employed to expose the incongruity and untenability of the proposition put forward by an interlocutor are both entertaining and effective. He discarded all authority but that of one's own experience, and encouraged the rational understanding of things. Pratītya-samutpāda formed the basic concept of his philosophy, and it was at the same time an original contribution to Indian and world thought. The fact that he appeared on many an occasion in the role of a critic does not stand in the way of our thinking that his real intention was to advance the cause of previous and current thoughts, as well as to heighten the value of the cherished ideals of religion and society. His

was not the Kantian idea of religion insisting on the acceptance of duty as Divine command, piety or duty being for him a natural outward expression of a righteous nature within. Abandoning the practice of baptizing with the holy waters of the Jordon, Jesus Christ wanted men to be baptized with the spirit of the Holy Ghost. In India, five centuries earlier, Buddha wanted men to be baptized with an internal bathing (sināto antarena sinānena).¹⁸ His mission, in fact, was to increase the inner significance of all external practices. He repudiated indeed the idea of a personal God based upon the Zulu-like argument from father back to his father, and from all fathers back to first father to prevent an infinite regress (apariyantagahaṇam, anavasthā), and replaced theodicy by cosmodicy, but did not fail at the same time to emphasize the need of developing godliness and divine attributes in man. He directed his disciples to use the entire realm of nature and society as an open school, and to gather moral qualities from all persons and all things, just as the bee collects honey from flowers without injuring them, and they were required not only to develop them within themselves but also to outgrow them.

The religious yearning in India behind the advancement of the cause of humanity found its classical expression in the prayer :

Asato māṁ sat gamaya.

Tamaso māṁ jyotir gamaya.

Mṛtyur mām amṛtaṁ gamaya.

“Lead me from unreal to the real.

Lead me from darkness to light.

Lead me from death to immortality.”

This was variously taken in the subsequent ages to imply the course of man’s advancement from ignorance to knowledge, from unconsciousness to self-consciousness, from dumbness to self-expression, from slumber to awakening, from bondage to freedom, from lethargy to activity, from hunger and thirst to abundance, from fears to the fearless state, from the mutable to the immutable, from disease to health, from strife to peace, from efforts to fruitions.

This yearning is nothing but the first religious impulse to greatness. But, as maintained in the Jātakas and Avadānas, it marks the beginning of a self-conscious career of incessant struggles for progress only when it is intensified into that form of the will which goes by the name of praṇidhāna, implying as it does the first strong resolution to pursue the future course of life at all costs. It presupposes these two things : (1) that the individual forming it is conscious enough that he is destined to do something great in the world, (2) that he is clear about the aims or ends to which to direct all his future efforts or endeavours.

The ends, in the case of a Bodhisattva, are stated to be these three : doing good to self, doing good to the nation, and doing good to the world at large.

With the *praṇidhāna* solemnly declared and the triple aims clearly kept before the eye, the individual plunges himself into a life of struggle and faces many difficult situations in life, in overcoming which he gets the opportunity for developing certain perfectionary virtues that go to constitute the strength of his character and widen the domain of his experience and knowledge. The minor and isolated instances of such feats of heroism may be collected from the realm of life around us, as well as from the national traditions of men. The *Jātakas* and *Avadānas* hold just a number of typical cases before us, their real aim being to make a methodical survey of the entire realm of existence and of life, including the whole of human history, as far as it is known, and the anecdotes of various heroes, with a view to showing how the history of the universe can be viewed in the light of a single human life and told in terms of successive episodes of the life of an evolving individual, how, in other words, the universal history gravitates towards and ultimately merges in a continued human biography.¹⁹

Just think, please, for a moment what would have been the place and position of man in the universe but for the advent of the Buddha types of men, the *Tīrthaṅkara* types, the Christ types, or the great Sage or Prophet types? If the world were left to the brutes, would the higher virtues have been brought to clear recognition at all? Had it been left to the vegetables, the heavenly

denizens and matter and energy, would there have been the least manifestation of consciousness or mind by the fullest possible development of which man is entitled to a supreme place in the universe ?

The individual as well as the national advancement in the history of man's civilization is to be judged primarily by the nature of the moral principle or ideal conceived, cherished and followed in practice. When the first great Jewish Prophet, Moses, advocated 'an eye for an eye', 'a tooth for a tooth' as the sound principle for his people and when Jesus Christ enjoined on them the principle of loving the enemy, blessing them that curse, doing good to them that hate, between the two there is a long, pathetic history of the religious, moral and political struggle of the Jewish race. Similarly when in India the sages recommended strength for strength, mildness for mildness as the best course of wisdom, and when Buddha spoke of and showed the way to the conquest of hatred by love, falsehood by truth and meanness by magnanimity, between the two there elapsed centuries of thought and moral evolution.

Before the introduction of Buddhism into China, the great sage Confucius was the spokesman of the highest moral wisdom of the Chinese nation. For the guidance of this ancient race, the best dictum of Confucius was : If you are going to deal with the wicked with leniency, with what are you going to deal with the virtuous ?

That the Buddha's standpoint was pre-eminently psychological is undoubted. This standpoint emerged out of biological background in India, as in the West. The idea of evolution was always at the back of India's early religious thought. When I said this, I did not mean to say that this doctrine of evolution was Darwinian or modern which latter is concerned with the problem of the origin of species, of a higher species out of a lower one by the law of the survival of the fittest, the adaptation to the environment, or natural selection. The Indian doctrine, whether Upaniṣadic, Ājīvika, Jaina or Buddhist, takes the species for granted, the individuals alone being liable to pass through them, according to the laws of karma.²⁰

NOTES

1. The Buddha-visaya which is counted among the four unthinkables is explained by Buddhaghosa as meaning sabbaññutādi Buddhaguṇānaṃ pavatti ca anubhā vo ca.

2. Ṛgveda, Nāsadiya Sūkta, X. 129.

3. Taittirīya Up., II. 8. Cf. Praśna Up. VI. 7, etat param Brahma Veda, Nātaḥ pram astīti.

4. Aitareya Ār. II. 3. 2. 1-5 Cf. Milinda, p. 32, where a distinction is made between manasikāra (rudimentary mind) and paññā (reason, wisdom), and it is held that sheep and goats, oxen and buffaloes, camels and asses possess rudimentary mind, but reasoned knowledge they have not.

5. The meaning of the eighth stage called paṇṇaka-bhūmi is still open to dispute.

6. Vatthūpama Sutta, Majjhima, i., p. 26.

7. See how in the Mahābhārata, XV. 279. 33-68 and Nīlakaṇṭha's Commentary the significance of Maskarin's six colour divisions (ṣaḍjīvavarṇāḥ) is explained in terms of the three guṇas : sattvas, rajas and tamas of Sāṃkhya. Even the term śuklābhijātīyaḥ is met with in the in ibid, XV. 279. 66

8. Taittirīya Up. 1. 3.

9. Aitareya Ār., II. 1, 3. 1.

10. cf. Dhammapada : pītibhakkhā bhavissāma.

11. cf. Ratana Sutta : nibbutim bhuñjamānā.

12. Mahābhārata, Śāntiparva, Mokṣadharmā. 184. 10-18.

13. These ideas of nature and development are all anticipated in the Aitareya Āraṇyaka, Cf. Barua, A History of Pre-Buddhistic Indian Philosophy, p. 56 ff.

14. The eight lokadhammas are generally wrongly enumerated as lābha and alābha, yasa and ayasa, nindā and pasamsā, sukha and dukkha, the middle two pairs

being overlapping. The correct enumeration is suggested in the Theragāthā, vv. 663-670

15. The four or five ranks according to the four or five rūpāvacarajhānas, as in the Dhammasaṅgaṇi.

16. For Buddha's estimate of Brahma Nirvāna, see the first sutta in the Majjhima Nikāya, called Mūlapariyāya.

17. Ariyapariyesana Sutta, Majjhima, i., p. 171.

18. Majjhima, i., p. 39

19. Barua, Barhut, Bk, I, p. 100f.

20. Mr. D. B. Jayasinghe in his excellent criticism of the next lecture in Religion series (The Mahābodhi, Vol. 52, 1944, Nos. 9-10, p. 283), has pertinently raised the question whether in accordance with Buddha's idea of evolution we are 'fallen angels' or 'risen apes'. To this the only reasonable answer I might suggest is—we are both. From the psycho-ethical point of view we are 'fallen angels' in so far as our citta (consciousness) meaning mind in its natural or original state (pakati-mano) which is radiant (pure) becomes stained by the impurities meaning the influxes of sin which are foreign to its nature (āgantukehi dosehi paduṭṭho hoti), and we are 'risen apes' in so far as we succeed in getting rid of these parasitic corrupting factors and rendering it supremely radiant through enlightenment. From the biological point of view we are 'fallen angels' in so far as we begin to lose, as we grow up in age, the loveliness of appearance and the innocence of nature which characterize our childhood, and we are 'risen apes' in so far as we begin to develop all the brighter features of appearance and the nobler qualities of nature as we consciously advance in spirituality, knowledge and character. In both the cases the fall is from a state which is fallible one, and the rise is from a more fallible to a less fallible or from a less stable to a more stable one. Buddha's significant description of the steadiness of our internal nature being: 'Just as the one mass rock or the firmly posted city-gate pillar is not shaken by winds from the four quarters.'

III

BUDDHISM AS BUDDHA'S PERSONAL RELIGION

I stand before you rather with a mixed feeling of joy and diffidence, the diffidence as to my competence to do justice to the subject which has baffled the efforts through ages before me. I am conscious, however, of the fact that it is no mean privilege and honour to come in as successor of a living great thinker of the East of the reputation and fame of Professor Sir Sarvapalli Radhakrishnan who fills at present the responsible office of the Vice-Chancellor of the Benares Hindu University,—a rare opportunity for which I must express my grateful thanks to Mr. A. G. Ranasinha, the public Trustee, who sent out the invitation to deliver a public lecture on Buddhism under the Dona Alpina Ratnayake Trust. I rejoiced to welcome it for a very special reason, namely, that it came as I thought, at a very opportune moment when I could be sure of the philosophic position of Buddha, particularly as to the logical relation between Paṭiccasamuppāda and Nirvāṇa constituting the two main points of consideration in Buddha's religion. Without being clear about it, we are

likely to be beating about the bush, praising the stupendous personality of Buddha but denying him the originality of thinking. It is in the light of this that you are to follow the trend of argument running through the lecture.

Today I am concerned to give you some idea of the nature and content of the religion which played the most important part, as I should say, in the memorable and awe-inspiring history of the attainment of Buddha's greatness and career, and which, when founded, was permeated and enlivened by the Buddha spirit. The nature and content of this religion may be generalised only in so far as it accounts for the possibility of the attainment of similar greatness and career by others. And when I propose "Buddhism as Buddha's personal religion" as the subject of discussion, I surely intend distinguishing it somehow or other from "Buddhism as an institutional religion."

At the very outset, the question arises—what do I understand by religion, especially personal religion? As you may be well aware, we have so far various definitions or characterisations of religion. With Immanuel Kant, for instance, religion consists in the acceptance of duty as Divine command. To Hegel, religion means the knowledge of the finite mind of its nature as absolute mind. To Pringle Pattison, it implies the apprehension and full enjoyment of the depth of our being, in the absolute man being as much a complement to

the world as the world is to man. To John Caird, it means the self-surrender of the human spirit to the Divine, and the function of religion consists in the elevation of man's nature above himself and the world. Radhakrishnan agrees with Caird in taking it to mean the complete transformation of man into the life of the spirit. As Waterhouse understands it, religion functions not only to create the ideals of life but also to generate and enshrine faith in their reality. To Rhys Davids, religion stands for the abiding attitude of man towards himself and the world. Max Muller, on the other hand, opines that religion implies, among others, the belief in a divine power and a hope of future life. William James, to whom we owe the distinction between personal and institutional religions, defines religion from the psychological point of view as the total reaction of the self upon life, while Matthew Arnold treats religion as morality tinged with emotion.

These modern definitions of religion have just served to bring out and emphasize the various features of religion without being able to establish a definition, which is universally acceptable. Those who truly speak with Caird and others of the business of religion as consisting in the elevation of man's state and nature above himself and the world around him have evidently at the back of their minds the etymology of the word *religion* deriving it from 're', meaning "again", and the root

'ligere', meaning "to bind", and leading us to contemplate religion as the means of binding us again with him or them whom we believe to be the higher being or beings, or what we consider the higher state or form of existence.

Now, turning to early Indian thought in general, and to Buddhist thought in particular, we may be sure to find that from the personal point of view, religion is but a quest of Truth or the Nature of Reality, led by a noble impulse to greatness as well as to discovery, with the yearning to be firmly established in the Truth, the ultimate end of which is not only the realisation and fullest enjoyment of man's true state in the depth of his being, which is freedom or emancipation, but also the establishment of a complete harmony between the human life and the supreme religious experience. It also seeks to guide others by pointing out the way or ways of salvation.

In other words, the main foundation of this personal religion is what is called *Saddhā* in Pali, *Śraddhā* in Sanskrit, i. e. faith as distinguished from *Bhakti* or devotion, which culminates in self-surrender of the human spirit to the Divine, to use Caird's phraseology. The philosophy of religion and its history, the varieties of religious experience, and the science of religion have been considered rather from the point of view of devotional religions that are all institutional in character. Religion being primarily concerned with the perfection of

individuals *qua* individuals, there is also ample scope for personal religion in the institutional. And I can say that most of the weighty psychological findings of James on the varieties of religious experience are based upon the records of institutional religions, Christianity in particular.

I will, therefore, ask you not to have any misgivings on this point of distinction I desire to make between Buddhism as Buddha's personal religion and Buddhism as an institutional religion. In the present lecture, my approach to the subject is from Buddha's standpoint rather than from that of his disciples and followers whose number is legion.

In dealing with Buddhism as personal religion from Buddha's standpoint, the first thing to which I would like to draw your attention is the nature of the religious impulse to greatness and discovery, the term impulse implying the natural inclination, the natural procilivity or the natural gravitation of human mind that way,—its *tappoṇatā tanninnatā tappabbhāratā*.

The rise of this has been sought to be accounted for psychologically by *kusalamūlatā* or the moral heritage from one's past, and historically by such a favourable combination of circumstances as may constitute the *khaṇa* or opportune moment, i. e., life in a suitable land, association with the wise, the right application of oneself, and the natural aptitudes resulting from previous good deeds.¹ Caird has carefully examined the weight of such historical

explanation in the case of the phenomenal spread of Christianity as a conquering faith.² Here our concern is more with psychology than with history.

To enhance the importance of this impulse, the Buddhist Theras have held before us an instructive account of the long preparatory course of a gifted evolving individual. They trace back the beginning of this preparatory life to a moment when at the sight of a previous Buddha with a large retinue of his followers, his great personality, subdued looks, radiant appearance expressive of his unexcelled spiritual glow within wonderful self-possession, gentle gait and the like, and the great ovation with which the people gathered together to receive him, the heart of an intelligent ascetic was at once inclined to render his personal service to the Buddha and to form a strong resolve forth-with to attain to that state and to have the courage to declare it before the great man who blessed him and predicted his future greatness.

We need not go so far as that, since we have from Buddha the following psychological explanation for the rise of such an impulse to greatness :

‘Here a certain person is endowed with faith, equipped with morality, replete with learning, enriched with generosity, vested with wisdom. To him the thought occurs : ‘Oh ! that it were possible for me to be so reborn as to attain to the status for powerful warriors or any other higher condition of existence, on the dissolution of the

body after death'. It burns his heart, it occupies the whole of his thought, makes his mind ponder over. Such a disposition of his and constant pondering over the matter, developed and elaborated in this manner, ultimately paves the way for the attainment of his end. This is the road, this the path that leads to his goal."³

Please do not go away with the idea that Buddha meant to put off the fulfilment of the aim to an indefinite date beyond this life, to another existence after death. "Oh the dissolution of the body, after death" was a stock phrase of the time, which he made use of to convey the truth to the hearer. We have at all events a famous discourse, in which he has dealt with the same subject at length with reference to here and now, to this very life. "Suppose, O great king, there were a slave, a hireling, rising up earlier, lying down later, doing the bidding, working to please, speaking to flatter, —a hanger on the face, and this were to occur to him one day : 'Wonderful it is, marvellous it is, namely, the course and maturity of virtuous deeds. Verily this king Ajātasattu of Magadha is a man as I am, and what a world of difference now exists between his royal state and my menial servitude ! Suppose I, too, were to perform these virtuous deeds.' And thereafter he were to lead the life of a bhikkhu, renouncing the world, restrained in body, speech and mind, contented with little, satisfied, and devoted to the lonely life of meditation and the

matter were reported to you. What would you do then, would you drag him back into his old condition of servitude?" The king replied, saying, "Certainly not, Sire! I would, on the contrary, extend to him such honour and hospitality and protection as are due to him in that position."⁴

The impulses arise and vanish leading to many vagaries of thought. But here the impulse is called into play by a profound sense or feeling of awe and accompanied by a sudden throb of life felt in the entire being of the man and a life-transforming thrill of joy (*pīti*) felt in the heart. It is quickly followed by a firm resolve of the will, which, in its turn, is followed by an appropriate declaration and action. The resolution implies at once these two things: self-confidence (*sampasādana*) and aspiration or courageous step of the will (*sampakkhandana*). It stimulates the motor energy (*virīya*) and awakens mental vision, the vivid realisation of the end or clear pre-perception of the situation which is going to arise, as well as the wisdom of following the particular course of life, setting all doubts at rest—in short, all that is implied by the two terms, *saddhā* and *paññā*.

The firmness of the mental resolve then formed or the robust form of the will then called into being is well expressed by such words of Buddha as "whether the sky be rent asunder or the earth leaves its fixed station" (*nabham phaleyya, pathaviṃ caleyya*), "Let my body wither when I

am on this seat, let my skin, bones and flesh be utterly destroyed, I will not move an inch from this seat until I attain the goal.”⁵ The same is enjoined on his followers who were to form the resolve thus : “Let my skin, nerves and bones dry up entirely, let my body of flesh and blood perish away, until my end is attained—the end which is attainable by manly strength, manly energy, manly effort, I will not cease to strive.”⁶

I have not as yet told you what made me state that the personal religion from Buddha’s standpoint is primarily a Quest of Truth or the Nature of Reality. With Buddha, precisely as with the Upaniṣadic teacher Yājñavalkya, seeking (*pariyeśanā*, Sk. *eśanā*), is the essential trend of life. To be in life is to seek after something. It cannot be that you will be at the same time in life and not seeking after something. You will be seeking either after progeny, wealth or fame, in short, worldly prosperity and happiness, or after something far nobler than that. The question for you and me to answer and decide is what to seek and what not to seek—to seek, in the words of Yājñavalkya, after the world or after God within us⁷ ; to seek, in the words of Buddha, after the world which is the ground of things contingent or after Nirvāṇa⁸ which is eternally a free state and stands apart and other than such a world of ours.

Before a man faces this great question, his mind becomes somehow or other completely upset. This

upset state of human mind is not an ordinary event. I must ask you all to realise with me the importance and seriousness of the situation which arises in human life from this upset state of mind. Take the case, for instance, first of all, of scientific discoveries. We daily see the fall of so many things from certain heights, but this passes as commonplace to us all. But Newton's mind was completely upset to notice the fall of an apple at a particular moment. How could it be that such an extraordinary phenomenon occurred in nature? And in trying to solve the mystery, he came to discover the demonstrable scientific truth which he formulated as the Law of Gravitation that stirred up the thinking minds of the world and revolutionized man's idea of the structure and functional order of the astronomical universe as well as man's conception of domestic, social, political and economic relations. The blueness of seawaters is a commonplace with us. But this very fact completely upset one day the mind of Raman and in solving the mystery that shrouded it, he discovered a new demonstrable scientific truth and formulated a law accounting for the structure, composition and behaviour of the molecules and atoms of matter.

The fall of an apple which upset Newton's mind led to one kind of discovery in the West. In India, as a Buddhist birth-story tells us, the fall of a withered leaf from the tree completely upset the mind of Arindama, an educated Brāhmaṇ youth,

who forthwith was awakened to the fleeting nature of the world and attained to the position of a saint.⁹ Vālmiki's mind was upset when the niṣāda shot an arrow at the male bird and killed it instantaneously when a krauñca pair was at play and the outcome of this was his immortal epic called Rāmāyaṇa. Similarly king Aśoka himself was completely upset when he, pondered over the aftereffects of the aggressive war he had waged against Kalinga, and its result was a momentous change in his own life along with the grand idea of Dhammavijaya or Conquest by Piety.

We daily come across our path innumerable sights of old age, decay, disease and death, but these pass as commonplaces. But the very first sight of them completely upset the sensitive mind of Siddhārtha, and it suggested at once to him the question : "What is all this, why and how could it be like this ?" It set him seriously thinking—what have I been doing so long ? Being conditioned by things contingent, am I not following a course of life which leads me into things still more contingent ? Should I not, renouncing everything of the world, seek after that which is not subject to these limiting conditions of human life and of existence ? No sooner had this thought bestirred his heart than he formed the resolve to leave worldly life, and he proceeded forthwith with the quest of Truth and succeeded in making the twofold discovery of an epoch-making character.

Thus Buddha came to speak of two kinds of seeking, the two kinds of quest, the two kinds of searching : one ignoble (anariya), and the other noble (ariya), and said, in consonance with the earlier Indian thinkers, that the upanīśā or way to worldly gains is one thing and that to Nirvāṇa quite another.

The first strong mental resolve to go out in the quest of Truth, technically called Praṇidhāna, presupposes these three things : (1) that the individual forming the strong mental resolve is conscious enough that he is destined to do something great in the world, (2) that he is absolutely clear about the aims or ends to which to direct all his future endeavours, and (3) that he is fully prepared to pursue the end at all costs. This act of Praṇidhāna is essentially an affair or operation of the concentrated human will. Behind it was the healthy belief to which the Upaniṣadic thinkers gave currency by declaring that the secret of success in life's pursuit lay in the will-power, in the right direction of the will to a rightly conceived end. The first impulsive bent of the heart towards an end must assume the form of Saṅkalpa or strong determination of the Will from which the fulfilment of the end follows. So they said : "Whatever end a person truly longs for, comes to its fulfilment from the determination of Will ; fulfilled by that, he elevates himself."¹⁰

Just as in the case of man's attainments, so in that of the manifestation of diverse forms of the

world, there lay at the back, as they all thought and believed, the operation and direction of the creative will. Though in the Brāhmaṇas, this creative will (*śiṣṛkṣā*) came to be attributed to a personal being, called Prajāpati, representing the first idea of God or Creator in early Indian thought, it is recognized and posited in an impersonal form as *kāma* in the famous cosmological hymn of Ṛgveda, known as the Nāsadiya sūkta. There it is held that the process of creation did not start before *kāma*, in which lay the germ of mind or intelligence (*manaso retaḥ*), was somehow or other stirred up in the original cosmic substance, water, full of potentialities and possibilities. The Book of Genesis which represents the same stage of human thought as the ancient Brāhmaṇa texts of India, derives in the same way the whole of creation with its full structure and order from the one and the same creative will, attributed to God who alone was the moving spirit in the deep enveloped by darkness.

As Buddha tells us in his great discourse on the Noble Quest, the quest which starts from the profound sense or feeling of dissatisfaction with the contingent character or limiting conditions of the world, implies the earnest search for something or some state of existence where these conditions are not. Thus the very search implies an innate belief in its reality and the possibility of its attainment. As he has pointed out in the Udāna, to ask, after

once having gone forth in quest of that which is unborn, not brought into being, and undying (ajātaṃ abhūtaṃ amataṃ) if any such thing or state exists, is to beg the question. Thus the religious impulse, which is at the same time philosophical and scientific, leads the trend of life to proceed from the conditioned to the unconditioned.

In the case of Buddha, the net result of his noble quest is stated to have consisted in a twofold discovery : (1) that of the nature of reality in the form of relatedness, of which the technical name is Paṭiccasamuppāda or Causal Genesis, and (2) that of Nirvāṇa signifying the highest religious experience and the spiritual state of consciousness gone beyond all its limiting conditions, and freed from all its latent tendencies to drag it back into bondage.

The discovery of the first is aptly compared to the chance discovery of an old, buried and forgotten city, and the emotions called up by it are likened unto those awakened by the romance in the chance-discovery of the buried city. The very word "discovery" implies that the thing discovered is not created by the discoverer himself. It simply means finding it out as it had been there all the time and announcing the fact of its existence to others for their information. Thus Buddha stated the position of the Truth or Nature of Reality as found out by him, as well as his own position in relation thereto.

"In so far as Dharma in the sense of ancient or eternally abiding reality (paurāṇa-dharmasthitā)

is concerned, it is a self-regulating order of cosmic life (dharma-niyāmatā), the suchness, realness and actuality of things (tathatā, bhūtatā, satyatā)¹¹ which exists by its own right independently of all truth-finders and path-finders, which is to say, of all thinkers and teachers, divines and philosophers ; only in so far as it signifies the pratyātmadharmasthititā, its nature is accessible to an individual contemplative through intuition at a supreme moment of realisation. As thinker and teacher, he simply declared the Truth with regard to the nature of reality as realised by him *per se*, affirmed it, and pointed out the way of reaching and apprehending it, each individually by his or her own efforts. On the basis of that intuition or enlightenment was formed the basic concept of his thought which in the sphere of religion and ethics, was interpreted, propounded and promulgated as a moral law. The path or the road which he discovered was not claimed to be new ; it was the one trodden by the Enlightened Ones of the past milleniums. The summum bonum of human life and the ideal of human conduct and character which he set forth was shown to be in complete accord with the noble experience and life of all the great contemplative and saintly personages of the past."¹²

As for the other discovery, namely, that of Nirvāṇa, Buddha tells us in many places that it is the most enjoyable experience of bliss (paramaṃ sukhaṃ), the highest emotional state of conscious-

ness which comes to prevail after consciousness gains or regains its free state, getting rid of all the mundane desires and pre-conceptions about the nature, reality and spiritual value of the world as such.

The free state of consciousness (citta) necessarily presupposes a previous state of bondage, brought about by the limiting condition of life and of existence. Our senses, mind and intellect give us but a limited, onesided and interested view of fact, actuality or reality. Thus often in stating the truth we either distort fact or give expression only to partial or half truths, and the result, upon the whole, is a misconstruction and misrepresentation of the fact, which is to say, the nature and order of things as it is (yathābhūtam).

Here, you may pertinently ask whether or no, the abiding order of cosmic life which is expressed by Buddha's causal genesis is an all inclusive reality ? If so, does it or does it not include Nirvāṇa in it ? If it precludes Nirvāṇa or any other element of experience, Nirvana or any other element of experience, material, mental, moral or spiritual, it cannot be an all inclusive reality. Further, if it is not all-inclusive, it does not deserve the name of reality at all. To be reality it must be not only a fact but the whole of the fact, known or knowable or actual or potential.

This created a puzzle and difficulty in Buddha's personal religion, and it divided the Buddhist

teachers into two sharply antagonistic schools of opinion, one maintaining that Nirvāṇa representing the counter-process of cessation was logically excluded from Buddha's Causal Genesis which is concerned with the process of becoming. The great Pali scholiast Buddhaghosa who has discussed this question has sought to maintain on textual and other grounds that both the process of becoming and the counter-process of cessation are comprehended by the Law of Causal Genesis as formulated and propounded by Buddha.¹³ But kindly allow me to observe that Buddhaghosa did not grasp the logical or metaphysical difficulty involved in the matter.

Buddha's Causal Genesis, as generally represented in the Buddhist texts, is an orderly sequence of the events of cosmic life. To quote the words of Buddha, "because of birth comes decay and death ; whether Tathāgatas arise or not, this element stands as the establishing of things as effects. The same as to the sequence, according to law, of other recurring facts of life and of existence. If such be the order which works itself mechanically, unalterably and eternally, and if we all belong to this very reality, how can we stand out of and away from it ? How is the escape from the cosmic process of life and its accidents at all possible ? To do justice to the two central points in Buddha's personal religion, namely, Causal Genesis and Nirvāṇa, we must be absolutely clear on the logical relation between the two.

The most welcome light on this point comes from the intellectually gifted early Buddhist sister Dhammadinnā whose views were fully approved and endorsed by the Buddha with the remark that he had nothing further to add to them. As interpreted by her, Buddha's Causal Genesis admits of two different trends of things in the whole of reality.¹⁴ In one of them, the reaction (*paṭibhāga*) takes in a cyclical order between two opposites (*paccanīkas*), such as pleasure and pain (*sukha-dukkha*), virtue and vice (*puñña-pāpa*), good and evil (*kusala-akusala*). This is aptly termed by Buddhaghosa as *visabhāga-paṭibhāga*. In the other, the reaction takes place in a progressive order between two counterparts or complements or between two things of the same genus, the succeeding factor augmenting the effect of the preceding one. This is what Buddhaghosa terms *sabhāga-paṭibhāga*.

By the term "world", as distinguished from Nirvāṇa, we are to understand the first trend in the life of reality where we revolve within the cycle of reaction between the opposites. Nirvāṇa represents the other trend in which the course of reaction lies from strength to strength, good to further good, from that to still greater good, from pleasure to joy, from joy to gladness, from gladness to happiness, from happiness to bliss, from bliss to beatitude, from intuition knowledge (*vijjā*) to the feeling of emancipation (*vimutti*), from that to self-mastery

(*vasībhāva*) or self-consciousness as to the acquisition of the free state, and from that to the fullest enjoyment of the bliss of *Nirvāṇa*. In reply to the question as to what follows by way of reaction from *Nirvāṇa* *Dhammadinnā* wisely said that *Nirvāṇa* was generally regarded as the final step in the process of thought in order to avoid an infinite regress, for the sake of *pariyantagahaṇam* in her own language. But she has not failed to indicate that even if there be any further reaction, that also takes place in the line and whatever follows therefrom will also appertain to *Nirvāṇa* and, therefore, will partake of its nature.¹⁵

Thus Buddha's is not precisely the Heraclitean view of change, though, according to both, 'in the ceaseless transformation of all things or the process of becoming nothing individual persists, but only the order',—'the law of change, which constitutes the meaning and worth of the whole.' It is not unwarrantable for a Buddhist who is poetically inclined sometimes to compare the process of change to the current of an everflowing river (*nadīsota-viya*) to say with a Heraclitean that a person does not step into the same river twice.

With Heraclitus the process of change means the constant transformation of everything into its opposite, the other being for him *eo ipso*, i. e., 'the opposed', the 'flux of things being pictured as a ceaseless strife of things, which is declared to be the father of things.' 'Change and counter-change

run on side by side, and the semblance of a permanent thing makes its appearance where for a time there is as much counterchange upon the one way as there is change upon the other.'¹⁶ The trend of the Heraclitean thought amounts indeed to what is conveyed by the Great Epic dicta stressing the fact of a cyclical rotation of pleasure and pain :

Jiveṣu parivartante duḥkhāni ca sukhāni ca.¹⁷

Sukhasyānantaram duḥkham

duḥkhasyānantaram sukham.¹⁸

Sampaśyata jagat sarvaṃ

sukhaduḥkhair adhiṣṭhitam

saṃyogo viprayogaś ca paryāyeṇopalabhyate.¹⁹

With Buddha becoming is the causal genesis which implies the sequence, according to law, of events-phenomena, appearances or experiences, that never recur in identical forms, but present themselves in such similar forms as constituting a metaphysical ground for the conception of continuity of the order (dhamma-santati). Each event is brought about by a conjuncture or combination of causal conditions or circumstances (paccaya sāmaggi or samavāya, to use the later Buddhist phraseology).²⁰ In the process of causal genesis, which may be interpreted as the underlying cosmic life or moral law, it is as much possible that the reaction (paṭibhāga) of pleasure (sukha) is pain (dukkha), which is its opposite, and *vice versa*, as that the reaction of knowledge (vijjā) is emancipation (vimutti), which is its counterpart.²¹ It is

equally possible that the reaction of one aspect of good is just another aspect of it, or that of the lesser degree of something is the greater degree of it. In other words, the process may be conceived either as one of a ceaseless strife of opposites or as one in which the counterparts complete each other, or even as one of augmenting or intensifying one thing by a similar thing. If so, the true aim of combined religious, intellectual and moral efforts is so to direct thought, will and action that good may lead to greater good, that to still greater good.

Whatever else Nirvāṇa may be, psychologically viewed, it is but a perfectly free state of consciousness (ceto-vimutti, cetaso vimokkho), a psychical condition under which consciousness feels itself to be entirely free from all obsessions and preconceptions, created by the habits of thought. In so far as it implies the ultimate feeling of one's sinlessness or purity of one's internal nature, the experience is psycho-ethical in its character. And in so far as it enables consciousness to dive into its own-depth of being and to fully enjoy the bliss of its true state, which is freedom, the experience is spiritual.

If there be thus at least two main trends of events in the life of reality as expressed by Buddha's Causal Genesis,²² we get certainly a free scope for the exercise of our choice between the two.

If such be the correct interpretation of the philosophical position of Buddha's Causal Genesis, both Saṃsāra and Nirvāṇa may be consistently

shown to be included in it, both as possibilities in one and the same reality. That this was the exact position may be realised from the fact that the entire mode or method of religious training which was the outcome of Buddha's personal religion was based upon the second trend, the second line of reaction implying the procession from good to greater good, from wholesome to more wholesome. The rotatory play or strife between the opposites is restricted to the Kāma or non-Jhanic, non reflective spheres of consciousness. Akusala, the immoral or unwholesome reaction of mind, is given no place in the Jhanic or reflective spheres of consciousness and religious experience admitting of infinite gradations though for the sake of convenience or scientific purpose these are reduced to sixteen or seventeen successive stages of progress in the life of an aspirant.

Given these two trends in the order of becoming as discovered by Buddha, and clearly held before us as such, it is up to us all to decide for ourselves which of them to seek and which not to. And here lies the scope for the freedom of the Will. Had Buddha's been simply the Heraclitean view of change, compelling us to rotate off and on with the cycle of the opposites, the grand conception of the progressive path of life as outlined by the Aṣṭamārga, better Daśamārga,²³ which emanated out of Buddha-jñāna, would have been logically impossible.

Thus we are led to that stage of discussion where we may examine the nature of Buddha-ñāṇa or Abhisambodhi and its psychological bearings on the character of the inner faith awakened by it and the development of Buddha's personality.

Buddha-ñāṇa (Buddha's knowledge) is but another term for abhiññā or abhisambodhi, here the prefix abhi implying excelling, superseding, transcending that which is within the access, reach, experience, apprehension, perception, vision or knowledge of the general body of mankind. Call it knowledge, call it experience, call it intuition, call it insight, even call it sensing or feeling, if you please. The advent or happening of it takes place in a psychical sphere, on the highest conceivable supramundane level of consciousness, in the highest plane of man's experience, in the most intensified state of mental concentration, in the highest state of meditation and in the highest yogic state of trance and religious ecstasy. In so far as it gave Buddha a clear insight into the nature of truth or reality, that is to say, in to the causal foundation of cosmic life and morality as well as of human thought, understanding or knowledge, it was a philosophic or scientific intuition, the content of which could be conceptualized and formulated as a definite law or laws of becoming.

But there is a purely religious or spiritual side of Buddha's abhisambodhi. In rising up higher and higher in the jhanic process from one level of

consciousness to another, from one plane of experience to another, accompanied by introspection, he was able to go through the entire gamut of mental life, which enabled him to have an insight into the mechanism of mind, the motives or springs of action (*hetu*), the nature of consciousness and its concomitants and complexes, of which the most remarkable outcome was a system of analytical psychology forming the scientific foundation of Buddhist ethics. It enabled him also to acquire what is called the *cetopariya-ñāṇam* signifying as it does the power of instantaneously or immediately entering into the mind, thought, motive or purpose of others, which is a faculty possessed, more or less, by all persons of great experience and successful men of the world. Through the yogic process all the instruments of knowing and appreciating are purified, sharpened and strengthened. The fleshy ear is sublimated into the divine, the fleshy eye into the divine; so to speak. On the purely psychical or mystical side the visions dawn on consciousness. The whole past history of the man presents itself, as it were, on the screen in a cinema show or is reflected as though in a mirror. The whole drama of life, its ups and downs, according to the destinies shaped by good or bad deeds of the individuals, is enacted as if before the eyes. The feelings arises all on a sudden that the burden of sin is gone and with the obsessions removed lightness or sense of relief is felt in

consciousness as also in the whole of the being. The will is set free. The knowledge arises in a definite form as to how the ingress and egress of sin take place in man's nature. The feeling of emancipation from the bondage created by sin, or the innate proneness to impiety and immorality arises and settles on consciousness. This is followed by the consciousness of being free, which in its turn is followed by purely emotional state of self-enjoyment of the free state thus gained and the rejoicing over the deep conviction about the success attained.

So far as religious knowledge is concerned, we can readily say with John Caird, that it is not arrived at by a ratiocinative process of thought or gained *a priori*. It comes direct to consciousness just in a flash of intuition. If I term it a psychical or mystical experience, you may easily tolerate me provided that you have a little patience and forbearance to allow me to tell you what I precisely mean by it. You need not have any prejudice against the term "mysticism" in religion.

Here I can do no better than place before you the two handy marks by which William James characterizes it, the marks called *ineffability* and *nöetic quality*. With regard to the first mark of ineffability, he points out that the subject of a mystical state of mind defies expression. Its quality must be directly experienced. It can neither be imparted nor transferred to others. Mystical states are more like states of feeling than like states of

intellect. And with regard to the second mark of nōetic quality, he observes : “Although so similar to states of feeling, mystical states seem to those who experience them to be also states of knowledge. They are states of insight into depths of truth unplumbed by the discursive intellect. They are illuminations, revelations, full of significance and importance, all inarticulate though they remain ; and as a rule they carry with them a curious sense of authority for after-time.”²⁴

Buddha, too, characterises the knowledge of things that are “deep, difficult to see, difficult to understand, subtle and super excellent”, as that which lies beyond the scope of mere logic (atakkāvacara) and is to be reached by the wise, each by himself or herself (paccattam). He can speak with authority on the subject because the things he speaks of have been apprehended, experienced and seen by him. So it is said that Tathāgata the Truth-finder and Path-finder speaks of things with much authority from having apprehended and seen them (jānato passato), which is to say, from his direct knowledge of them.²⁵

Wherever there is any original vision or perception of truth of human good, the declaration is verily like this. King Aśoka, for instance, who was the most enlightened emperor with original vision, said : “Whatever I see myself as good, I desire to have it translated into action by some definite means.”²⁶

Thus it is claimed that in the case of Buddha the conviction, whether religious, philosophic or moral, is born of actual experience or direct knowledge. This being the case, doubt or scepticism is set at rest ; it has no place in it. We may doubt everything else but not what we have actually apprehended or seen. We cannot be sceptical over our own experience. The sceptic is the common enemy of divines and philosophers. Doubt darkness counsel. It leaves human mind in a state of indecision, making it oscillate like a pendulum between two alternatives, two extremes of thought or of action, to be or not to be, to say or not to say, to do or not to do.

There is no wonder then that the entire psycho-ethical system of Abhidhamma which was a ripe fruit of the Buddha-knowledge, is designed mainly for the purpose of combating and completely overcoming doubt, perplexity or scepticism and allied mental concomitants and complexes in their various forms and degrees of intensity. The two great weapons for combating this powerful enemy are faith (*saddhā*) and knowledge (*paññā*), which go together, one implying the other, the confirmation of the first lying in the second (*paññanvayā saddhā*). Man's personality or assertive, impressive and convincing element or factor in a forceful human character develops from the inner conviction or confirmed faith in certainty about one's position as to truth and purity.

At this point, we may consistently discuss how such a personality with such a mind, such a vision, such an experience and such an internal strength, inner conviction and self-confidence react upon the whole of life. Its reaction is nothing but wholesome, beneficial, non-harming, friendly, loving, sympathetic, compassionate, forbearing, helping and the like. Henceforth the things are seen in a new mental perspective. A new mental attitude results from the grand vision of life in its entirety and its underlying reality. The things are interpreted in a new way in the light of the new ideal and the course of human civilization gets altogether a new direction. Discipline, orderliness and decorum in human conduct and behaviour forming the regulating force of human society and other institutions are intended to be a thing to grow from within instead of being thrust from outside. Stress is laid upon the inwardness than the outwardness of things. Self is declared as the lord of self (*attā hi attano nātho*). The state-made law is not defied ; it is just sought to be kept in abeyance. The quality of mercy is placed far above mere justice. The motive to action is required to be purified to make oneself sure of its wholesome expression and effect.

The outsiders were struck and deeply impressed by the moral rectitude and ethical perfection of Buddha, which, in his opinion, was but the least part of the praise that might be bestowed on him.²⁷

To appreciate the man is to appreciate the ideal he stands for. So he said : "He who sees the ideal, sees me indeed, and he who sees me, sees indeed the ideal" (Yo dhammam passati so mamam va passati yo mamam passati so dhammam va passati). Here the man and the ideal become a completely identified so that the system of thought or the religious faith may be presented either in doctrinal or personal terms (dhammādhīṭṭhāna, e. g., mettā ; sattādhīṭṭhāna, e. g., mettāvihārī).

Buddha's religion, whether in its Hīnayāna or Mahāyāna form, whether in its earlier or later phase, stands, as many thinkers say, for the doctrine of no soul, i. e., the unsubstantiality or fleeting nature of mind, consciousness as well as the world as a whole, and in this respect it differs from the Upaniṣad doctrine, Jainism and other religions.

It is undeniable that the Buddhists themselves have unduly exaggerated Buddha's doctrine of anātman. The idea of a changeless reality is indeed inconsistent with both experience and reason : it is an *a priori* notion of being, reached in the sphere of abstract thinking. The philosophical position, that "I have both changed and not changed". or that "I have changed in appearance only, not in reality" is indefensible. To defend it is to be obliged to have recourse to the doctrine of Māyā or illusion. According to Buddha's position, whatever is in reality or actuality is equally subject to the laws of change, of the sequence of opposites or

similars.²⁸ The fact of change enables us to conceive and speak of continuity or procession (santati). It is not fair to reality to say that it behaves in one way with the world and in another way with the soul, universal or individual, allowing it to enjoy the prerogative of remaining always where it is. If we agree with Buddha and Dhammadinnā that the course of life and of things is fundamentally a course of reaction of one thing from another in two series, Saṃsāra and Nirvāṇa, the question still remains: For whose good is religion, whatever it is, really meant?

If, as some of the Buddhist thinkers overstress the point, Buddha's thought reduces the individuals and things to nothing, extinction or annihilation becomes inevitably the goal of human life, from the very suggestion of which the Buddha-mind always recoiled. From the new position made out of Buddha's Causal Genesis, it follows that going away from the world simply means the change brought about in the trend of life so that the course of reaction may lie from the wholesome to the wholesome.²⁹ The most interested part of life is citta or mind, which is essentially a stream of consciousness. We uproot its immoral instincts and impulses, destroy once for all its immoral motives and complexes that are coloured by them. It is not suggested that the course of reaction from the wholesome to the wholesome stops anywhere in the life of consciousness itself with the attainment of

Nirvāṇa. The end is suggested simply for preventing an infinite regress in thought.

Thus I present for your consideration just a few salient points of the formative process of Buddhism from Buddha's personal standpoint.—a religion, which was destined to become a great force in man's civilization. Whether you agree with me or not on all the points raised, I sincerely hope that this formative aspect of Buddhism will not fail to interest you. The farther and farther we go away from Buddha, the more and more we are apt to lose sight of him from our midst. It is indeed from Buddha's point of view that Buddhism can claim to be a religion for all in all spheres of progressive life.

NOTES

1. Atthasālinī, P. 58 ; Cf. Maṅgala Sutta.
2. Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion, p. 336 ff
3. Saṃkhāruppatti Sutta, Majjhima (No. 120).
4. Reference is to the Sāmaññaphala Sutta, Dīgha, I.
5. Lalita-vistara :
Ihāsane Śuṣyatu me śarīraṃ
tvagasthi-māṃsaṃ pralayaṇ ca yātu
aprāpya bodhiṃ bahukalpa-durlabhāṃ
naivāsanāt kāyaṃ etat caṣyati.
6. Majjhima, I, p. 481 : kāmaṃ taco ca nahāru ca aṭṭhi
ca avasussatu, sarīre avasussatu māṃsa-lohitāṃ, yaṃ taṃ
purisatthāmena purisaviriyena parakkamena pattabbaṃ
na taṃ apāpuṇitvā viriyassa saṇṭhānaṃ bhavissatī ti.
7. Bṛhad Āraṇyaka Up., iv. 4. 22-25.
8. Ariyapariyesana-Sutta, Majjhima, I., p. 161 foll.
9. Sonaka Jātaka, No. 529. Fausböll, Jātaka, V. p. 248.
Cf. the case of king Maghādeva of Mithilā.
10. Chāndogya-Up., viii. 2. 10 yaṃ yaṃ antam
abhikāmo bhavati, yaṃ kāmaṃ kāmayate so 'sya
saṅkalpād eva samuttiṣṭhati, tena sampanno mahīyate.
11. Cf. such terms as ānandatā and sthitatā that occur
in the Bṛhad Āraṇyaka Up. i. 4. 6-7.
12. Barua, Aśoka and His Inscriptions, Pt. 1. Ch. IV ;
Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra, ed. by Bunyio Nanjio, pp. 143-4 ; D. T.
Suzuki's transl., pp. 125-6 ; Saṃyutta, II, pp. 28, 104 ff.,
Kathāvatthu, vi. 1 ; Mrs. Rhys Davids, Buddhism (Home
University Library) p. 33 ff.
13. Visuddhimagga, Ch. xvii : Paññābhūmi-niddesa.
14. From Buddha's division of human types into
onata-unnata (degraded-elevated), unnata-onata (elevated-

degraded) and unnata-unnata (elevated-elevated) in the Aṅguttara-Nikāya and Puggala-paññatti presupposes rather three trends :

- (1) from degradation to degradation.
- (2) from degradation to elevation and *vice-versa*.
and
- (3) from elevation to elevation. —For Dhamma-dinnā's views, see Majjhima, I. p. 304 f : Cūlavaddalla Sutta.

15. Majjhima, I. p, 304 : Nibbānassa pan 'ayye kiṃ paṭibhāgo ti ? Accasārāvuso Visākha pañham, nāsakkhi pañhānam pariyaṇṭam gahetum, Nibbānogādham hi 'āvuso Visākha brahmacariyam, Nibbānaparāyanam nibbānapariyosānam.

16. Windelband, A History of Philosophy, p. 50.

17. Mbh., XV. 25, 21.

18. Ibid, XV. 25. 23.

19. Ibid, XV. 153. 9.

20. Atthasālinī, p. 58.

21. Majjhima, I, p. 304.

22. Dhammapāla in his Udāna commentary (Siamese Ed., p. 35) to the Bodhi Sutta, I. 1, rightly says : Bhagavā Bodhirukkhamūle dhammasabhāva-paccavekkhaṇa-vasena paṭicca-samuppādam manasākāsi.

23. Dīgha, III, p. 271. B. C. Law, Concepts of Buddhism, p. 36 : The Daśamārga consists in the Aṣṭamārga plus sammā-ñāṇam and sammā-vimutti, Cf, Dīgha, III, 291.

24. The Varieties of Religious Experience, p. 380 f.

25. Majjhima, I, p. 7 : jānato aham passato āsavānam khayam vadāmi, no ajānato na apassato.

26. S. R. E. I, II : yaṃ kichi dakhāmi hakaṃ taṃ ichāmi kiṃti kaṃmanā paṭipādayeham duvālate ca ālabheham.

27. Dīgha, I, p. 3.

28. Mr. Jayasinghe acutely observes : "It does seem right that if the paṭicca-samuppāda contains the first two of the Noble Truths, then the second two must come in with the upward trend. Dr. Barua's suggestion has one advantage. It will remove all grounds for levelling a charge of pessimism against Buddhism. Quite incidentally in these two trends we see the foundations of two of the bright lights of modern philosophy. For the sequence of opposites is obviously the principle of contradiction and the sequence of similars the well-known principle whereby the quantitative changes give rise to qualitative ones."

29. Arguing from the premises that the Buddha himself refused to attach to the upward trend the prominence which he has undoubtedly given to the paṭicca-samuppāda, Mr. Jayasinghe finds reasons to doubt if the paṭicca-samuppāda contains the Buddha's views on reality. It will be seen in the Chapter that this very premise is open to dispute. It was no fault on Buddha's part that the Suttas present just one aspect of the paṭicca-samuppāda, namely, that in avijjā context only. An illustrative formula, avijjā-paccayā saṅkhārā, etc. was mistaken by the Theras for the whole of the Law. It is not quite correct to say that the upward trend comes into play only when a man becomes an Arahāt. The upward trend is the real trend of life which we fail to see on account of a parasitic overgrowth of a secondary nature concealing beneath it the primary one.

IV

BUDDHISM AS AN INSTITUTIONAL RELIGION

In the preceding lecture I tried to give you a definite and clear idea of what I understand by Buddhism as Buddha's personal religion. Buddhism from this standpoint was presented to you as religion of which the main foundation is faith (saddhā) seeking and finding its confirmation in knowledge (paññā). The noble quest of truth, as I sought to show, is the most fruitful activity called forth by the first religious impulse to man's greatness and discovery and sustained throughout by faith. Thus in its centre is the search for truth, and not worship, in which lies the essential feature of an institutional religion based more or less on the element of bhakti or devotion.

As distinguished from the personal religion taken in this sense, the institutional religion insists, more or less, on the self-surrender of the human spirit to the divine. So far as the inventive or creative aspect of Buddhism as Buddha's personal religion is concerned, nothing is perhaps truer to say than that Buddha is the only Buddhist in the world. I had occasion, never the less, to suggest

that there is in varying degrees room also for the play of personal religion in the institutional. This admitted, there is no logical difficulty in understanding the possibility of transition of the one into the other. I am concerned, therefore, to invite you in the present lecture to examine with me, however briefly, the process and nature of the transition of Buddhism as Buddha's personal religion into Buddhism as an institutional religion from the point of view of his disciples and lay followers.

I may begin by defining Buddhism from the institutional point of view as Buddha-Bhāgavatism (Deism), just as Jainism may be defined as Jina-Bhāgavatism, Vaiṣṇavism as Viṣṇu-Bhāgavatism, Śaivism as Śiva-Bhāgavatism, Śāktism as Śakti-Bhāgavatism, Christianity as Christ-Bhāgavatism and Islam as Allah-Bhāgavatism. Buddhism is that form of Bhāgavatism which derives its traits from the contemplation of the attributes of Buddha as Bhagavān,—a form of devotional faith of which the distinctive character is moulded by the personal religion, life and teaching of Buddha as known, understood and appreciated. Worship is in the centre of Buddhism precisely as in that of other institutional religions. Worship implies a relation between the worshipper and the worshipped.

Worship in itself is an act, an act of offering, which serves as the mode of expression of the religious sentiment of the worshipper. Through it the worshipper seeks either to approach, or to rank

and unite with the worshipped. The worshipped one stands as the highest object of adoration to the worshipper. Through salutation, adoration, gifts, prayers, hymns, rituals, study, meditation, and discussion, the worshipper seeks to realise and magnify the glory of the worshipped. The religious feeling of the worshipper is that there is no offering which he can make is really worthy of or sufficient for the worshipped, or that there is nothing of beauty and value which he should not give away in the name of the worshipped. Thus the worshipper is inclined to sacrifice everything he has of any value and worth, and when he has nothing else to give, he ends by offering himself, leaving everything for the sake of the worshipped. Call it self-dedication, call it self-sacrifice, call it self-surrender the implication is the same.

The domestic relations, such as those between teacher and pupil, father and son, brother and brother, husband and wife, lover and espouse, friend and friend, comrade and comrade, king and subject, master and servant, serve as different modes of conversation or communion between the two. These modes, taken singly, may suit the worshipper of a particular temperament, or they may be made use of successfully by one and the same worshipper.

As Ladd points out, the philosophical significance of conversations lies in the fact that the existence or reality of the person or thing spoken to is tacitly implied or taken for granted. It goes

without saying that the speaker himself believes in his own existence as an individual (*ātmabhāva*). If we, for instance, say, “O mind ! how long will you keep me in this state of woe and suffering !”, we do not doubt at the moment the reality of mind ; we affirm its reality. Thus in positing the reality of both, the speaker moves all along in a world of duality. This is precisely the position of Vaiṣṇavism in which the devotee is prepared to live always for the sake of his Beloved provided that he is allowed to feel a separate identity, that he is not required to merge or lose his own individuality in the Beloved.

I am aware that *śraddhā* and *bhakti* are not infrequently employed as synonyms in the daily language of man. But to understand the real distinction between the religion of *Śraddhā* and that of *Bhakti* as such it may suffice to bear in mind that in the former, *bhakti* or devotional feeling is given the lowest place ; in the latter, their relative positions are reversed. In the former, faith in the sense of religious conviction born of knowledge is evaluated as the culmination of the devotional feeling, while in the latter devotion ending in complete self-surrender is regarded as the consummation of faith or accepted belief. The fact is that the same term is used in two different senses in the two systems.

In the religion founded on *śraddhā*, *bhakti* is regarded, e. g., by Buddha, as that religious feeling

which is in its essence but a domestic affection or sentiment of love (gehasita-pemaṁ). In the religion founded on bhakti, śraddhā is treated as a selfish motive in worship for worldly gains and as such it does not come up to the devotional ideal of love for love's sake.

Without going into the merit of this conflict of ideas, I may simply point out that the difference between the two systems is really the difference between the manly spirit and manly energy on the one hand, and the womanly affection and submission on the other, which is to say, between the eternal man and the eternal woman. It is not, therefore, held without reason that a devotee is rather a woman than a man. "If thy soul is to go to heaven", says Cardinal Newman, "it must be a woman." But there are different types of institutional religions, some leaning more towards the manly faith, and some towards self-surrender. Through bhakti the mass religion seeks not only to vindicate itself but to establish its superior worth. Buddha characterized the mass religion of his time as consisting in Devadhamma, Deva-worship, which is just another word for Devavrata or Devayāga. Accordingly the Deva-worshippers are called *vatikas*, devotees, the keepers of religious vows, this religion consisting chiefly in the taking and keeping of vows to a deity, whoever or whatever the deity. This demanded a definition of Deva or Devatā from the cultured. As defined by

Buddha, they are deities to them to whom they are objects of veneration : ye yesam dakkhiṇeyyā te tesam devatā.¹ The very same definition was offered by the great Indian grammarian, Pāṇini, in his aphorism—sā'sya devatā, 'the deity as his.'² Both the definitions imply that just as a person is known by the company he keeps, so a person is known by the character of the deity he worships. It is as good to say with the Old Testament that God had created man, 'in His own image, after His likeness', as to say with Voltaire that man had created God in his own image, after his likeness, the only difference between the two being that one is theistic and the other, deistic. In popular belief every god or goddess, nay, every conceivable form of the Deity is a personal being, while in the interpretation of the cultured, every god or goddess means but a living form of the ideal to be approached. But whether the idea of the Godhead is theistic or deistic in its origin, when approached by the body of worshippers, its purpose is deistic.

The multiplicity of things around us, the diversity of creation, the glaring instances of social inequality and injustice give rise to serious problem in human mind, whether or no this multiplicity or manifoldness of things may be reduced to a unity, whether or no there is any intelligent being to account for the wonderful harmony which is suggested by the diversity of creation, whether or no there is any underlying moral order accountable for a

consistent explanation of happiness and misery of individuals, as well as for apparent social inequality and injustice. As a Vedic seer observed, the sun delights men with rain in season, the tempest-clouds infuse life into the earth in the form of rain, and various kinds of fire reanimate the heavens. The clouds are formed by water. From the clouds water descends in streams. The multiple principles of things are traceable in one and the same cosmic matter, and yet we are to confess—“What thing I truly am, I know not clearly : mysterious, fattered in my mind I wander.” If we are all from the same primitive substance of which the sun, lightning and fire are composed, if the sun be the germ and creator of the universe, still the question remains—‘What is that abiding element which, manifested in the form of the unborn sun, establishes and upholds the world-system?’ The general trend of the ancient religious thought of India may be shown to have been ‘towards the idea of the single, absolute and self-subsistent principle which is infinite in the sense of inexhaustible power and towards the view that all finite things and products of the self-evolution of correlated factors of one universal system and plan, and that the world therefore is a unity.’ Although Rṣi Dīrghatamas did not know himself what that unity or single principle is, he was this much certain that it was to one and the same reality that the sages gave many a name. They called it Agni,

Yama, Mātariśvan. They called it sometimes Indra, Mitra, Varuṇa, Agni, Garutman. On the fruit-bearing tree of life the Vedic seers noticed the opposite behaviour of two birds, one eating fruits, the other not eating but silently reflecting only. The religious feeling inherent in man's nature craved for a Deity on whom to wait with offerings : *kasmai devāya haviṣā vidhema* ?

The eagerness to know and the eagerness to worship continued. It was held in the later Indian thought, as embodied in the older Upaniṣads, that we are out to seek the ground of our immortality, reality and eternality in God within us, who is at the same time the God in the universe ; he is the smallest of the small and the greatest of great. He is far beyond the reach of virtue and vice, our social justice and injustice. And it is opined : "All the books of knowledge speak of His supreme state, all penances carry the message about it, and aiming at it, indeed, man lives the holy life, the life full of virtue and chastity."³

This is indeed the general Hindu view which found its most emphatic expression in the late mediaeval logical treatise called *Nyāyakusumāñjali*. It tells us that the savants speak of the way to salvation,—to Svarga (deliverance in this life) and Apavarga (final deliverance after death). It is in this connection that the necessity arises to ascertain the nature of the Supreme Being, the highest object of worship. It is with an eye to the under-

lying intelligent purpose or teleology of the world as a whole that the Upaniṣads speak of Him as the supreme Deity whose essential nature is absolute purity and absolute intelligence ; the Kāpilas describe Him as endowed with the eight attributes of perfection ; the Pātañjalas characterize Him as untouched by the karmic effects and afflictions, and as one who incarnates himself to declare the eternality of the revealed knowledge and to guide the action ; the Pāśūpatas represent Him as unblemished and standing apart from all ; the Śaivas call Him Śiva who is above all modifications of matter ; the Vaiṣṇavas approach Him as Puruṣottama, the perfect Individual ; the Paurāṇikas conceive Him as the Pitāmaha or Progenitor ; the Buddhists represent Him as the Omniscient ; the Jainas claim Him as uncovered in the sense that He has no leanings to ignorance, attachment, hatred and delusion ; the Mīmāṃsakas describe Him as one given as the worshipped ; and the Cārvākas know Him as the accredited Saint. According to the Naiyāyikas, these different schools of thought serve only to confirm in different ways their position as to the existence of a Deity.

An Admitting that each institutional religion has got to place before humanity a Supreme Being or Perfect Deity for the purpose of worship, whether of human, cosmic or divine origin, whether from the theistic or deistic point of view, whether arguing from cosmology (from effect to cause. from

pot to the potter), or from ontology (the changing implying the changeless as a logical necessity), or from puruṣārtha or teleology (from the pre-natal design, from the harmony in diversity), and also admitting that thereby they seek to satisfy different religious temperaments, one gets a chance to institute a comparison between the Godheads or Deities thus brought into being and represented, as regards their moral excellences, spiritual models, aesthetic graces and as embodiments of knowledge and truth, and as inspirers of piety and humanity. On the comparative merit of the Buddha type of the Supreme Being I may do no better than cite the well considered opinion of Paṇḍita Rāmacandra Kavibhāratī from Bengal on whom your king conferred a distinction for his erudition and rare talent. As an apology for the acceptance of Buddha as his saviour, Kavi Rāmacandra says, expressing his judgment thus :

He who is the most perfect Deity, the most perfect personality, is acceptable to me as my lord, guide, saviour, the supreme object of adoration, be he Buddha, Śiva, Jina, Viṣṇu, Brahmā, or Indra. The criterion of judgement demands that he is all-knowing, his words are absolutely faultless and above reproach he has not the least attachment to the world, his nature is absolutely free from three immoral motives of passion, hatred and delusion, whose heart is filled with unbounded and unselfish love and compassion. To me Śiva is not an enemy,

Hari is not a foe, Jina Kevalin a rival, Brahmā Svayambhū a stranger, nor is Buddha, the Master Mind, a friend, nor is he my father, nor is he of the same family and the same caste, a Brāhman from Gauḍa that I am. But on examination I find that 'Brahmā is overpowered with avidyā, Viṣṇu is embraced by great illusion, which it is difficult to discriminate, Śaṅkara holds Pārvatī in his own person, owing to excessive attachment, but in this world the great Muni, the Lord, is without avidyā, without illusion, and without attachment. O, brothers, tell me, tell me, who among these is to be worshipped, for the attainment of salvation, by people possessing intelligence.'⁴

Buddhism as an institutional religion had not come into being until the formation of the Saṅgha with the laity as its supporters. The Saṅgha was from the ecclesiastical point of view a distinct religious order or institution to gain admission to which the applicants were required to possess certain qualifications or to satisfy certain requirements, and to belong to which they had to conform to, and abide by laws, rules, regulations, formalities and conventions. From the point of view of its internal life, it was just a Brotherhood or Sisterhood of persons who came together to live a common life as children of the same father, as disciples of the same teacher and as followers of the same leader. From the point of view of its organization and internal cohesion, it was a corporate body or commu-

nity of persons of the same piece of mind and wedded to the same ideal. From the point of view of its mission, it was a volunteer corps of persons, men and women, prepared to go through the regimental drill and discipline to combat the forces of Māra, the Evil Spirit in the world of life and of existence. The laity consisted of the kings, princes, other royal personages, the nobles, the bankers and traders, the landed aristocracy and the general folk in the role of worshippers (upāsakas, upāsikās).

Thus in the historical drama of Buddhism as an institutional religion the chief actors are Buddha, his disciples and followers and the persons who represent the laity. The prelude to this drama lies in the romantic account of the advent of Buddha, the first Act is occupied with the equally interesting story of the able ministration of Buddha and its grand success ; the second with that of the sober career of the eminent disciples and followers who survived the Master, which is to say, of the great apostles ; the third with that of the foundation of various churches and the rise of the sects and schools of thought, and their traditions ; the fourth with the activity of the missions and their successes in different parts of the world and among different peoples ; and the fifth with the story of gradual decadence, exhaustion and stagnation followed by the rejuvenation of the faith.

From Buddha's point of view, the essential fact of the history thus made out lies in the manifold

process of the deification of Buddha and the representation of him as Devātideva or the god of gods in literature, legends, art and theology. From the point of view of the doctrine, the essential fact of the same history consists in the process of its origin, first formulation, first promulgation, its subsequent additions, interpretations, canonizations, elaborations, applications, personifications and mystifications. The same carries with it the process of alphabetical, linguistic, literary, scholastic and philosophic developments.

From the point of view of the Saṅgha, its essential fact lies in the process of growth of the vihāras or monastic abodes, various types of educational institutions, shrines, sanctuaries and temples, in short, in religious monuments of art and architecture with their endowments, the introduction and enforcement, amendments and modifications of rules, regulations, laws, formalities and various forms of convention, the rise and growth of sects and schools, the organization of churches and their missions, their rivalries and hostilities, their achievements and difficulties.

And from the point of view of the laity, its essential fact is to be read in the process of recognition of various objects of worship, development of different modes of worship, growth of piety finding its durable expressions in the erection of the vihāras and shrines of different types and artistic designs and styles, performance of various public and

humanitarian works, foundation of various educational and charitable institutions and moulding of the individual, social, political, moral, intellectual and spiritual life of the community as a whole. In these respects, the remarks that hold true of Buddhism, hold true, more or less, of Brahmanism, Jainism, Śaivism, Vaiṣṇavism, Christianity and Islam. The real point of difference to be noticed between the history of one religion and that of another lies in the distinctive character each religion imparts to its various details.

The divine advent and divinity of Buddha were sought to be established by the repeated prediction put into the mouth of previous Buddhas, by the invention of legends describing his happy life in the aesthetic heaven of contentment, the supplication of the gods and angels from all the ten thousand world systems for his advent on earth for the redemption of mankind, the stories of his bodily descent, the immaculate conception of his birth, the description of the dream of queen Māyā, the divine arrangement made for the protection of the child in the womb, the walking of seven steps by the new-born heavenly babe and the declaration of his mission, the reading of the thirty-two major bodily marks by the expert Brāhman readers of the signs of a Mahāpuruṣa, the homage paid to the heavenly babe by all the gods, angels and archangels headed by Arahadgupta and the announcement of the beginning of the new Buddha dispensation, the

jubilations in all the heavens over these events, the divine arrangement in presenting the sights of disease, decay, death and a person in the ascetic-garb, the divine arrangement enabling the prince to pass out of the well-guarded city of Kapilavastu without being noticed, the supply of the sacred robes of an ascetic and bowls by the four Lokapālas, the charming story of the hairlock of the Sākya prince in the heaven of the Thirty-three gods and of the great festival held there in its honour, the highly poetical legend of the Bodhisattva's battle with and vanquishing of Māra with all his hosts, the solicitations shown and felicitations expressed by the gods and angels, the attainment of the enlightenment, the supplication by Brahmā Sahampati for the foundation of the kingdom of righteousness, the presence of the gods and angels wherever Buddha delivered his illuminating discourses, the divine aroma associated with all the woodlands and rocky caves graced by Buddha's presence, the demise of Buddha causing sadness to all the heavenly worlds and the divine arrangement in connection with the funeral on the 7th day. His divinity was also sought to be established by his unsurpassed miraculous powers displayed on many an occasion as well as by the story of his preaching Abhidhamma in the heaven of the Thirty-three gods and of his bodily descent by a staircase connecting the heaven with the earth. Special sanctity was attached to all the trees headed by the great Bo that was associated

with the life of Buddha and to all the objects of Buddha's personal use, the bowl, the robes and the like, and miraculous powers were attributed to all of them. Since his demise his bodily relics were held in great veneration and duly enshrined in Stūpas and Dāgobas with pomp and éclat. The whole career of the Lord and Saviour of the three worlds and the greatest teacher of men and the gods was viewed as a continuous record of the overcoming of the malevolent spirits, the Yakkhas and the Nāgas, the subduing of the heretics and the unbelievers. These legends of high poetic invention supplied appropriate themes for artistic delineations through sculptures, paintings and religious poetry. Similar legends were invented in India by the devotees of Vāsudeva to magnify his glory and to invest him with divinity. With these two sets of legends in the historical background one may appreciate the legends of Jesus Christ with which his disciples, followers and devotees sought to establish his divine advent as well as divinity.

The Buddha-life, the Buddha-mind, the Buddha-wisdom, the Buddha-knowledge, the Buddha ideal and the Buddha spirit became embodied in the Dhammakāya or the tangible form of the doctrine, the corpus of sacred texts which was to take the place of the Divine Master in his absence. The Saṃgha was the corporate body of holy persons who were the receivers of the great Doctrine, the most interested bearers of Buddha's words and

inheritors of the Saddharma, privileged as custodians, embellishers and distributors of the priceless treasure.

The Buddha, the Dhamma and the Sangha were offered as three safe refuges to the afflicted humanity, and no less as three priceless jewels to be held in great affection, as three great ideals to be cherished and constantly meditated upon. The definition of them was supplied definitely bringing out the distinctive attributes of each so that the followers and devotees might not have any misgivings as to the nature of the ideals placed before them. The Buddha is defined as the prototype of the Divine Master and supreme human personality, the Adorable, the Perfect one, the living model of knowledge and virtue, the Wellgone, the Knower of the three worlds and the Unsurpassed Teacher and Trainer of tamable persons. The Dhamma is defined as the prototype of the Doctrine well-propounded by the Master, yielding the desired result here and now, in this very life and waiting for no time, the demonstrable truth with 'Come and see' as its motto, the driving force that leads to salvation and elevation of man's nature and civilization, the essential truth of which is realisable by the wise, each by himself or herself. The Sangha is similarly defined as the prototype of the religious body of the advanced disciples of the Master, traversing the right path of progress, walking along the straight path, the path of virtue

and righteousness, graceful and judicious in moral deportment, worthy of invitation and gifts and homage and forming the unsurpassed spiritual ground of virtue for the acts of piety. These three definitions of the Ideals of the personality, the light of truth and the torch-bearers were meant to serve as the Mirror of the Dhamma (Dhammādāsa). To this earlier Triad, the Mahāyāna Buddhism added the Bodhisattvas, who like the Greek gods came to represent in the East "the fair humanities of old religion with which the religion of beauty fill the earth and heavens" excelling in their spiritual being, mental sweep, all-embracing love and sympathy, the ideal of service, the finer religious emotions and aesthetic graces,—all that has yet been achieved and created in the sphere of abstract conception and refined imagination.

If the Triad were thus offered as the Three Refuges, or Three Jewels of the Good Faith to a Buddhist devotee either to betake to or to cherish with great affection, so far as their mutual relation is concerned, there is nothing better and more beautiful or comprehensive than what is expressed by the author of the Khuddakapāṭha Commentary. The interest of his opinion lies also in the fact that it unfolds before us all the conceivable poetical imageries by which the devotee in any institutional religion either has expressed or may express his mental attitude towards the cherished objects.

John Caird observes by way of comparing and

contrasting the religious position of Buddhism with that of Brahmanism: "So little is there in this religion any trace of positive movement that we may even represent it as saying simply that God is not-being.....So far from saying 'whatever is, is right', and finding in this the sanction of our natural passions, our inhuman customs and traditions, it is true to say, 'whatever is, is wrong', and it is only in emancipation from the thralldom of sense and habit, in ceasing from the thoughts, feelings, and desires that bind us to the finite in the utter abnegation of ourselves and the world, that we rise into union with the Divine. Only in that emptiness is the Divine fulness hidden. It is in some such movement of thought that we discern that which is at first sight so inexplicable in Buddhism—its conception of God and its morality of negation and renunciation, culminating in that 'Nirvana'—the heaven of nothingness, in which the Buddhist finds the highest destiny and blessedness of man."

Caird's purpose here is clear. He makes out a negative position for Buddhism as a religion. In order to establish historically that Christianity was a complement to Buddhism in the sense that in it the religious consciousness of man found the positive ground of morality and the fulness of life. I do not blame Caird for this so much as those on whose interpretation of Buddhism his opinion was based. I can say that Buddhism was not represented in this light to the Buddhist laity, whose mind and interest

were as much popular as that of any other people professing a different faith. To the laity the goal of Buddhism was held to be a paradise of bliss, far surpassing in its grandeur, beauty, serenity and ideality all the heavens or paradises conceived before. The religion was poetically presented as a large vehicle to carry all, men or women, house-holders or recluses by an imagery serving "to throw the Buddhist idea of the silent spiritual progress of man along the path of righteousness into clear relief, by contrast with the popular aspiration to attain rebirth in the heaven where Indra, king of the gods, visits the enchanting Nandana grove in a rattling chariot, surrounded by troops of nymphs making the chariot and the Paradise resonant with their music and melody and attended by a guard of fiendish warriors."⁵

This was followed by the grand poetical conception of Buddhakhetta or the peaceful, blissful, sombre and serene realm of Buddha's benign influence where in the midst of the beautiful sylvan natural surroundings stands the most magnificent mansion in the spacious hall of which the Buddhas and the saintly disciples and attendants are eternally engaged in discussions to further the cause of learning and human culture. The Mahāyāna Buddhism brought at last into being the idea of Sukhāvatī or the eternal paradise of bliss forming the abode of Buddha Amitābha of infinite light to satisfy the growing spiritual need of the Buddhists.

In none of the Indian religions, the goal (*niṭṭhā*) was held to be a "heaven of nothingness". With the Brāhmans it is the 'World of Brahmā', with the Tāpasas the 'World of Ābhassaras (Lights)', with the Parivrājakas the World of the Good (*Subhakiṇṇā*), and with the Ājīvakas 'the Realm of Infinite Mind' (*Anantamānasa*). On the other hand in the continuous history of Indian religions we discern the successive growth of the heavens or paradises, one superseding the other. By the time of the advent of Buddha the heaven of Īndra, which was once regarded as the highest conceivable abode of pleasure and joy in popular estimation, was declared to be a fool's paradise as will appear from the following verses from the *Samyuttanikāya* :⁶

"By troops of nymphs made resonant—not so !
 Haunted by troops of fiends that paradise
 Doth seem. 'Delusion' were a fitter name."

How shall there egress be ?
 Straight is the name that Road is called,
and Free
 From Fear the Quarter whither thou art bound.
 Thy chariot is the Silent Runner named
 With wheels of Righteous effort fitted well.
 Conscience the Leaning Board ; the Drapery
 Is Heedfulness ; the driver is the Norm
 I say, and Right Views, they that run before
 And be it woman, be it man for whom
 Such Chariot doth wait, by that same car
 Into Nibbāna's presence shall they come."

Religion, as distinguished from Metaphysics, takes and is bound to take a matter of fact or realistic view of life and things. It brings or may bring in its philosophy and idealism only to change the quality of the interpretation of its inner significance or to enhance its ethical and spiritual values. Thus we are told that Buddha presented his doctrine from two different standpoints called Sammuti (Saṃvṛti) or conventional and the Paramattha (Paramārtha) or scientific and philosophical. The Sammuti standpoint is one which is commonly accepted and appreciated. The Paramattha is the standpoint to appreciate which one needs proper training. But to be a system, Buddhism must be shown to be a complete and consistent whole coherent in all its constituent parts, the difference between the two standpoints must be more apparent than real. Nothing should be stated from any of them which is not ultimately in harmony with that which is advanced from the other. For example, from the Sammuti or common point of view, dāna (charity, liberality) which is the outcome of the mental state of dayā (compassion) is praised as a virtue. As an act of piety, dāna is a form of sacrifice (cāga, tyāga). In Nirvāṇa, which is posited from the Paramattha standpoint as the goal of Buddhism, we reach the climax or fulfilment of the spirit of self-sacrifice (cāga).

Well, if such be the position of Buddhism as a distinct form of devotional faith, we have got to

show that nothing was more contradictory or antagonistic to its articles of faith than what is popularly called Nāstikya or Atheism. In fact, the dogmatic character of the Buddhist faith found its first expression in the articles of faith that went direct against the atheistic denial on the part of Ajita Keśakambala of the efficacy of the gifts, sacrifices, offering in the name of the dead, of the reward and retribution of the good or bad deeds after death, of the existence of this world and of the next, of the existence of parents after death as well as of the religious teachers who can truly instruct us about the future existence of the individuals and the destinies according to their deeds.

It is not of course possible except from the theoretical or idealistic standpoint to make out an extraordinary position for the Buddhist peoples in different parts of Eastern Asia. They, too, Share the common weakness of humanity. In many matters they are no less superstitious than either the Hindus or the Jews, the Vaiṣṇavas or the Christians, the Muslims or the Sikhs. But viewing them as a whole, one cannot fail to notice certain distinctive traits in their mental attitude towards men and things, the nature of their social relations, their acts of piety, manners and customs, thought and love of learning, aptitudes for deep thinking, creative imagination and other qualities of both head and heart.

Let us consider here just one contribution of Buddhism as a form of devotional faith to the creative art of different Buddhist peoples of Eastern Asia. It has provided each Buddhist country with a religious monument serving as its artistic landmark, e. g., British India with the great temple of Bodhi Gayā, the kingdom of Nepal with the temple of Svayambhū, the city of Pagan in Upper Burma with the Ānanda Pagoda, the Lower Burma with Shwedagon, Ceylon with Suvāṇṇamālī the Mahāthūpa, and the island of Suvarṇadvīpa (Java) with the shrine of Borobudur. I need not be surprised if you still have a good deal of prejudice against Tantricism representing the later phases of the Mahāyāna Buddhism, the principles and ideals of which are being carefully studied and evaluated. But I may tell you that the great shrine of Borobudur, which stands as the most memorable erection of the piety and creative genius of the Mön Khmer race, is the finest outcome of this very Tantricism. This shrine, as I think, outdoes all the recognized architectural wonders of the world, if not by its size and mass, at least by the intricacy and subtlety of its structure and the spiritual meaning and appeal in all its parts as in the whole.

The part played by the disciples and followers of Buddha in the making of the long and eventful history of Buddhism is immense. They were the persons, men and women, who voluntarily renounced

the world, came into direct touch with Buddha and accepted him as their teacher and guide. They were the people who were privileged to feel that they belonged to one and the same brotherhood and sisterhood under a loving father. They came from different social grades, belonged to different nationalities, spoke different dialects, and represented different religious temperaments. They were differently endowed with intellect, imagination and spiritual nature. And yet they willingly merged their individualities in the common life of a single religious order to pass as the Sakyaputtiya Samaṇas. The Saṅgha, thus formed on the principle of the unity of purpose and ideal, was compared by Buddha to an ocean into which the various rivers lose themselves to assume the common name of the ocean. As to this Saṅgha, Buddha never thought that he was its founder or that it waited for his guidance. In his own opinion, he was just the pioneer or forerunner (pubbaṅgamo) of those who came afterwards in the role of 'wayfarers'. The Saṅgha was a self-constituted body to be guided not by a person but by a common ideal of virtuous life. In a sense, they appeared as redoubtable knights of the Round Table of King Arthur. Though in the wake of the new faith, they came in large numbers, all were not destined to reach the goal which in their mental purview was Arhatship ; many indeed lagged behind. Even if we consider the subsequent history of Buddhism, it will be noticed that one may count

on one's fingers those who made their mark and played the momentous part, and yet the importance of the work of the many who lived unnoticed and died unsung is not to be minimized. The teeming millions were the real power behind those who came into prominence and helped forward the cause of Buddhism.

Among the immediate disciples of Buddha, there were men and women of high social position, sharp intellect, clear insight and profound learning, although they mostly belonged to the three upper classes. In spite of their common heritage and common attainments as individuals, they developed certain spiritual powers and excelled others in respect of them, from which circumstance Buddha felt himself justified in dividing them into certain groups and placing foremost those who surpassed others in each group. Though for some special reasons the sisters as a body were placed below the brothers in ecclesiastical matters, theoretically in the matter of intellect, character and spirituality, women were regarded as equals of men. As Buddha expressed himself on this point, there are some women who are superior to some men in some respects, and *vice versa*. There were some among the sisters who figured equally as title-holders. The Thera-and-Therīgāthā contain the psalms of the early Buddhist Brothers and Sisters who came to self-expression, while their inspiring past legends filled the book of Apadāna. The interest and importance of these

legends lies in the fact that the pre-eminence which they had obtained was just the full fruition of their earnest sādhanā continued through several lives. In the case of these disciples, neither the truth in which they believed nor the path which they followed were the results of their own discovery. The religious experiences which they have given utterance to in the psalms ascribed to them are just confirmatory of those of the Master himself, and they in different words bear one and the same testimony to the greatness of Buddha. They are rightly represented, nevertheless, as the myriads of stars who surround the full-moon. They revolved like the planets round the sun shining forth in his glory. Although they made no original discovery, they proved themselves to be of inestimable service to Buddhism as persons who put Buddha's formulations of thought in more effective forms and as those who elaborated the points suggested from time to time by the Master. Buddhist thoughts got their direction from the forms in which they expressed Buddha's ideas or the manner in which they explained and elucidated the various points of the Doctrine and the Discipline.

The famous stanza, for instance, by which Thera Assaji stated Buddha's idea of Causal Genesis became recognized as the creed formula of the Buddhists of all ages, countries and schools of opinion. The single stanza which embodied Bhikkhunī Vajirā's opinion about men's individuality formed

the scriptural authority for the subsequent Buddhist thought and discussion on the same subject. Puṇṇa Mantānīputta's opinion on the seven steps to purity supplied the ground plan of such later monumental works of exposition of Buddhism as Upatissa's *Vimuttimaggā* (Path to Freedom) and Buddhaghosa's *Visuddhimaggā* (Path to Purity). Sāriputta's authoritative opinion on the inseparability of the mental states as they occur in the unitary mental operation served as the philosophical foundation of the Abhidhamma system of Buddhist psychological ethics.

As was natural in the circumstances, Buddha's disciples and followers became interested, immediately after his demise, in collecting his words and the early tradition of the Saṃgha, thereby forming the nucleus of the primitive Buddhist Canon, as also the entire Buddhist literature. The course of the history of Buddhism was rather dull and monotonous during the first century, and it was not quickened into a vigorous life until the Vajjiputtaka bhikkhus of Vesāli with their republican national tradition challenged the position of the Theras and formed themselves into a powerful sect and school of thought, namely, that of the Mahāsaṅghikas.

This first division was quickly followed by others, seceding from both and their offshoots, each establishing a new interpretation of certain vital points of the faith and bringing about a change in the texts and language of the Canon. The tradi-

tional number of these earlier sects and schools is eighteen, including the Theriya or Theravāda which found a stronghold in Ceylon and afterwards in Siam and Burma and flourished immensely under the imperial aegis of Devānampiya Asoka. It was at the instance and with the reverential backing of Asoka that Buddhism aspired to be a great force in the Asiatic and world civilization. Imbued with the idea of Asoka's Dhamma-vijaya or Conquest by Piety and Love, it proceeded to gain the paramountcy as a universal religion of the entire human race.

I cannot but agree with Dr. N. Dutt in thinking that the rise of the eighteen sects and schools of thought was rather a sign of health than that of distemper, rather a clear proof of the increased vitality and power of expansion and adaptability of Buddhism than that of its stagnation and death.

The subsequent tendency of these sects as separate streams, into which the main current of Buddhism bifurcated, was to converge to fewer and fewer producing these two great results :

(1) in bringing about a clear distinction between the two ideals of Saintship and Buddhahood, which is to say, between Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna on the side of religion ; and

(2) in forestalling the development of the four powerful schools of Buddhist philosophy : the Mādhyamika or Śūnyatāvāda, the Yogācāra or Vijñānavāda, the Sautrāntika or Sarvāstivāda, and

the Vaibhāṣika or Scholastic, the first two under the aegis of Mahāyāna and the second two under that of Hīnayāna. Their contributions to the development of the later Indian philosophy are inestimable. The growth of subtler dialectics and higher metaphysics in India was considerably due to them. They opened up the new vista of human thought and religious ideal. Aśvaghoṣa, Nāgārjuna, Vasubandhu, Asaṅga, Diṇnāga, Dharmakīrti, Kamalaśīla, and others stand out as towering figures in the history of Indian as well as of world thought.

The later Gupta period witnessed the foundation of the world-famous University of Nālandā which flourished side by side with those of Odantapura and Vikramaśīla in south Bihar, Somapura (Pāhārpur) in North Bengal, and Paṇḍita Vihāra in Chittagong Division under the Pāla kings whose long and prosperous reign formed a glorious chapter in the history of later Buddhism, not to mention many others that were founded in other parts of Bengal. Similar institutions came into existence also in other Buddhist countries, including Ceylon.

The earlier form of Mahāyāna developed in Nālandā came to be distinguished as the Bodhi-sattva-naya or classical from the more advanced form thereof called the Agranaya Mahāyāna with the Mantrayāna and Vajrayāna as its two branches. As a reaction against all of them arose the movement of the little understood Sahajasiddhi or Sahajiyā Cult with its continuation in the religion

of the later Indian Santas—Kavir, Dādu, Nānak, Tukārām, Caitanya and many of the Muslim Sūfis.

During the Pāla period, Buddhism proceeded on its new career of Trailokya-vijaya in the supersession of its earlier career of Dharmavijaya. Śīlabhadra, the head of Nālandā, and Dīpaṅkara Śrījñāna from Samatāṭa (East Bengal), who became the head of the Vikramaśīla University and was also connected with the Somapura Mahāvihāra are great figures in the annals of Agranaya Buddhism, the latter specially for his mission to Tibet as real founder of the religion of Śākya-muni in the Land of Snow.

The mightly river of Buddhism flowed out of India in different channels, north, south, east and west, across the seas, across the deserts and through the mountain valleys, to irrigate and fertilise other soils, creating everywhere a glorious history for itself. As early as the time of Asoka, Buddhism got a chance to be connected with the Greek and Semitic currents of religious thought in the Mediterranean countries.

The historians while accounting for the dwindling of Buddhism in the land of its birth lay undue stress on its hopeless internal corruption and decay. But it is so easy to flog a dead horse, to put it in the language of Professor Rhys Davids. The opinion is no longer tenable. Corruption is far from explaining the disappearance of so mighty a flow. If it were corrupt, I should rather say that

greater was its right to survive along with the countless cults and creeds, rooted in grossest superstition, that pass under the bewildering general name of Hinduism. The fact is that the main mission of Buddhism in India as in other countries was cultural and as such its main citadel was not the society but its educational institutions, great and small. When these fell, one by one, at the onset of foreign invasion with the foremost idea of military conquest, Buddhism lost its foothold, and its able preachers and exponents had to flee away,—a catastrophe with its most pathetic story to be unearthed and related by competent archaeologists. The same would have been the tragedy in the life of Buddhism in your island, too, had you not been united with your kings and the Saṃgha in resisting throughout your history foreign invasions favouring other faiths and other forms of culture, no matter whether from the Indian shore or the land far across the desert.

From the drift of the discussion, it may appear to you that I have indiscriminately placed the laity in a comparatively lower position than the members of the Saṃgha. This point has been discussed in the Buddhist Canonical Texts and more elaborately in the Milinda. The householders have nowhere been denied the chances of the attainment of Nirvāṇa, though in the orthodox opinion, at the moment of its attainment the marks of household life vanish. But here is still a deeper consideration to make. Among the laity, the kings and the

overlords held a pre-eminent position. According to the well-considered Buddhist opinion of old, all the bodily marks and minor characteristics of a Mahāpuruṣa equally distinguish a person destined to become a perfect Buddha or to figure as a righteous and enlightened emperor. In the bulk of the Pali Discourses, Buddha has spoken of the principles and ideals first from the standpoint of a righteous king emperor (cakkavatti) and then from the standpoint of a Buddha. In other words, there is a parallelism drawn between the two positions : one aiming at the kingdom of piety and the other at the spiritual kingdom of knowledge and virtue.⁷ The Cakkavatti ideal set forth by Buddha had its fulfilment in the Dhammavijaya of Aśoka. If the members of the Saṃgha generally aspired after Arahatsip, the pious kings are not rare in the history of Ceylon and other Buddhist countries who in their inscriptions have declared themselves as Bodhisattvas or aspirants for Buddhahood, which in a sense was their birthright as scions of the warrior race to which Buddha himself belonged.

Tolerance in some sense or other is a characteristic feature of the Indo-Aryan religions. So far as the general state-policy of Indian kings was concerned, they honoured and helped all sects with this difference, however, that in the case of religions other than the one in which they were personally interested, they had not taken the initiative in the founding of their institutions. The general Hindu

idea of religious toleration is rather a passive one based upon the policy of non-intervention in the divine business of others. It cherished the belief that however different the paths, they lead ultimately to one and the same goal. In contrast with this Aśoka enunciated his principle of toleration emphasising its active phase. The Asokan principle discourages the condemnation of other sects as well as the glorification of one's own sect. It insists that there should be free interchanges of thoughts and ideas, and that they should study each other's traditions so that all may be well-informed and can by helpful discussions and healthy criticisms, avoiding ill feelings and misunderstandings, co-operate for each other's growth in the essence of things (sāravaḍhi).

NOTES

1. Culla Niddesa, *sub voce* devā.
2. Pāṇini, iv. 2. 24.
3. Kāṭha Up., I. 2. 14.
4. Bhaktiśataka, Haraprasad Sastri's ed. and trans., vv. 1-3.
5. Barua and Mitra, Prakrit Dhammapada, Magavaga.
6. Saṃyutta, I, p. 33.
7. See Lakkhaṇa Suttanta and Cakkavatti-sīhanāda Sutta in Dīgha, III.

V

BUDDHA'S DOCTRINE OF THE MEAN

There is hardly any student of Buddhism who is not familiar with the Buddha's Doctrine of the Middle Path, but a very few of them have seriously questioned as yet its *raison d'être* or commonly accepted connotation and implication. It often seems somewhat strange to me whenever and wherever any unwary scholar or popular speaker freely talks about the Buddha's Doctrine of the Mean (Majjha, Madhya) in terms of the Middle Path. He bases undoubtedly his statement or argument on the authority of the Benares Discourse. There is every reason for doubting the authenticity of the tradition representing the Benares Discourse as the Buddha's First Sermon in the shape and form in which it comes down to us in the Saṃyutta Nikāya, Vinaya Mahāvagga, Lalitavistara, and Mahāvastu. Its mechanical character, looseness of form, and exegetical nicety arouse nothing but suspicion. In the opinion of Professor Rhys Davids the very title of the First Discourse, Dhammacakkappavattana, variously rendered in English—"Turning of the Wheel of the Law", 'Foundation of the Kingdom of Righteousness'—resulted from a

poetical imagery, which the early Buddhists so often borrowed from the previous poets of Vedic literature.¹ A critical examination of the textual position of Buddha's First Discourse by Dr. B. C. Law led him to observe : 'The traditional First Discourse, as we now have it, would seem to be a later got-up thing with some romantic appendages. We get in it that form in which it might be treated, and as a matter of fact was used in the Buddhist community as a Paritta or Samāgama, i. e. as a sacred text fit to be chanted in the presence of a concourse of the gods invoked for the well-being of the audience.'² Dr. Law's main textual argument is based on the disparity which exists between the Ariyapariyesana or Pāsārāsi Sutta on the one hand, presenting as it does an autobiographical account of the Buddha's going forth in quest of the Truth, his two-fold discovery and first successful ministration to the five ascetics at the Deer Park of Isipatana (Sārnath) and the Dhammacakkappavattana Sutta in its extant form on the other. The Ariyapariyesana Sutta does not introduce the famous discourse on the topic of the Middle Path and Four Noble Truths. It has nothing to say about the two extremes.³

We have the use of *majjha* as a substantive in the Jātaka dictum *anumajjhaṃ samācare*,⁴ one 'should properly give effect to the felt mean', and the Aśokan exhortation *majhaṃ paṭipādayema*,⁵ 'We will fulfil the mean'. We get the adverbial use of the word in the Buddha's expression

majjhena dhammaṃ desemi,⁶ 'I present the doctrine' by way of the mean.' The Adjectival form *majjhimā*, 'middle' is employed in the Pāli Benares Discourse, and that in the term *majjhimā Paṭipadā*, while the Sanskrit form *madhyamā* in *pratipatsu madhyamā* is employed by Nāgārjuna in his *Vigraha-vyāvartanī*.

Tha Jātaka word *anumajjha*, explained in the gloss as meaning *anubhūta majjha* or 'felt mean', is significant. It shows that the mean aimed at cannot be logically defined, but it can be felt by each person individually, which is to say, that here the Buddhist 'mean' comes very near to Aristotle's 'mean', 'the happy mean' 'the proper mean', or 'the golden mean'. If with Aristotle virtue be the mean between two extremes, the questions arise : 'What is the criterion here? Who is to judge? How are we to know what is the proper mean in any matter?' The reply is : 'Mathematical analogies will not help us. It is not a case of drawing a straight line from one extreme to the other, and finding the middle point by bisection. And Aristotle refuses to lay down any rule of thumb in the matter. There is not golden rule by virtue of which we can tell where the proper mean is. It all depends on circumstances, and on the person involved. What is the proper mean in one case is not the proper mean in another. What is moderate for one man is immoderate for his neighbour. Hence the matter must be left to the good judgment of the individual.

A sort of fine tact, good sense, is required to know the mean, which Aristotle calls insight.'⁷

That this is precisely the case with the Buddha's 'mean' may be realized from the fact that in the Culla-Vedalla Sutta⁸ the Bhikkhuṇī-Dhammadinnā makes use of the term *avijjā*, meaning 'the unrecognizable' 'the indefinable', to signify the mean between, or *tertium quid* of the two extremes or opposites, namely, the pleasureable or agreeable feeling *sukha* and the painful or disagreeable feeling *dukkha*. The mean or *tertium quid* is the feeling called *adukkha-asukha* 'neither painful nor pleasureable, neither disagreeable nor agreeable' which goes also by the name of *upekkhā*. It remains unrecognized so long as it is not brought into clear recognition, we are not mentally aware of it, and it becomes *vijjā* or recognized when it is brought into clear recognition, we become mentally aware of it. Proceeding in the line of this 'mean' between the two opposite feelings or states of feeling, the contemplative comes to develop *tatramajjhataṭṭā*, a balanced state of mind which is the *sine qua non* of equanimity. According to the Pali scholiast 'the mean', i. e. *upekkhā*, is termed here *avijjā* because it is difficult to define it, it remaining covered by darkness (*andhakārābhibhūtā duddīpanā*).⁹

And yet in the matter of the ethical ideal of life Aristotle's 'mean' is not precisely the Buddha's 'mean'. The Aristotelian doctrine stands almost on a par with the Kauṭīliyan, not to say, peculiarly

Brahmanistic. With Aristotle virtue means that the appetites must be brought under control, not that they must be eradicated. Hence there are two extremes to be avoided. It is extreme, on the one hand, to attempt to uproot the passions ; and it is extreme, on the other, to allow them to run riot. Virtue means moderation. It consists in hitting the happy mean as regards the passions, in not allowing them to get the upper hand of reason, and yet in not being quite passionless and apathetic...
Every virtue lies between two vices, which are the excess and defect of appetite respectively.¹⁰
 Kauṭilya enjoins in the case of his ideal king, that he should not go without worldly enjoyment ; he should enjoy the pleasures of the sense, though not inconsistently with the principles of equity and advantage.¹¹

Both Aristotle and Kauṭilya kept evidently in view the regulation of secular life, the normal course of life in human society. Even with regard to secular life the Buddha's doctrine of the mean did not accord a positive sanction to the enjoyment of the pleasures of sense. He had nevertheless no grudge against it, a point which is clearly brought out by Aśvaghoṣa in his *Life of The Buddha*.¹² The hankering for happiness in the sense of enjoyment of the pleasures of sense was to him a general biological principle which guided the course of life in the order of nature—*sukhakāmāni bhūtāni*.¹³ The same principle guided also the

normal course of life in human society. Taking this for granted, he would dwell on charity and virtue serving (*dāna-kathā*, *sīla-kathā*) as means of enjoying the abundance of happiness in an anthropomorphic heaven or paradise—a *sagga* which is the ordinary mortal's dreamland of *vipula sukha*.¹⁴ He would not advise any man or woman to marry, but if they approached him as a married couple, he would gladly acquaint them with his conception of the ideal and non-ideal of conjugal life. If they were indulging in sexual enjoyment without a grudge, he would extol to them the virtue of loyalty, moderation and the like. As to the householder, the labourer, the cultivator, the trader, the banker, the ruler, the teacher, the learner, his interest lay in giving them the best possible advice and guidance to proceed along the path of duty, piety, virtue, and progress. Even when certain Buddhist teachers or sects came to accord sanction to sex-indulgence or marriage, they did so on an ethical or ideal ground, and not surely on the Brahmanist's biological ground and principle of sexual congress with wife for the sake of progeny only using it as the tangible means of ensuring the immortality of the self through the continuity of the family line and the perpetuity of the race and cultural tradition. In other words, the Buddha's ethical idealism was really behind this positive sanction.¹⁵

With Aśoka the mean is ideal of administration to be fulfilled or achieved—*majham paṭipādayema*—

by avoiding the two extremes, the ideal in which the well-established rule is that not a single person should suffer from sudden arrest, coercion, or imprisonment, on the one hand, and that all people, officers and citizens, should be active and energetic in the matter of promoting sufficiently the cause of piety and virtue, the education of men and the elevation of human nature. Fulfilment or achievement carries with it and necessarily implies the idea of some definite means, and so far as Aśoka's official agents were concerned, the definite means consisted in the instructions issued or communicated to them for translating them into action in letter and spirit. The two extremes to be avoided were two sets of unwholesome mental dispositions, malignity, cruelty, and oppressiveness, on the one hand, and non-application, lethargy, and weariness for exertion, on the other. Winsome cordiality and diligence are the two traits of character that are behind the balanced state of mind or judgment which is compatible with the dynamic of conduct.¹⁶

The Jātaka doctrine of the felt mean, too, insists on the avoidance of the two extremes in administration, the drastic or despotic method, on the one hand, and the gentle or lenient method, on the other. The argument advanced in support of this is :

Paribhūto mudu hoti, atitikkho ti veravā,
etañ ca ubhayam ñatvā anumajjham samācare.¹⁷

'Disregarded is the ruler who follows too mild a method ; he who follows too severe a method

provokes hostility. Knowing these two to be such, he should give effect to that which is the felt mean.'

Kauṭilya advances the very same argument against these two extremes, and that in virtually the same language. But in his opinion wisdom between the two lies in meting out punishment as deserved.¹⁸ It involves the policy of 'Tit for Tat', of 'paying a man in his own coin' (upakāra-apakāra-yor dr̥ṣṭapratikārī). Kauṭilya's is the Kosala King's or the Great Epic's policy of 'matching severe with severe and mild with mild' :

Dalham dalhassa khipati mudussa mudunā

mudum.¹⁹

Tikṣṇakāle bhavet tikṣṇah, mṛdukāle mṛdur

bhavet.²⁰

Thus it falls short of the ethical standard of the Benares king's policy of 'conquering the wicked by goodness'—asādhum sādhunā jine—which is extolled in the Pali Rājovāda Jātaka. There may be circumstances, as Aśoka observes, in which drastic action on the part of a State, even resorting to conquest by the force of arms, is unavoidable, but he would give sanction to either of them with reluctance and precaution against excess (R. E., XIII).

Now, viewing the matter from the standpoint of mendicant or recluse life, we are to understand by Majjhima Paṭipadā of the Benares Discourse not so much the Middle Path or Via Media as the means, method, or process for the fulfilment of the doctrine or ideal of the mean. The adjectival interpretation

'middle' goes to objectify an abstract idea of the means, method or process. I am painfully aware of the difficulty of getting rid of the concrete imagery of path, course, or way (paṭipadā, magga, ayana), such as in the expressions ākarāvatī paṭipadā²¹ (formulated path), ariyo aṭṭhaṅgikamaggo²² (noble eightfold path), ujumaggo (straight path), and ekāyana²³ (one way). The same difficulty lies with the interpretation of sammādiṭṭhi, etc., whether it means the view of the right or the rightness of the view. This difficulty may be obviated if we understand by either, the samyak and rightness, just completeness or comprehensiveness with a dialectic movement of thought and a dynamic of action.

The Buddha's ideal of the mean to be realized by means or method of the samyak insists indeed on the avoidance of the two extremes (dve antā)—*ēte te ubhe ante anupagamma*. But these extremes do not necessarily imply a contrast or antagonism between household life and ascetic life, as generally supposed. The contrast is to be historically interpreted in one and the same context of the life of those who have run away from household life—the pabbajitas. The contrast is drawn between two anuyogas or yogic modes, the rājayoga and the haṭhayoga,²⁴ one through the enjoyment of the pleasures of sense and the other through self-mortification (*atta-kilamatha, dukkara-kārikā*); one having for its maxim: *Sukhena sukhaṃ adhigan-*

tabbam—through delight to delight, and the other : Dukkheṇa Sukhaṁ adhigantabbam—through hardship to bliss.²⁵ The first maxim means that through the experience and enjoyment of delight in the pleasures of life and in everything of the world the yogin comes to experience and enjoy the delight in beatitude. The second maxim means that the yogin or aspirant must undergo all manner of hardship, penances and austerities in order to realize the blissful nature of soul, the tranquil state of the self, the purity and spirituality of internal nature, the supreme condition of consciousness. In the Buddha's opinion, the five pleasures of sense are the noose (pāsa) that binds us to things mundane,²⁶ and self-mortification is useless as means²⁷ of enlightenment and internal purity. The yoga method on the basis of samyak, in its all-embracing character, is dignified, rational, effective, and progressive.²⁸

At the same time the Buddha is not without sincere appreciation for a person who appears clad in a raiment made of rags, and who has become lean and emaciated while meditating alone in the wood.²⁹ And against Māra's invitation to the regulated life of a man of the world offering oblations to fire and acquiring much merit instead of following the difficult mode of mental exertion through penances and privations, his definite reply is that he would rather prefer the latter as the means of obtaining the supreme experience :

Tassa m'evaṁ viharato pattass'uttamavedanam.³⁰

The Pali anuyoga as employed in the Benares Discourse is a term of the Buddha's yogic phraseology, meaning as it does an inner or internal application of mind. It stands for the third step or stage in the yogic method or process, the previous two steps or stages being represented by ātappa (strenuousness in exercise, rather physical or physiological) and padhāna (strengthening of the will towards the aim): sammā ātappaṃ anvāya, padhānaṃ anvāya, anuyogaṃ anvāya.³¹

In the realm of thought, too, whether it be ontological, logical or ethical, the Buddha's doctrine of the mean is indispensable as complement to his doctrine of the samyak or synthetic, and *vice versa*. Here, too, his doctrine of the mean avoids the two extremes while his doctrine of the synthetic proceeds with its own mode of thinking and with its own outlook on life and things to synthesize them in the sense of making them significant in essence or spirit. His is not the way of the dogmatist tenaciously adhering to one or the other extreme position, nor is it that of the eclectic admitting both the extremes, each in its own sense, on its own ground, and from its own standpoint, nor even that of the sceptic avoiding the issues.³² Nowhere commitment is made to any of the four positions in the Laws of Thought (catuṣkoṭi). It is not that the Buddha discourages the metaphysical speculation or is afraid of facing the issue; he does not simply admit the validity of the form in which the problem is stated,³³

whereas the sceptic admits the problem as stated but suspends his judgment thereon.

In the Buddha's case, his doctrine of the samyak demands that the extremes must be synthesized in their true spirit in such a manner that they will acquire their best meaning and value in an independent mode of thinking and judgment.³⁴

The two extremes to be avoided in the Buddha's doctrine of the mean as to the ontological thought consist of these two antagonistic axioms :

(i) That all exists—sabbam atthi ti—an eternalistic thesis ;

(ii) that nothing exists—sabbam n'atthi ti—an annihilationistic thesis.³⁵

As to the logical thought, the two extremes are :

(i) That all things are pre-determined by a cause, single efficient cause, God, Fate, Time, or the like—sabbe pubbekatahetu—a determinist thesis ;³⁶

(ii) that all things emerge without a cause, proximate or remote—sabbe ahetu-appaccayā—a fortuist thesis.³⁷

And as to the ethical thought, they stand for these two axioms :

(i) That the happiness and misery are one's own creation—sukhadukkham sayamkatam ;

(ii) that the happiness and misery are created by an agent or cause other than the self—sukhadukkham paramkatam.³⁸

The Buddha's doctrine of the samyak seeks to meet all the three thought-situations by his doctrine

of paṭiccasamuppāda or pratītyasamutpāda as viewed from an intuitional or objective, a conceptual or subjective, a doctrinal, logico-architectonic or psycho-ethical standpoint.

Historically viewed, each doctrine of the mean appears as a synthetic landmark, while between any pair of the extremes we are to witness centuries of evolution, whether of thoughts, or of beliefs, or of modes and ways.³⁹ The result which followed therefrom differed from time to time. The synthesis reached, for instance, in the Īśa Upaniṣad, a text of the Vājasaneyya school, as between the two extremes, the opinion that the immortality of the self is possible only through avidyā implying the continuity of the family-line through progeny, on the one hand, and the opinion that it is possible only through vidyā implying a life of renunciation and lonely meditation, on the other, came to serve as a philosophic foundation of the Brahmanist scheme of self-training through four āśramas or stages of life. The Vājasaneyyas opined that after overcoming death in the sense of the discontinuity of the family-line through avidyā, one realizes the immortality of soul through vidyā :

Avidyayā mṛtyum tīrtvā vidyayāmṛtam aśnute.⁴⁰

The synthetic landmark reached through Nāgārjuna's doctrine of the mean came to suggest two different view-points of truth, namely, conventional or scientific (sāmṃvṛtika) and transcendental (pāramārthika).⁴¹ Nāgārjuna wanted to maintain

that although the Sarvāstivāda or Abhidharma position as to the concepts being the handy ideal symbols or mental counterparts of the facts of experience was untenable when tested by the transcendental dialectic of śūnyatā, its validity was not challengeable when seen and judged from the conventional or scientific standpoint.

If so, it will not be correct to maintain : 'The philosophy of India, as we understand it, has not been the result of accumulation of thoughts and ideas, promulgated by different philosophers at different periods of history. It is like the organic growth of a full-grown tree into its branches, foliage and fruits from the power of a seed which merely unfolds itself by inner growth and differentiation and not by external accretion.'⁴² The propounder of the view is evidently inspired and guided by the Chāndogya poetical imagery of a huge banyan tree as given in its germinal form in a tiny seed. Even apart from other considerations, the synthetic landmarks themselves must have to be taken as definite and distinct chronological landmarks in the development of Indian thought.

Here I am not arguing certainly for the applicability of Hegel's triple dialectic method of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis to the process of development of thoughts which forms the subject matter of a history of philosophy. But if one of the two extremes be regarded as the thesis and the other the anti-thesis, we may certainly expect to reach some-

where in a subsequent thought, a synthesis of the two, which means some kind of transcendence including both what is affirmed and what is denied. In the dialectic of history the partisans of the extremes are either different individual thinkers, or schools, or even trends of thought, and at the stage of synthesis there may emerge different kinds or types with different bearings on contemporary and subsequent trends of thought.

The question arises : if the Buddha's doctrine of the mean insists on the avoidance of the two extremes judged as errors (micchā), how is it possible for his doctrine of the samyak to include them in a new synthetic development of thought? With the Buddha, precisely as with Hegel, the micchādiṭṭhi implies just an onesided view (ekaṅgadassana), a partial truth, and not an erroneous view. Its defect is its inadequacy, incompleteness or incomprehensiveness. If thus the case of a micchādiṭṭhika be like that of a blind man describing correctly an elephant in terms of the likeness of a particular limb of the animal touched and felt by him, and if all the individual descriptions taken together refer to the animal as a whole,⁴³ the Buddha's position cannot be differentiated from the eclectic's way of perceiving and appreciating truth in all affirmations and denials. Here the parable of the blind man and the elephant is inapt. The fact of the case is that the Buddha's own mode of thinking proceeds on a fluxional view

of reality, and not on a static view. If it is seen to proceed occasionally on a static basis, it is just by the way. Here the extremes remain and die in the background as parent ideas or contributory factors, while the samyak or synthetic emerges as the offspring with its own growth, movement, and development.

NOTES

1. Buddhist Suttas, S. B. E., p. 141.
2. J. R. A. S., Bombay Branch, New Series, Vol. XV, 1939, p. 74.
3. B. C. Law, op. cit., p. 75.
4. Jātaka, IV, p. 192.
5. S. R. E., I.
6. Saṃyutta, II, p. 77 ; III, p. 15 ; Aṅguttara, I, p. 173 ; III, p. 440.
7. W. T. Stace, A Critical History of Greek Philosophy, Macmillan 1946, p. 318.
8. Majjhima, I, p. 304.
9. Papañca-sūdanī, II, p. 370.
10. Stace, op. cit., p. 318.
11. Arthaśāstra, I, 7 : Na nissukhaḥ syāt. Dharmārthā-virodhena kāmam seveta.
12. Buddhacarita, IV, 70-86 : B. C. Law, Aśvaghoṣa, p. 79.
13. Dhammapada, 131.
14. Ibid., 27.
15. Kathāvatthu, XXIII, 1 : ekādhippāyo methuno dhammo paṭisevitabbo—'With united resolve sex may be indulged in'. See Commentary. Cf. the Sarvāstivāda argument in favour of marriage which the Lalitavistara, Chap. VII, puts into the mouth of the Bodhisattva.
16. Barua, Asoka and His Inscriptions, Pt. I, pp. 252ff.
17. Jātaka, IV, p. 192.
18. Arthaśāstra, I, 4 : yathārha-daṇḍaḥ. pūjyaḥ. Cf. Mahābhārata, XII, 56, 40-41.
19. Rājovāda Jātaka, No. 151.
20. Mahābhārata, XII, 140-65.
21. Majjhima, II, p. 35.

22. Dhammapada, 273.
23. Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta : ekāyano ayaṃ bhikkhave maggo sattānaṃ visuddhiyā.
24. Yogatattva Upaniṣad, 23 ; Barua, Ceylon Lectures, p. 270.
25. Majjhima, I, p. 93 ; B. C. Law, Mahāvīra : His Life and Teachings, pp. 66ff.
26. Majjhima, I, p. 173.
27. Ibid., I, pp. 85ff.
28. Cf. Dhammapada, vs. 141-142.
29. Dhammapada, v, 395.
30. Padhāna Sutta, v. 11.
31. Dīgha, I, p. 13.
32. Ibid., p. 27 ; Barua, A History of Pre-Buddhist Indian Philosophy, p. 329.
33. Majjhima, I, pp. 7ff.
34. Aṅguttara, V, p. 119 ; Miss I. B. Horner's comment in her article—Gotama and the other sects, Journal of the American Oriental Society, Vol. 64, No. 4, 1946, p. 284.
35. Saṃyutta, II, p. 17 ; III, p. 135.
- 36-37. Aṅguttara, I, p. 173 ; Majjhima, II, p. 217.
38. Saṃyutta, II, p. 19 ; cf. Dīgha, III, p. 137.
39. Barua, op. cit., pp. 405ff.
40. Barua, op. cit., pp. 354ff.
41. These two view-points were readily accepted also in Theravāda Buddhism (Papañcasūdanī, II, p. 203 ; B. C. Law, Buddhaghosa, p. 85) and Advaita Vedānta.
42. H. M. Bhattacharyya, The Principles of Philosophy, 1944, p. 10.
43. Udāna, pp. 61ff.

VI

THE BASIC CONCEPT OF BUDDHISM

Though it may sound rather strange to say that every great thinker or true philosopher of the world is really a man of one thought, it is nevertheless a truism in history. Just as a central idea, called moral, runs through an epic narrative interweaving various episodes into a unity, so a central thought pervades a whole system of thought or of faith built upon its basic concept or creed. As regards Buddhism, its concept is *pratitya-samutpāda*, a term which has been variously represented in English by 'causal genesis', 'dependent origination' and 'causation'. We need not quarrel over words. Let us better try to realize its full philosophic and doctrinal significance as the basic concept of Buddhism in general and of Buddhist thought in particular.

In the *Ariya-pariyesana Sutta*, Buddha tells us that the noble quest which had impelled him to pass from home into the homeless state of a wanderer or seeker of truth happily led him to a twofold discovery, viz., (1) that of the *iha-pratyayatā pratitya-samutpāda*, and (2) that of *nirvāṇa*. The discovery meant the finding out of the thing or

things longed for. That was in Buddha's case the non-contingent, that which is not subject to the limiting conditions of life and existence.¹

If thus the claim made be that of a discovery only, it stands to reason to premise that the discoverer himself does not create the thing he discovers but simply finds it out as it is (yathābhūtaṁ). Buddha's discovery is, therefore, aptly compared to the accidental discovery by a traveller of an old, buried and forgotten city as well as of the path leading to it.² Hence was his well-deserved epithet of Tathāgata meaning the Truth-finder and Path-finder. Buddhism which as an outcome of that discovery became thus both a way of truth and a way of life. As a way of truth it became concerned with the thing as it is or the things as they are, and as a way of life its concern was with the thing as it ought to be or the things as they should be, i. e., the ideal or ideals of life conformably to the form or forms of truth as stated as well as to the nature of reality as discovered. To be intelligible to human understanding and effective as guidance to thought and action the form or forms of truth must be either philosophical or scientific, logical or psychological. To be inspiring to life and appealing to human heart and effective in their diverse expressions, the form of the ideal or ideals must be either ethical or aesthetic, literary or artistic, social or political, religious or educational, national or international.

So far as the mental or subjective aspect of the discovery goes, it is an unprecedented experience with an objective content referring to an existing fact, an actuality or a reality. This experience has to pass successively through three mental modes before it becomes a public property as a body of doctrine and discipline (dharmavinayam) or a system of thought and faith, namely intuitional or mystical, conceptual or apprehensible, and architectonic or systematic. With each mode is connected a particular form of mental activity, whether it be n etic, ideational or rational where the prospect of success calls up the emotion of joy (priti) and the attainment of success is followed by the enjoyment of self satisfaction, happiness, bliss or beatitude (sukha). The experience which is presentative at the second and expressive or presentable at the third.

According to the Pali scholiast Dhammap la, whilst reflecting on the nature of reality the Blessed One got hold of the causal genesis in his mind.³ This may be taken to mean that with Dhammap la pratitya-samutp da or causal genesis represents the true nature of reality. But in the words of Buddha, the term is applicable as much to the true nature of reality as intuited as to the true nature of reality as conceived and formulated ; it is applicable to the same as presented, interpreted, expounded, elaborated and applied.

Pratitya-samutp da as intuited in its presentative

character is otherwise known as *paurāṇa-dharmasthititā*, and it stands for the ancient or eternal nature of reality which exists by its own right independently of the advent of the Tathāgatas, independently of all modes of knowing and all forms of thought-construction and rational interpretation. The same as conceived or formulated in its representative character is otherwise known as *pratyātmadharmasthititā*,⁴ and it stands for the basic concept of Buddhism and Buddhist thought as the unalterable cosmic law. The same as presented, interpreted, expounded, elaborated, elucidated and applied is known variously by the name of *pratyayākāras*⁵ (causal forms), *satyas* (truths), and the like, and all of them stand for the various architectonics of thought as well as the moral law. The ideals of life and action are set out in conformity with the truths as formulated and presented. The truths are formulated on the basis of the central concept, while the central concept has behind it the nature of reality as intuited or experienced. The Buddhist creed formula, *ye dharmāḥ hetuprabhavāḥ*, etc., applies to *pratītya-samutpāda* as conceived, formulated, presented, interpreted and applied. Regarding the *paurāṇa-dharmasthititā*, the *pratyātmadharmasthititā*, and the system of thought and faith based upon the second, Buddha's significant statement in the *Saṃyutta* is : "Because of birth, monks, decay-and-death. Whether there be an arising of

Tathāgatas, or whether there be no such arising, in each this nature of things stands, this causal status, this orderliness, the relatedness of this to that. Concerning that the Tathāgata is fully enlightened; that he fully understands. Fully enlightened, fully understanding, he declares it, teaches it reveals it, sets it forth, manifests, explains, makes it plain, saying : Behold ! Conditioned by this, that comes to be."⁶

In the above statement, Buddha clearly refers to and distinguishes between the three successive mental modes :

(1) becomes enlightened or awakened as to the nature of reality which exists by its own right—*abhisambujjhati* ;

(2) formulates with the suggestion therefrom the fundamental law of the cosmos, which is to say, forms the basic concept of his doctrine—*abhisameti* ;

(3) states, addresses, sets forth, establishes, discloses, expounds, elucidates, in short, presents as a system—*ācikkhati*, *deseti* etc.

Pratītya-samutpāda as the essential nature of reality is characterized in Pāli as the elementary datum of experience, the standing order of becoming (*dhammaṭṭhitatā*), the way of the happening of things (*dhammaniyāmatā*), suchness, orderliness (*tathatā*), uncontrariness (*avitathatā*), Unother-wiseness (*anaññathatā*), background of relatedness (*idappaccayatā*). It is further characterized in the *Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra* and other *Mahāyāna*

treatises by such predicates as vacuity (śūnyatā), realness (bhūtātā) and actuality (satyatā). The same set of predicates applies, *mutatis mutandis*, also to pratītyasamutpāda as formulated, presented, interpreted and applied, though in a somewhat different sense.⁷

The positive thesis of the philosophy of Nāgārjuna, who is not without reason honoured in the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra as the second Buddha, is generally missed. This is, however, clearly stated in the two opening verses of his Kārikā. These indicate that Nāgārjuna's primary interest was to call attention to the pratītya-samutpāda as the fundamental nature of reality which is not capable of verbal representations and not apprehensible by the intellect, the mode of understanding. It refuses to accept all the predicates the intellect can devise, e. g. cessation (nirodha), origination (utpāda), annihilation (uccheda), eternality (śāśvata), singleness (ekārtha), manifoldness (nānārtha), advent (āgama), and egress (nirgama). The only mental mode of witnessing or being face to face with it is intuition, immediate preception, first-hand experience or direct vision, all being means within the reach of mysticism. The powerful dialectics employed throughout his Kārikā are directed to expose the incapacity of all the intellectual and verbal modes of representing that nature of reality as it is, as it exists by its own right, independently of all thinkers and all ideal construc-

tions. If the last word of Nāgārjuna's dialectics be 'be quiet', it only means the futility of the modes of understanding and the expressions of language as means of representing and stating that nature of reality, and nothing else. The incapacity of intellect and language is not to be used as proof against the objective reality of that nature as intuited, witnessed or experienced, the nature of reality to which the Buddha felt with the deepest conviction that he became supremely enlightened (*abhisambuddho*). The utility of this intuition or supreme experience is not denied, for therein lies the means of stopping all aberrations of intellect and getting tranquillity which is the *summum bonum* (*prapañcopaśama śiva*).

Dr. Satkari Mookerjee characteristically observes : "The Sautrāntika may rejoin that (his) philosophy is the most perfect possible explanation of the objective world and is absolutely immune from the logical difficulties which are the besetting sins of other realistic philosophies. But the justice and validity of this claim have been disputed by Nāgārjuna and Śaṅkara, who have shown in unmistakable language that causation is the hidden rock on which the barque of realism has suffered shipwreck."⁸ But reading between the lines, one cannot fail to understand that here Nāgārjuna's way of thinking is not different from the general Buddhist way. Pratītya-samutpāda or the essential nature of reality which exists by its own right is

not the law of causation as conceived, formulated and applied. Proceeding from the experience with its elementary datum, one may come to conceive and formulate the law of causation or dependent origination, but one cannot resolve it back into the experience itself which occurred once only when it occurred and remains nevertheless a point of reference to *pratitya-samutpāda* conceived and formulated as the law of causation. According to the general Buddhist way of thinking, one may proceed from a chemical combination of all the ingredients used to account for the possibility of the preparation of a dish of pudding, but one cannot for that reason resolve the taste of the pudding, which is something unique, into the separate tastes of the ingredients themselves that have lost their individualities in course of the cooking.⁹ The experience which is a momentary affair and never occurs twice in one and the same form accounts similarly for the possibility of the conception and formulation of a law of causation, and the law of causation or the system of thought built upon it derives its significance therefrom but that does not mean that the experience is restorable from the law itself, far less its elementary objective *datum* which is not an ideal construction, and hence deserves the name of an *asaṃskṛta dhātu* or uncreated element of reality, as it is constituted, mind can just once peep into the nature of reality as it flashes through intuition or mystical experience.

Now, considered with reference to the noble quest described in the Ariyapariyesana Sutta, is the discovery claimed to have been made by Buddha, twofold or single? If twofold, are we not compelled to entertain the notion of there being two *asamṣkṛta dhātus* or uncreated elements of reality, namely, *pratītya-samutpāda* and *nirvāṇa*, which is logically absurd?¹⁰ The uncreated elementary objective *datum* of experience must be single or unitary. But how is it stated to be double or twofold? Suppose we assume that *pratītyasamutpāda* alone is the element of reality, can it not be shown that *nirodha* or *nirvāṇa* is just a side-issue or an aspect of it?

Whether we objectively watch cosmic life, or individual life or life of consciousness, we can have just momentary peeps or glimpses, into it. At the most we can have 'point instants' or 'snapshot views' within a limited duration. In the kaleidoscopic or cinematographic view, one picture seems to pass away or to appear in quick succession or in an order or sequence, while just one picture is always present before the eyes that gaze on without reflecting or thinking. The impression left on the mind of the observer is that of the movement of pictures or appearances in the continuity of an order of change or becoming, in short, of orderliness in a continuity of which the first beginning (*pubbakoti*, *pubbanta*) and the ultimate end (*aparakoti*, *aparanta*) cannot be seen and determined. So far as the cosmic life, individual life,

individual life or life of consciousness is concerned, certain experiences occur that remind us of those occurred in the past and are preserved in memory. But for the memory, the experiences that occurred previously would be lost or non-existent for ever. If the case be that of a person continuing to write a new figure on a black board with his right hand and to efface the old figure with his left, there is present always a single figure before the observer and that which is effaced is gone for ever. But for the memory the past is past, the present is present and the future (anāgata) is that which is not come, that which is yet to be. With regard to the past, the correct statement is 'that it was' (ahosi), with regard to the present 'that it is' (etarahi paccuppanno) and with regard to the future, 'that it will be' (bhavissati).¹¹ There is no other mental mode of describing historically the event watched than representing it in terms of the three portions of time, viz., a past (atīta), a present (paccuppanna), and a future (anāgata), while the event itself has nothing to do with these mental modes that introduce into it the ideas of sequence, succession and duration, and thus relate it to the concepts suggestive of time and its reality. As we watch, that which strikes us is the continuity of a process of genesis at every juncture (pratisandhi) of which are to be noticed something ceasing to be and something coming-to-be, in other words, nirodha and utpāda, but the objective *datum* of

experience is always the utpanna or something which has come-to-be. Something which has ceased-to-be becomes a thing of the past, non-existent for us but for memory. We proceed from the utpanna dharma to utpanna dharma, the ceasing-to-be and the coming-to-be being the mental modes of representing the junctures in the process of genesis. The observed order of sequence applies to one utpanna dharma ceasing-to-be and to another utpanna-dharma coming-to-be. One can say, therefore, that the notion of cessation is just a side-issue and a negative aspect of the fact of sequence, either that something having ceased-to-be, something ceased-to-be, or that something having come-to-be, something came-to-be. This indeed is known as the original formulation (ādinaya) of pratītya-samutpāda conceived as the fundamental law or mode of happening in the process of genesis :

- (1) Imasmim sati idaṃ hoti imass' uppādā
idaṃ uppajjati ;
- (2) Imasmim asati idaṃ na hoti, imassa
nirodhā idaṃ nirujjhati.

The first setting, called anuloma-desanā, is set forth in terms of advent or appearance, and the second, called paṭiloma-desanā, is set forth in terms of cessation or disappearance.¹² In the second Pali Abhidhamma text called Vibhaṅga, as well as in the Sarvāstivāda texts, the paṭiloma-deśanā is altogether dispensed with and just the anuloma-desanā, is retained.¹³

In the above formulation of the general law of genesis, happening or becoming, the mental representation or verbal statement is in terms of sequence between two utpanna-dharmas, one ceasing-to-be and the other coming-to-be. If we cannot causally connect or interrelate them, the building up of a system of thought is impossible. When we causally inter-relate them in thought we make different causal relations out of the simple fact of sequence, and take them to subsist between the paccayas (causal factors, conditions or circumstances) and the paccayupanna-dhammas (causally induced states, i. e. effects).¹⁴ If the causal relation subsumed between two successive events or stages in a process of genesis involving the notions of advent and cessation, single terms are the convenient devices of thought to designate these events or stages. The notion of temporal sequence is out of place in the causal interpretation of an event, which when it takes place, takes place as a unit with regard to time and is to be viewed as a common performance of several causal factors and condition in their momentary unification. One may think of simultaneity but not of priority or posteriority.¹⁵ If anyone speaks here of priority, it must be understood in a logical sense (uppāda-paccayaṭṭhena).¹⁶ A rational explanation of the possibility of the occurrence of an event, mental or otherwise, lies not in any single efficient cause (eka kārana), whether it be God or Time or Fate,

but in a conjuncture of circumstances (paccaya-sāmaggi, samavāya), a view, which is in different ways adopted in the Sāṃkhya, Pūrvamīmāṃsā, Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika system of Indian thought. Though Pali scholiast Buddhaghosa pleads for the plurality of causes (aneka-hetuto vutti),¹⁷ Buddhist realism stands really for the unification (samavāya or ekikaraṇa) or combination of causal factors and circumstances excluding the idea of mere juxtaposition or collocation.¹⁸ The unification or combination must be sufficient to account for the possibility of the result produced.

The general law of happening in terms of temporal sequence (tabbhāva-tabbhāvitā)¹⁹ with its causal implication was sought to be illustrated by a causal scheme of life exhibiting the twelve successive stages in the process of genesis, each denoted by a single term, aṅga or nidāna. The twelve terms are avidyā, saṃskāra, vijñāna, nāmarūpa, ṣaḍāyatana, sparśa, vedanā, tṛṣṇā, upādāna, bhava, jāti followed by jarā-maraṇa-śoka-paridevana-upāyāśāḥ. The convenient mode of expressing the causal nexus between any two successive stages is because of this, that : avidyā-pratyayāt saṃskārāḥ, saṃskāra-pratyayāt vijñānam, etc. Unfortunately this illustrative causal scheme represented as a wheel of life (bhava-cakra),²⁰ has been mistaken for the whole of pratītya-samutpāda conceived and formulated as a general law of happening. The illustrative (yadidaṃ)

causal scheme, as its twelve terms and eleven links indicate, is suited only to represent the common experience of mankind and animal world in connection with the biological development of an individual and its bearings on the feelings of others interested in his welfare. If we stop at jarā-maraṇa (decay-and-death), the scheme applies only to the biological career of an individual from its beginning to its end. The three terms, śoka, paridevana and upāyāsa (sorrow, lamentation and despair), represent the painful feelings of the kith and kin of a person on account of his death, and should, therefore, be omitted, as Vasubandhu has done, while discussing the biological career of an individual qua individual. The continuity of the biological career carries with it the notion of sequence or succession of ātmabhāvas, bodily appearances or individual existences within limited durations. Before we proceed further with the discussion, we should consider Vasubandhu's interpretation of pratītya-samutpāda in the Abhidharmakośa and Yaśomitra's interpretation of the same in his Abhidharmakośa-vyākhyā.

Vasubandhu and Yaśomitra seem to interpret pratītya-samutpāda, the former tacitly and the latter explicitly, under its four aspects, viz., (1) as representing the momentary character of all forms in which the nature of reality presents itself to experience, i. e., as kṣaṇika-pratītya-samutpāda, (2) as representing the continuity of the order of

becoming, i. e., as *prākarṣika-pratītya-samutpāda*, (3) as involving the idea of inter-relation between cause and effect, i. e., as *sāmbandhika-samutpāda*, and (4) as differentiating the successive stages in the career of individuals, i. e., as *āvasthika-pratītya-samutpāda*.²¹ According to Vasubandhu, by the causal scheme of life Buddha meant the *āvasthika* aspect, and by the twelve terms outlining the same, the twelve successive stages, each exhibiting predominance of a particular feature, whether it be *avidyā*, *saṃskāra* or the like. At each stage is to be recognized a particular organic combination or development of the five aggregates.²²

In this architectonic of thought conceived in terms of the three portions of time, out of the twelve *nidānas* the first two, namely, *avidyā* and *saṃskāra*, are relegated to past, the last two, namely, *jāti* and *jarā-maraṇa*, to future, and the middle eight, from *vijñāna* to *bhava*, to present. The *nidānas* are classified also under three heads, viz., *kleśa*, *karma* and *vastu*. *Avidyā*, *trṣṇā* and *upādāna* are to be treated as *kleśas*, i. e., the mental properties or co-efficients that stain or contaminate our nature, the nature of consciousness (*citta*). *Saṃskāra* and *bhava* stand for *karmas* or the volitional phases of action shaping the destiny or determining the form of birth and rebirth. The remaining seven signify *vastus* or *loci* of *kleśa* and *karma*; these stand also for *phalas* or resultants.²³

Viewed under the *āvasthika* aspect of *pratītya-*

samutpāda, the process of genesis gives rise to the idea of an orderly sequence between successive ātmabhāvas or bodily appearances within limited durations of life (addhā). The junctures in the connected narrative of a continuous biography are called sandhis or pratisandhis. Here the past existence or episode is represented as followed by the present, and the present by the future. So far as the past existence is concerned, we are required to take cognizance of these two distinctive features, viz., avidyā and saṁskāra. Here vidyā and avidyā stand for two kinds of knowledge running counter to each other, just as two enemies who are both men are hostile to each other in their intentions and actions.²⁴ The term avidyā does not imply the absence, abhāva of vidyā or knowledge of some kind.²⁵ The real difference between the two lies in the fact that the animal instincts and impulses, sex-urges and lower passions are subservient to one kind of knowledge²⁶ and the higher instincts and impulses and nobler desires and ideas are led by the other kind. Vasubandhu defines the avidyā stage as the total natural disposition of the animal instincts and impulses, sex-urges and lower passions of an individual in his past life, and the saṁskāra stage as the sum total of the effects of past deeds of an individual as determining his destiny.²⁷

As to the present life, the vijñāna stage is the condition of the individual just at the moment of conception and at the inception of organic develop-

ment. The next stage, called *nāma-rūpa*, covers the period of organic development, the development of the foetus in the womb, prior to the development of the six sense-organs. This is immediately followed by the *ṣaḍāyatana* stage which is just prior to the stage of *sparśa* in which the organs of sense begin to function, bringing the individual into contact with the external world and enabling him to communicate with and feel interested in persons and things other than himself.²⁸ In the *sparśa* stage the individual acquires the potentiality for experiencing different feelings. The *vedanā* stage prevails when the individual begins to experience certain feelings for an object of enjoyment, and it is followed by the *trṣṇā* stage when he conceives the longing for the object during its enjoyment.²⁹ The next is the stage of *upādāna* when the individual runs after the objects of enjoyments for obtaining them. In the *bhava* stage he begins to perform such deeds as may enable him to attain to the desired future state.³⁰ In relation to the future life, the *trṣṇā* and *upādāna* stages act as the *avidyā* stage, and the *bhava* takes the place of the *saṃskāra*. In the scheme of future life the *jāti* stage is just another name for the *vijñāna* and the term *jarā-maraṇa* denotes the stages from the *nāma-rūpa* to the *vedanā*.³¹

The poetical imagery depicting the *āvasthika pratītya-samutpāda* as a *bhavacakra* or wheel of life must be handled with caution. If in the order

of sequence one ātmabhāva be followed by another and the second be neither the same as, nor quite different from, the first, there is no room for the imagery of a wheel, the series running as $a, a^1, a^2, a^3, a^4, \dots, a^n$.

The imagery comes in only in so far as similar stages recur in the same theoretical order of sequence in each ātmabhāva, and yet we are not to picture to ourselves the procession by the analogy of a single wheel in motion, it going on rather in a spiral or chainlike movement.

Vasubandhu maintains that the above formulation of the law of āvasthika-pratītya-samutpāda was intended to set at rest all doubts as to the past, present and future existences of individuals as individuals.³² The typical questions raised concerning the three are : Did I exist in the past or not, do I exist now or not, shall I exist in future or not, after having been what I am now what I am, what shall I become after having been what I am now ? These questions as problems are said to have been discarded by Buddha in the Sabbāsava Sutta on the simple ground that to admit the questions is to beg the questions, i. e., to admit the answers suggested in them. Arguing therefrom one is apt to arrive at one or the other of the following six conclusions : that one possesses an entity, that one does not possess an entity, that one knows self by self, that one knows not-self by self, that one knows self by not self, that there is a soul or percipient within

him, and that soul is the only entity which perdures through the whole series of bodily changes, not itself being liable to change.³³

All that Vasubandhu means amounts to saying that by the above statement of the law the Blessed One both avoided and met the two extreme positions of self-existence and self-extinction, in other words, of eternalism and annihilationism. To subsume an entity, be it soul or spirit, which remains unaffected by organic transformations is to take up an arbitrary position in a reality where all things change but the soul or spirit alone enjoys the imperial or royal prerogative of remaining where it is, being always above the law. Nowhere in the process of genesis, in no stage of individual existence, is to be noticed such disparity between one element of reality and another, i. e., between matter and spirit, body and soul. Wherever there is any bodily appearance or individual existence, there is an inseparable combination of the five aggregates, all being equally subject to one and the same law of causal genesis. But the question still is—how far will the procession go without coming to an end for good? Does or does not nirvāṇa imply, in other words the total cessation of the process of becoming meaning the *uccheda* or annihilation of individuality, of a changing individuality?

Once we assume that nirvāṇa means the cessation of the eschatological process of individuality, there is no escape from the charge of annihilationism

which was always denied by Buddha. If, from the eschatological point of view, we say with Ajita Keśakambala, a veritable Cārvāka philosopher, that individuality ceases with death, and after death a person is not, it is a bold case of annihilationism. Suppose the next man comes and avers that to completely get rid of individuality one must utterly exhaust the karmic force, which is not possible through the effort of one life. Individuality ceases entirely to be only when a perfect man dies after experiencing the first state of trance. The third man pleads for the second state and the ninth man for the eighth, and the Buddhist were to come at last to plead for the ninth state of samāpatti. Can we defend any of them against the above charge?³⁴ The Vedānta position is no better if it be likely this that individual selves become ultimately merged in the universal self like the rivers losing themselves in the sea, abandoning their separate entities. The Sāṃkhya position is worse if it means that when an individual reaches the highest conceivable stage of perfection, after death his soul becomes separated for ever from prakṛti or matter, which contains the potentiality and possibility for all organic changes, including mental. Is this precisely the ultimate eschatological position to which we are led by the logical conclusion from the trend of Buddha's āvasthika pratītya-samutpāda?

We can well appreciate Buddha when he took Bhikṣu Svāti to task for construing his philosophic

thought as implying that vijñāna alone runs from existence to existence through the entire series of embodiments. By vijñāna Svātī obviously kept in view the Upaniṣadic vijñānātman or soul made up of a mass of intelligence (vijñānaghana)³⁵ or bare consciousness. But the criticism put into the mouth of Buddha goes to show that the word vijñāna was taken to mean sense-cognitions and not that because of which these mental acts and developments are possible, i. e., the bhavāṅga citta or ālaya-vijñāna—the life-continuum, the individuated consciousness.³⁶ Even if Svātī's vijñāna were taken in this very sense, he could not be absolved from the guilt of misrepresentation. There is nowhere this suggestion that vijñāna or citta alone can exist apart from being a component factor in some form or other of the organic unity of the five aggregates.

We can similarly appreciate that in the Khandha Saṃyutta Bhikṣu Yamaja is severely criticised for having given out that as he construed Buddha's doctrine, it meant the cessation of the process of individuality of an Arahant with death. To put it in his own words, "on the dissolution of the body a kṣīṇāśrava becomes annihilated as an individual, after death he is not (i. e., does not evolve further)." The stereotyped Buddhist arguments employed to bring the upholder of the wrong opinion to a right way of thinking are to these three effects : (1) that none of the five aggregates as constituents of an

individual existence is a permanent entity ; (2) that in no stage an individuality is identifiable either with a single aggregate or with a sum total of all five aggregates ; and (3) that no individuality in any of its stages is conceivable apart (aññatra) from the five aggregates.³⁷

By the illustrative formula, because of avidyā, saṃskāra, because of saṃskāra, vijñāna, etc. just one aspect of āvasthika pratītya-samutpāda is sought to be brought out. Viewing in the light of this particular formula, we are to picture to ourselves an orderly sequence of the various stages of individual life with avidyā, saṃskāra etc. as their distinctive features. In Theravāda Buddhism, this formula is supplemented by another, namely, because of the cessation (nirodha) of avidyā, the cessation of saṃskāra, because of the cessation of saṃskāra, the cessation of vijñāna, etc., to bring out another aspect of the same. Viewing in the light of this second illustrative formula, we are to picture to ourselves an orderly sequence of the various stages of individual life with avidyā-nirodha, saṃskāra-nirodha, etc., as their distinctive features. The nirvāṇa stage is to be reached when there takes place a complete cessation of avidyā as well as of the instincts, impulses, passions and desires led by it (avijjāya asesā-virāga-nirodhā). Considered from this point of view, nirvāṇa, which is held out as the *summum bonum* of life, is negatively characterised as a state implying the exhaustion or

extinction of all āśravas, the complete cessation of avidyā and of duḥkha. This has led many a critic of Buddhism, particularly John Caird, to think that Buddhism offers us but 'a heaven of nothingness' as the goal of life, which is to say, that in Buddhism the world has arrived only at a negative result.³⁸ This is undoubtedly due to the sequential setting of the stages of life in terms of nirodha and kṣaya, instead of in terms of samudaya and pāripūri.

In point of fact, whether such a setting be in terms of one or the other, behind it is the reality of causal genesis, the trend of life tuning through the successive stages of development. Neither the course of cosmic life, nor that of individual life, nor even that of the life of consciousness is negated thereby; it is on the contrary, posited. By negating it, we render the significance of all such causal settings and thought schemes of existence and of life and experience nugatory. The negation of it means the denial of the factual reality existing by its own right on which these must have their bearings in order to be significant both in thought and in the life of efforts.

To understand Buddha's real trend of thought one may do no better than to take clue from its various mātikās or architectonics. According to one of them, four are the expressed or implied aims of a life of efforts, namely, the stoppage (lit. non-production) of the appearance of those sinful and unwholesome states that have not as yet arisen,

getting rid of such states that have already arisen, the inducement of those wholesome states that have not as yet arisen, and the preservation, non-confusion, augmentation, increase in magnitude, development and fulness of wholesome states that have arisen.³⁹ Here the first two aims relate to *nirodha* or *kṣaya* and represent its two modes, and the last two relate to *samudaya* and denote its two modes. Does it not follow from this way of stating the matter that the aim, upon the whole, is the fulfilment (*pāripūri*) of all the higher possibilities of life ? The question of negation arises only when we think of getting rid of and guarding against those diseased states and future diseases that stand in the way of the healthy development of life and its progressive course.

But we must also consider here the implication of two other architectonics of Buddha's thought. Going by them, we are to adopt two different modes in classifying the living individuals, one complementary to the other, one in which the individuals are assumed to be stationary, i. e., at rest, and the other in which they are taken to be changing, i. e., in motion. According to one, they fall into these four classes : elevated (*unnata*), degraded (*avanata*), both elevated and degraded (i. e., elevated in one sense, some respects and degraded in another sense, other respects), and neither elevated nor degraded. According to the other, which is really Buddhistic, they are to be classified

as degraded-elevated (*avanata-unnata*), degraded-degraded (*avanata-avanata*), elevated-degraded (*unnata-avanata*), and elevated-elevated (*unnata-unnata*).⁴⁰ Accordingly the individuals may be judged either as degraded though they appear to be at the present moment, they are tending towards elevation or as not only degraded now but also proceeding headlong towards degradation, or as elevated though they be now, they are tending towards degradation, or fourthly, as not only elevated now but also proceeding towards further elevation. Is it not evident also from the second classification that the aim of Buddhism is to lead life from elevation to elevation by arresting its course from degradation to degradation ?⁴¹ Is the emphasis laid here on the negative or the positive aspect of the results of life's efforts, the passage of life from stage to stage being always the nature of reality behind all resulting efforts ? To do justice to Buddha's balanced mind and comprehensive view, one can say that in his thought schemes and methods of training, the emphasis has been equally laid on both the aspects.

The Pāli or Theravāda illustrative formula is mostly two-armed (*anuloma-paṭiloma*) and rarely one-armed (*anuloma*); the Sarvāstivāda formula is invariably one-armed (*anuloma*), precisely as in the Vibhaṅga, Ch. VI. Whether one-armed or two-armed, the formula betrays the mental preoccupation about the general run of life under the sway of

avidyā and tṛṣṇā. Under the aspect of cessation, too, it suggests the mental preoccupation about the stoppage of the unwholesome and the elimination of the troublesome factors, in short, negative results of life's efforts. In the Vibhaṅga chapter on paṭicca-samuppāda alone, we have specimens of different causal formulas (paccayākāras) including those applicable to the course of life that starts from kusala-mūlas.⁴² Here too the application of the law of causal genesis to the progress of higher or better life on the lokottara level of consciousness is barely indicated. It is clearly shown that if a course of life starts from a kusalamūla, the play of avidyā, tṛṣṇā and upādāna has no place in it, in each series prasāda, i. e., śraddhā (serene faith) is substituted for tṛṣṇā and adhimokṣa (strong bent of mind) for upādāna. Prasāda or śraddhā implies faith or belief in better states of existence and their realizability through right-directed efforts, etc., and samyag dṛṣṭi, translated by 'right-view', whether laukika or lokottara,⁴² is rooted in it.⁴³ In that case, samyak saṅkalpa, translated by 'right resolve', whether laukika or lokottara, may be taken to be rooted in adhimokṣa. Unfortunately for Buddhism, it has nowhere been clearly shown what the illustrative formula of āvasthika pratītya-samutpāda should be to set forth the procession of the better stages of life that start from vidyā. The series from vidyā to vedanā running life that from avidyā to vedanā, its continuation may be

outlined by the following terms : samyag dṛṣṭi, samyak saṅkalpa, samyag vāk, samyak karmānta, samyag ājīva, samyag vyāyāma, samyak smṛti, samyak samādhi, samyag jñāna, samyag vimukti.⁴⁴

The causal concatenation from samyag dṛṣṭi to samyag vimukti will not be denied because the causal links, sammādiṭṭhi-paccayā sammāsaṅkappo, sammāsaṅkappa-paccayā sammāvācā, etc., are met with in Pali literature. The difficulty lies with the proposed causal series connecting vijjā with saṅkhārā, ...phassa with vedanā. The objection may be raised that no saṅkhāras can follow from vijjā. This is valid only if we view the matter in the context of avidyā in which Buddha's doctrine of causal genesis is presented in the Pali Nikāyas. In this context the saṁskāras are rightly taken by Buddhaghosa as those belonging to the three lower levels of consciousness called kāma, rūpa and arūpa (tebhūmikā saṅkhārā). So when we say that no saṁskāras will follow from vidyā (higher knowledge), we mean those saṁskāras which belong to the three lower bhūmis. And when we say there will no longer be any rebirth, we mean that there will not again be a degradation of our nature to compel the citta to find itself back in the avidyā context. To exhaust the possibility of such degradation of our nature is the laudable aim of the progressive path taught by Buddha, and certainly not to stop the course of elevation from higher to higher forms.

In the progressive course of life which proceeds from health to health, from wholesome to wholesome, one may notice a twofold process of *nirodha*, namely, *apratisamkhyā* (natural, temporary) and *pratisamkhyā* (through knowledge).⁴⁵ When the *kuśala* states prevail, say, during the *rūpa* and *arūpa* *dhyānas*, the *akuśala* states cease to be present then in consciousness, but these may make their appearances after the *dhyāna* periods are over. Thus there are chances of lapses or recurrences, though not in identical forms. The prescribed course of training is intended, therefore, to exhaust these unhappy possibilities, to eliminate these chances. We reach the *nirvāṇa* stage when these possibilities are completely exhausted and these chances are entirely eliminated. Thus the fulness of life reached through the progression of wholesome stages and the thorough elimination of obstacles on the way by means of two kinds of *nirodha*⁴⁶ may be taken to meet at a point, which seems to have led *Nāgārjuna* to hold that the ultimate reaches (*koṭis*) of *saṃsāra* and *nirvāṇa* are the same.⁴⁷ But how far will the process of life go without coming to an end ?

If negatively *nirodha* and positively *pāripūri* be held out as the final goal of life's efforts, the highest conceivable state of perfection reached by Buddha or any other man, does it follow from Buddha's doctrine of *pratītyasamutpāda* that there is such a finality ? Does the recorded history of

men bear testimony to that? I would say : No. It is negative by the evidence of history. Theoretically only nirvāṇa or fulness of life is the finality. History attests that there was a time when nirvāṇa or vimokṣa was claimed to have been realized through the first rūpa-dhyāna and during the first samāpatti. World progressed and subsequently this was found to be wrong. It came to be claimed that some one else realized it through the second rūpadhyāna and during the second samāpatti. Proceeding in this manner, and already before the rise of Buddhism the claim was made in favour of the eighth samāpatti. This, too was declared by Buddha to be inadequate, and he came to base his claim on the ninth samāpatti. Thus the number of samāpattis swelled up from one to nine as well as the number of vimokṣas.⁴⁸ If the number could go up from one to nine, why should it not be that like the growing number of planets, it will increase from more to more with each fresh realization or discovery? Then, again we are not to think, when we speak of the number of planets, only of one solar system. Even assuming for argument's sake that under the present condition of human beings belonging to our planet the state of perfection reached by Buddha was not the penultimate but the very ultimate one, it does not follow from it that there are not still better conditions of beings elsewhere in the universe. The uttaritara slogan of Buddha, precisely the parātpara slogan of the

Upaniṣads, is inconsistent with any claim to finality, unless it be a finality so far, a finality hitherto known and recognized as such. Just as in a numerical series, 1, 2, 3, 4...n, the n remains always the theoretical finality, the same as to nirvāṇa which is held before us as the final goal and which is bound to recede like ever retreating horizon as we advance towards it.

One more question still remains to discuss. How is it possible to turn the avidyā series of āvasthika pratītya-samutpāda into a vidyā series, if vidyā and avidyā be diametrically opposite in fact? They are mutually contradictory as logical terms, no doubt. But, in fact, avidyā, as we saw, does not imply the absence of jñāna or knowledge of some kind. Just as two contradictory logical terms, red and not-red, comprehend together the whole universe of discourse regarding the subject of colour, so vidyā and avidyā (not-vidyā) may be shown to comprehend together the whole universe of discourse regarding knowledge. Avidyā as a kind of knowledge is based upon a certain reading of the situation of life or the nature of reality, which impels us to follow the so-called normal course of life guided by our natural instincts and impulses, sex-urges and worldly desires and passions that serve only to degrade our nature. Vidyā as another kind of knowledge is based upon a different reading of the situation of life or the nature of reality, which inspires us to change the direction of life and

thought, to follow a different course of action which is calculated to elevate our nature.⁴⁹

But vidyā may also be regarded just as a self-conscious stage of avidyā, here the two terms standing respectively for that which is brought into clear recognition and that which is not. A person, for instance, is naturally good and pious but does not know that he is so and why he is so. He is then in the state of avidyā. Subsequently he becomes self-conscious and knows not only that he is good and pious but also why and how he is so. He is then in the state of vidyā. Going by Buddha's discourse in the Aggañña Suttanta, we are to understand that the virtues that are perceivable in men when they live as children of nature become the ethical possessions of the best of men through a life of earnest effort. This is evidently the distinction Dhammadinnā sought to make between avidyā and vidyā when she promised that vidyā follows as a counterpart (sabhāga-paṭibhāga) from avidyā and avidyā in its turn from upekkhā.⁵⁰

NOTES

1. Majjhima, I, p. 161ff.
2. Saṃyutta, II, p. 104ff. ; Mrs. Rhys Davids, Buddhism (Home University Series), p. 33ff. ; Laṅkāvatāra-Sūtra, ed, Bunio Nanjio, pp. 143-4 ; Suzuki's Transl., pp. 175-6 ; Barua, Asoka and His Inscriptions, Pt. I, Ch IV.
3. Udāna Commentary, Siamese Ed., to the Bodhi Sutta : Bhagavā Bodhirukkhamūle dhamma-sabhāvapacca-vekkhana-vasena paṭicca-samuppādaṃ manasākāsi.
4. Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra, pp. 143-44.
5. Vibhaṅga, Ch. VI, where paccayākāra is used as a substitute for paṭiccasamuppāda.
6. Saṃyutta II p. 25 ; The Book of Kindred Sayings II p. 21.
7. Visuddhimagga, II, p. 518.
8. The Buddhist Philosophy of Universal Flux, p. 57.
9. Milinda, p. 63.
10. Kathāvatthu, vi, 2.
11. Poṭṭhapāda Sutta, Dīgha, I. p. 200ff.
12. Udāna, 1, 1-3 ; Majjhima, I, 262 ; II, p. 32.
13. Vibhaṅga, Ch. vi ; P. C. Bagchi in Epigraphica Indica, Vol. XI pp. 194, 199, B. C. Law, Concepts of Buddhism. P. 47ff.
14. According to Vasubandhu, between the samutpāda (i. e., hetu) and the samutpanna (i. e., phala)—Abhidharmakośa, iii. 28.
15. This is Vasubandhu's definition of samanantara pratyaya. Abhidharmakośa, ii, 62 : citta-caityā acaramā samanantarāḥ.
16. Dhammapada Commentary, I. p. 23.
17. Atthasālinī, p. 59 ; samavāya-saṅkhāto samayo anekahetuto vuttim dīpeti, tena eka-kāraṇa-vādo paṭisedhito

hoti. Samavāyo ca nāma sādharma-phala-nipphādane aññamaññāpekkho. Tasmā eko kattā nāma n' atthi.

18. Atthasālinī, p. 60 : sādharma-phala-nipphādakatte na hi tthitabhāvo sāmaggī na anekesaṃ samodhānamattam na ca andhānaṃ dassanaṃ nāma sādharma-phalaṃ.

19. Abhidhammattha-saṃgaha, Ch. viii ; Atthasālinī, p. 60 : assa bhāvena bhāvo.

20. Abhidharmakośa, iii. 16.

21. Ibid, iii. 25.

22. Ibid, iii. 25 : āvasthikaḥ kliṣṭo yaṃ, prādhānya-ttvaṅgakīrtanam. Cf. Atthasālinī, p. 421.

23. Ibid, iii. 27.

24. Ibid, iii. 28 : vidyā-vipakṣo dharmo 'nyo' vidyāmitrāṇṛtādivat.

25. According to Yaśomitra : vidyāyā abhāvo' vidye ti tu nābhipretā.

26. According to Yaśomitra, Kleśair-anugatā hi avidyā.

27. Abhidharmakośa, iii. 21 : pūrva-kleśā daśāvidyā, saṃskārāḥ pūrva-karmaṇaḥ.

28. Ibid, iii. 21-22 : sandhiskandhās tu vijñānaṃ, nāmarūpam atahparam ; prak śaḍāyatanotpādāt tat pūrvam trikaṣaṅgamāt.

29. Ibid, iii. 22-23 : sparśaḥ prak sukha-duḥkhādikāraṇa-jñānaśaktitaḥ. Vittiḥ prāṇ maithunāt tṛṣṇā bhogamaithuna-rāginaḥ.

30. Ibid., iii. 23-24.

31. Ibid., iii. 24.

32. Ibid., iii. 25 : pūrvāparāntamadhyeṣu sammoha-vinivṛttaye.

33. Majjhima, I, p. 7.

34. Brahmajāla Sutta, under ucchedavāda, Dīgha, I, p. 34 ff.

35. Bṛhad Āraṇyaka Up., V, 5. 13. Note that prajñāna and vijñāna are used as variants.

36. Majjhima, I, p. 256 ff.

37. Read C. D. Chatterji's excellent paper, A Point of Distinction in the concept of Khandha in Buddhism, in Bhārata-Kaumudī, i, p. 161 ff.

38. The popular prospects of an eternal and everlasting life of bliss and glory in a paradise as held out by Hīnayāna Buddhism in the Buddhakhetta (Buddhavaṃsa), by Mahāyāna Buddhism in Sukhāvatī (Sukhāvatīvyūha), and by other religions in the Vaikunṭha, the Heaven, and the like should not be brought in to bear upon the present discussion. These must be relegated to the realm of poetic fancy.

39. These are known as cattāro sammappadhānā, See Saṅgīti Suttanta, Dīgha, III, p. 221.

40. Puggala-paññatti, iv. 20.

41. This trend of Buddha's thought goes against Stcherbatsky's forceful opinion (The conception of Buddhist Nirvāṇa, p. 29) that the "moral law conduces through a very long process of evolution the living world into a state of final quiescence, where there is no life, but something lifeless or inanimate. In this sense the Vaibhāṣika outlook resembles the materialism of modern science." For the modern scientist's view, cf. Julian Huxley's Essays of a Biologist, first and last chapters (Pelican Series).

42. See Mahā-Cattālīsa Sutta, Majjhima, III. p. 231.

43. Saddhā-mūlikā sammādiṭṭhi, Sumaṅgalavilāsinī, I. p. 231.

44. Dīgha, III. pp. 291; B. C. Law, Concepts of Buddhism, p. 36.

45. Abhidharmakośa, i, 6: Pratisaṃkhyā-nirodho yo viśaṃyogaḥ pṛthak pṛthak; Utpādātyanta-vighno' nyo nirodho 'pratisaṃkhyayā. See for other definitions of these two nirodhas Satkari Mookerjee's The Buddhist Philosophy of Universal Flux, pp. 5, 101, 244-46, 248-49, 252.

46. The utility of apratisamkhyā-nirodha lies in presenting the rise of the hindrances that have not arisen, and that of pratisamkhyā-nirodha in getting rid of those which have arisen. Cf. Satkari Mookerjee, op. cit.

47. i. e., yā koṭi nirvāṇasya sā koṭi saṃsaraṇasya ca.

48. Brahmajāla Sutta, Dīgha, I. p. 36 ff. ; Dīgha, III. p. 262.

49. Cf. Muṇḍaka Up., i, 1-2, according to which avidyā-aparāvidyā and vidyā-parāvidyā. The former is concerned with things perishable, i. e., wordly, and the latter with Brahman, the imperishable being. In the Īśa, avidyā meaning the moral run of life based upon the procreative institution of marriage is treated as means of preventing physical discontinuity, and vidyā meaning the leading of chaste life, the practice of austerities and the pursuit of higher knowledge as means of realizing the immortality of soul ; avidyayā mṛtyum tīrtvā, vidyayāmṛtam aśnute.

50. Cullavedalla Sutta, Majjhima, I, p. 304. According to Buddhaghosa : upekkhā pana andhakārābhibhūtā duddīpanā, avijjā' pi tādisā vā ti ten' ettha sabhāga-paṭibhāgo.

VII

FAITH IN BUDDHISM

In the Pāli Abhidhamma Books the term faith (saddhā) has been defined thus : "The faith which on that occasion is a trusting in, the professing confidence in, the sense of assurance, faith, faith as a faculty and as a power—this is the faith that there is."¹ This definition obviously follows what Mrs. Rhys Davids aptly describes as "the method of the dictionary," since it is presented in terms which "mutually overlap in meaning, without coinciding."² It is to be understood that the three terms, Faith (saddhā), the Faculty (saddhindriya), and the power (saddhābala), are not exactly synonyms but are slightly different from one another in their connotation. This kind of specification implies a logical division, which is not rigid but flexible enough to allow one species of faith to pass imperceptibly into another that is higher. These so called species are no more than so many "aspects and phases" which, when viewed psychologically, admit only of a difference of degree and not of kind. Faith in its specific sense, i. e., as distinguished from the Faculty and the Power, denotes only a kind of blind or professed faith as distinguished from a realised one.

The all important discrimination of the three species of Faith could not be achieved in a day or two, and not until the 4th or the 3rd century B. C. when a Buddhist school, viz., the Hetuvādin, pressed home a clear-cut distinction. "The average man of the world," they affirmed, "possesses Faith but not the Faculty."³ In the same vein they sought to maintain that knowledge was not within the reach of the average man.⁴ And in vain the Theravāda or Orthodox school contended for a difference of kind, logically considered. The latter appear to have conceded so far to the former that the uninstructed might possess practical wisdom but not knowledge in its higher technical sense. By knowledge the Hetuvādin meant the philosophic insight which consists in "analytic discernment, analytic understanding, ability to investigate or examine, the faculty of research, etc." Similarly they appear to have conceded to the Orthodox claim that the average man is "capable of liberality... and so forth", but they definitely stated that the average man is incapable of faith as a Faculty and far more so of faith as a Power, for these higher forms of faith are impossible without the understanding of the true nature of things. In the case of the untutored, faith does not come from knowledge but originates from hearsay or time-honoured religious tradition. That is to say, the faith of the average man is not what the Buddha himself termed "The reasoned or rational faith" (*paññānvayā saddhā*).⁵

Thus the Hetuvādin effected a significant distinction between the ordinary faith and the philosophic.

We obtain from the *Netti-pakaraṇa*, a work which is attributed to Mahākaccāna, a characterisation of faith showing some improvement on the older *Abhidhamma* definition : "The absence of impurity is the mark of assurance and tranquillity or satisfaction its consummation. Solicitation is the mark of faith, and unflinching devotion its basis. Steadiness is the mark of assurance, and faith its basis."⁶

Mahākaccāna's analysis of faith in the *Netti* is illustrated in the *Milinda*. Faith is characterised by these two marks : (1) *Sampasādana*, tranquillizing in the sense of making the hindrances subside, and rendering consciousness clear, serene and untroubled ; (2) *Sampakkhandhana*, leaping high in the sense of aspiring to attain that which has not been attained, to master that which has not been mastered, to realise that which has not been realised. Further, in the *Milinda*, faith is contrasted in a general fashion with the hindrances (*Nīvaraṇas*) of which *Vicikicchā* (doubt or perplexity) is one.⁷

Buddhaghosa in his *Atthasālinī*⁸ gives an account of faith which is mainly based on the analysis in the *Milinda*. It is truly observed by Mrs. Rhys Davids that "Faith is characterised and illustrated (by Buddhaghosa) in the same terms and approximately by the same similes as are used

in the Milinda. That is to say, it is shown to be a state of mind where the absense of perplexity sets free aspiration and energy. It is described as trust in the Buddha and his system."⁹ Investigating the matter a little more closely, we can say that his account of faith is in reality a synthesis of analyses found in all earlier Buddhist writings inclusive of Aśvaghoṣa's philosophical work, "The Awakening of Faith" (Śraddhotpatti Sūtra).

He maintains on the authority of the Peṭakopadesa that the antithesis of doubt is discursive thought.¹⁰ Following other older authorities he speaks of doubt as "the contrary of belief, confidence, or faith."¹¹ Believing or professing confidence in is the characteristic mark of faith, and its chief function is tranquillisation or aspiration. Sudden spiritual elevation of mind or emancipation is its ultimate end, and its basis is the object of reverence or the condition of Sotāpatti.¹²

The Abhidhamma definition of faith assumes a popular character when it is re-stated in terms of Buddhaghosa's commentary : "Faith is a trusting and taking refuge in the Buddha and other Jewels—the Doctrine and the Order. It is an act of believing in the sense of plunging, breaking, entering into qualities of the Buddha and the rest and rejoicing over them."¹³ "Faith is the guiding factor of charity, morality and religion in the sense that it precedes all charitable, moral and spiritual instincts and dispositions."¹⁴ Buddhaghosa refers elsewhere

to faith (saddhā) as transforming itself or deepening into devotion (bhakti) by repeated practices. Love (pema) is invariably associated with faith. The other element which accompanies it is pasāda, a sense of assurance, attended by serene delight out of satisfaction of man's spiritual need.¹⁵

Buddhaghosa's division of faith into four classes is a novel feature in the Buddhist analysis :

(1) Āgamanīyasaddhā, adventist or adventitious faith, e. g., the epoch-making faith of a Bodhisatta who is destined to become a supreme Buddha.

(2) Adhigamasaddhā, realised faith, e. g., the philosophic conviction gained by the Ariyapuggalas or Buddhists in the eight higher stages of experience.

(3) Pasādasaddhā, unshaken faith, e. g., the unwavering faith (aveccappasāda) of a stream-attainer in the Buddha, the Doctrine and the Order.

(4) Okappanasaddhā, professed faith, which is, according to Childers,¹⁶ "outward or seeming faith which makes a man keep up appearances, but does not touch his heart, e. g., the faith of Vakkali which consists in service rendered in connection with the shrine, the bodhi-terrace, teachers and preceptors." Again his reference to two kinds of love temporal (gehasita) and spiritual (saddhāpema) is interesting enough as forestalling Svapneśvara's division of faith into aihika and its opposite.¹⁷

The Buddhist conception of faith is apparently involved in self-discrepancy. Buddha in agreement

with Mahāvīra and other predecessors was of opinion that Doubt and Faith are two opposite states of mind, so that the affirmation of one implies the negation of the other : “If a person entertains doubt, is perplexed about the Teacher and the rest, he does not attain mukti by reassuring faith, and his mind does not bend towards earnestness, application, perseverance and energy—this is the first bolt of the heart in his case.”¹⁸ Buddhaghosa, on the other hand, asserts on the authority of the Peṭakopadesa that the contrary of doubt is discursive thought (vicāra). How are we then to distinguish realised or articulate faith (adhigama-saddhā) from faith unwavering (aveccappasāda), when both are within the reach of a stream-attainer ? The discrepancy involved may be explained away if we can effect a sharp distinction between religious belief and philosophic conviction, that is, if we can show that the sceptic is the common enemy of “divines and graver philosophers.”

Supposing that doubt is the contrary of belief, it necessarily follows that, like faith, doubt admits of various stages of growth. To resist an over-powering doubt we require an unwavering faith. The Arahant is equipped with faith and other faculties and powers in a higher degree than the Buddhist Aryans who occupy the lower ranks ; that the Sotāpanna or stream-attainer who fills the lowest rank among the Aryans can claim a higher order of faith and the rest than a Kalyāṇa Puthujjana or good

average man who is undergoing training, preliminary to the Aryan stage ; and that such a good average man is entitled to a higher position than a most ordinary man of the world. Among ordinary men, too, there are some who cherish high ambition, and others who do not. Thus it is clear that faith can be classified as follows with reference to the persons concerned:—(1) the faith of the ordinary man of the world ; (2) the faith of an inquirer before he receives instruction ; (3) the faith of an inquirer who is undergoing preliminary courses of training ; (4) the faith of the Sotāpanna, an Aryan who has graduated himself in the Buddhist system ; (5) the faith of the Aryans who have not as yet reached the goal ; and (6) the faith of an Arahant who has realised Nirvāṇa. The first of these may be named for convenience' sake Okappana-saddhā, the blind or professed faith, characterised by the mark of satisfaction (sampasādana), and the last named is the highest faith, characterised by the same mark in a deeper sense of purity, tranquillity and bliss. The Arahant is said to be devoid of faith (assaddha) because there is nothing left for him to desire, that is, he needs no faith or aspiration (sampakkhandhana) of any kind. Similarly the second and the third can be classed together under the professed faith marked by aspiration, and which is in a preliminary stage of articulation. The fourth is the faculty or articulate faith

(saddhindriya) and the fifth is the power or strengthened faith (Saddhābala).

Doubt or Scepticism is broadly divided into three classes, viz.,—(1) Doubt as a first Obstacle (Vicikicchā Nivaraṇa), (2) Doubt as a Fetter (Vicikicchā Saṃyojana), and (3) Doubt as a Fetter inherent in lower nature (Orambhāgiya Saṃyojana). This division of doubt runs parallel to that of Saddhā into Faith, the Faculty and the Power. It is, therefore, conceivable that doubt is capable of as elaborate a classification as faith.

The common name for religious doubt is Cetokhila (the bolt of the heart), and philosophic doubt is in some way allied to Avijjā (Ignorance or Agnosticism). There are five Cetokhilas, the bolts which steal the heart against all tender feelings and higher aspirations, viz., entertaining doubt, getting perplexed about the Teacher, the Doctrine, the Order, the Training (Sikkhā), and the want of fellow-feeling.¹⁹ That the first four bolts represent together what is termed above religious doubt is manifest from Buddhaghosa's comments. He says that these are the four specific forms of doubt entertained :

“(1) as to whether or no the Teacher has the 32 major bodily marks, or the 80 minor bodily marks of a Buddha, or the requisite omniscience with respect to things past, future and present ;

(2) as to adequacy of the Paths and their Fruits to lead indeed to the grand ambrosial Nirvāṇa ;

(3) as to whether those of the Order are indeed at various stages of the path to salvation, or have rightly won their way so far ;

(4) as to whether the Training is helpful.”²⁰

Avijjānīvaraṇa is defined in the Dhammasaṅgaṇī (1152, 1162) as the ignorance of, or an agnostic attitude towards, the four truths viz., things past, future and present and causality. Avijjā thus defined is distinguished at once from Cetokhila as an intellectual element from a spiritual one.

The difference between the Hindrance and the Fetter of doubt, or between the Fetter and the Orambhāgiya Fetter is one of degree rather than of kind. The differentia (pabheda) provided by the ancient writers is this : the Hindrance is a state of mind to be put away by religious belief and discursive thought, the Fetter by faith unwavering and insight philosophic, and the Orambhāgiya Fetter by bhāvanā (contemplation, introspection).²¹ In the Abhidhamma book the two pairs of words are set forth in definition in identical terms, although it must not be supposed that the conceptions themselves are identical. The Hindrance, for instance, can be got rid of by an average man through professed faith in the Teacher and the System, and by a young inquirer through faith in the system, which he aspires to be acquainted with, or by a reflective student who is undergoing the preliminary courses of training. The

Fetter, on the other hand, can be got rid of by a stream-attainer through faith now confirmed and intellect now sharpened. Lastly, the Orambhāgiya Fetter which lies deep in the heart,²² or flows in and out,²³ can be got rid of by the Aryans in higher stages through the power of faith and by circumspection. The Sutta-Piṭaka gives a category of five Hindrances of which Doubt is one, whereas the Dhammasaṅgaṇī enumerates six Hindrances of which Doubt and Ignorance are two.²⁴ Evidently the six Hindrances were the outcome of a further analysis of Doubt. However, the interest of the enumeration of first four bolts and the definition of Avijjā is that they enable us to discriminate two sides of doubt. Each species of doubt presents two sides, viz., spiritual and intellectual. On its spiritual side it can be put away by faith professed or realised, and on the intellectual side by judgment and insight. Thus the Buddhist division of doubt shows a resemblance to Hume's division into two species, viz., "Scepticism antecedent to all study and philosophy," and "Scepticism consequent to science and enquiry." The former is broadly represented by the Buddhist Hindrance, and the latter by the Fetter. So far as the Hindrance is concerned, doubt before instruction and enquiry can be removed by faith of which the characteristic mark is aspiration and doubt at the inception of the career of a reflective student by discursive thought. Sāriputta, the chief disciple of the Buddha, holds that it is within

the power of a Stream-attainer²⁵ to shake off all kinds of doubt except those which are deep-rooted in our lower nature, and removable by introspection.

It is stated that the four conditions of Sotāpatti on the side of feeling are unwavering faith in the Teacher, the Doctrine, the Training, that is, the four opposite states of the four bolts of the heart. The four conditions on the intellectual side refer to association with the wise, hearing of the good doctrine (study in the wider sense), reflective reasoning, and systematic knowledge of things.²⁶ Thus it can be proved that the Buddhist Sotāpanna is a religious philosopher whose duty is to confirm the faith and understand the truth.

The Fetter with which the Sotāpanna is confronted is a philosophical doubt or scepticism proper with regard to the beginning and the end of things, or to use the words of Naciketā in the Kaṭhopaniṣad (1-1-20), a doubt as to whether a person continues to exist or not after death.²⁷ But doubt which the Buddhist philosopher has to overcome is bound up with the question "as to whether there is a twelve-graded cycle of causation taking effect here and now or not taking effect at all,"²⁸ or as to whether, in the language of the Buddha, causality (dhammatā, idappaccayatā) is objectively and universally valid.²⁹

Thus the faith of a Sotāpanna is intended to put away doubt regarding the five points denoted by the Teacher, the Doctrine, the Order, the Disci-

pline, and the natural causation. So we read in Aśvaghoṣa's *Awakening of Faith*,³⁰ a work which belongs to the same period as "The Questions of King Milinda": "There are four aspects of faith.... (1) To believe in the fundamental truth, i. e., to think joyfully of suchness (bhūtatathatā). (2) To believe in the Buddha as sufficiently enveloping infinite merits, i. e., to rejoice in worshipping him, in paying homage to him, in making offerings to him, in hearing the good doctrine (saddharma), in disciplining oneself according to the doctrine, and in aspiring after omniscience (sarvajñatā). (3) To believe in the Dharma as having great benefits, i. e., to rejoice always in practising all pāramitās. (4) To believe in the Saṃgha as observing true morality, i. e., to be ready to make offerings to the congregation of Bodhisattvas, and to practise truthfully all those deeds which are beneficial at once to oneself and others."

Those who are still in doubt that the Buddha was in every sense an Indian who, like his compatriots, carried on in his own the glorious works of the Aryan forefathers, those who deny that the Buddhist analysis of faith was far in advance of earlier attempts in the Vedas and the Upaniṣads and those who are inclined to admit that there is a close affinity between Jainism and Buddhism, so much so, that the one is to be estimated as a richer articulation of the other, may with profit examine the instances, cited below :—

(1) The Pāli Canon abounds in such expressions as the offerings of the faithful (saddhā-deyyāni), alms given in faith (saddhāya dinno piṇḍo), etc. The Mahāmaṅgala Jātaka in particular, has verse, which reminds one of the popular notion of faith found in the Vedas, and interspersed throughout the older Upaniṣads. "Food and drink which the faithful give, garlands and perfumes and unguents offered with a contented mind—these are said to be the causes of happiness in heaven."³¹

(2) Buddha's strong plea for the cultivation of faith as a basic principle of human culture was derived from the same stock of Indian ideas as are contained in the Upaniṣads. The Saṅkhāruppatti-Sutta which embodies Buddha's powerful arguments may be regarded as a faithful reproduction of older ideas in a passage of the Chāndogya Upaniṣad (VII. 2) : "Here a Bhikkhu is endowed with faith, equipped with morality, replete with learning, enriched with generosity, vested with wisdom." The thought occurs to him, "Alas ! Would it be possible for me to be reborn so as to gain the status of powerful Nobles (or any higher condition of existence) on the dissolution of the body, after death. It burns his heart, it occupies his thought, it makes his mind contemplate. Such dispositions of his, and pondering over things, developed and enlarged in this manner, pave the way for the attainment of his ultimate end. This is the road, this the path which leads to his goal."³²

(3) Faith is the guiding factor which precedes all charitable, moral, religious and spiritual functions,³³ the basic principle of all virtuous deeds (puññakiriyā vatthūni), sanctioned by religion. The magnanimity of heart makes itself felt when something is given in faith.³⁴ These statements are made by the Buddhist commentator Buddhaghosa in a manner far more precise and definite than the crude fashion in which Yājñavalkya expressed the same thought, itself an improvement on the popular notion of faith in the R̥g-veda : "Sacrifice is based on charity, charity on faith, faith on the heart. Faith is conceived by heart, faith is established indeed in the heart."³⁵ Moreover, the manner in which Buddhadatta and his younger contemporary Buddhaghosa applied the older psychological analysis of mind for the purpose of discriminating the virtuous deeds sanctioned by religion³⁶ conclusively proves that such a critical faculty was unknown to the ancients. For instance, charity which is one of the ten virtuous deeds is defined by the Buddhist thinkers as an excogitation or conscious yearning of the heart coming into play since the gifts are produced, before these are made over, and subsequently when the donor recollects these with a mind gladdened with joy.³⁷

As to the close affinity between Jainism and Buddhism let one instance suffice. The Jainas enumerate nine obstacles to faith : Sleep, dozing, half sleepy state, deep sleep, deep-rooted greed,

obstacles concerning faith in the objects of the four kinds of knowledge.³⁸ The five hindrances to faith as enumerated by the Buddhists include sensual desires, hatred, sloth and torpor, worry and flurry, and doubt to which may be added ignorance.³⁹ Of these torpor (middha), as appears from its definition in the Abhidhamma Piṭaka, covers the first four obstacles, mentioned by the Jainas.⁴⁰

“Faith is perfected”, says Aśvaghoṣa, “by practising the following five deeds : Charity (dāna), morality (sīla), patience (khanti), energy (viriya), cessation (or tranquillisation, samatha) and intellectual insight (vidarśana, vipassana).⁴¹ This pronouncement of Aśvaghoṣa reminds us of the word of the Buddha, quoted in the Milinda :

“By faith he crosses over the stream,
By earnestness the sea of life ;
By steadfastness all grief he stills,
By wisdom is he purified.”⁴²

It is clear from this oft-quoted verse that mukti in its negative and positive aspects is attainable by faith, although human perfection requires the proper cultivation of other faculties and powers. Buddha has declared elsewhere that faith is the first principle to which penance, wisdom and the rest are subordinate. “Faith is a seed, penance the rain, wisdom my yoke and plough, consciousness the pole, mind the tie, mindfulness my plough-share and goad..... such is the tilth that I till, the tilth of which the

fruit is immortal life, the tilth by which one gets rid of all kinds of suffering.”⁴³

The Arhant is indeed a person who has fully developed or cultivated these five moral or spiritual faculties—faith, energy, mindfulness, concentration, and reason.⁴⁴ Those who fill the lower and lower ranks are persons who cultivate these in a weaker and weaker degree. Those who are completely devoid of these five essential moral or spiritual faculties are placed outside the category of Aryans, and they are said to belong to the ranks of average men.⁴⁵

It is clear from this that, according to Buddha Gotama, the higher is the plane of cognition, the finer is the type of religion; the deeper are the convictions, the stronger are the expressions of faith. There are, in other words, the degrees of faith corresponding to the degrees of knowledge. Reason or Wisdom determines the quality of faith (paññānvayā saddhā);⁴⁶ the relative position of faith and knowledge in the wider sense can be inferred from the accepted Buddhist classification of Arahants into two orders: (1) Sukhavipassaka, the subtle seer, (2) Samathayānika, the mystic “who makes quietude his mode.” This shows that among the Buddhist saints all were not gifted with higher perception, i. e., not philosophers. There is another classification by which the Arahants are divided into three orders, viz., (1) Kāyasakkhi, the Intuitionist, (2) Diṭṭhippatta,

the Intellectualist, and (3) Saddhāvimutta, the Rationalist. Saviṭṭha considered the devout mystic as the best of all, Sāriputta preferred the Intellectualist, and Mahākoṭṭhita preferred the Intuitionist. When the matter was referred to the Buddha for a final decision, he regretted his inability to make any dogmatic assertion,⁴⁷ for any one of the three classes might appear to be superior to others according to circumstances. Although in this particular passage of the Aṅguttara-Nikāya (III. 21) the Buddha refrained from delivering a definite judgment on the question at issue, there are other passages⁴⁸ to indicate his real position. There he enumerates seven classes of Arahants, according to the highest place to the Ubhatobhāgavimutta, one who attains perfection by means of concentration and reason. The second place in his opinion is occupied by the paññāvimutta, one who attains mukti by means of reason. Below him stands the Kāyasakkhi, the intuitionist who aspires to envisage the real as a single whole.⁴⁹ To an intuitionist analytical functions of the understanding, that is, all perceptual and conceptual reconstructions of reality are ultimately futile. The Intellectualist (Diṭṭhippatta) standing fourth in order of merit is a learned man who has ability to grasp and explain the philosophy of the Buddha. The Rationalist (Saddhāvimutta) who occupies the fifth place is a strong believer plus one who fairly understands the import of Buddha's system.

Next comes Dhammānusārī, the good man who develops the five faculties by faithfully carrying out the moral principles of the Teacher. In the lowest rank is placed the Saddhānusārī who develops the five faculties, essential to mukti, by way of blind faith in and through the love of the Buddha.⁵⁰ Here Buddha adds a word of explanation. In the case of the first two classes there is no further need of earnestness, for it is impossible for them to be careless. The remaining classes are nevertheless recognised in his system, because all cannot attend to a complete course of spiritual training.⁵¹

The complete course of spiritual training⁵² is to be gone through only by an earnest seeker of truth, who, full of faith, approaches a teacher with whom he associates himself. Thus with rapt attention he hears the doctrine which he remembers, examines, and understands, whereby he begins to feel love for the subject, and finally he realises the highest truth by his own efforts and acquires deep insight by his wisdom.

The character of the early Buddhist faith is set forth in the last utterance of the Buddha to his disciples which is as follows :—"Handa dāni, bhikkhave, āmantayāmi vo : vayadhammā saṅkhārā, appamādena sampādetha." "Now I charge you, bhikkhus : All composites are subject to decay, be earnest in your duties." And this appamāda or earnestness is the one word by which the Master

summed up his whole life, nay, this is the one expression whereby he summed up his whole teaching : “Regarded as a subjective element, O bhikkhus, I do not find,” he said “any other element which conduces to the greatest good, than earnestness (appamāda) ; nor do I find any other element than earnestness which conduces to the stability of the faith, and preserves it from getting perverted and from disappearing.”⁵³ It is well said in the Milinda which is a classical Pāli composition dated about the 1st cent. A. D., that energy (viriya) which is the positive nomenclature for appamāda, is the mainstay of all good qualities, illustrated by the following similes :—

(1) Just as a man, if a house were falling, would make a prop for it of another post, and the house so supported would not fall ; just so is the rendering of support the mark of perserverance :

(2) Just as when a large army has broken up a small one, then the king of the latter would call to mind every possible ally and reinforce his small army, and by that means the small army might in turn break up the large one ; just so is the rendering of support the mark perseverance, and all those good qualities which it supports do not fall away.⁵⁴

In support of this interpretation of energy, the Milinda cites the following words of the Teacher from an unknown source : “The energetic hearer of the Noble Truth, O Bhikkhus, puts away evil and

cultivates goodness, puts away that which is wrong and develops in himself that which is right, and thus does he keep himself pure." The earnestness or energy here contemplated with which he held fast to meditation under the Bodhi tree, is the determination so well expressed in many later poetical works, the determination not to deviate from the path of duty even if the heavens be rent asunder or the earth's stability be disturbed. (*nabham phaleyya paṭhavim caleyya*).

When a man steps into a Buddhist sanctuary, I shall not be surprised if he will meet a votary or superstitious worshipper taking refuge in the Triad by repeating the set formula—"I take refuge in the Buddha, I take refuge in the Dhamma, I take refuge in the Saṅgha, once, twice and thrice." But whatever be the interpretation of the commonly accepted formulae, to me the servile expression "I take refuge" seems utterly incompatible with the heroic spirit which the Buddha sought to impart to all that he said and to all that he did. It calls up a train of cowardly associations which befits a degenerated age. This is not verily the way in which a Buddhist who is to appear as a conqueror was called upon by the Master to profess his faith. The proper way to express one's faith is to say and feel.

NOTES

1. Dhammasaṅgaṇi, 12, 15 ; Vibhaṅga, p. 123 : “Yā saddhā saddahanā okappanā abhippasādo saddhā saddhindriyam saddhābalaṃ : idaṃ vuccati saddhindriyam.” The above translation is an extract from the Buddhist Manual of Psychological Ethics by Mrs. Rhys Davids.

2. A Buddhist Manual of Psychological Ethics, intro., p. xix.

3. Kathāvatthu, xix. 8 : “N’atthi lokiyaṃ saddhindriyam.” Here Mrs. Rhys Davids and Mr. Shwe Zan Aung translate lokiyaṃ “in worldly matters”, see the “Points of Controversy”, p. 342.

4. Op. cit, xx. 2 : “N’atthi puthujjanassa ñāṇam.”

5. The expression has been quoted in the Atthasālinī, p. 69.

6. Netti, p. 28 : “Okappanalakkhaṇā saddhā adhimutti-paccupaṭṭhānā ca. Anāvilalakkhaṇo pasādo sampasīdana-paccupaṭṭhāno ca. Abhipatthiyanalakkhaṇā saddhā. Tassā aveccappasādo padaṭṭhānam. Anāvilalakkhaṇo pasādo. Tassa saddhā padaṭṭhānam.”

7. Milinda-Pañha, ed. Trenckner, pp. 34-38. The Questions of King Milinda, S. B. E., xxxv, pp. 54-58.

8. Atthasālinī, pp. 119-120 : Saddhā uppajjamānā nīvaraṇe vikkhambheti.

9. Mrs. Rhys Davids : A Buddhist Manual of Psychological Ethics, p. 14, f. n. 3.

10. Atthasālinī, p. 165 : “Vicāro vicikicchāyā (paṭipakkho) ti Peṭake vuttam.”

11. A Buddhist Manual of Psychological Ethics, p. 44, f. n. 3.

12. Atthasālinī, p. 120 : “Aparo nayo, Saddahanalakkhaṇā saddhā okappanalakkhaṇā vā, pasādana-rasā

.....pakkhandana-rasā vā....akâlussiya-paccupaṭṭhānā adhi-
mutti-paccupaṭṭhānā vā saddheyyavatthu-padaṭṭhānā sotā-
pattiyaṅga-padaṭṭhānā vā.

13. Atthasālinī, p. 145 : Buddhādīni va ratanāni
saddahati pattiyaṇṇatī ti saddhā.....Buddhādīnam guṇe
ogāhati bhinditvā viya anupavisatī.....pasīdati.

14. Ibid., p. 120 : saddhā pubbaṅgamā purecārikā hoti.

15. Puggala-Paññatti Commentary, p. 248 : "Punappu-
nam bhajanavasena saddhā va bhatti. Pemaṃ saddhā-
pemaṃ gehasitapemaṃ pi vaṭṭati. Pasādo saddhāpasādo va."

16. Childers' Pāli Dictionary, p. 410. The above
classification of faith has been quoted from the Commentary
on the Mahāparinibbāna-Suttanta.

17. Śvapneśvara's Commentary on the Śāṇḍilya-Sūtra,
Aph. 18.

18. Majjhima Nikāya, I, p. 101 : "Yo so.....Satthari
(tathā Dhamme Saṃghe Sikkhāya) kaṅkhati vicikicchati
nādhimuccati na sampasīdati tassa cittaṃ na namati ātaṇ-
ṇāya anuyogāya sātaccīya padhānāya.....ayaṃ paṭhamo
ceto-khilo." Cf. Sthānaṅga (ed. Dhanapati) p. 289 :
"Se naṃ muṇḍe bhavittā agāraṃ anāgariyaṃ pabbāie
Niggaṃtha pāvayane saṃkhie kaṃkhie vitigicchie
bhoyasmā vaṇṇe kālusasamāvaṇṇe Niggaṃthapāvayaṇaṃ
no saddahai no patthiyai no roei Niggaṃthapāvayaṇaṃ
asaddahamāne apatthiyamāne aroemāne manaṃ uccācaṃ
niyacchati vinidhāyaṃ āvajjati paṭhama duhasejja."—
"If a person does not leave home as a shaveling to
become a homeless recluse according to the Niggaṃtha
ordinance, seized by fear and sunk in sin he hesitates,
doubts, is perplexed about the Jaina system, he does not
believe in, does not take to, does not rejoice in the
Niggaṃtha mode. The result is that his mind gravitates
from high to low and ultimately destroys his prospects.
This is the first way of lying on a thorny bed."

19. Saṅgīti-Suttanta (Dīgha, III) *sub voce* Cetokhila ; Majjhima Nikāya, I, Cetakhila-Sūta, p. 101.
20. Atthasālinī, pp. 354, 355. A Buddhist Manual of Psychological Ethics, p. 260, f. n. 2.
21. E.g., Vibhaṅga, p. 16 : dassanena pahātabbo, bhāva-nāya pahātabbo.
22. Anusaya. 23. Āsava.
24. Hume's Essays, R. P. A., No. 28, pp. 70-71.
25. Saṅgīti-Suttanta (Dīgha-Nikāya, III). *sub voce* Sotāpattiyaṅgāni.
26. Sotāpattiyaṅgāni enumerated in the Saṅgīti-Suttanta (Dīgha-Nikāya, III) include : Satthari, Dhamme, Saṁghe, Sikkhāya aveccappasādo ; sappurisasamsevo, Saddhamma-savanam, yonisomanasikāra, dhammānudhammapaṭipatti.
27. Yeyam prete vicikitsā manuṣye astīti eke nāstīti eaike.
28. Atthasālinī, p. 355 : dvādasapadikaṁ paccaya-vaṭṭam, atthi nu kho natthī ti kaṅkhā.
29. Saṁyutta Nikāya II. 25 : Tathatā, Avitathatā, Anaññathatā, Dhammatā, Dhammaṭṭhitatā, Idappaccayatā—these are all synonyms of Paṭiccasamuppāda. The same holds true of Bhūtatathatā and Dharmakāya. Kathāvatthu vi, 2 : xi. 7.
30. Suzuki, the Awakening of Faith, p. 128.
31. Jātaka, No. 453 :
“Annañ ca pānañ ca dadāti saddho
mālañ ca gandhañ ca vilepanañ ca
pasannacitto ānumodamāno
saggesu ve sotthānam tad āhu.”
- Cf. Rg-veda, x, 151 ; Chāndogya Up., iv. 1. 1.
32. Majjhima-Nikāya, III, pp. 99-103 : Idha bhikkhu saddhāya samannāgato hoti, sīlena samannāgato hoti, sūtena samannāgato hoti, cāgena samannāgato hoti, paññāya samannāgato hoti. Tassa evaṁ hoti : “Aho vatāham

kāyassa bhedā parammaraṇā khattiyamahāsālānaṃ saha-
vyataṃ uppajjeyyan ti. So taṃ cittaṃ dahati, taṃ cittaṃ
adhiṭṭhāti, taṃ cittaṃ bhāveti ; tassa te saṃkhārā ca vihāro
c' evaṃ bhāvitā bahulikatā tatrappattiyā saṃvattanti.
Ayaṃ maggo, ayaṃ paṭipada tatrappattiyā saṃvattanti.”

33. Atthasālinī, p. 120.

34. Ibid., p. 162 ; Saddahitvā okappetvā dadato pana
cetanāmahattaṃ nāma hoti.

35. Brihad. Ār. Up., III. 9. 21.

36. Abhidhammāvatāra, pp. 2-4 ; Atthasālinī, pp. 157-
162. Saddhā is conceived as a cetanā.

37. Atthasālinī, p. 157 ; dīnavatthusū tan taṃ dentassa
tesaṃ uppādanato paṭṭhāya pubbabhāge pariccāgakāle
pacchā somanassacittena anussaraṇakāle cā ti tīsu kālesu
pavattā cetanā dānamayaṃ puññakiriyavatthu nāma.

38. Uttarādhyayana Sūtra, xxxiii. 2.

39. Kāmacchanda, vyāpāda, thīnamiddha, uddhacca-
kukkucca, vicikicchā (avijjā).

40. Uttarādhyayana Sūtra, xxxiii, f. n. 2 ; nidrā pracalā,
nidrā-nidrā, pracalā-pracalā. Cf. Vibhaṅga, p. 254 :
“Middhaṃ soppaṃ pacalāyikā soppaṃ supanā supitattaṃ”
Atthasālinī, p. 378 : “Supanti tenāti Soppaṃ, akkhidālā-
dīnam pacalabhāvaṃ karotī ti pacalāyikā.” The Jaina
Commentator explains pracalā as the “slumber of a stan-
ding or sitting person.”

41. Suzuki, The Awakening of Faith, p. 128.

42. Sutta-Nipāta, Ālavakasutta, v. 184 :

“Saddhāya tarati oghaṃ, appamādena aṇṇavaṃ,
vīriyena dukkhaṃ acceti, paññāya parisujjhati.”

43. Sutta-Nipāta, Kasibharadvāja Sutta, vv. 77-78.

44. saddhindriyaṃ, viriyindriyaṃ, satindriyaṃ, samā-
dhindriyaṃ, paññindriyaṃ.

45. Saṃyutta-Nikāya, V, p. 202 : Imesaṃ kho bhikkhave
pañcannam indriyānaṃ samattā paripūrattā Arahaṃ hoti.

Yassa kho bhikkhave imāni pañcindriyāni sabbena sabbam sabbathā sabbam natthi, tam aham bāhiro puthujjanapakkhe ñhito ti vadāmi.

46. Quoted in the Atthasālinī, p-69.

47. Na sukaram ekamsena vyākātum.

48. Majjhima Nikāya, I. 478 ; Puggala-Paññatti, III. 3.

49. Ibid., I. 292. Mahākoṭṭhita who was an intuitionist forces Sāriputta to admit that the real is an indivisible whole.

50. Ibid., I, p. 479 : "Tatthāgate c'assa saddhāmattam hoti pemamattam."

51. Ibid., anupubbasikkhā, anupubbakiriyā, anupubba-paṭipadā.

52. Majjhima Nikāya, I, p. 480 ; Aṅguttara, II, 5. 6.

53. Aṅguttara, I, pp. 16-17,

54. Milinda, p. 57.

VIII

MAHĀYĀNA IN THE MAKING

In this paper I set myself to examine three among the latest Pāli Canonical books in order to set forth the germs of certain Buddhist ideas that were afterwards incorporated and developed into the Mahāyāna system of faith, of which the *raison d'être* is what is known as the Doctrine of Trikāya.¹ The books concerned are : (1) the Buddhavaṃsa, (2) the Cariyāpiṭaka, and (3) the Apadāna. Though it has been noticed by previous scholars, such as Professor Rhys Davids² and Dr. Winternitz,³ that the germs spoken of, can be traced in such texts as the Buddhavaṃsa and the Cariyāpiṭaka, I have reasons to think that the attempt herein made is the first of its kind, for none of the previous scholars has seriously endeavoured to bring out the logical inter-connection of the three texts and their teachings, taken together.

✓ I. Preliminary Observations.— Until the Canonical Jātaka Book, which is a collection of 500 Buddhist Birth stories⁴ in the shape of narrative ballads or dialogues in verse (ākhyānas, upākhyānas), is published, it is difficult to say if it contains any account of Gautama Buddha's present life.

But judging from the fact that the Mahāpadāna Discourse in Dīgha II, which contains an account of Gautama's present life along with that of the present lives of six previous Buddhas, is mentioned as a Jātaka in the Culla-Niddesa,⁵ and also that the Niddesa scheme of Buddha's life embraces the stories of the present and of the past,⁶ I am led to presume that the Canonical Jātaka Book also contains some account of his present existence. This conjecture gains in significance when it is found that the Barhut carvings, which presuppose, a running prose commentary on the Jātaka Book,⁷ have more fully worked out the Niddesa scheme.⁸ The later literature of the Jātaka class, excepting the selections, contains universally an account of the present existence of Gautama.

The Barhut scheme of Buddha's life, past and present, was further developed in the Jātaka-commentary, the Indian version of which seems to have been earlier than the Milinda. In the Introductory section (Nidānakathā) we have an account of 25 Buddhas, including Gautama as the last, instead of seven in earlier schemes. Thus we have in hand three separate schemes of Gautama's present and past existences, which pre-suppose one another, each of them being a literary synthesis of earlier stories and legends. The Niddesa scheme, for instance, is a synthesis of the four earliest Suttantas, one of which, viz., the Mahāpadāna gives an account of the present existence, of

Gautama, and the rest—the Mahāsudassana, the Mahāgovinda and the Makhādeva—give the stories of the past. The Barhut scheme is an elaboration of the Niddesa scheme with selections from the current commentary on the Jātaka Book and other existing compositions like the Khandhakas of the Vinaya Piṭaka. The Commentarial scheme is, on the contrary, a synthesis of the Jātaka Book with its running commentary and of the Buddhavaṃsa and the Cariyāpiṭaka among others. The Nidānakathā of the existing Jātaka Commentary is on the whole a co-ordination of the Buddhavaṃsa and the Cariyāpiṭaka, both of which are quoted by name.⁹ The notable feature in the Nidāna account of the present life of Gautama is that it establishes by the help of the Buddhavaṃsa Gautama's relation to his 24 predecessors and sets forth in the light of the Cariyāpiṭaka the ten perfectionary virtues (dasa pāramitā) which Gautama as a Bodhisattva fulfilled during his past existences, reckoned from the dispensation of the Buddha Dīpaṅkara. Since the Buddhavaṃsa and the Cariyāpiṭaka are quoted in the Nidānakathā, they are necessarily earlier than the existing Jātaka Commentary and must be placed earlier than the Milinda.

Looking at the genesis of these two texts. viz., the Buddhavaṃsa and the Cariyāpiṭaka we cannot but be impressed by the fact that they were just the results of an analytic process which was going on in Buddhist literature between the two synthetic

landmarks represented by the Barhut selections and the Jātaka Commentary, the Indian version of which is almost contemporaneous with the Milinda, if not earlier.

II. The Buddhavaṃsa. —It is a metrical version of, and a supplement to, the Mahāpadāna stories of seven Buddhas. The Mahāpadāna stories which are included in the Niddesa scheme as well as in that at Barhut do not bring out the historical relation of Gautama to his predecessors. Besides, the Mahāpadāna doctrine of Dhammatā is illustrated only by the stories of seven Buddhas, past and present, and there is no mention of any future Buddha like Metteyya. On the other hand, the Buddhavaṃsa not only preserves in verse the old prose account of seven Buddhas (Vipassī to Gotama), but adds the stories of the 18 predecessors of Vipassī (Dīpaṅkara to Phussa) and mentions Metteyya as the Buddha to come, thus illustrating the dhammatā doctrine more fully than the Mahāpadāna. Because the account of Metteyya is absent from the Buddhavaṃsa, we are not to suppose that the popular belief in the future Buddha had not expressed itself in any concrete form. The Cakkavattisutta of the Dīgha III affords a nucleus of the legend of the Metteyya in the prophecy put into the mouth of Gautama, the prose nucleus developed later in the Anāgatavaṃsa on the lines of the earlier Genealogy of the Buddhas. Tradition ascribes the Buddhavaṃsa and its sequel, the

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Anāgatavaṃsa, to Kassapa,¹⁰ whom as originator and not in the traditional sense of author, I think to be no other than Kumārakassapa, because these Genealogical Legends developed from the earlier Jātaka literature with which he had so much to do. In the Buddhavaṃsa we have a regular genealogy of the Buddhas in the sense that their lives are linked together by the chain of existences undergone by the Bodhisattva of the present Buddha.¹¹ Thus the Buddhavaṃsa seeking to maintain the succession of the Buddhas by the Bodhisattva career of Gautama necessarily presupposes the Jātaka proper, i. e., the stories of the past, which the Mahāpadāna does not, since the stories of the Buddhas there are all detached, each relating to the present existence only of a Buddha. In other words, the Mahāpadāna is not a Book of Genealogy, but rather an historical basis of it. With the growth of the Book of Genealogy of the Buddhas from the Mahāpadāna the earlier dhammatā doctrine was supplemented and in a sense superseded by the praṇidhāna idea, a consummation of the earlier Indian conception of Faith (Śraddhā) viz., the belief that man becomes what he wishes to be, illustrated by the typical account of the hermit Sumedha, the first Bodhisattva who resolved to be a Buddha during the dispensation of Buddha Dīpaṅkara and realised his aspirations as Gautama.

Over and above this praṇidhāna doctrine, reinstating the ancient Indian conception of faith

against the popular belief in fate, developed as a Law of Karma in the Jātaka cult, the genealogy of the Buddhas is of paramount importance in the history of Buddhism as being the literary record of an age, when the Buddhist theologian had to invent an antiquity as a prop to his faith, in its keen competition with the rival faiths that drew their authority from the remotest past. But the date of the Buddhavaṃsa shows that he was incapable of inventing the desired antiquity at once. Before any way could be made towards the lineage or the uniform succession of the Buddhas, the Buddhas themselves had to be distinguished as a class from the Paccekabuddhas and the Bodhisattvas, and their number sufficiently multiplied. The lineage itself which was a new feature added in the Buddhavaṃsa to the earlier Buddhalogy of the Mahāpadāna could not alone suffice to convey the idea of antiquity. It was by the synthesis of the mythological lineage and the cosmological notion of infinitely recurring cycles of time (kappas) that the idea of antiquity was conveyed in the Buddhavaṃsa.

The question arises, could the Buddhist theologian achieve all this, if there had been no historical ground to build upon. The Majjhima Nikāya preserves in the Isigilisutta (III. 16) an old list of Paccekabuddhas who are otherwise designated seers (isis) and teachers (satthā), dwelling on a mountain, the Isigili Pabbata in Rājagaha. This curious list contains the names of Nemi, Sārabhaṅga, and

Kaṇha, who are treated in the Jātaka literature as Bodhisattas or previous incarnations of Gotama Buddha. This very list also mentions Piyadassī, Sikhi, Tissa, Maṅgala, Paduma, Padumuttara and Sobhita, who appear among the additional Buddhas past. Hence the importance of the Majjhima Discourse. It furnishes us with a list of Indian teachers or seers differentiated by the Buddhists into three distinct classes of heroes, namely, the Bodhisatta, the Paccekabuddha and the Sammāsambuddha. Next the Dhammikavagga of the Aṅguttara,¹² embodies a story of seven Brāhman purohitas. Mahāgovinda and the rest, who are mentioned as celebrated Indian teachers. They, too, are treated in the Jātaka literature as Bodhisattas. These purohitas and such other Brahman teachers as Hārīta and Kaṇhadīpāyana are classed as Bodhisattas obviously on no other ground than that their instructions and personal examples were calculated to foster the Buddhist idea of renunciation.

Although this was the original idea attached to the Bodhisattas, Paccekabuddhas and Sammāsambuddhas, viz., that they were all Indian seers or teachers, it will be a mistake to suppose that they were all historical personages. Buddhalogy or the idea of Bodhisatta, Paccekabuddha or Buddha, must be treated as a mythological creation of the Buddhists. No historical value can be attached to this fanciful creation, which went on multiplying the numbers of the Buddhas and the Bodhisattas.

The *Āṭānāṭiya* suttanta which is later than the *Mahāpadāna* Book, furnishes a clue to the psychology which lay behind the multiplication. There we reach a stage of the Buddhist mythology characterised by belief in the existence of myriads of Buddhas as opposed to the earlier list of seven actually named. Hence the later additions of the names of Buddhas, e. g, in the *Buddhavaṃsa* and other later works, can be explained as giving concrete shape to the vague belief in the indefinite number.

Now our question is, where lies the immediate background of the synthesis of the lineage and the cosmical eras, which we find in the *Buddhavaṃsa*. I would say that it is in two of the *Suttanta-Jātakas*, viz., the *Mahāpadāna* and the *Mahāgovinda*. First, in the *Mahāpadāna* list of seven Buddhas we are supplied with a chronological succession,¹³ expressed in terms of cosmical eras (kappas). Examining this succession in the *Mahāpadāna* we notice two points :

1. That the first two Buddhas, Vipassī and Sikhi, are separated by an interval of 60 Kalpas, and the Buddhas Sikhi and Vessabhū are separated from the rest by an interval of 30 Kalpas.

2. That Vipassī is alone said to have flourished in one Kalpa ; Sikhi and Vessabhū are the two successors of Vipassī, who are relegated to one Kalpa, while four Buddhas (Kakusandha to Gotama) are associated with the current era characterised as 'Lucky' (Bhaddakappa). In the story

of the Mahāgovinda Suttanta the gods of the Thirty-three rejoiced to see four Buddhas in the world or three or at least two, whereon Sakka, the king of the gods, impressed them with the idea that the world should consider itself fortunate, if it be blessed with the advent of one Buddha of the rank of Gotama, not to speak of four, or three or two. Sakka is at last represented as emphatically laying down a general rule that it is impossible that two Buddhas should arise simultaneously in one world-system. These earlier speculations constitute the background, I say, because the synthesis in the Buddhavaṃsa is nothing but a crystallisation of these nebulous ideas. The doctrinal bearing of this synthesis is that it promulgates an abiding belief in the alternate evolutions and dissolutions of the world-system through vast and countless periods of time glorified by the sublime dispensations of the Buddhas. That is to say, Buddhism as the theologian tried to prove was not a new religion, but a recrudescence of what was believed to have existed through eternity the best and the oldest of religions, acceptable to all.

III. The Cariyāpiṭaka. —It is a Jātaka selection similar to the Barhut. The Prañidhāna doctrine developed in the Buddhavaṃsa left a question to be answered in the Cariyāpiṭaka. Taking for granted that the hermit Sumedha became in the present lucky era what he had resolved to be many Kalpas back during the dispensation of Buddha Dīpaṅkara,

the Buddhist theologian had yet to explain the modes and methods whereby Sumedha's realisation of his aspiration was possible. Are we to believe, according to the ancient Indian conception of faith, that resolution alone suffices for the realisation? The Cariyāpiṭaka induces us to say, no. The path to realisation lies through resolution translated into action. The Buddhavaṃsa teaches what Will can do, the Cariyāpiṭaka inculcates how a Bodhisatta, who has made a resolve, ought to exercise his will in order to attain the goal, the Sambodhi. This is the justification of the title Cariyāpiṭaka, so aptly applied to a selection of Birth-stories. The very title signifies that the selection has to do with cariyā or practices, and in fact, the contents show that the selection is intended to propound a very special doctrine, viz., that of pāramitā, which is tacitly implied in the earlier Jātaka cult. The doctrine is that the Bodhisatta, before he reaches his goal, has to practise the Perfectionary Virtues (pāramis, pāramitās) through a prolonged succession of births. Since the Cariyāpiṭaka defines by its Pāramitā doctrine the path to Sambodhi, it has the just claim to be considered as a complement to the Buddhavaṃsa. These Prañidhāna and Pāramitā doctrines taken together embrace, exemplify and bear out the statement in the Majjhima (III. p. 99) when the Buddha emphatically formulates his idea of faith. Here is a summary of the statement. "When a Bhikkhu is endowed with faith,

equipped with morality, replete with learning, adorned with character, filled with generosity and vested with wisdom, a right aspiration arises in him for the attainment of a higher condition of existence, on the dissolution of his body, after death. The thought burns his heart, it occupies his mind and makes him excogitate. Such mental dispositions and indwellings of his, developed and enlarged in this manner, conduce to the attainment of the cherished end. This is the road, this the path, that leads to his goal."

The reader will observe that the interval between the resolution and the realisation, stated in general terms by the Buddha, was extended in the *Cariyā-piṭaka* through Buddhalogy, so as to comprise several cycles of existence—a stretch of imagination proceeding perhaps from a loose literal interpretation and exaggeration of the expressions "on the dissolution of the body, after death" (*kāyassa bheda parammaraṇā*), a current popular idiom meaning the immediate future following the present existence, which Buddha Gotama may not have meant. The desired higher condition did not necessarily mean in Gotama's phraseology an existence hereafter as we commonly understand it. To suppose that it signifies 'hereafter' in its commonest acceptation is to lose sight of the Buddha spirit acutely expressed by 'here and now' (*saṃditṭhika, akālika*) in the earlier characterisation of Dhamma.¹⁴ Again in the *Sāmaññaphalasutta* (*Dīgha I.*) we are supplied

with a lengthy discourse of the Buddha on the immediate fruit of the recluse-life ripening in this present conscious existence (*saṃdiṭṭhika*). There are, again, a few significant words of the Buddha which are said to have been appealed to by the Buddhist thinkers of pre-Aśokan and post-Aśokan ages as authoritative pronouncements in support of their following views :

1. That the present alone exists.¹⁵
2. That man lives and dies every moment in the momentary happening of consciousness.¹⁶

Thus promulgating the belief that sambodhi is the richest fruit of human efforts continued through almost innumerable cycles of individual existence, the *Cariyāpiṭaka* seems to have lost sight of the Buddha spirit of energy and brought forward a new philosophy of life suited to the temperament of the general run of Indian people whom the enervating climate of India tended to make easy-going.¹⁷ It appears that the *Cariyāpiṭaka* was but a production of a decadent age when Buddhahood or Arahatsip was idealised to such an enormous extent and conceived so far beyond human reach as to give rise to a belief that there was no Buddha or no Arahata in the world at the time. The *Cariyā* doctrine, I am of opinion, is post-Aśokan. For I notice that in the Pre-Aśokan views of salvation which formed the ground for the growth of the *Cariyā* doctrine, there is no idea of a futurity beyond this life and ranging over countless cycles of existence. In the

Kathāvatthu (I. 4 ; II. 9) we come across two views, which the commentator ascribes to the Sammitīyas, Sabbatthivādins and Bhadrayānikas and, among the post-Aśokan schools, to the Andhakas : (1) The Aryan puts away the impurities step by step (odhiso-odhiso), or, as the commentator puts, it, “by one portion at a time”. The same idea is expressed in another controversy in these words ; (2) penetration is acquired in segmentary order. These two statements embrace but the positive and negative sides of one and the same view, viz., that the process of self-realisation is gradual. This theory of life appears to have been a deduction from a metaphysical doctrine of the Sammitīyas and Vajjiputtakas, of the gradual development of self-consciousness, loosely denominated as puggala, personality or jīva, living soul, passing from one state of existence to another.¹⁸ Thus the sammitīya doctrine may on the whole be pointed out as the historical background of the Cariyā doctrine. The main point of difference between the two is that the Sammitīya doctrine is devoid of all mythological implications attaching to Buddhalogy engrafted on the fanciful notions of cosmical eras which characterise the Cariyā doctrine. The complete assimilation of the three distinct ideas : (1) the puggala passing from one state of existence to another, (2) the progressive course of enlightenment and (3) the cosmical eras embracing innumerable cycles of existence could not be reached until after Aśoka. The side-light

that can be obtained from the inscriptions of the Great Mauryan brings within our vision a stage earlier than that of the Cariyā doctrine. For there we find a belief in a glorious hereafter as a heavenly reward for energetic efforts in this world.¹⁹ The futurity vaguely expressed in the royal belief in heavenly reward does not seem to imply any more than an immediate future following the present existence.

The Cariyāpiṭaka combining in one doctrine, beliefs in rebirth, cosmical eras and progressive course of sambodhi formed the literary basis of the later Mahāyāna system of training of the Bodhisattas expounded in the Śikṣāsamuccaya, the Daśabhūmīśvara, and the Bodhicaryāvatāra, to mention only the standard works. Thus it afforded a medium through which Buddhalogy with its novel theories approached the Āśrama theory of the Brahmans. It is interesting to note here that in the Gaṇaka-Moggallāna Sutta (Majjh. III. 1) Buddha made an approach to the Brahman method of training, the Āśrama theory of education conceived in an ascending numerical order, as a graduated system.²⁰ If there is any resemblance in this instance of adaptation, it does not appear to have extended beyond the fact that the Buddha also came to feel the want of conceiving a system of his own on a graduated scale for the proper guidance of his followers at large. I am not here to investigate the points of resemblance between the two systems. Without going into such details I may notice that

their underlying theories and motives differed. For while the Brahmanical system of education was conceived on a par with the natural gradations of existence, and justified itself by a metaphysical theory of the gradual development of self, Buddha's system lacked that general regulative principle which the Brahmanist deduced from their conception of life on a basis of heredity. Failing a deductive construction from a universal theory of life, Buddha's system could not claim for its justification anything but a practical expediency, suggested by the varied mentality of his followers, recruited from different social grades with a view to constituting one common brotherhood. The very idea of a system was rather a concession, a legitimate concession, one may say, to the general shortcomings of human nature, than necessity arising from the very constitution of our mind. His conception of mind as supremely radiant (*pabhassara*) by nature was prejudicial to all ideas of stereotyped system except for the training of those whose mind was tainted by impurities foreign to its nature (*āgantukadosehi paduṭṭha*). The Buddha introduced in this manner a new system based upon the general psychology of human mind and not upon the hereditary stronghold of caste-system, thus affording a free scope for the natural self-determination of those who possessed strong common sense or intuition. But in its approach to the established Brahmanical system of training, the *Cariyā* doctrine afforded a

universal regulative principle proceeding as a deduction from the underlying belief in the moral self-evolution of the Bodhisattva who is a member of Buddha-clan through countless cycles of existence, in other words, from a principle of ideal heredity of culture associated with the mythological creation of Buddha-genealogy.

IV. The Apadāna.—It is the Book of Legends, consisting of autobiographical ballads, where the Arahāt followers of the Buddha, Theras and Therīs, recount their past existences with special reference to those incidents, religious experiences and acts of piety, which had shaped their destinies culminating in Arahātship. The legends are introduced by general description of Buddhahood, distinguished into two types—the state of the Buddha and that of the Paccekabuddha. Thus the Apadāna may be regarded as a supplement to the Buddhavaṃsa in the sense that it adds the accounts of the Theras and the Therīs on the lines of the Great Legend (the Mahāpadāna) of the Buddhas. We say that the Apadāna was a supplement because the Buddhavaṃsa with its Buddha-legends could not alone suffice to impress the mighty point and magnificent work of faith, without similar legends of Theras and Therīs who were Buddha's followers, co-workers and the mainstay of the Faith. The particular Theras and Therīs immortalised by the Apadāna are those who were the followers of Gautama, the present Buddha. The Apadāna brings

out by the legends of Theras and Therīs a special feature of the doctrine of piety, and this specialisation seems to establish a logical connection of the book with the Buddhavaṃsa and the Cariyāpiṭaka. The Buddhavaṃsa by its Praṇidhāna doctrine teaches, as we noticed, what Will can do, the Cariyāpiṭaka by its Pāramitā doctrine teaches how the Will should be exercised by piety among other virtues, and it was left to the Apadāna to teach how reverence and loving regard should be shown to those personages, the heroes of a nation, whose words, blessings and sacred memory are a source of inspiration and solace. Thus while the Buddhavaṃsa and the Cariyāpiṭaka impressed on people the education of will and intellect, the Apadāna was concerned with the cultivation of proper religious sentiments or feelings of devotional love and humbleness of a spirit, finding expression in acts of piety. The doctrine upheld in the Apadāna is what may be technically called Adhikāravāda, which means that it is necessary to establish a claim to Arahātship by homage and such other acts of piety. In other words, the Apadāna proceeded to show that human success and future greatness depends not on individual will and energetic effort alone, but on the guidance, sympathy and grace (anubhāva) of those who are accounted as cherished teachers, and on a reciprocal reverence for them accompanied by regard for the existing system and religious tradition.

I maintain that the Apadāna, along with the Buddhavaṃsa and the Cariyāpiṭaka, is post-Aśokan in date, and I think that the popular idea of piety inculcated on an extensive scale in the Apadāna is in itself a sufficient evidence. An analysis of the legends sets forth that the Apadāna idea of piety did not extend beyond the worship of the Buddhas or their relics and shrines, by offerings and homage, nor beyond the belief that salvation was ensured by the feeling of joy, intense and spontaneous, resulting from such worships.

The immediate background of the Apadāna doctrine of piety lies, I believe, in the stories of the Vimānavatthu, which bears a close resemblance in teaching with the inscriptions of Aśoka. The phases of belief which have found expression in the Vimānavatthu are characterised by a humanizing spirit rendering the abstract concrete or practical. The stories teach that the householders can become dwellers of celestial mansions which vary in glory and splendour according to the merits gained by the following acts of piety and religious observances. (dhammacariyā) :

(a) Faith in the Three Jewels (tiratanesu saddhā).

(b) Buddhavandanā—Various modes of salutation to the Buddha, touching his feet (pādavandanā) or with folded hands (añjalikamma), with a mind transported with joy (muditamano), and a heart serene (pasannacitto).

(c) Buddhapūjā—Worshipping the Buddha with offerings of flowers and perfumes.

(d) Cetiyavandanā, Thūpapūjā, Dhātu-pūjā—Worship of shrines, topes and relics.

(e) Observance of the Uposatha.

(f) Keeping the precepts (sīlasamādāna).

(g) Kiccāni—Fulfilment of duties by man and woman.

(h) Āsana—Cordial reception of the Buddha and his followers.

(i) Dāna—Liberal gifts of food and drink, and other requisites to the Buddha and the Order.

(j) Vihāradāna—Dedication of Vihāras to the Buddha and the Order.

(k) Bhikkhādāna—Alms-giving.

(l) Ārāma-ropā, Vana-ropā, Caṅkama, Pokkharāṇi—Laying out of gardens, planting of trees, construction of roads, and excavation of tanks.

(m) Rathapadīpādi—Gifts of chariots and provision of lights, etc.

(n) Puññānumodanā—Participation in virtuous deeds.

These Vimāna ideas of piety were intensified later in the legends of the Apadāna which virtually did away with the precepts and duties of life, and emphasized only such formal aspects of religion as Pūjā, Vandanā, Dāna and Dakṣiṇā. Among other differences, the following are the most noticeable :

1. Like the inscriptions of Aśoka, the Vimāna stories hold out for the householder a promise of

heavenly reward generally in the immediate future,²¹ while the Apadāna legends invariably illustrate by the lives of Theras and Therīs how heavenly rewards thus obtained are continued through many cycles of existence and multiplied, until these lead to Arahatsip.

2. The Vimānavatthu sets out a religion for the householder, stripped of the idea of renunciation, whereas the Apadāna legends combine by a peculiar mythological device the pious life of the householder with the higher attainment of the recluse, the latter overshadowing the former—a synthesis unknown in the time of Aśoka.

3. The Vimāna stories promulgate generally the worship of the present Buddha²² with his doctrine and followers, while the Apadāna legends by their Adhikāravāda exalt the past Buddhas and bring into prominence the worship of shrines, relics and topes.

4. The emphasis laid in the Vimāna stories is on the whole on individual morality and duty, while the Apadāna legends emphasize mainly the aesthetic, charitable and humanitarian aspects of the faith.

It seems as if the Vimānavatthu and the Apadāna represent the two sides of Aśoka's religion. For the instructions in Aśoka's inscriptions are only a reproduction of the teachings of the Vimānavatthu²³ and the Apadāna legends are nothing but the embodiment of Aśoka's personal practices. And the conflict between the Vimāna and Apadāna

doctrines is the same as that between Aśoka's teachings and practices. What we find in Aśokan inscriptions is in spirit but a faithful reproduction of the Buddha idea of worship, which consists in following his instruction and not in personal homage and offering, the foolish ways of common people.²⁴ But in his personal practices Aśoka himself appears to have followed a mode of worship which the Buddha had denounced as vulgar. In the history of this conflict between the two forms of Buddha worship, the Apadāna marks a stage in the growth of the Buddhist creed when the ethical side practically disappeared yielding place to the popular. The result was that the emotional side of the faith devoured its previous rationality (paññānvayatā).²⁵

The Adhikāravāda of the Apadāna combines two elements—the Gr̥hya and the Śrāmaṇya. We have seen above that the background of the Gr̥hya religion is in the Vimānavatthu. But we have to enquire, where lies the background of Śrāmaṇya, the religion of the recluses. I think it is in the earlier extant songs of the Theras and the Therīs.

We have in the existing Pali Canon two anthologies of the psalms of the early Buddhists-Theras and Therīs, the former numbering 259, and 264 including the duplicated names,²⁶ and the latter 73.²⁷ Among the Theras and Therīs named there are a number of historical persons whose dates range from Buddha to Aśoka. For instance, the commentator Dhammapāla singles out Tekicchakāri

as a Thera whose father was banished by Candagutta Moriya, who, therefore, may be taken as a contemporary of king Bindusāra; the son and successor of Candagutta. Among the contemporaries and relatives of king Aśoka, the commentator mentions Vitasoka, and Prince Tissa called Eka-vohāriya in the text, as Theras who were brothers to the Great Maurya. Of the Therīs none are mentioned by the commentator as belonging to the time of the Mauryans or later. That the gāthās ascribed to these Theras and Therīs were all really uttered by them, no one can believe. This is not to deny that there are many genuine utterances or self-expressions of the poetically gifted brethren and sisters. Whether the Theras and the Therīs were all historical personages or not, whether the stanzas bequeathed to us under their names be all their genuine utterances or not, we cannot but be struck by the fact that stanzas were all to the same purpose, to bring out the same phase of belief, to promulgate the same doctrine of self-expression (aññāvāda), to inculcate the same dhammatā, or the order of the norm (niyāma), wherein holiness is the natural expression of what Mrs. Rhys Davids characteristically denominates the Arahant's "mental and moral being." This self-expression which characterises the psalms is but an outward indication of the inner conviction of a Buddhist saint when he has reached the purest state of consciousness by means of meditation.

In the Apadāna, one can find another redeeming feature of the Buddhist faith which is absent from the original teachings of the Buddha, viz. the germ of a conception of Paradise in its charming description of Buddha Khetta, the conception that was so much developed afterwards in the well-known Mahāyāna work, the Sukhāvatī-vyūha.

NOTES

1. Daisetz Teitars Suzuki was the first to emphasize this view in his outlines of Mahāyāna Buddhism, p. 21. See his able exposition of the Trikāya-Doctrine Ibid, pp. 256f.
2. Buddhist India, pp. 176-177.
3. See Nariman's translation of Winternitz's views on Buddhist Literature in A Literary History of Sanskrit Buddhism.
4. This is a surmise from the mention of 500 Birth-stories in the Culla-Niddesa (P. T. S.), p. 80.
5. Culla-Niddesa p. 80,
6. The Niddesa scheme is drawn up on the basis of four Suttanta Jātakas which comprise (i) the Mahāpadāniya Suttanta (Dīgha, II), (ii) the Mahāsudassaniya Suttanta (Dīgha, II), (iii) the Mahāgovindiya Suttanta (Dīgha, II), and (iv) the Maghādeviya Suttanta (Makhādeva Sutta in the Majjhima).
7. The point has been fully discussed by Rhys Davids in his Buddhist India, pp. 198 f.
8. Cunningham, Stūpa of Barhut.
9. Fausböll, Jataka, I, pp. 1, 2, 3, 28, 47, 90 ; IV, 406.
10. Index to the Gandhavaṃsa, J. P. T. S., 1896, pp. 54, 70.
11. The earlier beginnings of this linking process are traceable in the Suttanta Jātaka, e. g., in the Ghaṭikāra-sutta of the Majjhima, where the present Buddha says that the he was born as Jotipāla, the teacher in the dispensation of Kassapa the Buddha.
12. Aṅguttara, III, pp. 368-373.
13. Dīgha, II, p. 2. Ito so ekaṇavuto kappo yaṃ Vipassi.....ekatiṃso kappo yaṃ Sikhi .tasmiṃ yeva kho...

kappe Vessabhū.....imasmiṃ yeva kho bhikkhave Bhadda-
kappe ahaṃ (i. e. Gotamo etarahi araham sammāsam-
buddho).

14. Dīgha II. p. 93. Also compare Bhaddekarattasutta
Majjh. III. p. 187, where Buddha exhorts the bhikkhus with
the words : ajj' eva kiccam āpannam ko jaññe maraṇam
suve, (Strive to-day, for who knows death will not come
to-morrow).

15. The Kathāvatthu commentary attributes this view
to the Theravādins and Bhavya to the Old Sthaviras and the
Sarvāstivādins (Rockhill, life of the Buddha, pp. 190, 191).
The Kathāvatthu itself (1. 7) shows that that view was
deduced from a statement of the Buddha preserved in the
Saṃyutta, III. 71. "That material body which has come to
birth has appeared, is reckoned, termed, named, 'exists',
but is not reckoned as 'has been', nor as 'will be' (Points of
Controversy, p. 95).

16. The Kathāvatthu commentary attributes this view
to three schools viz., Vajjiputtaka, Sammitīya and Andhaka,
the first two of which are pre-Aśokan and the third post-
Aśokan. See Kathāvatthu I. 1. art 193 ; II. 7. The view
is said to have been based upon such Canonical passages as
Aṅguttara I. 10 and Saṃyutta II. 95 q.v. ; cf. Mahāniddeśa,
p. 117 :

jīvitam attabhāvo ca sukha-dukkhā ca kevalā,
ekacittasamāyuttā lahuso vattati khaṇo.

17. The gradual degeneration of the Buddha-spirit of
energy in the popular Buddhist faith is patent. A pious
Buddhist of Ceylon, Burma or Chittagong, evinces a wish to
attain salvation in the dispensation of the future Buddha
Metteya.

18. Kathāvatthu I. 1. art. 158.

19. E. g. Rūpanāth Edict : khuddakena hi ka pi
pakamanena sakiyo pipule pi evage ārodheve.

20. Brāhmaṇānaṃ hi anupubbasiṅkhā anupubbakiriyā yathā ajjhene.

21. The Vimāna story of Revatī (No. 52) which also occurs as a Peta-story in the Petavatthu is one of the few exceptions.

22. The Vimāna story (No. 82) which mentions Sumedha, a past Buddha, is one of the few exceptions.

23. Notably the Vimāna story of Revatī (No. 52).

24. Mahāparinibbāna suttanta in the Dīgha, II, p. 138.

25. Cf. paññānvayā saddhā in the Saṃyutta, V, p. 222.

26. Mrs. Rhys Davids, Psalms of the Brethren, Introduction, p. xxvii.

27. Muller, Paramatthadīpanī, Introduction, p. ix.

IX

BUDDHISM AND EARLY VEDĀNTA

It is a rare privilege for me to have this opportunity of addressing you on such an important subject as Buddhism and Early Vedānta. I rejoice to find here by my side Swami Siddhātmanānda whom I met first in Rangoon and have the pleasure of meeting again in Colombo, two poles asunder. I see also present in our midst Mr. M. S. Anne, the Representative of the Government of India, who has been exceptionally kind to me in many ways, and my esteemed friend Mr. Nataraja, Bar-at-law, who is an eminent member of the Colombo Bar and a distinguished representative of the Hindu settlers in this island. There are many others, ladies and gentlemen, whose personal acquaintance I should like to make and whose presence I surely feel. Whoever we may be, whether Indians or Indian settlers, there is no reason to think that we are aliens to this island either by land or by race and cultural heritage, the bulk of the Ceylon population being the descendants of the earlier settlers or colonisers from different parts of the main-land of India. Such being the case, the political and other aspira-

tions of Ceylon as a whole are, after all, our own aspirations, and we have got to share the common responsibility of furthering the cause of our common culture and civilization. Although Buddhism happens to be the main religion of the island, undeniably the way for it was paved by the earlier preachers of Indo-Aryanism here as in various other parts of India. The Tāpasas, Parivrājakas, Ājīvikas and Jainas were certainly the forerunners of the Buddhists. The wave followed on the wave from the shores of India to deliver to the shores of Ceylon the lofty and eternal messages of the soul and of Buddha-mind. These are indeed the two main messages India had to convey to the world, one through the Upaniṣad doctrine or Early Vedānta and the other through Buddhism.

As for the Ramkrishna Mission and Vivekānanda Society under whose joint auspices we meet here this afternoon, I am glad to observe that they seek to harmonize in their mission throughout the earth the teaching of Vedānta with the practical side of Buddhism. Ceylon is still full of inspiring memories of Swami Vivekānanda who was the organ voice for the serene and sweet heart of Rāmkrishna Paramahansa, and the few lectures delivered by him bear happy reminiscences of this island. It was again Swami Vivekānanda who, besides being a living link between the two countries, boldly proclaimed in his Chicago address that Buddhism is the natural fulfilment of Hinduism.

Broadly speaking, Buddhism and Vedānta represent the two main currents of Indian religious and philosophic thought, the rest of the religions and philosophies belonging either to this or to that. If by Vedānta is meant the system of Vedānta as presented in the Sūtras of Vādarāyaṇa and developed through later interpretations, it is chronologically later than Buddhism proper and the earlier forms of Buddhist thought, nay, it is later even than the Bhagavadgītā containing, as it does, the philosophic foundation of Hinduism. If by this term is meant on the other hand the commonwealth of Vedāntic doctrines as embodied in the Upaniṣads, its main foundation is undoubtedly pre-Buddhistic and pre-Jaina. Although the continuity of this early Vedānta can be traced through a long series of the Upaniṣad texts bringing us down to the Muslim period of Indian history and bearing clear traces of many later developments and changes in the religious and philosophic thought of India as a whole, they possess as members of the Upaniṣad family a few common traits in their general appearances, expressions and modes of presentation. The main tenets and general upshot of the earlier texts are maintained throughout. So I shall not discard them out of consideration simply because they appear in some respects to be later compilations. To facilitate the discussion of the subject proposed I shall confine my observations, only as far as possible, to those Upaniṣads which are definitely presupposed by the

Pāli Dialogues of the Buddha and early Buddhist literature.

To an unbiased and critical student of the Upaniṣads and Buddha's Dialogues, it cannot but appear that certain texts of the former read almost like and clearly anticipate certain texts of the latter or that certain texts of the latter are at first sight nothing but elaborations of certain texts of the former. There are certain remarkable utterances of Buddha which verbally echo those of the Upaniṣad teachers. In points of language and underlying spirit, phrases and idioms, thoughts and ideas, the Pāli Dialogues of Buddha represent, no doubt, the next stage of cultural development. These facts, viewed superficially, have led the majority of modern Indian exponents of Hindu philosophy to deny the originality of thought and experience to Buddha. Even in the opinion of so great an exponent of Indian philosophy as Professor Sir Sarvapalli Radhakrishnan the main part played by Buddha was to democratize the philosophy of the Upaniṣads. Some are inclined also to the view that the real service rendered by Buddha was to confirm the truth from an *a posteriori* point of view of what was presented in the Upaniṣads from an *a priori*. The fact about all these opinions is that Buddhism and Jainism still pass as alien to the general thought movement of India which is sought to be grasped and interpreted under the misleading name of Hindu philosophy. The sectarian and separatist spirit is still

so rampant and deep-rooted in the country that we often fail to comprehend the historical importance of the contributions of Buddhism and Jainism to the organic development of the commonwealth of Indian and world thought, and to realize how they fill in big gaps or supply many missing links in the process of that development.

It is not only the four Vedas with their appendices, the Brāhmaṇas with the Āraṇyakas and Upaniṣads, the Śrauta and other older Sūtras but also the Bhārata of Jaimini and the Mahābhārata of Vaiśampāyana are admittedly presupposed by the Pali Buddhist Canon and the earlier texts of the Jaina canon in Ardhamāgadhī. Even one may freely concede that the Pali Jātakas, I mean the Canonical Jātakas, are in many respects replicas of the anecdotes and words of popular wisdom as were embodied in the Vaiśampāyana or pre-Pāṇinian Mahābhārata. The prevailing religious ideals of life, the collective wisdom of the age, the notable personalities and examples of character, the accepted laws of piety and duty, the approved rules of decorum, the recognized principles of conduct, the treasured experiences and thoughts and utterances of the best of men, and the like which were the constitutive elements of Indo-Aryanism find respectful mention and are prominently held in the Jātakas and Dialogues of Buddha. These were the common property of all. What is historically important is to determine the points in respect of which

Buddha struck a new note, sought to give a new direction to Indian and world thought, suggested new methods of approach to the problems of philosophy and like, defined the task of religion, broad-based the foundation of ethics and morality, tried to change the methods of education and training, and was concerned to indicate the lines on which domestic, social and national life might be developed, moulded and remoulded.

With regard to this heritage and vast wealth of all that went by the name of Indo-Aryanism and of which Buddha was a proud inheritor, his role was not only that of a gifted expounder and powerful preacher and disseminator, not only that of a bold critic and careful examiner, but also that of a pre-eminent leader and supplimenter. These are indeed the true perspectives in which we can have a clear view of the picture of historical relationship between Buddhism and Early Vedānta.

An air of secrecy or mystery is maintained throughout the Upaniṣad tradition with the result that the Upaniṣat itself has come to be treated, e. g., in the writings of Madame Blavatsky, as an equivalent of 'Secret Doctrine'. Even in a Sanskrit treatise like the Arthaśāstra of Kauṭilya or the Kāmasūtra of Vātsyāyana the word aupaniṣadikam which is a derivative of Upaniṣat has been freely employed to mean a body of Ātharvaṇika (occultic) practices, not to say, of black arts. But as employed in so authoritative a text as the Taittirīya Upaniṣad,

the word is to be treated as a synonym of 'command', 'admonition', 'instruction' to be obeyed and followed :

eṣa ādeśaḥ, eṣa upadeśaḥ, eṣā Vedopaniṣat,
etad anuśāsanam evam upāsitavyam,
evamucaitad upāsyam (ibid, i. 11.4)

In a similar strain the word upanīṣā which is the Pali equivalent of upaniṣat occurs in Buddha's exhortation : "To this end is the discourse, the advice, the upaniṣat, the listening with rapt attention" :

etadatthā kathā, etadatthā mantanā, etadatthā
upanīṣā, etadatthā sotāvadhānam.¹

In the Dhammapada, verse 76, the word upanīṣā is distinctly used in the sense of 'path' or 'way' when Buddha declares that way to gains is one and that to Nirvāṇa another :

añña hi lābhūpanīṣā, añña nibbāna-gāminī.²

The word upaniṣat is taken in the Sanskrit lexicon to mean a doctrine ministered in secret.³ To explain in terms of the Upaniṣads themselves, the doctrine signified by upaniṣat is one to receive which an earnest seeker of truth and good was required to humbly approach an accredited teacher and to be respectfully seated before him, feeling his august presence.⁴ Such is precisely the picture given in the prelude to each Dialogue of Buddha of the inquirers or learners approaching the gifted Master and sitting before him for the discussion of matters of interest and importance.

The serenity and calmness of the atmosphere in which the topics of supreme interest and importance were solemnly mooted and discussed are the most striking feature of it. The Dialogues, except in rare instances where the interlocutors happened to be equals, hardly assume the form of such logical debates as are reported in the Pali Book of Controversies called *Kathāvatthu*. We have in them more of dogmatics than of dialectics, more of the experiences of masterminds through an intuitive mode of getting into direct touch with the transcendental reality than of the ripe results of a ratiocinative or discursive process of the thought.

The upaniṣat of the *Taittirīya* text which is in the form of a command, admonition or instruction is nothing but a valedictory address with which the teacher used to charge his pupil at the time of the latter's leaving the institution after finishing his Vedic course of Study :

Satyam vada. Dharmam cara. Svādhyāyān mā pramadaḥ. Ācāryāya priyam dhanam āhṛtya prajātantum mā vyavacchetsiḥ. Satyān na pramaditavyam. Dharmān na pramaditavyam. Kuśalān na pramaditavyam. Bhūtyai na pramaditavyam. Svādhyāyappravacanābhyām na pramaditavyam. Devapitrākāryābhyām na pramaditavyam. Mātṛdevo bhava. Pitṛdevo bhava. Ācāryadevo bhava. Yānyanavadyāni karmāṇi tāni sevitavyāni, no itarāṇi, etc. (*Taitt. Up. i. 11*).

“Speak truth. Practise piety. Be not inatten-

tive to the study of the Vedas by chanting. Do not cut off the family line after procuring for the teacher the wealth of his liking. Deviate not from truth, from piety, from good, from prosperity, from the Vedic injunctions, from duties to the gods and pitṛs. Attend to mother, father, teacher, guest as though to a deity. Only the works that are blameless are to be performed, not others. Etc.”

The upaniṣat of Buddha which is in the form of a discourse, piece of advice or an exhortation is to proclaim :

vinayo saṁvaratthāya, saṁvaro avippaṭṭisāra-
tthāya, avippaṭṭisāro pāmojjatthāya, pāmojjo
pītatthāya, pīti passaddhatthāya, passaddhi
sukhatthāya.....yathābhūta-ñāṇadassanaṁ
nibbidatthāya, nibbidā virāgatthāya, virāgo
vimuttatthāya, vimutti vimuttiñāṇadassanatthāya,
vimutti-ñāṇadassanaṁ anupādāparinibbānatthāya
(Vinaya, V. p. 164)

The discipline is for restraint, restraint is for non-repentance, non-repentance is for joyousness, joyousness for joy, joy for the subsidence of torment, that for ease, ease for concentration, concentration for knowing and seeing things as they are, that for ceasing to feel interest, that for dispassion, dispassion for emancipation, emancipation for the awareness and that for the total extinction of the thirst.”

The valedictory address in the Taittirīya Upaniṣad may be shown to contain the main principles of Aśoka's Dhamma, particularly those

inculcated through M.R.E. (Mysore version) :
“Thus saith the Beloved of the gods : respectful
attention must be paid to mother and father, like-
wise to seniors, tender regard for living beings
must be strengthened, truth must be spoken, these
very attributes of piety must be propounded ;
likewise the teachers must be honoured by pupils
with submissiveness, etc.”

In the Muktika text (7-8), the term Upaniṣat
stands for both the container and the contained to
both of which the name of Vedānta is applied, and
whether as the container (text) or as the contained
(doctrine), Vedānta is extolled as the kernel or
quintessence of Vedism.⁵ In the Muṇḍaka text
(iii 2. 6), the main content of the Upaniṣads is
appropriately represented as the well-defined
knowledge of Vedānta (Vedānta-vijñānam). In
other texts this knowledge is given the name of
Brahmavidyā or Brahmatattva, which is just another
word for Ātmavidyā or Ātmatattva. In the
Muṇḍaka text itself (ii. 2.3), the learner is advised
to make use of the Upaniṣad as the bow, and to set
on it the arrow (i. e., himself) sharpened by
reverential approach (upāsanā), aiming at and
piercing the knowledge of the indestructible
(akṣaya), i. e., of Brahman, the absolute and trans-
cendental being. The leading of brahmacharya or
chaste life is insisted on throughout the Upaniṣads
as the primary moral condition of self (individual
life) for the attainment of that supreme end. Thus

to be an adept in Vedānta entitled to deal with the Brahma-lore is to be the finest type of ethical man, glowing with the inner glow and outer expression of spirituality. Such is precisely the criterion of a person being an expert vedāntin suggested by Buddha in one of his very first utterances : "The Brāhman whose self has been cleansed of sins, who is nonboasting, whose nature is not stained by passions, who is self-controlled, who has thoroughly gone through Vedānta and lived the holy life is indeed the man who can expound the Doctrine of Brahman."

Yo brāhmaṇo vāhitapāpo nihuhuṅko

nikkasāvo yatatto

Vedantagū vusita-brahmacariyo dhammena

so Brahmagādāṃ vedeyya.⁶

Immediately after the time-honoured Vedic seers, Buddha mentions the Brāhman teachers belonging to the different Vedas, such as the Addharyas (Adhvaryus) to be connected with the Yajurveda (White), say the Vājasaneyas, the Tittirīyas (Taittirīyas) to be connected with the Taittirīya (Black) recension of the Yajurveda, the Chandokas (Chāndogyas) to be connected with the Sāmaveda, and the Bāhvṛcas to be connected with the Ṛgveda, say the Aitareyas.⁷ They are spoken of as the teachers who were propounders of diverse paths leading to one and the same state of union with Brahmā.⁸ In the Dialogues of Buddha we are introduced also to several con-

temporary religious orders of the Brāhman Parivṛājakas and the schools of thought represented by them. In them we are referred moreover to the important religious orders and schools of thought founded by six Śramaṇa teachers, Brāhmanas and Kṣatriyas, who were regarded as renegades to the Vedic tradition of Indo-Aryanism, including Mahāvīra, the founder of Jainism. The Brāhman Parivṛājakas and Śramaṇas have been classified and named either according to their practices and habits or outward signs, or according to the doctrines upheld, or even according to the personal distinction of the founders and leaders. The Upaniṣads, earlier and later, contain the views and religious practices of the earlier Brāhman schools of the Śrotriyas as well as those of the various schools of the Brāhman Parivṛājakas. The later texts are named also after the deities of whom the exponents of the Upaniṣad doctrine of Brahman and self happened to be the votaries. The Great Epic in its post-Buddhistic form came to embody a number of Gītās forming as they did a literature by themselves by way of a deflection from the Upaniṣads. How much of the doctrines and practices contained in the Upaniṣads and these Gītās is really presupposed by primitive Buddhism is an all-important question to return a satisfactory answer to which we need a close co-operation of many a competent scholar.

Buddhism and Early Vedānta are concerned

with the problem of the origin and development of the cosmos, the world of life, the society and the state. Both seek to determine man's supreme place in the world as a whole. Both consider man's position from the anatomical, physiological, embryological, psychological, eschatological, ethical, intellectual and spiritual points of view. The elevation of human nature by all possible means is the principal aim of both. The problem of vidyā and avidyā, their bearings on the course of human life, the law of Karma and its bearings on the problem of freedom of the will, the problem of dream and sleep and of death and after, and the problem of memory are equally important in both. The problem of liberation or deliverance (mukti, mokṣa, nirvāṇa) is vital to both. The questions of individuality and progress demands a satisfactory answer from both. The need of yoga or dhyāna as means of concentration, insight, introspection, higher knowledge and the development of super-normal faculties is equally stressed in both. The cosmography with the same psycho-ethical purpose as a means of measurement of the levels of consciousness, the planes of experience, and the perfection of character. Both lay the same kind of emphasis on the polite behaviour on the part of the learner according to the rules of decorum and the fulfilment of the moral conditions of the self. Both draw away the mind from things external and worldly and seek to increase its

inwardness, from cares and anxieties, worry and flurry to that of tranquillity and peace. Both exhort men to grow from more to more, to go ahead (uparyupari, uttaritaram). Both recognize the need of food or nourishment of five different kinds, stressing the great importance of spiritual food to the self. The art of reading a rational meaning into rituals and popular practices is tried in both to deepen their significance.

The Bodhisattvas of the Jātakas are modified or unmodified heroes of the popular anecdotes with their prototypes in the pre-Pāṇinian Mahābhārata. They are moralisers, instructors of wisdom, the collective wealth of which was in the immediate background of Buddhism proper.

There is yet no valid reason to change my opinion that Yājñavalkya, the founder of the Vājasaneyā school, is indeed the most notable milestone in the history of Indo-Aryanism prior to the advent of Buddha. He is the historical expounder of the doctrine of Karma referred to by Buddha.⁹

Buddha's Discourse on the Noble Quest is nothing but a later elucidation of a saying of Yājñavalkya, which is met with in the Bṛhad Āraṇyaka.¹⁰ It is again in contradistinction to the philosophy of Yājñavalkya that Buddha wanted his disciples, to appraise the main philosophic position of his own thought.¹¹ Similarly it is in contrast with the main burden of the moral of the Great

Epic that we are required to appraise or appreciate the main trend of the Jātaka ethics.¹² The types of the old-world thought classified and defined in the Brahmajāla Sutta apply mainly to the teachings of the Upaniṣads, and partly only to those of the contemporary Śramaṇa teachers.

Buddha's vivid account of hard penances including the practice of Haṭhayoga¹³ has its exact Sanskrit counterpart in such Upaniṣads as the Yogaśikhā, Paramahansa Parivrājaka, Saṁnyāsa, Turiyātīta and Avadhūta. Behind Buddha's conception of nāma-rūpa and five aggregates is the Upaniṣadic idea of nāma-rūpa and five kośas. The same four predicates of duraṅgama, ekacara, asarīra and guhāsaya are applied alike to citta and ātmā.¹⁴ Buddha's description of organic functions in terms of the six vātas cannot but remind us of the Upaniṣad account of the same in terms of the five prāṇas (vital airs).¹⁵

The points of similarity, which are in some instances verbal only, go to determine the historical background of Buddhism, and these are not to be mistaken for the points of identity. It is the points of difference and distinction that are really important from the historical point of view as suggesting a new direction to Indian and world thought and as determining Buddha's original contribution and progressive steps. The keys are supplied to the understanding of the ranges of religious experience and philosophic thought within which the points

of similarity are to be noticed, as well as those within which the points of difference are to be adjudged and appreciated. The ranges within which the points of agreement are to be noticed are broadly characterised as *laukika* (mundane, popular) and spoken of as comprising the three worlds of conscious existence (*lokas*) or three levels of consciousness and planes of experience (*bhūmis*). And the ranges within which the points of disagreement are to be noted and appreciated are broadly characterised as *lokottara* (supramundane, going beyond the popular stage, progressive) and spoken of as comprising the eight stages of conscious advance and rationality. Even within the consensus of opinion there are points of difference and distinction, and in the later systems of Indian thought other than Buddhist the *lokottara* position of Buddhism is assailed with new armaments of logical thought, theology and epistemology forged in the vigorous workshop of both orthodoxy and heterodoxy.

The *Mūlapariyāya* among the *Suttas* and the *Mūlapariyāya* among the *Jātakas* are historically the most important, the first as indicating the most departure of Buddha's thought from Early Vedānta and the second as indicating the point of departure of Buddhism from the general trend of Hinduism or popular Indian thought. In one case we are to understand the departure from the philosophy of the *Upaniṣads* and in the other from the popular

philosophy of the Great Epic. The earlier Indian philosophy outlined in the Mūlapariyāya Sutta is one which is embodied in the Brhad Āraṇyaka Upaniṣad, and the popular notion which is sought to be counteracted in the Mūlapariyāya Jātaka is one which is emphasized throughout the Mahābhārata.

The Great Epic emphasizes throughout its narrative the importance of time (kāla), providence (daiva) and fate (diṣṭa) as explanations for all that happens in life to an individual, a family, a race or nation. Time destroys all beings, time recreates them, time remains awake while we are all asleep, the decree of time is inviolable :

Kālaḥ pacati bhūtāni, kālaḥ samharate prajāḥ
kālaḥ supteṣu jāgarti, kālo hi duratikramaḥ.

As against this popular notion of time, the Mūlapariyāya Jātaka lays down that if time be the consumer of beings, of all even including itself, it is possible for a person to consume time the all-consumer :

Kālo ghasati bhūtāni sabbān'eva sahattanā
yo ca kālaghaso bhūto sa bhūtapacaniṃ pacati.

Although the exact Sanskrit counterpart of the Jātaka maxim is met with in the Śāntiparva, this new trend of thought is utterly on consistent with main thought which runs through the Great Epic narrative as also through that of Vālmīki's Rāmāyaṇa.

kālaḥ pacati bhūtāni sarvāṇyevātmanātmani

yasmim tu pacyate kālas tam vedeha na

kaścana.¹⁶

This and similar other progressive trends of thought and ideas may be traced, even in one and the same language, in the Śāntiparva of the Great Epic and the Buddhist Canonical texts. But whereas they are introduced by the way in the former without the least regard for coherence or consistency with the main structure of the Epic thought, they form an integral part of the Buddhist thought and the very foundation of Buddhist ethics and moral discipline.

So far regarding the Mūlapariyāya Jātaka. Now, as to the Mūlapariyāya Sutta representing the first Discourse of the Buddha in the Majjhima Nikāya, its historical importance lies in the fact that it not only enables us to ascertain what an intimate knowledge Buddha had of the philosophy of the Upaniṣads but also to understand the point of departure effected by him from its main trend of thought.

Regarding the philosophy of the Upaniṣads Buddha's significant statement is : "I know this well (sañjānāmi), but I know also something farther than it (abhijānāmi)". He correctly represents this philosophy when he points out that its main pre-occupation is the knowledge of the self and of the relation which subsists between the self and the not-self. The approach to all the problems of philosophy is from the point of view

of self (attā), wherefore one might say that the Upaniṣad philosophy is 'self-centred' or 'ego-centric'. As Buddha himself puts it, here is an attempt throughout to find out and establish one's identity with every constituent element of existence and fact of experience, to derive the self out of that, to relegate the self to the not-self, to find the self in the not-self and to establish the ownership or control of the self over the not-self, the ontological axioms being : 'I am that', 'I am from that', 'I am of that', 'I am in that', 'that is mine'. A realistic attitude of mind is implied in this mode of thinking with the result that every aspect of reality which presents itself to experience or is cognized or conceived is taken and believed to be a fact or thing-in-itself. In the next Sutta called Sabbāsava, Buddha speaks of the epistemological axioms of Early Vedānta as consisting in 'I possess a true self', 'I do not possess a true self', 'I know well the self by the self', 'I know the not-self by the self' and 'I know the self by the not-self'.¹⁷

The conviction gained through the mystical or direct religious experience and the conclusion arrived at from both the lines of argument come to this that the soul within us is the true self which alone perdures unaffected in its nature through the entire series of changes which affects only the bodily or biological aspect of our individual life and existence.¹⁸

The dialectic movement of the early Vedāntic

thought is effectively represented by Buddha in the *Mūlapariyāya Sutta*. This thought, as clearly indicated by him, started from a purely physical basis of existence, with the consideration of man's position in relation to the constituents of matter, and culminated in *Nirvāṇa*, with the consideration of the state of soul, the principle of consciousness, in respect of the highest condition of its spirituality. The successive steps of thought are broadly represented as physical, biological, theological, epistemological and a spiritual. At its biological step, the philosophy of the *Upaniṣads* was concerned with the consideration of the whole of life (*bhūta*)—the relative position of all living beings from plants upwards to the highest type of man, and including also all mythical personalities—the gods, angels and spirits, suprahuman or infrahuman. At its third step, it was occupied, first of all, with the consideration of the position of the *devas*, next with that of *Prajāpati* from whose creative energy and will-to-be the world of life comes to be and *Brahmā*, the deistic personal God in whom the world of mind reaches its consummation, and, last of all, with that of the higher attributes to be predicated of *Prajāpati* on the one hand and *Brahmā* on the other. At its epistemological step, it became interested, first of all, in the consideration of modes of knowing or sources of knowledge : perception (*diṭṭham*), tradition (*sutam*), inference (*mutam*) and understanding (*viññātam*) and next in that of the

categories of thought : unity (*ekattaṃ*), diversity (*nānattaṃ*), universality (*sabbaṃ*), by which the content of knowledge may be characterised. At its last step, the Upaniṣadic thought looked beyond its logical reach and felt the need of Nirvāṇa, better Brahma-nirvāṇa, to complete the idea of the self for our spiritual satisfaction. It goes without saying that almost all the terms used and their gradation are to be found in the philosophy of Yājñavalkya.¹⁹

Buddhism proper as a system of thought was regarded by its propounder just as a further step from Early Vedānta. The commonwealth of Indian thought behind Buddhism is taken to suggest three different lines of reasoning : (1) that based on *dhyāna* meaning meditation and mysticism yielding the psychical data of experience, vision, recollection of the past and miracle ; (2) that based on *tarka* meaning the formal consistency implied in a logical mode of thinking ; and (3) that based on *mīmāṃsā* meaning the data of thought and principles of action derived from the authoritative texts through a methodical interpretation of them. Buddhism, distinguished in its own sphere as *lokottara* from *laukika*, or as *paramārtha* (scientific) from *sammuti* (consensus of current views) was designed by its author to develop a system of thought and moral discipline from the *anātman* or non-personal point of view, abandoning the personal standpoint of *satkāya* or *ātmavāda*.

If the main philosophic difference between Buddhism and Early Vedānta lies thus in the two standpoints of anātman (non-self)²⁰ and ātman (self),²¹ what is precisely meant by it ?

“None or nothing is dear if the self is not dear”, says Yājñavalkya, “all is dear because the self is dear to oneself. The self therefore, is to be seen, learnt, minded and meditated upon.”²² The true self, the abiding and unchanging element of reality within us is soul, the essence of which is bare consciousness (citi, cinmātra) or ‘witness consciousness’ (sākṣīcaitanya), which is unaffected by all the changes that happen in life meaning our biological existence. This soul within us and that within the rest of things or the universe are identical in their nature and substance.

Through the Upaniṣads one may watch the course of an age-long philosophic contest between the warriors as kings and princes and the Brāhmins as Śrotriyas. It is possible that they preserve the memory of that remote age when the warriors as patriarchs were the real shepherds to the people in their double capacity of being their leaders and law-givers, rulers and educators. In the age of the Upaniṣads both of them figured as warm advocates of the doctrine of Brahman and earnest seekers of the true self within and without, the broad traditional distinction between them being that whereas former professed to be Brahmovādins, the latter tended to be Prāṇavādins. The texts now extant

do not enable us to make out any such clear line of cleavage between the thinkers belonging to two social orders. The difference between the two lines of thinking irrespective of their social equations, hinged on the question as to whether Brahman is essentially a vital principle (prāṇa) or a psychical one (prajñā). In a passage of the Brhad Āraṇyaka Upaniṣad (ii. 9. 19), 'All-gods' (Viśvadevas), spoken of as being three and three thousands, are reduced ultimately to prāṇa, the vital principle, and Brahman is represented as that. In the Aitareya Upaniṣad (iii. 3), on the other hand, the ultimate foundation of the entire world of life is traced in prajñā or prajñāna, the psychical principle, and Brahman is represented as that. If one of these views be treated as the thesis and the other as the antithesis, the synthesis of the two is reached in the Kauṣītaki texts (iii. 3) where it is declared :

Yo vai prāṇaḥ sā prajñā, yā vā prajñā sa prāṇaḥ
saha hyetāvasmiñ charīre vasataḥ sahotkrāmataḥ.

"That which is the vital principle is also the psychical, and *vice versa*, both residing together in a living body pass away together."

It follows from this that prāṇa and prajñā are just the two aspects or principles, viz., vital and psychical, of one and the same being. Behind the notion of their inseparable association or connexion was the poetical conception of the tree of life to which cling two birds, inseparable comrades, one of them eating the sweet fruit, the other looking on.

without eating and on which a man sits grieving, bewildered by his own impotence (anīśā), and not grieving when he sees the other lord (īśa). With reference to a living individual, prāṇa stands for the life-principle with which the body as an aggregate of matter is instinct, the choleric or primal form of heat (tejas), the creative energy, the vitality depending on some kind of food (anna) and determining the duration of individual existence (āyus) and the animating spirit of an animated whole. And with reference to a thinking individual, prajñā stands for the psyche with which mind, intellect and the senses are informed, consciousness by virtue of which the awareness of one's true self becomes possible, the cognitive faculty, the power of thinking, willing and feeling, the principle of rationality, the source of intelligence, the inner light, the increaser of spirituality. The conception of prāṇa and prajñā as the principle of life and that of intelligence is valid only in the case of a puruṣa or soul embodied and individuated. The puruṣas are the sparks or particles of one and the same reality, Brahman, the ultimate ground of everything that is or that be, and they are as such the same as Brahman is in their nature and essence. When the puruṣas are implicated in worldly relations they form the jīvātmans, and when they go out of these relations and appear in their independent nature, they become paramātmans. The puruṣas become ultimately absorbed into Brahman and fresh

puruṣas start from the same inexhaustible source of life and intelligence. The theory of absorption and fresh creation in alternation is supported by certain analogies drawn from nature which have more a sentimental appeal than a scientific value. Just as, for instance, a spider spreads out its net and draws it back into it at its sweet will, or just as the rays are radiated from and absorbed back into the solar body, so this world which is the playground of all the embodied souls is created out of and taken back into Brahman.

The Sāṅkhya philosophy differs from Early Vedānta mainly in this respect that it discards the absorption theory of the latter and advocates the eternal separation after perfection of the puruṣas from the whole of the biological side of life as represented by prakṛti and its modifications. The Sāṅkhya allocation of passivity to puruṣa and activity to prakṛti is too catachetical to be admitted as metaphysically sound. Similarly its duality between the two principles having nothing in common between them as regards their nature is most arbitrary to be defended. So far as the plurality of the souls is concerned, the Sāṅkhya and Jaina doctrines are in agreement, although they differ from each other in so far as in the first the soul remains untouched by all physical, sensory, mental and intellectual activities of an individual, and in the second the soul is the single element of reality which is vitally interested in all such affairs

since the whole moral effect of them is to be borne by it.

The metaphysical position of Early Vedānta is sounder in so far as the plurality of the existence of puruṣas is derived from a single reality, Brahman. But the emanations and absorptions of the puruṣas from and back into that reality are represented, after all, as a mechanical affair. The transcendental character assigned to the puruṣas which are gone out of mundane relations is virtually the same as that which is postulated in Sāṅkhya.

However grand and fascinating may be such a conception of the nature of the puruṣas, whether in Early Vedānta or in Sāṅkhya, the whole structure of thought is built on the foundation of a superstitious popular belief. In other words, its scientific foundation is weak and highly questionable.

After the foetus develops in the womb from parental union and reach a certain stage of development the puruṣa as an entelechy enters the organism by the suture (vidṛti) of the head or tips of the fingers and finds its way into the heart where it lodges itself. The Russian doctors of the present age claim to have found out the weight of the souls, whereas the savants of the Upaniṣads managed to find out their length, aṅguṣṭha-mātra, the thumb-length which is really the length of the cavity of the heart.

The soundness of the Upaniṣad idea of puruṣa as an entelechy depends on the scientific accuracy

of the embryological theory of conception and the development of the foetus in the womb. It is just a semblance of scientific truth, or at the most an approximation to it when it is premised that conception results from a parental union serving to bring the semen into contact with the blood :

śukra-śoṇita-saṁyogād āvartate garbhaḥ.²³

This is unscientific in so far as it postulates that in the seventh month the foetus (in the case of human beings) is conjoined with the individual soul (jīvayuktaḥ), that, in other words, the soul enters the organism.

Behind Buddha's enumeration of the three pre-requisites of conception was another age-old popular belief that a departed spirit destined to be reborn waits to take advantage of the parental union to enter the womb. The pre-requisites mentioned consist of the physical fitness of the parents, the sexual congress, and the readiness of a gandharva for ingress.²⁴ According to the Amarakoṣa (Nānārtha., 409), the word gandharva stands for an antarābhava-sattva, which means either a being in the womb or a being in between the state of death and that of rebirth. The antarābhava idea is discarded in the Abhidhamma philosophy.²⁵

Buddha has nowhere explained what he precisely meant by the expression *gandhabbo paccupaṭṭhito hoti*. Buddhaghosa understands by *gandhabba* a being bound for ingress (*tatrūpago satto*), and maintains that by the expression, *paccupaṭṭhito hoti*, is

not meant that a being intending to be reborn stands near at hand watching the parental union ; here it means that driven by the machinery of his karma a being becomes destined to be reborn.²⁶

The fact is that neither the Upaniṣad teachers nor the Buddhist scholiasts were aware of the fact that conception takes place only when a particular spermatozoon comes into touch with an ovum and succeeds in fertilising it. In stating the three pre-requisites of conception Buddha's intention was not to endorse any superstitious belief but just to establish that a scientific explanation for the happening of an event lay not in any single cause but in a conjuncture of circumstances sufficient to account for it.

The Upaniṣad notion of soul gave rise to the theory of there being an internal percipient (vedagū), which uses any organs of sense as a window as it pleases. Here the Buddhists propounded a more scientific view, maintaining that each sense has its own range of action with the result that it enjoys a certain degree of independence of its own in an interdependent system.²⁷

The process of rectification of such fancy-born ideas may be traced, however, through the Upaniṣads themselves. In the Kauṣītaki Upaniṣad (iv. 10), for instance, when the Brāhman Bālāki affirms that he sees the puruṣa or personal double of himself in the mirror, the philosopher king, Ajātaśatru, points out his mistake, saying, "Do not challenge me on this.

I meditate on him as the likeness (*pratirūpa iti*)."²⁸ In the *Bṛhad Āraṇyaka* (iii. 1. 24-25), when Śakalya foolishly enquired "In what does the heart abide ?" Yājñavalkya said, "O Ahallika, when you think the heart could be anywhere else away from us, if it were away from us, the dogs might eat it, or the birds tear it." And in the Pāli *Sumsumāra Jātaka* (No. 208), the Bodhisattva is represented as saying to the crocodile, "Even thou wert led to believe that my heart might be found hung on the branch of a tree, foolish fellow !"

The Upaniṣad philosophers were divided in their opinion as to the relative importance of the senses and the objects, some holding because of the development of the organs of sense the objects come to be realized,²⁹ and some because of the need of realizing the objects the organs of the sense develop. A synthetic view followed, stressing the equal importance of both the subjective factor (*prajñāmātrā*) and the objective factor (*bhūta mātrā*) without the interaction between which the sense or mental operation enabling us to have a knowledge of the external world is not possible. So we are told in the *Kauṣītaki* (iii. 8) : "If there were no objects, there would be no subjects, and if there were no subjects, there would be no objects. For on either side alone nothing could be achieved."³⁰ It is further opined that without *prajñā* meaning the mind consciously attending to the affair of a particular organ of sense, the organ by

itself does not perceive the object.³¹ "Some maintain here, that the prāṇas become one, for (otherwise) no one could at the same time make known a name by speech, see a form with the eye, hear a sound with the ear, think a thought with the mind. After having become one, the prāṇas perceive all these together, one by one. Thus it is indeed, said Indra, but nevertheless there is a pre-eminence among the prāṇas."³² Thus the insistence in all the Upaniṣads is—"Let no man try to find out what speech is, let him know the speaker. Let no man try to find out what odour is, let him know him who smells."³³

It was on this advanced step of thought in Early Vedānta that Buddha's psychological theory of sensation was evidently formulated : "There being the eye, there being the form (within the field of vision), there being the visual cognition '(conscious attending on the part of the mind to the affairs of the eye), the coming together of the operation is the contact which is the *sine qua non* of sensation" : Cakkhusmim sati, rūpe sati, cakkhu-viññāṇe sati, tiṇṇam saṅgati phasso."³⁴

On the same advanced step of thought was built up also the Buddhist psychological conception of the unity of mental life meaning that every mental operation, when it takes place as a unit with regard to time.

On the Upaniṣad notion of the three states of waking, dream and sleep and the further discri-

mination of the state of sleep into the initial stage of *suṣupti*, the fourth stage of *turiya*, the next stage of *turiyātīta* (going beyond the *turiya*), the next and the final stage of *avadhūta* were built up the systems of yogic practice. Sleep was taken to be a periodical natural state of the self which is unperturbed by dreams. "The arteries of the heart called *Hitā*", says *Ajātaśatru*, the philosopher king, "extend from the heart of the person towards the surrounding body. Small as a hair divided a thousand times, they stand full of a thin fluid of various colours, white, black, yellow, red. In these the person (*puruṣaḥ*, the personal double, the inner man) is when sleeping he sees no dream. Then he becomes one with that *prāṇa* alone. Then speech goes to him with all names, the eye with all forms, the ear with all sounds, the mind with all thoughts. And when he awakes, then, as from a burning fire, sparks proceed in all directions, thus from that self the *prāṇas* (speech, etc.) proceed, each towards its place, from the *prāṇas* the gods, from the gods the world.³⁵

As *Yājñavalkya* explained, in the state of sound sleep the inner person (*puruṣa*) or true self within us withdraws himself from all organs of sense and all organs of action for rest in his central abode, namely, the heart which is the vital centre, and here, in this state, the vital principle (*prāṇa*) in him which is in the ethereal form of *tejas* becomes embraced, so to speak, by, or unified with the

principle of intelligence (vijñāna, prajñā).³⁶ The duality meaning the subject-object relation being thus got rid of, he becomes one, and one only, and becoming one, he neither sees nor smells, etc.³⁷

It goes without saying that the yoga was resorted to just as a practical mode of conscious efforts to reach back or attain to this tranquil psychical state of the true self within.

These semi-scientific and semi-fantastic old-world ideas were certainly behind the more intelligible account given by Buddha in the Vedalla Suttas of the order in which the three different functions, vocalic (vacīsaṅkhāra), other bodily and sensory (kāya-saṅkhāra) and cognitive (citta-saṅkhāra) cease and revive.³⁸

The possibility of a gradual cessation and revival in a reverse order of the three functions needed an explanation, and this led to the conception of bhavaṅga or a state of life-continuum³⁹ into which citta (consciousness) sinks or subsides as soon as a cycle or series of mental processes or activities with reference to a particular object of sense or of thought, or of meditation is completed.⁴⁰ This Buddhist conception or scientific hypothesis of periodical subsidence of citta into a state of life-continuum⁴¹ had certainly behind it the Upaniṣadic idea of the ultimate unification of prajñā with prāṇa in a state of sleep or a corresponding yogic state.⁴²

In Buddhism, however, no abiding and unchanging element of reality is made out of the bhavaṅga-

citta or ālaya-vijñāna. This is represented rather as a stream of consciousness with its normal current or flow which does not assume a representative character until it rises up to a certain level of manodvāra below which it is subliminal and above which it is supraliminal.

According to the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra, the functional cessation (lakṣmaṇa-nirodha) does not necessarily imply a cessation of the normal flow of the stream of consciousness (prabandha-nirodha). It is with the rise of the bodhi-citta meaning the 'aspiration for enlightenment' that the bhavāṅga-citta or ālaya-vijñāna gets on into the path which makes for its intellectual, ethical and spiritual progress.

If by the term ātmā or ātman is meant a permanent being serving as the ground of immortality, an element of reality which is eternal, immutable, invariable, not in any way liable to change, and which constitutes the true self within us and within the universe, the anātman philosophy of Buddha sought to establish that there is no such element of reality, no such entity to be found in any form of concrete existence (ātmabhāva) or in experience. If one argues on an ontological ground that the very idea of change presupposes that of a changeless being or reality, it would follow therefrom that both change and changeless are relative ideas and that, as such neither has its independence as a concept of reality.

From the anātman or impersonal way of viewing the world emerged and developed a truly scientific or philosophic method of treating and correlating the facts of experience. This thought needed certain prajñaptis (terms, concepts or generalised ideas) as its intellectual devices, and the business of thought was conceived as one consisting in building up the mātṛkās or architectonics in order to guide men in a rational understanding and interpretation of facts. The individuals as individuals, whether men or animals or things, being variables, they had to be left out of account. The scientific or philosophic thought cannot proceed on mere nāmarūpa or nominalistic basis ;⁴³ it must somehow or other be conceptualistic. But to come into such a world of concepts and causality is to come away from actuality, the world of variables. When however, the concepts and causality are made too much of in the name of science or rationality and passed as correct expressions of truth or reality, a Nāgārjuna is bound to appear in the scene with his sharp dialectics to expose their hollowness and inherent logical fallacy with regard to the Abhidhamma system, and a Sādhū Śāntinātha with his critique to play a similar part with regard to Vedānta.⁴⁴ Is it not stressing the matter rather too far to affirm that none speaks to none, each individual being in fact only a temporary organic combination of the five aggregates ? Just as in Buddhism the scientific or philosophic issue is not infrequently

confounded with the religious or biological one, so the psychical or mystical issue is often confounded with the ontological one in Early Vedānta. The trend of the Buddhist Paramārtha argument, however, is that the idea of a living individuality is identifiable neither with any single constituent nor with a sum total of all the constituents, nor is it conceivable apart from an organic combination of them all.⁴⁵

Four different systems of yogic practice came to be recognized in the religion of Early Vedānta, to wit, mantra-yoga, laya-yoga, haṭha-yoga and rāja-yoga. The first of them consists in the method of developing the divine powers through the muttering of and meditation on the formulas of mystic potency for a period of twelve years. This is considered the most inferior form of the yogic practices. The second system consists in the automatic traduction of consciousness to its original state (citta-laya) in all postures. The third one implies the method of reaching the state of concentration and trance (samādhi) in which the individual soul becomes one with the universal one,⁴⁶ and that through the practice of aṣṭāṅga-yoga, particularly the breathing exercise (prāṇāyāma) meaning perfect control of the respiratory function. And the fourth system consists in a yogic method apparently in violation of all ideas of social morality and disregard of the popular view of the sexual purity and moral continence in saintly life.⁴⁷

With regard to the first system, it may be observed that in spite of a rational interpretation of the Vedic rituals the religion of Early Vedānta has its lapses into ritualism and sacerdotalism. The system of laya-yoga was habitual with such adepts as the Avadhūtas and is exemplified by the state of trance in which Mahāvīra, the founder of Jainism, was found in all bodily postures.⁴⁸ The difference, as casually suggested to me by Dr. Bapat, is one between the methods of application, one implying the practice of hard penances,⁴⁹ and the other the indulgence in the pleasures of the sense.⁵⁰

The mantrayoga of Early Vedānta was at the back of the Buddhist Mantrāyāna and Kālacakrayāna, just as the vajrolī and amarolī and sahajolī modes of the rājayoga were at the back of the Buddhist Vajrayāna and Sahajasiddhi.

It was on the basis of the haṭhayoga that Buddha built up a rational system of meditation with the practice of mental awareness (smṛtyupasthāna) as its grammar. There is nothing corresponding to it in the Sāṃkhyayoga or adhyātmayoga of the Upaniṣads of all ages. It is difficult for this reason to differ from Professor S. N. Dasgupta when he opines that the Yoga method of Patañjali was derived from Buddhism.

The ethical principles of life as inculcated in the Upaniṣads, the Dialogues of Buddha and the Jaina texts are for all practical purposes the same. But one must admit that their psychological founda-

tion is nowhere so clear, rational, sound and deep as in Buddhism. This is not to deny that the putting in the Bhagavad Gītā has a greater emotional appeal or that the Jaina presentation of the subject is more academical. But it will be admitted that in the one the insistence is on the acceptance of duty as Divine command and that in the other the cumbrousness of classifications and scholasticism make the system dull and rob it of the dynamic of conduct.

Thus the discussion may be continued. But I must not tax your patience any longer. I cannot do justice to the subject in a single lecture. And yet I hope and trust that the few lines indicated may prove useful to those of you who are disposed to consider the whole matter dispassionately and impartially.

NOTES

1. Vinaya, V. p. 164.
 2. cf. Aśvaghoṣa's Saundarānanda-kāvya, xiii. 22. 23. mokṣasyopaniṣat vairāgyam, jñānasyopaniṣat samādhiḥ.
 3. Amarakoṣa, Nānārthavarga, 293 : dharme rahasyu-paniṣat syāt.
 4. Muṇḍaka Up., i. 2. 12-13 : tad vijñānārtham sa gurum evābhigacchet samit-pāṇiḥ śrotriyaṁ brahmaniṣ-ṭham, tasmai sa vidvān upasannāya samyak praśānta-cittāya śamānvitāya.
 5. tileṣu tailavad Vede Vedāntaḥ supraṭiṣṭhitaḥ.
 6. Udāna, I. 4.
 7. There is a comparatively modern Upaniṣad called Bāhvṛca.
 8. Dīgha, I, p. 237f.
 9. Majjhima, II, Tevijja-Vacchagotta Sutta.
 10. Bṛhad Āraṇyaka, iv, 4 and Ariya-pariyesana sutta. ,
 11. Bṛhad Āraṇyaka, iv. 1 and Mūlapariyāya Sutta, Majjhima, Sutta No. 1.
 12. Jātaka, No. 245.
 13. Majjhima, I, Mahāsaccaka Sutta.
 14. Barua and Mitra, Prakrit Dhammapada, Citavaga.
 15. Majjhima, I, Mahāhatthipadopama Sutta.
 16. Mbh., XV. 238. 25.
 17. Majjhima, I, p. 7 : atthi me attā, n'atthi me attā, attanā va attānaṁ sañjānāmi, attanā va anattānaṁ sañjānāmi, anattanā va attānaṁ sañjānāmi.
 18. Ibid, I, p. 7.
 19. Bṛhad Ār., iv. 4-5 ; iv. 5. 6-7.
- Cf. the terms lokāḥ, bhūtāḥ, devāḥ, Brahmā, dṛṣṭa, śrūta, muta, vijñāta, ekāyana, pṛthak, sarva.

20. Barua, Prolegomena to a History of Buddhist Philosophy.

21. Cf. Varāha Up., ii. 49 :

śrutyutpannātmavijñāna-pradīpo bādhyate katham
anātmataṁ parityajya nirvikāro jagatsthitaḥ.

Ibid, ii. 26 : anātmavid amukto pi siddhijātāni

vāñchati.

22. Bṛhad Ār., iv. 5. 6 : na vā are sarvasya kāmāya
sarvaṁ priyaṁ bhavati, ātmanas tu kāmāya sarvaṁ
priyaṁ bhavati, ātmā va are draṣṭavyaḥ śrotavyo
mantavyo nididhyāsitaḥ.

23. Garbha Up, 2.

24. Mahātaṇhāsankhaya Sutta in Majjhima, I.

25. See Debate on the subject in Kathāvatthu viii. 2.
Acc. to the Commentary, the Pubbaseliyas and Sammitiyas
among the Buddhists were believers in the intermediate
state of becoming.

26. Papañcasūdanī to the above Sutta : na mātāpi-
tunnaṁ sannipātaṁ olokayamāno samīpaṭṭhito nāma hoti,
kammayanta-yantito pana eko satto tasmim okāse nibba-
ttanako hoti—ayam ettha adhippāyo.

27. Milinda pp. 54, 71.

28. Cf. Bṛhad Ār. Up., ii. 1. 8.

29. Aitareya Ār. ii. 4. 1. 6.

30. yaddhi bhūtamātrā na syur na prajñāmātrāḥ syur
yad vā prajñāmātrā na syur na bhūtamātrāḥ syuḥ. Na
hyanyatarato rūpaṁ kiṁcana siddhet.

31. Kauṣītaki, iii. 7.

32. Ibid, iii. 7.

33. Ibid, iii. 8.

34. Dīgha, I, p. 42. iii, pp. 228, 272, 276.

35. Kauṣītaki, iv. 20.

36. Bṛhad Ār., iv. 4. 22.

37. Ibid., iv. 3. 22-34, iv, 4-2.

38. Majjhima, I.
39. This is the expression by which Shwe Zan Aung represents bhavaṅga in English.
40. Cf. Atthasālinī, p. 72.
41. Milinda, section on Supina.
42. Cf. Chāndogya, vi. 9. 2: prāṇabandhanam mana iti.
43. Chāndogya Up., vii. 1-2.
44. The reader is referred particularly to Ch. V of The Critical Examination of the Philosophy of Religion published in 2 vols, from the Indian Research Institute of Philosophy, Amalner.
45. Yathā hi aṅga-sambhārā hoti saddo 'ratho' iti evaṁ khandhesu santesu hoti 'satto' ti sammuti—
Saṃyutta, I, p. 135 ; Milinda, p. 28
46. Yogatattva Up., 21-27.
47. Ibid, 107 : samādhiḥ samatāvasthā jīvātmā-paramātmānaḥ.
48. Yogatattva Up., 23 : layayogaś cittalayaḥ koṭīśaḥ parikīrtitaḥ gacchams tiṣṭhan svapan bhuñjan dhyāyen niṣkalam īśvaram. Cf. Culladukkhakkhandha Sutta in Majjhima, I, p. 91ff.
49. Pali, attakilamathānuyoga.
50. Pali, kāmasukhallikānuyoga.

X

ROLE OF BUDDHISM IN INDIAN LIFE AND THOUGHT

The very fact that the convenors of the Indian Philosophical Congress thought it necessary to bring the subject to this forum of discussion implies that we have not as yet a definite and clear idea of the part played by Buddhism in Indian life and thought in spite of the divergent views that have gained ground in the modern world from the days of Schopenhauer and Max Müller to those of Sri Sarvapalli Radhakrishnan and Dr. Dasgupta. The issue raised suggests a problem to be approached from the standpoint of the history of philosophy which to be worth the name must be both a history and a philosophy by itself.

The historical method kept here in view is well anticipated by Radhakrishnan in whose opinion it requires us to be sure of the exact chronological development, to form a clear idea of the force of the Indian spirit which had its shaping influence on the contributions made by different peoples at different ages to the continuous development of Indian thought, and to recognize the solidarity of

philosophy with history, of intellectual life with the social conditions.¹

The underlying spirit of Indo-Aryanism is to set higher values on the religious and cultural side of man's life and civilization. Accordingly the whole trend of Indo-Aryan thought was to have declared and established the supremacy of mind over matter, of soul over body, of spirit over intellect, of reflective life over vital, in short, of things spiritual over things temporal.

This found its poetical expression in one of the oldest Vedic hymns² and its artistic expression in one of the inscribed indus seals.³ This was at the back of the Upaniṣadic conception of Devayāna and Pitṛyāna and Buddha's conception of the upward course (uddhagamana) meaning the elevation and the downward course (adhogamana) meaning the degradation of human nature. The inner trend of life came to be interpreted by Yājñavalkya as eṣaṇā meaning seeking, seeking either after children, riches and worldly fame and power or after the imperishable and undecaying state of soul.⁴ Buddha interpreted it as pariyesanā meaning earnest seeking, either ignoble (anariya) or noble (ariya), either after that which is contingent or conditional or after that which is contingent or conditional or after that which is non-contingent or unconditional.⁵ The noble quest on his part led to the discovery of pratītyasamutpāda as essential nature of factual reality and Nirvāṇa as the free state of conscious-

ness, the tranquil state of our internal nature, and the highest emotional state of spirituality and blessedness.

Here the nama of Yājñavalkya deserves special mention, his philosophy having formed a great synthetic landmark of early Indian thought prior to the rise of Buddhism. He was evidently credited by Buddha as the propounder of the Indian Doctrine of Karma⁶ slightly modified in Buddhism.⁷ The Buddha, in one of the most important among his Discourses defined, though negatively, his own position as a thinker in contradistinction to Yājñavalkya's philosophy in the Br̥had Āraṇyaka Upaniṣad.⁸ The pre-Pāṇinian Mahābhārata with its several replicas in the Jātakas and other Buddhist works, modified to suit the Buddhist ideal of morality and ethical idealism, must be constantly kept in view along with the Vedas, the Sūtras and the theories and stories of creation in order to appreciate the rôle of Buddhism.⁹ None of the Sūtras of any of the six systems of Hindu philosophy is presupposed by Pāli Canon.

The history of Buddhism as a progressive movement of thought and self-culture with the regulative principles of human conduct and the directive to the furtherance of the cause of humanity started from the enlightenment of a deeply meditative mind and the successful career of an earnest seeker of the truth and the way and that of a thinker and teacher. It was built up on the

tradition of a new religious order and Kṣatriya school of thought founded by Gautama the Buddha whose eminent and influential immediate disciples and later followers were mostly erudite and gifted men from Brāhman families, and rarely those from other social grades.

The enlightenment is described as an epoch-making event in a psychical sphere of consciousness, a sudden inner illumination of the mind in an intense form of concentration, as an awakening to the essential nature of the objective reality in a flash of intuition. This nature is viewed as that element of reality (*sā dhātu*) which stands in its own right independently of all thinking and ideal construction.¹⁰ It is a matter of discovery rather than that of the ratiocinative process of thought. The task of the discoverer is not to create the thing or fact but just to find it out and declare it as it is (*yathābhūtam*).

So far as the Buddha speaks of the thing-in-itself or things-in-themselves, his philosophical position is Kantian. It is not Kantian in so far as the emphasis is laid on the supreme value of the chance discovery of the truth and the way by a 'wayfarer' in a purely psychical region of consciousness through Yogic *pratyakṣa* and the life-transforming mystical experience and spiritual vision. Furthermore, Buddhism had not developed a system of thought, which thinks precisely in terms of notions supplied a priori by mind from itself and those derived a

posteriori from the data of experience.¹¹ In Buddhism, precisely as in Sāṅkhya-Yoga and Older Vedānta, mysticism rather than intellectualism constituted the basis of religion, and intuition rather than discursive thought served as the mode of apprehending nature of reality the suchness or actuality of things (Bhūtata, Dharmatā, Tathatā, Satyatā).

The tried means of inducing and experiencing the mystical states which in the opinion of William James are more like the states of feeling than like the states of knowledge,¹² and developing the noetic quality is said to be Yoga or the practice of meditation and mental concentration. The moral behaviour (sīla) of the aspirant is subservient to this means, and it has just a negative value as means of getting rid of certain hindrances, external and internal that lie on the way.¹³

In the Buddha-upaniṣad the middle place is occupied by the Yoga method of self-culture and self-perfection. Certain states lead up to it and certain states follow from it as results. Thus Buddhism, too, upholds the Yoga tradition of the Indus Valley civilization associated with Śiva. The right direction of the mind to and the firm resolve of the will for the attainment of the fourfold end (pradhānas), the proper exercise and articulation of all faculties and powers (indriyas, balas), the practice of mindfulness or subjective awareness, and the correct registering of all the facts of experience

and the data of thought are combined with it. It is relied upon as means of deepening mental concentration by passing from one objects to another, eliminating all objects and complexes foreign to consciousness, diving deeper and deeper into our internal nature and ultimate state of consciousness and of life, plumbing the depths of truth, differentiating the levels of consciousness and planes of experience and thought, distinguishing the mental complexes that arise with each type of thought and their reactions on the self and the surrounding world.

A very important part was thus played by Buddhism in immensely developing, perfecting and rationalizing the age-old Yoga method of India leaving a distinct legacy to the Yoga method of Patañjali. The net outcome of this was an analytical psychology—a system of psychological ethics,¹⁴ developed particularly in the *Abhidharma* branch of Buddhist literature. By it Buddhism changed the definition of art, treating it as a tangible expression of refined imagination. The earlier definition met with in the *Brāhmaṇas* went to represent art (*śilpa*) as imitation of the works of nature (*devaśilpānām anukṛtiḥ*).¹⁵ Even Pāṇini defined an image in terms of likeness (*ive pratikṛtau*).¹⁶ The *Brāhmaṇa* definition was applicable to dolls and terra-cotta figurines, the tradition of which carries us back to the civilization of the Indus Valley. Buddha's definition of art as means of actualization of an idea

✓ conceived in the mind (*cittam citten'eva cintitam*)¹⁷ was elucidated later by Buddhaghosa and others.¹⁸ It served to bring about a palpable change in the conception, technique and purpose of Indian art. The image of Buddha was neither carved nor installed as an object of worship until his votaries were taught to believe that it was not a physical likeness but a shape and form of art without any objective background (*uddesikam avatthukam manamattakam*).¹⁹ Such was the viewpoint regarding the iconic representation of all the gods and goddesses of the later Mahāyāna Pantheon, they being conceived as the *dhyānārūpa* of *sūnyatā*. The real history of Indian art commenced from the impetus given to it by Aśoka. Thenceforward, Indian art became creative, pushing the imitative craftsmanship ✓ into the dark background of popular life.

By the Yoga method Buddhism developed a rational theory of sensation and perception and supplied a good corrective to the general Indian theory. In the earlier stage of Indian thought the thesis 'Because of the organ of sense, the object' was met by the antithesis 'Because of the object, the organ of sense', and the synthesis was reached in the Kauṣītaki Upaniṣad attaching importance to both the subjective factor (*prajñāmātrā*) and the objective factor (*bhūtamātrā*), the interaction between the two being the *conditio sine qua non* of sensation or mental operation warranting the possibility of a knowledge of external world.²⁰

With this in the intellectual background, the Buddha laid down the *conditio sine qua non* of sensation : "There must be the organ of sense, the appropriate object and the sense-cognition. In the coming together of the three in a single mental operation lies the possibility of sensation."²¹ This was taken by the Ābhidharmikas to mean that when an object enters the field of sense, is within the range of action (*āyatana*) and there is no defect, organic or otherwise, in the particular organ at the time, the object impinges on the sensitive part of the organ and action and reaction (*hanana-paṭihanana*) take place between the two.²² This physical or physiological operations is not enough by itself as an explanation. There must also be mind to attend to it to fulfil the required conditions, better, to complete the causal situation,

Bālāki of the older Upaniṣads naively betrayed his inanity when he contended for an inhibiting spirit, a personal double (*puruṣa*) in each organ of sense.²³ He might be excused. But the most advanced scientific explanation which followed from this line of thinking, e. g. in the Nyāya philosophy, sadly failed to recognize the part played by the object, and there was much beating about the bush in clearing up meaning of 'proximity' (*sannikarṣa*).²⁴

Diṇnāga, the great Sautrāntika teacher, is not unreasonably regarded by Vidyābhūṣaṇa as the founder of the Mediaeval school of Indian logic.

His fame, precisely like that of Dharmakīrti and others, rests on his being the author of powerful treatises on Pramāṇavāda or Indian theory of knowledge. The critical examination of the nature and validity of pramāṇas was started by Nāgārjuna, Āryadeva and other earlier Buddhist thinkers. But it was Diṇnāga who gave a systematic shape and form to this branch of Indian philosophy. According to Diṇnāga and Dharmakīrti, pratyakṣa, generally translated by 'perception', stands for a direct knowledge or experience of the object which is individual and unique (svalakṣaṇam). This knowledge, which is gained either through an apparatus of sense or Yogic intuition, is unerring in the sense that it carries with it its own certitude as regards the belief in its reality when it occurs. Pratyakṣa contains nothing, no interpretation, supplied by mind from its own resources (kalpanāpoḍham), as is done in perception. The mind at the time of pratyakṣa must be so disposed as to be free from all thoughts and preconceptions (vikalpas), the soundness of body and mind being held as a prerequisite.²⁵ Certainly behind this scientific definition of pratyakṣa was the Buddhist practice of mindfulness (smṛti-prasthāna) and the Ābhidharmika idea of the functional modes of mental processes (citta-vīthis). It is assumed that mind (citta) in its non-functioning and thought-free (vīthi-mutta) state is just a life-continuum (bhavāṅga, i.e. ālaya-vijñāna)—a stream of consciousness inseparable

from the general life-process of an individual.²⁶ When any object enters the field of a sense, and action and reaction take place between the two, the normal flow of consciousness is disturbed and arrested and it rises up to the manodvāra (supraliminal) stage to turn towards the particular sense to mind its affairs. This is followed by other vīthis, the cycle being completed with the naming of the object, which is not possible previous to perception identifying the object with a class.²⁷ Thus there is a long way from the first impact of object on sense-organ and perception. The Sautrāntikas pointed out the psychological and logical error in thinking that the class-notion or universal (jāti) is given *a priori* in a name denoting any individual object.²⁸

Here Buddhist thinkers had to obviate a difficulty. If sense-cognition be an act of mind and the object a thing of the external world, which stands over against the organ of sense, how is it possible for mind or consciousness to recognize the object which is non-conscious and no part of itself? As to this, their position is that mind does not cognize anything which is not its own content, no part of itself, it being concerned with the image (patibhāganimitta).²⁹ But for this the external world is non-existent. Mind in its realistic attitude, as in Sarvāstivāda, Sautrāntika, and Vaibhāṣika systems, regards the image as the mental counterpart of the object contacted by the

organ of sense. Mind in its idealistic attitude, as in Vijñānavāda or Yogācāra philosophy, regards all things as vikalpas or ideal creations and constructions by mind out of its own fancies and preconceptions, which thought in its dialectic position, as in Śūnyavāda or Mādhyamika philosophy, fails to find an objective correlate to any idea or concept. Proceeding realistically, as in the practice of smṛti-prasthāna, mind may or may not receive or form any image referable to an external object of sense. If the image is not received or formed, we cease to feel interested in an external thing and are not involved in the drama of pleasure and pain, happiness and misery on its account.³⁰ In the same connection the Ābhidharmikas developed with much ingenuity a Door-theory of cognition (Dvāra-kathā). By this they ruled out of court the idea of sequence between the impact of the object on the sense-organ and the formation of the image in the mind. The external sense-door and the internal mind-door are set one behind the other, so to speak, and the object-impact and image formation take place simultaneously. Here the analogy of the bird perching on a tree and the instantaneous casting of its shadow on the ground below³¹ may be inapt but the approach is undoubtedly scientific.

If the reduction of the number of pramāṇas (instruments and kinds of knowledge) from six to two, viz. pratyakṣa and anumāna, were a distinctive

contribution made by the Sautrāntikas to Indian epistemology, the reduction of the ten-limbed syllogistic structure of thought as means of valid argument and inference (parārthānumāna) to the two-limbed one with 'example' was equally their votable contribution to Indian logic. The latter was effected by Dinnāga through his theory of invariable concomitance (vyāpti) of the probans (hetu) standing for the major premise and the probandum (sādhya) standing for the inference or conclusion. If the Jainas effected a further improvement by omitting 'example' from the universal proposition on the ground of internal concomitance (antarvyāpti) bringing the Indian syllogism into line with the Aristotelian, the Buddhists had certainly paved the way for them.³²

Buddhist philosophers took a lively interest in the discussion of the import of words and negative judgement (abhāva), and their contributions on these problems could not pass unrecognized in other systems of Indian thought. As to the import of terms and words, the general Buddhist position is that they do not refer to reality, their concern being with the concepts that are ideal constructions, the handiworks of nirmāṇa-citta.³³ Although universals are thus intellectual fictions their value in thought-representation arises from the fact that at the back of the psychological process of their formation is the impact of the object on the organ of sense—of the external fact which is particular,

discrete and disconnected and which stands in its own right independently of the thinking mind.³⁴ The personal names given by the parents are mere convenient word-devices to designate certain individuals ; they have accordingly a denotation without any connotation. Even in the matter of denotation, the organic whole can be identified neither with any single part or constituent nor with their mechanical summation.³⁵ Buddhaghosa's dissertation on the signification of terms and concepts (*paññattis*)³⁶ and Ratnakīrti's *Apohasiddhi* cannot but be treated as important contributions on the subjects. According to Vasubandhu and Yaśomitra, the function of two contradictory terms is to comprehend the universe of discourse regarding a common subject, going by which the negative term *a-vidyā* does not imply the absence of knowledge of which the practical bearings on human conduct run counter to or other than those of the *vidyā* kind.³⁷

At the back of the Sautrāntika idea of the transition of thought from *pratyakṣa* or direct experience to *svārthānumāna* meaning the conceptual form of thought for self-satisfaction, and from that to *parārthānumāna* meaning the syllogistic structure of reasoning, as well as at the back of the Mahāyāna idea of three Kāyas, Dharma, *Nirmāṇa* and *Sambhoga*, was Buddha's idea of the three steps of knowledge leading to the building up of a system of thought and training. Abhi-

sambodhi implies the mystical or intuitionā step, abhisamaya, the conceptual, and desanā, the doctrinal.³⁸ The Dharmakāya of Mahāyāna theology is the essential nature of reality standing in its own right, the Nirmāṇakāya means the nature as brought within one's conception in a form of thought, and the Sambhogakāya stands for the doctrine or system as profounded for the guidance of others—all personified for religious purpose.³⁹

Similarly at back of Sautrāntika's logical test of truths consisting in the community of nature and causality (tādātmya-tadutpatti) was the Buddha's doctrine of hetu-pratyaya or pratītyasamutpāda. Their pragmatic test consisting in arthakriyākāritva, too, was in no way un-Buddhistic.

As for the pragmatic test, no view of life, none of the philosophic positions, whether eternalistic or annihilationistic, idealistic or materialistic, pluralistic, dualistic, or monistic, dogmatic or sceptical, ascetic or hedonistic, theological or ritualistic, theistic or athiestic, is good and acceptable if it serves to make us irrational in mental attitude, intellectually inane, æsthetically ugly, ethically imperfect, socially irresponsive, and spiritually dead or unprogressive, inactive, lethargic and diffident, if it does not set reason free to think and see things for oneself,⁴⁰ to ensure the freedom of the will to act, to endow life with brighter and brighter qualities, and the like. No path of action is good if it does not make for progress but stagnates all higher

activities and is not adequate for the attainment of the fulness of life. No human institution or organization, whether religious or political, social or economic, is good if it serves only to degrade human nature and does not elevate it, meaning the raising of the standard of morality, rationality and spirituality, in short, of culture and civilization.

Now, as for the logical test, the rationality of philosophic thought consists neither in studiously evading the issues as by the sceptics, nor in the academic approaches to truth from all standpoints as by the Jainas avoiding the operation of the laws of thought. It consists neither in devising a hypothetical negative argument, Chandrakīrti's *prasaṅgānumāna*, nor in employing as independent logical argument as suggested by the *Svātantrikas* to expose the logical absurdity of the opponent's position without having a thesis of one's own to maintain in either case. Thought to be thought must think logically taking care to see that the first statement tallies with the last, and *vice versa*. If it is not self-consistent throughout, it falls to the ground.

While discussing the general philosophical position of Buddhism, Radhakrishnan remarks that it is psychological, logical and ethical but not metaphysical. It stands certainly for ethical idealism, but it does not seem quite correct to say that it is not metaphysical despite its ontological position being rather obscure. From the beginning the trend of Buddhist thought is epistemological, it being inter-

ested in making a critical survey of the philosophy of the older Upaniṣads⁴¹ and conducting a critical examination of the grounds of various beliefs, the data of experience and of thought, the lines of argument, the conclusions drawn, their logical consequences and ethical and practical bearings.⁴²

True that when a yogin develops clairvoyance (divyacakṣu), his career as an individual presents itself with all its transitional stages and forms like a cinematographic show on a screen of memory,⁴³ giving rise to the belief that he as an entity passed through an unbroken series of embodiments like a snake which goes on casting off its old worn-out skin to put on a new one,⁴⁴ and other individual beings appear before his eyes as rising up and falling away from different states according to their deeds, forcing upon him the belief in the operation of the law of Karma.⁴⁵ To a normal view 'Nothing is dear if self is not dear, and all things or persons are dear because the self is dear.'⁴⁶ Every living individual is vitally interested in his welfare and aspires to die with the self-satisfaction that he did his best what he was to have done.

These Upaniṣadic ideas might be taken for granted and profitably utilized for building up a religious and ethical life. The fleeting character of the world is denied by none. That everything formed is bound to break down some day is a fact, which nobody challenges. The divergence of views arises in philosophic thought when we try to ration-

ally understand and logically interpret the nature of existence and the manner of change and its final stage. On this vital issue Buddhism had to fight a difficult battle against all other schools of Indian and world thought, especially by denying the existence of soul as an abiding entity and declining to think in terms of any permanent substances and attributes.

In the Buddhist view the nature of existence is fluid or fluxional. It may be said to be static only if it be assumed that at each single movement of Yogic pratyakṣa the time-consciousness is reduced to zero point, not to say, eliminated, and the objective reality presents itself to the view as a single and unique fact. It is spatial because it has position, and it is an infinity because there is no other fact then present. The nature of existence could have been taken to be static, eternal and unchanging, if it would appear in one and the same form at successive moments of Yogic pratyakṣa. Since it appears or presents itself in varying forms, its character is fluid. But this is not enough to say that the forms in which it presents itself are each unique. If that were so, the datum of one experience could not have been connected with that of another, and the building up of a system of thought on the basis of a causality would not have been possible. The facts of different experiences registered in memory and viewed in an order of sequence go to show that if they are not identically the same, they are not

altogether divergent (na ca so, na ca año),⁴⁷ with the result that if the law of identity cannot be established thereon, we can at least establish a law of similarity, and to conceive not a circular but a cyclical order of the cosmic and life-processes. The similars as facts of experience must possess a community of nature or commonness of features and factors (tādātyma, svabhāva), however variable, otherwise they cannot remind us of one another. To interconnect these 'points-instants' in a string of memory thought cannot but introduce the idea of continuity (santati)⁴⁸ or procession (prabandha) as a logical necessity.⁴⁹ Such is the main ontological position of Buddhist thought.

Pratītyasamutpāda, literally translated by 'causal genesis', is held as the basic concept of Buddhism. Vasubandhu and Yaśomitra speak of it under its four aspects : (1) Kṣaṇika representing the momentary duration of each appearance or fact of experience, (2) Prākaraṣika, the continuity of the order of becoming, (3) Sāmbandhika, the causality, (4) Āvasthika, the successive stages of the individual life-process.⁵⁰ At the step of abhisambodhi or Yogic pratyakṣa, it means the essential nature of factual reality standing in its own right. At the abhisamaya or conceptual step (pratyātma), it is brought in the form of thought as a law of sequence: "This having been, that comes-to-be, this having ceased, that ceases-to-be."⁵¹ At the desanā or doctrinal step, it is interpreted and utilized as a law

of causation or dependent origination and the whole structure of thought is built upon it.⁵² A highly interesting and deeply instructive philosophy of relations is developed in Buddhism on the same basis with somewhat different significance in its application to logical thinking⁵³ and psychological ethics.⁵⁴ The Kauṣitakin idea of the unity of mental life⁵⁵ is endorsed by the Buddhist Ābhidharmikas with whom, too, when a mental operation takes place, it takes place as a unit with regard to time, in the same subjective context and stimulated by the same object.⁵⁶ This unit appears as a complex on introspection and analysis,⁵⁷ and the philosophy of relations comes in to enable us to understand the inter-relations of different causal factors. Although the citta and the cetasikas as mental co-efficients arise together simultaneously⁵⁸ the former is given priority, logical priority (*uppāda-paccayaṭṭhena*), only for a rational understanding of the subject.⁵⁹

The relative positions of the three steps of knowledge is such that when we pass from the first to the second, we get out of touch with reality, we come away from it, and when we pass from the second to the third, we are apt to lose sight of the master-mind whose personal conviction is the real authority behind the Doctrine and the Discipline—an argument by which Śāntarakṣita refutes the Brahmanist faith in the *apauruṣeyatva* of the Vedas.⁶⁰ Thus when we come finally to the system itself, we move

about in a world of logical thought which can never be resolved to get back the reality as directly experienced, here Buddhist philosophy tending to be Bergsonian. Now thought is occupied with itself to devise the *mātikas* or ground plans of thought, Kant's architectonics, for the guidance of others in a rational understanding of what is what. For the purpose of psychological ethics *pratītyasamutpāda* is taken to mean a moral law, law of reaction (*paṭibhāga*, Aśvaghoṣa's *pratikriyā*). The Buddhist view of the world is Heraclitean and Great Epical in so far as it maintains that the line of reaction may proceed under the sway of *avidyā* between two opposite states, such as pleasure and pain, happiness and misery,⁶¹ it ceases to be so when it maintains that the same under the guidance of *vidyā* takes place between two complementary states (*sabhāgas*, *sadisas*), driving the development of wholesome states towards the fulness of life (*pāripūri*) meaning *Nirvāṇa*.⁶²

The powerful dialectical weapon of the *Mādhyamikas* was used with its destructive effect on all systems on the strength of the same doctrine of *Pratītyasamutpāda*. If the concepts as devices of intellect are all relative and interdependent, such as those representing the three divisions of time, *pāst*, present and future, and cannot as such stand on their own legs, none of them can be competent to express the reality which stands in its own right. This is the typical argument of

the dialectic of śūnyatā. But for that reason we are not to go away with the idea that the Mādhyamikas were just clever enough to destroy the thesis of others without having a positive thesis of their own. Nāgārjuna himself at the end of his *Vigrahavyāvartanī* maintains: 'If a man believes in the void, then he believes in all dharmas, mundane and supramundane. If he believes in the doctrine of emergence of all dharmas as effects from the combination of causal circumstances. If he believes in that, then he believes in the Four Noble Truths. If he believes in them, then he believes in emancipation.'

Thus our discussion reaches a point where we may answer the general charge of negativism⁶³ levelled against Buddhism, particularly by John Caird, while distinguishing its position from that of Hindu polytheism and pantheism. In his opinion 'so little is there in this religion any trace of positive movement that we may even represent it as saying simply that God is not being.....So far from saying, "whatever is, is right", and finding in this the sanction of our natural passions, our inhuman customs and traditions, it is true to say, "whatever is, is wrong", and it is only in emancipation from the thralldom of sense and habit, in ceasing from the thoughts, feelings, and desires that bind us to the finite, in the utter abnegation of ourselves and the world, that we rise into union with the Divine. Only in that emptiness is the Divine fulness hidden.'⁶⁴

This charge, like that of pessimism,⁶⁵ is due to the one-sided emphasis laid by the Buddhists themselves on the significance of the tenfold progressive path of life.⁶⁶ It is equally due to the failure of scholars to apprise themselves fully of the general mission of Buddhism. It is not less due to the lack of proper appreciation of its guidance to worldly life and human institutions. The four express aims of life of efforts kept always in view of Buddhism comprise the prevention of the rise of those sinful and unwholesome states of existence which have not as yet arisen, the abandonment of those states which have already arisen, the inducement of those wholesome states which have not as yet arisen, and the preservation, non-deterioration, argumentation, increase, development and fulness of those states which have arisen.⁶⁷ By such statement of the fourfold aim of moral and spiritual life the Buddha gave an important guidance to other branches of Indian science, such as those of medicine, wealth and administration, all of which accepted the formula suiting their needs.⁶⁸

If taking human life to be at rest men were usually classified as degraded, elevated, partly degraded, partly elevated, and neither degraded nor elevated, Buddhism supplemented it with a new classification, taking human life to be in motion. According to this new classification, the best of the four men is one who is not only elevated now, but is proceeding also to further and further elevation:

(unnata-unnata).⁶⁹ This leaves no room for doubt that the aim of Buddhism is to lead men and their institutions from elevation by arresting and stopping their course towards degradation.

Of the four ends of Buddhism, the first two are evidently negative, they being concerned with two kinds of nirodha (cessation) called pratisamkhyā and apratisamkhyā,⁷⁰ and the remaining two are positive, their concerns being reinforcement and development.

If the Atman philosophy of the Upaniṣads impels us to discover the likeness of the self (ātmatām) in the whole of the not-self, and the Anātman doctrine of Buddhism impels us to find out the unlikeness of the human self (anātmatām) in the not-self, even then the common aim of both is to raise the position of man and the standard of values. If with the early Greek thinkers 'man is the measure of everything', with the Indian thinkers only a perfect type of man is the measure of everything, and not any and every man. If, according to the general Vedantic view, the highest among men stands on the same level with the highest in the universe,⁷¹ in accordance with the general position of Buddhism the highest in the universe is not found to be on a par with the standard of ethical intellectual and spiritual perfection reached or reachable by the highest among men. If in one view the history of the universe is unmeaning if it does not gravitate towards the fullest recognition and appreciation of the greatness and goodness

of Brahman the Supreme Being and the Absolute, in the other view the same is unmeaning if it does not tend towards the fullest realization of the greatness and goodness in the godly man. If, going by the first view, the Brahmanist thinkers proposed a social organization which does not go out of harmony with the order of nature, external and internal, going by the second view, the Buddhist thinkers stood for an organization in which the nature and form of existence should be conformable to an ideal scheme, both necessitating a careful survey of the natural order and the ascertainment of man's place in the cosmos. A synthesis of the two views was sought to be effected in the Bhagavad Gītā through its cult of Bhāgavatism and Puruṣottama, Nietesche's Übermensch, and this was not without its influence on the later history of Buddhism, when it tended to become a distinct form of Bhāgavatism, the Buddha-Bhāgavatism, particularly in the writings of Aśvaghoṣa the poet.

If the Veda-upaniṣad taught in Older Vedānta^{7 2} had formed the main substance of the Indian doctrine of piety and duty for the layman, good layman, upheld alike by Buddha and Aśoka, the Buddha-upaniṣad may be shown to have formed the positive thesis of all schools of Buddhist thought.^{7 3}

The general mission of Buddhism, like that of Christianity, was not to destroy the law but to fulfil it, both wanting to temper the rigour of mere justice with the quality of mercy. If the Brāhman hymn-

chanters as worshippers of the Akṣara or Śabda Brahman had elevated human speech through the Ṛgveda, Buddha and his followers enriched its vocabulary and expressiveness, maintaining its dignity and gave an impetus to the development of various local and national scripts and languages. It served as a powerful creative factor to the development of different types of Indian literature. In the psalms of the early Buddhist Brothers and Sisters we have fine examples of lyrics that stand chronologically next to the Vedic hymns, forestalling the kāvya and dramas of Aśvaghoṣa who paved the way for Bhāsa and Kālidāsa, vied with Vyāsa and Vālmīki in creating ideal characters, family-life and kingdom. The plot of narratives incense is dispensed with. Attention is directed to the eradication of social evils and the cause of piety vigorously espoused. Moral courage is displayed in driving superstition out of man's mind. Fears of all kinds are sought to be removed.⁷⁴ The spirit of self-dedication to social service cherished in the Bodhisattva-naya. Mahāyāna went to increase the altruism of ethical virtue, and its value was widely recognised. The laws of etiquette and rules of decorum were held before the people. Buddhism laid down the foundation of a science of law, anticipating modern jurisprudence, and advocated a new system of education. In point of fact, Buddhism vigorously espoused the cause of education and culture⁷⁵ and the Buddhists succeeded in founding

several universities instead of creating a separate society or caste among the householders. It gave a great impetus to the development of medical science and chemistry as also to the founding of hospitals. The moral tone of society and human expression was sought to be improved.⁷⁶ Popular rites and rituals, customs and traditions were not rudely brushed aside. Their forms were sought to be changed by holding the superior worth of other forms.⁷⁷ The ground was prepared for a law of persons by placing the duties of householders on a reciprocal basis.⁷⁸ The scope of human understanding was sought to be widened by enunciating a new principle of toleration, insisting on the careful study of all traditions and appreciation of different standpoints with a view to being well-informed and helping each other to grow in essential matters. If the Mahābhārata in its final stage advocated a somewhat different idea of tolerance with its greater sentimental appeal, it suggested really the wisdom in following the policy of non-intervention in the divine business of each person, class or community.⁷⁹ Extremism in all positions of thought and action was sought to be avoided through 'the doctrine of the mean (madhya)' and this was not without its salutary effect on the course of political thought.⁸⁰ Buddha was not in favour of preaching any dogmas and creeds among the masses who needed only the good principles of piety and dynamic of conduct to guide them.⁸¹ The Madhya doctrine was meant to call men away from forms to

the essence of things, the germ of quarrel lying in slavish adherence to forms and the possibility of agreement in the essence of things. Buddha agreed with contemporary thinkers that philosophers and divines might at best enunciate higher principles of conduct and set forth nobler ideals, but it was possible only for a progressive state to apply them to life at large. Thus the position of the king or king emperor was freely recognized by them as the founder of a socio-moral order (rājadharmā-pravartakaḥ) based upon the principle of piety and aiming at the increase of comfort and happiness of men in this life and the attainment of heavenly life hereafter.⁸² Buddhism tried to draw away people a interest from the pompous and lustful heaven of Indra to a new paradise in Buddhakhetta with its idea of an eternal school for the thinkers, teachers and learners with its grand mansion in sylvan surroundings,⁸³ and ultimately to another in Sukhāvatī which is an eternal abode of infinite light, grace and spirituality. The Buddha and his followers did not quarrel with the forms of government, whether monarchical, oligarchical or republican; they were mainly interested in emphasizing the discharge of certain essential duties by each State. Buddha propounded the ideal of the universal monarch which was fulfilled to a large extent by Asoka who, following the policy of Dharmavijaya, carved out a permanent place for India in the comity of nations and

proved to be the real founder of the greater and eternal India. Buddha upheld a theory of social contract (mahājana-sammatti)⁸⁴ in accounting for the origin of kingship in preference to the Upaniṣad theory of divine origin of the same, and came to regard State and society as purely human institutions.⁸⁵ The caste system was shown to be unjustifiable on biological, social, ethical and philosophic grounds.⁸⁶ Both the Buddhist view of life and the law of the land combined to see all Indians free and none of them as slaves, even not a foreigner used as a slave. Megasthenes paid the highest compliment to Indians on this ground.⁸⁷ But the table was turned by Manu in whose time the forms of slavery increased in number and were assuming a feudal character. Manu gave a religious and legal sanction to the institution and his argument is, to all intents and purposes, the same as that of Aristotle.

It is often doubted if Buddhism is at all a religion. Radhakrishnan rightly points out that the Buddha was not a rationalist⁸⁸ in spite of his rationality,⁸⁹ since there is nowhere the least tendency in his teachings to condemn religion. Buddhism is not in its earlier stage a religion, if there can be no religion without a theistic God. If religion is primarily an inner urge to the search for truth and the path of progress and salvation, Buddhism is certainly a religion. If from the psychological point of view religion be

taken to mean the total reaction of the self upon itself and the surrounding world, it is definitely a religion. If religion be taken to mean a right endeavour of man to rise above himself and the world, then, too, it is nothing but a religion. If the word signify the worship of a Deity and a śaraṇāgati, in that case, too, Buddhism is a religion. Even as stated by its founder, Buddhism was a religious movement with its reforming zeal and the distinct mission of doing good to the many, bringing happiness and solace to the many, to both gods and men, to all men.

Buddhism as a religion* upheld āstikya and discarded nāstikya and scepticism. It had its articles of faith and did not question the existence of the heaven and the earth, the sun and the moon, the revolution of seasons; the world of nature, men and women, gods and angels, domestic, social and other institutions, good and evil, this world and the next, erudition and wisdom, the cosmos with its causal and moral order, bondage and salvation. It prescribed the formula of saraṇāgati,⁹⁰ the moral precepts, the practice of meditation, the cultivation of association with the wise, extolled the objects of worship, the value of renunciation and all acts of piety and merit. It assigned due place to faith and devotion, miracle and mysticism.

Buddhism in its earlier history pursued the career of Dharmavijaya, devoting all its energies to the task of elevating human nature and ame-

liorating man's lot in life.⁹¹ In its later history it launched upon the career of Trailokyavijaya, seeking to sublimate all modes and forms of worship and means of salvation by supplying the best of everything without jeopardizing its central and real position.⁹² The Buddha-upaniṣad yielded place to Buddha-Bhāgavatism, and the latter in its turn to Trantricism,⁹³ each with its historical importance and deep doctrinal significance.

Nirvāṇa is set out as the supreme goal. The subject has been discussed at length by La Vallée Poussin, Stcherbatsky, Keith, N. Dutt, Shew Zan Aung, Satkari Mukerjee, B. C. Law and incidentally other scholars, although it remains as vague as before. Without detaining you over it, I can say that historically the only best way of understanding and appreciating it is to consider how the Buddhist conception agrees with and the differs from the general Vedantic idea of Brahma-nirvāṇa when approached from the Yogic, psycho-ethical, ontological, eschatological and paradisaical points of view. Buddha sets forth the dialectic movement of thought leading ultimately to the category of Nirvāṇa which the Upaniṣad philosophy came to treat as a thing in itself (nibbānam nibbānato sañjānāti).⁹⁴ There is a Buddhist point of view, looking from which Nirvāṇa appears to have just the mathematical value of N, all noble efforts and progressive states and experiences of life and mind being approximations to that theoretical

perfection. To a Yogin, it is a definite experience. The deeper the mental concentration, the fuller the realization. The real difficulty begins when the question is approached from the eschatological point of view, whether or no, there is the continuity of the individual life-process in the case of a person who dies after realizing Nirvāṇa. Buddha's position on this point is not clearly stated, although it is expressly mentioned that it is neither that of an eternalist nor that of an annihilationist, nor is it even that of a sceptic. In the later stage of Buddhism, the continuity of the trend of life is distinctly postulated and strongly maintained.⁹⁵

These are some of the salient points I would like to place before you for your consideration. The history of Buddhism must be wholly included in the collective life-movement of India and viewed together with other religions and systems of thought as an integral part and distinct form of the cultural movement which goes by the name of Indo-Aryanism. In the chronological setting of developments of the doctrine and the discipline due place must be assigned to Buddhism in order to understand what went before and after or what was going on at the time, and how it both influenced and was influenced in its turn. Upon the whole, the chronological position of Buddhism as the Buddha-upaniṣad in its earlier phase is next to that of the Veda-upaniṣad or Older Vedānta.⁹⁶ Even viewing the history of Buddhism as a whole

it may be premised that Buddhism and Vedānta are the two main currents of Indian thought, the rest being subordinate to one or the other. As a pupil of mine suggests, the half of Indian thought is Buddhism, which is rational, critical, creative, directive and progressive. There is hardly any problem or matter of interest and importance on which we have not commendable findings and guidance from Buddhism. It may be judged both as a philosophy and a religion even as a form of mysticism, with its negative and positive sides. It has a distinct message of rationality, tolerance, concord and hope for the modern world which is completely gone out of joint and stands exhausted of its resources, spiritual vigour and political wisdom.

NOTES

1. Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, p. 56.
2. R̥gveda, I, 164, 20
3. Barua, Indus Script and Tantric Code in B. C. Law Volume, II p. 463.
4. Br̥had Āraṇyaka Up., iv, 4, 22-25.
5. Majjhīma, I, pp. 101 ff.
6. Ibid., I, p. 483.
7. Br̥had Āraṇyaka Up., vi, 5, 4-7 ; Atthasālinī, pp. 64f. ; Shew Zan Aung, Compendium of Philosophy, Introd. Essay, p. 44
8. Majjhima, I, pp. Iff. ; Barua, Ceylon Lectures, pp. 253f.
9. Barua, op. cit., pp. 239ff.
10. Saṃyutta, II, pp. 104 ff. ; Mrs. Rhys Davids, Buddhism (Home University Library), pp. 33ff. ; Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra, Nanjio's edition, pp. 143f. ; Suzuki's Transl., pp. 175f.
11. Cf. Radhakrishnan, op. cit., pp. 467f., for some similarity between Kant and Buddha in their attitude to metaphysical problems.
12. The Varieties of Religious Experience, pp. 380f. ; Barua ; Ceylon Lectures, pp. 165f.
13. Dīgha, I, p. 71.
14. We owe this nomenclature to Martineau. cf. Radhakrishnan, op cit. p. 418.
15. Aitareya Br., vi, 1 ; Barua, Barhut, Bk, III, pp. 74f.
16. Pāṇini, v. 3. 96.
17. Saṃyutta, III, p. 151.
18. Atthasālinī, p. 64.
19. Jātaka, IV, p. 228.

20. Kauṣītaki Up., iii, 7 ; Barua, Ceylon Lectures p. 263.
21. Dīgha, I, p. 42 ; iii, pp : 228, 272, 276.
22. Atthasālinī, pp. 309f.
23. Bṛhad Āraṇyaka Up., ii, 1, 8.
24. Satkari Mukerjee, The Buddhist Philosophy of Universal Flux, pp. 301ff.
25. Satkari Mukerjee, op. cit., pp. 337ff.
26. Cf. Chāndogya Up., vi, 9, 2 ; prāṇabandhanam mana iti, Barua, Ceylon Lectures, p. 266.
27. Shwe Zan Aung, op. cit, Introd. Essay, pp. 28f.
28. Satkari Mukerjee, op. cit., p. 295.
29. Satkari Mukerjee, op. cit., p. 338 ; Shwe Zan Aung, op. cit., Introd. Essay, p. 54.
30. Dīgha, I, p. 70.
31. Atthasālinī, p. 72. The Buddhist physio-psychologist would not have been compelled to resort to such a theory, if he were acquainted with the modern knowledge of interaction between the sense-organs and cerebrum through sensory and motor nerves.
32. Satkari Mukerjee, op. cit., p. 364.
33. Abhidharma-kośa, vii, 50-51.
34. Satkari Mukerjee, op. cit., p. 46.
35. Saṃyutta, I, p. 135 ; Milinda, pp. 25ff.
36. Puggala-paññatti Commentary, Introd.; Shew Zan Aung, op. cit. Introd. Essay, pp. 4f.
37. Abhidharma-kośa, iii, 28.
38. Saṃyutta, II, pp. 104ff, ; Barua, Ceylon Lectures, p. 175.
39. Cf. N. Dutt, Aspects of Mahāyāna Buddhism and its relation to Hīnayāna, pp. 96ff.
40. Aṅguttara, I, pp. 188f. ; Barua, Ceylon Lectures, p. 291.
41. Majjhima, I, pp. 1ff. ; Barua, op. cit., pp. 253f.

42. Dīgha, I, p. 29.
43. Ibid., I, p. 81.
44. Jātaka, No. 154, Petavatthu, i, 12 ; iv, 3 ; B. C. Law, The Buddhist Conception of Spirits, Revised edition, pp. 32f.
45. Dīgha, I, p. 82.
46. Brhad Ār. Up., iv, 5, 6 ; Saṃyutta, I, p. 13.
47. Milinda, p. 40.
48. Netti-Pakaraṇa, p. 79 ; Atthasālinī, p. 421.
49. Satkari Mukerjee, op. cit., p. 205 ; Radhakrishnan, op. cit., p. 370 ; Barua, Ceylon Lectures, p. 169.
50. Abhidharma-kośa, iii, 25 ; cf. Atthasālinī, p. 421.
51. Udāna, i, 1-3 ; Majjhima, I, p. 262 ; II, p. 32.
52. Barua, Ceylon Lectures, p. 175.
53. Netti, i, pp. 78f.
54. Paṭṭhāna and its Commentary ; Abhidharma-kośa, ii, 61-63 ; Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha, Chap. viii ; Satkari Mukerjee, op. cit., pp. 316f. ; Shwe Zan Aung, op. cit., pp. 178ff.
55. Kauṣītaki Up., ii, 7.
56. Dhammapada Commentary, I, p. 23.
57. Atthasālinī, pp. 143f.
58. Abhidharma-kośa, ii, 62 ; Citta-caittāḥ acaramā utpannāḥ samanantarāḥ.
59. Dhammapada Commentary, I, p. 23.
60. Tattvasaṅgraha, verses 1502-3 ; Satkari Mukerjee, op. cit., p. 405.
61. Barua, Ceylon Lectures, pp. 157ff.
62. Majjhima, I, p. 304 ; Barua, Ceylon Lectures, pp. 158ff.
63. Radhakrishnan, op. cit., pp. 431f., discusses the charges of intellectualism and asceticism against Buddhist ethics.
64. Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion, Glasgow, 1901, p. 325.

65. Schopenhauer found pessimism as the great truth in every great religion like a person suffering from jaundice sees everything yellow. But his pessimism and Leibnitz's optimism are more questions of psychological moods than problems of philosophy as exemplified by Milton's *L'Allegro* and *IL Penseroso*.

66. *Dīgha*, III, pp. 271, 291.

67. *Ibid.*, III, p. 221.

68. Barua, *Asoka and His Inscriptions*, part I, P. 155.

69. *Puggalapaññatti*, iv, 20.

70. Satkari Mukerjee, *op. cit.*, p. 249 ; Barua, *Ceylon Lectures*, p. 198 ; *Pratisamkhyānirodha* does not, however, represent the positive aspect of *Nirvāṇa* as Mukerjee opines.

71. B. C. Law, *Aśvaghōṣa*, pp. 67f. ; Barua, *Ceylon Lectures*, pp. 204ff.

72. *Taittirīya Up.*, ii, 8 ; *Praśna Up.*, vi, 7.

73. *Aśvaghōṣa's Saundarananda Kāvya*, xiii, 22-23 ; *Āryadeva's Śataśāstra*, Tucci's Transl., p. 14.

74. Buddha sought to destroy the dread of the accumulation as Karmic sins through 84,00,000 aeons by propounding a Miltonic idea of mind, which is its own place and can undo in a moment the work of ages. *Mahāniddeśa*, under *Jarā Sutta*.

75. See Iswarlal Topa's paper—*Asoka and his Dhamma-culture* in Barua's *Asoka and His Inscriptions*, pp. 356ff.

76. Referring to the discourses of Buddha, Rhys Davids observes : 'In depth of their philosophic insight, in the method of Socratic questioning often adopted in the earnest and elevated tone of the whole, in the evidence of the most cultured thought of the day, (they) constantly remind us of the dialogues of Plato.'

77. *Dīgha*, I, pp. 143ff.

78. Barua, *op. cit.*, pp. 236, 268ff.

79. Ibid.; pp. 271f.
80. Ibid., pp. 233.
81. D. R. Bhandarkar, Asoka, Revised edition, p. 250.
82. Barua, Asoka and His Inscriptions, i, p. 237.
83. Apadāna, Buddhāpadāna.
84. Dīgha, III, p. 93.
85. Barua, Asoka and His Inscriptions, p. 228.
86. Suttanipāta, pp. 119ff. ; Dīgha, I, pp. 91ff. ; Dial of the Buddha, S. B. B., Vol, II, pp. 96ff. ; Divyāvadāna, pp. 622f. ; Aśvaghoṣa's Vajrasūci, cf. Vajrasūcika Upaniṣad.
87. McCrindle, Ancient India, p. 38, Arthaśāstra, ii. 13 ; Barua, Asoka and His Inscriptions, i. p; 264,
88. Radhakrishnan, op. cit., p. 359.
89. Aṅguttara, I, pp. 188f, ; Barua, Ceylon Lectures, pp. 329f.
90. Dhammapada Verses 188-192 ; Sumaṅgala-vilāsinī, I, pp. 231ff. ; Paramatthajotikā, I, pp. 16ff.
91. Barua, Asoka and His Inscriptions, Part-I pp. 283ff., 312ff.
92. Ibid., pp. 299ff.
93. The Mantrayāna, Vajrayāna and Sahajasiddhi were developed in Buddhism in response to the Upaniṣadic Manrayoga and Rājayoga, the latter consisting in Vajroli, Amaroḷi and Sahajoli. Barua, Ceylon Lectures, p. 276.
94. Majjhima, I, pp. 3f.
95. Barua, Ceylon Lectures, pp. 199ff.
96. Max Müller, S. B. E., Vol. XV, Introd., P, xxxvi ; Radhakrishnan, op. cit., p. 470.

APPENDIX I

Buddhadatta and Buddhaghosa : Their Contemporaneity and Age

I have read with profit Rev. A. P. Buddhadatta's article—The Great Author of Summaries—Contemporary of Buddhaghosa—contributed to The University of Ceylon Review (Vol. III, No I). His introductions to Buddhadatta's Manuals have been fruitful in that some of the Indian scholars have sought to clarify the historical and geographical references in the Nigamanas to three of the manuals and the Madhuratthavilāsinī, the latter being a commentary on the Buddhavaṃsa. Now, in the above article he has reconsidered some of the points.

The first point is that he is inclined to accept Kalabbhakulanandana (also, -vaḍḍhana) as the more correct of the two variants in the MSS., the other being Kalambakulanandana. The second name, Kalamba, of the royal family, if accepted, must have to be equated with Kadamba. The fact however, is that both the Kalabhras (Pāli Kalabbha) and the Kadambas had founded kingdoms in South India. The Kadambas being connected rather with Kanārā and Western Mysore¹, the Kalabhras would seem to have a greater claim on our attention

as a ruling people whom the Pallava king Simhaviṣṇu defeated during his reign (A. D. 575-600). But the question remains open until the identification of contemporary king Accuta-vikkanta (Acyuta-vikrānta) or Accuta-vikkama (Acyutavikrama), on the fixing of the date of whose reign depends greatly the date of Buddhadatta, the Pali manual writer and commentator who was a native of Uragapura (Uraiyūr near Trichinopoly) on the Kāverī and a citizen of the Cola country, especially when the Kadambas maintain the tradition of the Acyutarāyas up till a late period and the Kalabhras are still wanting in it.

The second point is that he draws our attention to Miss C. Minakshi's identification of Buddhadatta's Bhūtamaṅgala with the present village of Pallivritta Bhūtamaṅgalam on the Vennār, a branch of the Cauvery, in the Mannarguḍi Taluq centrally situated in the district of Tanjore (Current Science, No. 8, Vol. VI). This identification is to be preferred to Mr. P. T. Srinivasa Iyengar's Budalur in the Tanjore District.

Without meaning to challenge Minakshi's suggestion, I would like to state where exactly my difficulty is. Minakshi herself came to know of two villages of the same name, Bhūtamaṅgalam, at close proximity in the Mannarguḍi Taluq. It is quite possible that even in Buddhadatta's time there were localities more than one known by the name of Bhutamaṅgala and that to distinguish

his Bhūtamaṅgala from the rest he characterised it as Maṅgal-Bhūtamaṅgal. It is evident, moreover from his descriptions that Maṅgala-Bhūtamaṅgala was just another name of Kāverīpaṭṭana, or, at any rate, that of a dvāragāma or suburb of the same. The point may be made clear thus :

- (1) In the Nigamana to his Vinaya-Vinicchaya, Buddhadatta locates the great monastery erected by Viṣṇudāsa or Kṛṣṇadāsa in Maṅgala-Bhūtamaṅgala described as 'prosperous and richly endowed in all respect' (iddhe sabbaṅga-sampanne)—a description applied in Pāli to a prosperous city or town. The same is placed in a central part of the Cola territory which looked like 'an epitome of the whole world' (sabbassa pana lokassa gāme sampiṇḍite viya). It was washed by the waters of the Kāverī.
- (2) In the Nigamana to the Buddhavaṃsa-commentary, he substitutes the name of Kāverīpaṭṭana for Maṅgala-Bhūtamaṅgala, and the same is the case with the epilogue to his Abhidhammāvatāra.
- (3) We are yet to enquire if Mannar in the name of the Mannarguḍi Taluq is not the modern equivalent of Buddhadatta's Maṅgala.

The third point is the contemporaneity of Buddhadatta and Buddhaghosa sought to be established on a common reference to Thera Saṅgha-

pāla at whose instance one wrote the Uttaravini-
cchaya and the other, the Visuddhimagga.

Rev. Buddhadatta has made out a very good case. The similarity in the two descriptions of Saṅghapāla is very close and striking indeed. The Thera Buddhadatta, as he himself tells us wrote all his works while he was residing at Viṣṇudāsa's monastery in Kāverīpaṭṭana alias Maṅgala-Bhūta-maṅgala. The request must have come from Saṅghapāla to write the Uttara-Vinicchaya when obviously the latter was staying with him in the same monastery, while Buddhaghosa in the epilogue to his Visuddhimagga refers to the Bhadanta Saṅghapāla when the latter was the head of the Mahāvihāra of Ceylon. Buddhaghosa wrote his Visuddhimagga and other works but the Nāṇodaya in Ceylon. Buddhadatta lived in Kāverīpaṭṭana in the centre of Cola, evidently the southern Cola territory.³ Buddhadatta, who, too, was a celebrity of the Mahāvihāra, must have gone to Ceylon before he began to write his works in South India. The tradition in the Buddhaghosuppatti expressly says that the two great men met each other when one was returning from and the other (i. e., Buddhaghosa) was going across to Ceylon. The Saddhammasaṅgaha tells us that Buddhaghosa arrived at Nāgapāṭṭana (Negāpaṭam at the mouth of one of the middle distributaries of the Kāverī) wherefrom he must have gone over to Ceylon. If so, they had not met each other

either earlier in Ceylon or later on in South India, although Buddhaghosa before leaving the Indian shore, resided at Kāñcipura (Conjeevaram on the lower course of the Lower Pennār below the Madras City) and other places⁴ including the Mayūrasuttapaṭṭana or Mayūrarūpapaṭṭana⁵ which may probably be identified with Mayaveram⁶ at the mouth of one of the upper distributaries of the Kāverī.⁷ If on the sameness of the 'supplicant', namely, Thera Saṅghapāla, we base the contemporaneity of the two Pali commentators, it follows that they wrote their works independently, almost at the same time, one in South India and the other in Ceylon, and there is no reason, therefore, that one should have mentioned the other. There is, nevertheless, a slight difference in the references made to Saṅghapāla by the two writers. Buddhadatta's reference is evidently to a 'revered fellow elder by whom he was "courteously and lovingly requested" (sakkacca sādaram yācito). In the case of Buddhasīha, his own pupil, he simply uses the expression "respectfully requested by" (sakkacca.....āyācito). Buddhaghosa's reference is to a most venerable teacher, Bhadanta-Saṅghapāla, while in referring to the junior Buddhaghosa he applies the simple epithet of Bhikkhu or Yati.⁸ These facts go indeed to make Buddhadatta an elder contemporary of Buddhaghosa,—a view expressed by Rev. Buddhadatta in 1915⁹ in disregard of the tradition in the Gandha-

vamṣa which places Buddhadatta next to Buddhaghosa in age.¹⁰

The matter assumes somewhat a different aspect once we presume that the author of the Samantapāsādikā is not the great or pioneer Buddhaghosa, the author of the Visuddhimagga. The Chinese translation of the Samantapāsādikā presupposes a Pāli text extant before 489 A. D. The text, as we now have it, contains references not only to the Visuddhimagga but to the Nikāya-commentaries as well, including even the Paramatthajotikā. Takakusu and Nagai point out that the concluding eleven verses or the Pāli prologue, from the sixth to the 16th, are missed in the Chinese translation which contains in their place six verses that are altogether of a different purport. The important matters that are missed comprise (1) the eulogy of the teachers and tradition of the Mahāvihāra, (2) the purpose of presenting the Sinhalese commentaries in a Pāli garb, (3) the behest of Thera Buddhasiri behind the undertaking, and (4) the name of the three earlier Sinhalese commentaries.

If the main contents of the extant Pāli text and those of the Chinese translation are the same, and the earlier Sinhalese commentaries are quoted and discussed alike in the body of both, the absence of the verses concerned from the Chinese translation is immaterial. The absence of the verses praising the Mahāvihāra tradition and Vinaya

teachers is easily explicable if the fact be that the copy of the Pali original taken to China was procured from the rival school of Abhayagiri. I have strong reasons to believe that the commentary in its original form and Mahāvihāra recension was written during the reign of Kitti-Siri-Meghavanna (A. D. 334-92).¹¹ So far the only means of determining the earlier form is the full knowledge of the text before the Chinese translator. Pending that, I may draw here the attention of the scholars to an interesting point.

Buddhaghosa in the epilogue to his *Papañcasūdanī*, says that he began to write the work in compliance with a request made to him by the Most Venerable Buddhhamitta when they were previously staying together at the *Mayūra-sutta-paṭṭana*. The author of the *Jātakatṭhakathā*,—probably Culla-Buddhaghosa, says in the prologue to the work that Buddhhamitta was one of the three Theras at whose instance he undertook the work. The author of the *Samantapāsādikā*, on the other hand, states in the epilogue to his work that he had read the *Vinaya Commentaries* with the Most Venerable Buddhhamitta. If Buddhhamitta be a common personal factor like *Śaṅghapāla* in the cause of *Buddhadatta* and *Buddhaghosa*, the problem of the personal identity and distinctness of the great *Buddhaghosa* and the author of the *Samantapāsādikā* is apt to become more complicated. But there is no certainty as yet as to the

identity of Buddhhamitta of the Mayūrasuttapaṭṭana and that of the Mahāvihāra.

One thing is certain, that both the Samantapāsādikā and some of the commentaries of the pioneer Buddhaghosa clearly presuppose the Dīpavaṃsa quoted in places by name, and nowhere the Mahāvaṃsa. And yet the prose legend of Asoka as narrated in the Samantapāsādikā agrees entirely with a tradition similar to that in the Mahāvaṃsa,¹² and it differs here and there from that in the Dīpavaṃsa. Two glaring instances of disparity are cited below :

- (i) As to the mission to Suvaṇṇabhūmi, the verse quoted from the Dīpavaṃsa in the Samantapāsādikā speaks of the place as a country dominated by the Pisācas (in plural number) and does not connect it with the sea, while the prose account connects it with the sea and describes it as a country in the grip of a terrible Rakkhas, precisely as in the Mahāvaṃsa story :

Saddhim Uttaratherena Soṇatthero mahiddhiko
Suvaṇṇabhūmim agamā tasmim tu samaye pana
jāte jāte rājagehe dārake ruddarakkhasī
samuddato nikkhamitvā bhakkhayitvāna gacchati.
(Mv. xii 44-45).

“tena ca samayena tattha ekā rakkhasī samuddato
nikkhamitvā rājakule jāte jāte dārake khādati.¹³
(Sp., i., p.).

The verse quoted from the Dīpavaṃsa reads :

Suvaṇṇabhūmiṃ gantvāna Soṇuttarā

mahiddhikā¹⁴

Pisāce niddhamitvāna Brahmajālam adesayum.

(ii) The prose account in the Samantapāsādikā agrees with that in the Mahāvamsa and differs from the Dīpavamsa tradition in so far as it represents Nigrodha as a posthumous son of Asoka's elder step-brother Sumana and does not speak of Asoka's two coronations.¹⁵ Buddhaghosa in his Sumaṅgala-vilāsinī (ii, p. 613), records a prophecy according to which prince Piyadāsa (Priyadarśana) was to have assumed the title of Asoka at the time of his coronation,¹⁶ the first coronation according to the Dīpavamsa.

Similarly the Nidānakathā of the Kathāvatthu Commentary cites the account of the rise of the eighteen Buddhist sects from the Dīpavamsa which makes no mention of the six later sects that arose in India, while the prose account mentions them¹⁷ on the strength of a tradition similar to that in the Mahāvamsa.

I would not say with Rev. Buddhadatta that the Ācariya Buddhadatta was 'a great poet', there being nothing of poetry in his composition. He was obviously a successful versifier, and at the most, a maker of the Vinaya and Abhidhamma manuals in elegant and easy prose and verse.

The existence of Buddhadatta's commentary on the Buddhavamsa may be presumed as the reason why Dhammapāla left the Buddhavamsa out of

his account when he wrote his commentaries on the two companion works, the Cariyāpiṭaka and Apadāna. Having not the Apadāna commentary before me, I am not in a position to say what Dhammapāla has done there, but on looking through his Cariyāpiṭaka Commentary I find that, strangely enough, he has wholly ignored Buddha-datta's Madhuratthavilāsinī.¹⁸

Dhammakitti's Mahāvaṃsa Supplement refers the Ceylon career of the great Buddhaghosa to the reign of Mahānāma (A. D. 409-431). This Buddhaghosa mentions the name of no contemporary ruler, either of India or of Ceylon. The author of the Samantapāsādikā,¹⁹ on the other hand, definitely says in the epilogue that he began to write the work in the 20th and completed it just at the commencement of the 21st year of the reign of a king of Ceylon deserving the epithets of Siri-Kuḍḍa, Siri-pāla and Siri-nivāsa. The author of the Dhammapada Commentary belonging to the serial commentary called Paramatthajotikā, probably Culla-Buddhaghosa, a younger contemporary of the author of the Visuddhimagga and Abhidhamma Commentaries, associates similarly his literary activity with the reign of a king of Ceylon deserving the epithet of Siri-kūṭa. Buddha-datta on the Indian side connects his literary career with the reign of the Accuta king Accuta-Vikkanta of the Kalabbha or Kalamba family and his residence with the monastery erected at

Kāverīpaṭṭana by Viṣṇudāsa or Kṛṣṇadāsa, evidently a Vaiṣṇava name. It may be noted here that the Skanda Purāṇa preserves the tradition of an unnamed ancient and powerful king of Cola who had the seat of his government at Kāñcīpura and during whose reign Viṣṇudāsa, a pious Vaiṣṇava saint, flourished and succeeded with much difficulty in persuading the contemporary Cola king to give up the performance of the pompus and cruel Brahmanical sacrifices. From Buddhaghosa's expression, Kāñcīpurādīsu, it is clear that Kāñcīpura was the chief town of Cola in his time. All the same, neither the great Buddhaghosa nor the author of the Samantapāsādikā can be placed later than the reign of Mahāsenā, if it can not be shown that the text of the Dīpavaṃsa present before them was then closed once for all. This remark applies with greater force to the author of the Visuddhimagga, particularly in the absence of references to a contemporary king. The earlier Pali Chronicle of Ceylon may be easily supposed to have been completed previous to the reign of Dhātusena (A. D. 460-78) who caused it to be widely known to the people.²⁰

The kings of India and Ceylon who find incidental mention in Buddhaghosa's works belong all to a period earlier than the fourth century A. D. Other cogent reasons to consider in this connection are as follows :

(i) That the tradition claiming him to be the

first Indian Buddhist scholar who showed the way of presenting the Sinhalese commentaries in a Pali garb is amply corroborated by the fact that the Vinaya and Nikāya Aṭṭhakathās mentioned in his Visuddhimagga are all earlier Sinhalese commentaries. If Buddhadatta on the Indian side wrote his works independently, he, too, must have based them on such authorities.

- (ii) That his Kathāvatthu Commentary goes to show that not only the earlier eighteen but such later Indian Buddhist sects and schools of thought as the Andhaka (Andhra), Pubbaseliya (Pūrvaśaila), Aparaseliya (Aparasāila), Rājagirika, Siddhatthika, Uttarāpathaka, Hemavatika (Haimavata) and Vetullaka were all existing in his time,—the sects and schools of thought that do not find mention in any hitherto known Indian inscriptions that are later than those of the Kuṣāṇa, Sātavāhana and Ikṣvāku rulers which are all pre-Gupta. The statements—“Just as now (seyyathā pi etarahi) the Sammitiyas and others”, “just as now the Andhakas and the like” are significant as to contemporaneity. With regard to the Andhakas, he is careful to record that they consisted of the four later Indian sects called

Pubbaseliya, Aparaseliya, Rājagiriya and Siddhatthika.²¹ Buddhaghosa characterises the doctrine of the Vetullakas as mahāsuññatāvāda or the Mahāyāna Doctrine of the Great Void. In all probability the reference is to the Doctrine of the Void as developed in the Prajñāpāramitā and such other Vaipulya Śāstras. He was aware of the difference and distinction between the two kinds of nirodha, paṭisaṅkhā and appaṭisaṅkhā, discussed by Vasubandhu in his Abhidharmakośa and other later writers.²²

- (iii) That if the great Buddhaghosa had flourished after king Kitti-Siri-Meghavanna's time, it is unexpected that he should not have to say anything about the Tooth-relic in Ceylon, and that at least in connection with the name of Dantapura, the ancient capital of Kalinga.
- (iv) That assigning the great Buddhaghosa to a pre-Gupta age, it becomes easy to connect the author of the Samantapāsādikā with the reign of Kitti-Siri-Meghavanna who was a contemporary of Samudragupta.

The pioneer Buddhaghosa and the author of the Samantapāsādikā have discussed in different contexts the scriptural and doctrinal position of certain texts associated with the early Vaitulyaka or Mahāyāna tradition of Ceylon. In the Saman-

tapāsādikā (iv. p. 742), these are presented in two different lists. The texts of the second list alone find mention in Buddhaghosa's Sāratthappakāsinī (ii, pp. 201-2), while the first text of the first group is considered in the Atthasālinī (pp. 91-2).²³ Some of the typical texts of the second or common list are considered in another connection in the Samantapāsādikā.²⁴ Everywhere the common finding against them is that they were unauthentic and unauthoritative for the reason, that they had not passed through the first three Buddhist Councils (tisso saṅgītiyo anārulham). In discarding the texts of the common list as a-Buddhavacana, Buddhaghosa adduces this additional reason, that their subject-matters fall outside the scope of the five recognized topics of Buddhism, viz., dhātu (elements), ārammaṇa (objects), asubha (loathsomeness), ñāṇavatthu (foundations of knowledge) and Vijjākadambaka or Vijjākaraṇḍaka (body of acquisitions).²⁵ The author of the Vinaya Commentary, on the other hand, opines that there might be no objection to composing poems and verses (to present and popularise the doctrines) in various languages if they were based on the idea of the unworldly way (vivaṭṭūpanissite). There was objection, nevertheless, to accepting the texts of the first list as authoritative, while those of the common list were definitely not the Words of the Buddha (a-Buddhavacandāni).²⁶

The first list in the Vinaya Commentary consists of the five Suttas called Kulumba (Kuṭumba), Rājovāda (Rājāvavāda), Tikkhindriya (Tikṣhendriya), Catuparivaṭṭa (caturparivarta), and Nandopananda.

Professor Malalasekera rightly refers us to the Atthasālinī (p. 91) where the vidaḍḍhavādin (sophistic opponent, i. e., Vetullavādin) is said to have cited the authority of the unauthentic Kulumbasutta in support of his opinion that an unwholesome physical reaction may follow from a purely mental act at the 'mind-door.' Evidently the reference is to a Mahāyāna text which is not traced as yet.

For the second text Professor Malalasekera refers us to introductory episode of the Sumaṅgala Jātaka where we have mention of the Buddha's Discourse, Rājovādasutta, addressed to the Kosala king Pasenadi.²⁷ The suggestion is welcome in so far as it concerns the Rājāvavādakasūtra in Nanjio's Catalogue No. 988, which, though a work of Hīnayāna, bears in Tibetan the full Sanskrit title of Āryarājāvavādaka-nāma-Mahāyāna-Sūtra. But Nanjio's Catalogue, Nos. 248-50, presupposes a Mahāyāna Sūtra, translated into Chinese in A. D. 420-79, 649 and 705. Śāntideva in his Śikṣāsamuccaya, cites passages from different Rājāvavādakasūtras, one bearing the stamp of Mahāyāna²⁸ and the other that of Hīnayāna.²⁹ The text in the Samantapāsādikā first list must be identified with the Mahāyāna Sūtra.

The fourth Sutta called Catuparivaṭṭa can in all probability be identified with the Caturadharmika Sūtra of Mahāyāna quoted by name in the Śikṣāsamuccaya³⁰ or the Caturvargaśikṣādharmā in Nanjio's No. 1417, translated in A. D. 435-43. The third and fifth Suttas as Mahāyāna works are not as yet traced.

The common list consists of such alien texts as the Vaṇṇapiṭaka, Aṅgulimālapiṭaka, Raṭṭha-pālagajjita, Ālavakagajjita, Gūlha or Guyha Vinaya, Gūlha-Vessantara, Vedalla, Vedalha or Vetulla Piṭaka. The Sāratthappakāsinī (Siamese ed.) includes also the name of the Gūlhamagga and Gūlha-Mahosadha. These texts are mentioned in two slightly different orders in the two works. In another context the Vinaya Commentary names only the Gūlha-Vinaya, Gūlha-Vessantara and Vedalla as three typical texts to be treated as extraneous (bāhirakasuttam) and discarded as unworthy of study (gārayhasuttam).³¹ Here four works are of the Gūḍha (Secret) or Guhya (Esoteric) class, and the rest belong to the Paritta or Dhāraṇī type. The works bearing the title of Piṭaka cannot but remind us of the Dhāraṇī or Vidyādhara Piṭaka and the Bodhisattvapiṭaka quoted by name in the Śikṣāsamuccaya of Śāntideva and probably also in the Sūtrasamuccaya of Nāgārjuna who was a predecessor of Śāntideva.

In connection with the Gūḍha or Guhya texts belonging to the Guhya cult of Mahāyāna, mention

may be made of the Guhyagarbharāja, Śrī-Guhyasamāja-tantrarāja, Guhya paramarahasya and Guhyasamayagarbharāja in Nanjio's Nos. 1026-29. The Tathāgataguhyā Sūtra is quoted by name in the Śikṣāsamuccaya.

The Vaidulyarāja Sūtra in Nanjio's No. 671, translated in A. D. 265-326, seems to answer well to the Vedulla or Vetulla Piṭaka.

The Raṭṭhapālagajjita is no other than the Rāṣṭrapālapariṇcchā in Nanjio's No. 23 (18), translated in A. D. 589-618 and quoted by name in the Śikṣāsamuccaya.³² Here Rāṣṭrapāla is the name of a Yakṣa.

The Ālavakagajjita, too, belongs to the Mahāyāna Pariṇcchā class, and it may be compared with the Ugrapariṇcchā and Pūrṇapariṇcchā in Nanjio's Nos. 23 (19) and 23 (17), translated in A. D. 220-65 and A. D. 384-417, here Ālavaka, Ugra and Pūrṇa being all Yakṣas.

The Aṅgulimālapiṭaka corresponds with the Mahāyāna Aṅgulimāliya Sūtra in Nanjio's Nos. 621 and 434, translated in A. D. 265-316 and A. D. 420-39 and quoted by name in the Śikṣāsamuccaya.³³ The Pali counterpart seems to be the Aṅgulimālaparitta (Milinda, p. 151).

The Vaṇṇapiṭaka may be provisionally identified with the Kanakavarṇapūrvayoga in Nanjio's No. 390, translated in A. D. 534-54.

The Mahāvyutpatti list includes the name of Rājāvavādakam (wrongly Rājupavādakam), Rāṣṭra-

pālaparipṛcchā, Sarvavaidalyasaṅgraha and Aṅgulimāliyam.³⁴

The Pali Parittas which are claimed to be Buddhabhāsitas in the Milinda (p. 150ff) were literary developments similar to the Dhāraṇis, and deserve as such to be relegated to the Vidyādharapīṭaka quoted by name in the Śikṣāsamuccaya³⁵ or to the Dhāraṇisaṅgraha Sūtra in Nanjio's No. 795. The Theravāda of Ceylon itself came subsequently to have Parittasaṅgaha of its own.

The Mahāvamsa is very definite in stating that Vetullavāda or Mahāyāna form of Buddhism got a footing at Abhayagiri even before the reign of Vohāratissa and the Vaitulyakas become a menace of the Theravāda to the great annoyance of the partisans of the Mahāvihāra.

It was at the instance of the Mahāvihāra monks that sixty Vaitulyakas were banished from the island by king Goṭhābhaya alias Meghavaṇṇa, father and predecessor of Jetṭhatissa and Mahāsena. In consequence thereof the Vetullavāda became aggressive and vindictive, and it worked to play havoc to the Mahāvihāra through the influence of the Colian monk Saṅghamitta with the king Mahāsena during the greater part of the latter's reign. This powerful man of wicked design and terrible action was an adept in exorcism and the like (bhūtavijjādi-kovido). He is said to have come across during the latter part of Goṭhābhaya's reign as the avenger of the cause of the Vaitulyakas.

It is said that he audaciously entered the place when there was at the Thūpārāma a conference of the monks evidently from the Mahāvihāra and won the favour of king Goṭhābhaya-Meghavaṇṇa by defeating in argument the Thera Goṭhābhaya of Saṅghapāla's Pariveṇa who happened to be the king's namesake and maternal uncle.³⁶

The Mahāvamsa account is historically most significant. It goes to show that the conference of the Mahāvihāra monks called by the king himself and that he was present there when it met at Thūpārāma to try certain doctrinal issues with Saṅghamitta, the Mahayanist monk and Colian vindicator of the Vetullavāda who came in as a powerful disputant.³⁷ Some of the important issues of the controversy which then took place are the very points on which we have findings from the pioneer Buddhaghosa and the author of the Samantapāsādikā. Referring as if to an issue raised there, Buddhaghosa in his Atthasālinī (p. 91), observes : *Vidaḍḍhavādī (vitaṇḍavādī) panāha : "Akusalam kāyakammam manodvāre pi samuṭṭhātī" ti.* So *"tayo saṅgahe ārūlham suttam āharāhi" ti vutto, idam Kulumbasuttam nāma āhari.*

In the Sāratthappakāsinī (ii, pp. 201-2), he mentions the criterion by which any new text offered for acceptance as authoritative or unauthoritative is to be judged, namely, to see whether its subject matter falls within the scope of the recognized topics.

We have in the Samantapāsādikā not such a rough-shod but an elaborate and more thorough-going and rational judgement on the point at issue. Here he does not refrain even from expressing his forcible judgement on the extra-Canonical authorities cited by the Thera Nāgasena in the Milinda.

As for the pithy account of the controversy at the Thūpārāma conference (sannipāta), the Mahāvamsa seeks to heighten its importance by introducing the Thera Goṭhābhaya, the spokesman of the Mahāvihāra monks and able defender of the pure doctrine of Theravāda, as a person who was the namesake and maternal uncle of the reigning monarch and no less as a Thera from the most important Pariveṇa of Saṅghapāla. There is nothing to prevent me thinking that, like the Mayūra and other Pariveṇas the Pariveṇa (an aṅgaṇa according to the commentary) of Saṅghapāla was just one of the important buildings of the Mahāvihāra and, for the matter of that, the Thera Saṅghapāla was the leading personality of the institution. If this Saṅghapāla be no other than the renowned Saṅghapāla who was the personal link between Buddhaghosa and Buddhaddatta their age cannot be earlier than the reign of Goṭhābhaya-Meghavamma (A. D. 302-15) and later than of his immediate successor Jetṭhatissa (A. D. 323-33), while that of the author of the Samantapāsādikā must have been somewhat later,

and it was most probably the reign of Mahāsena's great son and successor and Samudragupta's Ceylon contemporary, king Kitti-Siri-Meghavaṇṇa.³⁹ If this suggestion be sound, the literary career of Culla Buddhaghosa (Buddhaghosa II), who was probably a younger contemporary of the great Buddhaghosa, may also be connected with the earlier part of the reign of Kitti-Siri-Meghavaṇṇa—a ruler well deserving the epithet of Siri-kūṭa.⁴⁰ The cross references in the Nikāya Commentaries to the Samantapāsādikā are later additions, while the treatment of the citta topics in the Samantapāsādikā clearly presupposes the first four Nikāya Commentaries as well as the Paramatthajotikā. If any salient point may be established when the contents of the Chinese translation of the Vinaya Commentary are fully made known to us, it is precisely this, and nothing else.

NOTES

1. By the way, the Kadamba capital Vanavāsī, also known as Jayanti or Vijayanti, is not mentioned in the edict of Asoka. If Vincent Smith has written so in his Oxford History of India, p. 198, it is simply due to a slip of his pen.

2. There being an ancient land-route connecting the Lower Kāverī region with Karṇāṭa, probably along the banks of the Kāverī, as proved by the joint testimony of the Great Epic, the Rāmāyaṇa and Hwen Thsang's Si-yu-ki, it is not impossible that the Kadambas founded a territory in Cola even before the Kalabhras.

3. It is difficult to say with Dr. D. R. Bhandarkar (Aśoka, Revised ed., p. 38) that "in Aśoka's time there were more than one Cola and one Pāṇḍya king."

4. Nigamana to Manorathapūraṇī: āyācito sumatinā therena Bhadanta-Jotipālena Kañcīpurādisu mayā pubbe saddhim vasantena.

5. Nigamana to Papañca-sūdanī; āyācito sumatinā therena Bhadanta-Buddhamittena pubbe Mayūrasuttapaṭṭane saddhim vasantena.

6. Apparently Mayūra was a Prakrit form of Mayapura (Sk. Mayapura or Māyāpura); cf. Palūra in the Nāgārjunīkoṇḍa inscriptions=Palapura=Dantapura.

7. This is to modify my previous views in Ceylon Lectures p. 90.

8. Ceylon Lectures, p. 90.

9. Buddhaddatta's Manuals (1915), p. xiii f.

10. J. P. T. S. 1886, p. 59; B. C. Law., The life and Work of Buddhaghosa, p. 98. It should be noted that Buddhaddatta who is described in the Buddhaghosuppatti

as the author of the Jinālaṅkāra, the Dantadhātuvaṃsa (i. e., Dāṭhāvaṃsa) and Bodhivaṃsa (i. e., Mahābodhivaṃsa) has nothing in common with Buddhaddatta, the author of the Vinaya-Vinicchaya and the rest.

11. Ceylon Lectures, p. 90.

12. The fact may be explained, no doubt, if we agree with Geiger in thinking that there was an earlier Aṭṭhakathā Mahāvaṃsa.

13. Dr. Bapat kindly informs me that this statement occurs also in the Chinese translation.

14. Samantapāsādikā, i. e., p. 69. The Siamese ed. reads : niddamitvāna and adesissuṃ. Dīpavaṃsa. viii. 11. Oldenberg's ed. reads the second line as—Niddhametvā Pisācagaṇe mokesi bandhanā bahum.

15. Dīpavaṃsa, vi. 22, 24. Barua, Asoka and His Inscriptions, Part I, p. 16ff.

16. Piyadāso nāma kumāro chattaṃ ussāpetvā Asoko nāma Dhammarājā hutvā.

17. Aparāparaṃ pana Hemavatikā Rājagirikā Siddhattikā Pubbaseliyā Aparaseliyā Vājiriyā ti aññe cha ācariyavādā uppannā cf. Mahāvaṃsa, V. 12-13.

18. Cf. Cariyāpiṭakaṭṭhakathā, pp. I. 15, 16.

19. Here the Nigamana to the Kaṅkhāvitaraṇī, too, is taken into consideration.

20. Cūlavaṃsa, XXXVIII 58 ; Malalasekera, A Dict. of Pali Proper Names, i, p. 1088.

21. K. A., I. 9 ; B. C. Law., The Debates Commentary, pp. vi, 62.

22. Ibid, ii.9 ; Ceylon Lectures, p. 199.

23. The references are given, by G. P. Malalasekera in his Dict. of Pali Proper Names.

24. Sp., i, p. 232.

25. S. A., ii, p. 201.

26. Sp. iv, p. 742.

27. Jātaka, iii, p. 439 ; Malalasekera, Dictionary, ii p, 729.
28. Ch. i ; Bendall and Rouse's Transl., p. 10.
29. Ibid., Transl., p. 142.
30. Ch, vii ; Bendall and Rouse's Transl., p. 158.
31. Sp., i. p. 232.
32. Bendall and Rouse's Transl., pp. 55, 152, 190. 197, 285.
33. Ch. vi. ; Bendall and Rouse's Transl., p. 131.
34. Sanskrit-Tibetan-English Vocabulary in Memoirs of the Asiatic Society of Bengal, Vol. III, Pt., I. p. 81ff.
35. Ch. vi ; Bendall and Rouse's English Transl., p. 140.
36. Mahāvamsa, XXXVI. 111-13.
37. For the king's part and procedure followed in settling disputes on the points of doctrine and discipline, see. Sp. ii, p. 307 ; iii, p. 583 and Malalasekera, op. cit., p. 371.
38. Sp., i, p. 230ff. ; iv, p. 742.
39. Ceylon Lectures, p. 91ff.
40. Variants : Siri-Kuḍḍa, Siri-gutta.

APPENDIX II

BOOKS OF STORIES OF HEAVEN AND HELL

Genesis, Chronology and Utility

1. Introductory :—The supreme necessity of inculcation of the belief in a life beyond death, in Heaven and Hell, and in distribution of rewards and punishments according to merits and demerits of one's deeds as a means of persuading the people to the path of virtue and of deterring them from the path of vice was realised by some of the Indian teachers long before the advent of the Buddha. This belief was put to the test in the 6th century B. C. when the spirit of sophistry was predominant. This called forth hostile attacks from the materialists, who were divided into two camps—the metaphysical and the politico-moral. The metaphysical school was represented by Ajita Kesakambalī and the politico-moral school came to be associated with the name of Brhaspati or Śukra. That which came to be known long afterwards as Cārvāka philosophy was really a synthesis of the teachings of these older schools of thought. • The further development of the

teaching of Ajita Kesakambali can be traced in the views of Pāyāsi (Pāesi or Prayāsi) the chieftain of Setavya in Kosala, who came into the field, according to Buddhist evidence, immediately after the demise of the Buddha, and according to the Jaina evidence, shortly before the Jinahood of Mahāvīra. It is Pāyāsi who discussed the practical issues and supplied the stronger logical arguments of Ajita's philosophy. Among the opponents of Pāyāsi one has to reckon the Venerable Kumāra-samaṇa Kesī, a follower of Pārśva, and the Venerable Kumāra Kassapa, a follower of the Buddha. Among Ajita's many opponents, the chief was Pakudha Kaccāyana. Indian thought, before the advent of Mahāvīra and the Buddha as teachers, was closed with the powerful scepticism or agnosticism of Sañjaya of the Belaṭṭhi clan, who has been expressly identified in the Mahāvastu (III. p. 59) with Sañjaya Parivrājaka of Rājagaha, famous in Buddhist tradition as the previous teacher of Sāriputta and Moggallāna, who became afterwards two chief disciples of the Buddha. Moggallāna and Kumāra Kassapa are two among the immediate disciples of the Buddha who popularised Buddhism amongst the mass by means of drawing in a novel way the pictures of life in Heaven and Hell. It is in their school that there developed a cult which culminated in popular Buddhism as represented by the Birth-stories, the edifying legends, the epic narrations, the songs

of praise, including the stories of Heaven and Hell. The greatest pioneer in this missionary movement was Moggallāna who had to pay the tragic penalty of martyrdom to the cause of his religion. He became necessarily an eyesore to Buddha's detractors, the so-called Heretics, on account of the consummate skill with which he is said to have popularised the lofty teachings of his master. In Ajita we meet with an unqualified atheism, in Sañjaya, mere scepticism. Mahāvira, and still better the Buddha, had shown the way to enlightened belief. The change of teachers on the part of Moggallāna is eloquent of the conflict between enlightened doubt and enlightened faith ending in victory for the latter. Moggallāna was a past master in the art of persuasion by means of miracles of eye-witness to life in Heaven and Hell, and of this art he was by no means the first professor, since he had a long line of precursors before him. In all essentials the art remained the same, only it was accommodated in changed circumstances to time and place. This art is found to have a painful history behind it, with a long list of martyrs, whose accounts are yet to be written. The Buddhist Jātaka Book and the Kauṭīliya Arthaśāstra have recorded only a few typical examples of martyrdom, a host of others being cast into oblivion. A close examination of recorded instances we have, goes to show that there was at the time no other effective way of checking

the tyrants and sinners with whom the country abounded than the one resorted to by the Aryan preachers by conjuring up the pictures of life in Heaven and Hell. They succeeded in striking terror in the hearts of wrong-doers, as also they succeeded in inducing the good people into acts of piety by holding up before them the vivid and splendid picture of paradises ready to receive them. In one of the Buddhist Birth-stories,¹ the great sage Saṅkicca has narrated the terrible fate that overtook the tyrants and sinners on the dissolution of their mortal frame, after their death. All these he did in reply to an enquiry made by his friend who usurped the throne of Benares after killing his father in secret. The king was terror-stricken, lost the peace of his mind and felt as if he was being tormented in a hell. So he became eager to hear from his friend destinies of transgressors of the moral law after death. The instances cited by the sage are as follows :

1. Ajjuna, king of the Kekayas, was a great archer. For causing annoyance to the sage Gotama he was utterly destroyed.

2. King Daṇḍakī having insulted Kisavaccha the guileless ascetic, was uprooted like a palm-tree.

3. King Mejjha fell from his high position for ill-treatment of Mātāṅga, the far-famed sage ; his kingdom became a wilderness ; he died with all his subjects.

4. Members of the Andhaka-Venhu race were slain by each other's mace in consequence of an insult meted out to Kaṇha-Dīpāyana.

5. Being cursed by a sage, King Cecca capable of flying through the air, was swallowed by the earth.

The Sarabhaṅga-Jātaka² adds two more instances of persons suffering torments in Hells :—

6. King Kalābu having maimed the saintless saint, the preacher of patience, was burnt in an infernal abode.

7. King Nālikīra fell into the jaws of dogs in hell for the inhuman ill-treatment of a guileless ascetic, whose body was torn to pieces and offered to dogs.

The story of Daṇḍakī is expanded in the Sarabhaṅga-Jātaka, that of Mejjha in the Mātāṅga, that of Andhaka-Venhu in the Ghaṭa-Jātaka and in the Maṇḍalaparva of the Mahābhārata, that of Kalābū in the Khantivādi-Jātaka and that of Cecca in the Cetiya. In one instance, the tyrannical monarch puts the ascetic to inhuman death by cutting him into pieces and offering his limbs to dogs to devour. In another instance, another king pierces a harmless saint with arrow under the misapprehension that he stood in his way as Ill-Luck to spoil his game. In a third instance, a courtesan, then a brahmin minister, and subsequently the king himself spat on the matted hair of an ascetic as a means of getting rid of sin and putting off

calamities. In a fourth instance, the boys roughly handled a great saint as a matter of sport. Circumstances changed by the time of Mahāvīra and the Buddha. It is evident from the reminiscences of these two world-renowned teachers, as recorded in the Jaina Ohāṇa-sutta³ and the Buddhist Mahāsīhanāda-Sutta,⁴ that within the Aryandom, the central region in Northern India, the mischief-makers were confined to young cowherds. In non-Aryan regions the whole population was against the preachers and missionaries of Aryanism. As we read in the Jaina Āyāraṅga-Sutta, in Lāḍha or Western Bengal, the wild inhabitants used to set dogs upon the ascetics. Some of the Buddhists Suttas, e. g., the Ālavaka, record chances of ascetics being thrown down precipices, being suspended from trees with head downwards or thrust into holes of monstrous serpents by the savage tribes. These tribes were actuated to this line of conduct, in cases, by a motive of self-defence, as a protection against the mischiefs of the spies disguised as ascetics. To cope with this formidable opposition, the ascetics with their mission of peace found it necessary to fall back upon the only weapon in their hands likely to prove effective, namely, inculcation of moral precepts against vice and in favour of virtue, accompanied by artistic illustrations and religious demonstrations, and in certain cases, by miracles and other supernormal / feats. Grim stories of sinners sent to the bottom-

less pit of hells and of virtuous persons enjoying the bliss of paradises told with effect upon the populace. Painting had its full share in the task. By means of pictures illustrating the terrible doom of sinners and the happy lot of the pious souls, some of the ascetics sought to make a powerful appeal. As Buddhaghosa tells us, a class of beggarly brahmins sprang into being with this as their exclusive profession, and they were known as Makhas or Mañkhas. According to Jaina accounts, the parents of Gośāla, the great Ājīvika leader, belonged to this class of ascetics. The Sanskrit drama *Mudrārākṣasa* draws a picture of the Mauryan time when some of the naked ascetics moved about in the country with Yamapaṭas or Death-pictures in their hands.

These pictures are described in Buddhist literature as *karaṇacitra* or *Carañcitra*, praised by the Buddha himself as the very best of the pictorial art of his time. Bas-reliefs and frescoes took the place of these pictures in Buddhism. So long as Buddhism was confined during its earlier history to a region where Aryanism was the accepted creed, the Buddhist preachers did not feel the necessity of laying emphasis on suffering in hells. But when Buddhism was propagated outside this region among peoples who were not cultured enough to be tolerant and thoughtful, they found it expedient to utilise or invent the ghastly stories of hell, full of pain and sorrow.

The Suttanta Jātakas, representing the earliest forms of Buddhist Birth-stories, tell us only of a glorious life in celestial mansions. The inscriptions of Aśoka are conspicuous by the absence of any reference to hell in them. Among the large number of sculptures carved on the railing of the Barhut Stūpa, we come across only one scene of hell where a man and a woman are suffering torments for the uncondoned sin of poisoning innocent people.⁵ Among the many schools of Buddhist thought, particularly among those which are pre-Aśokan, there is only one, viz., the Gokulikas or Kaukkulikas, given to pessimistic speculations, emphasizing the darker aspects of life.⁶ Very naturally the Book of Stories of Hell developed within Buddhism later than the Book of Stories of Heaven, as being shown in the following pages.

2. Canonical Background :—Two Canonical anthologies called Peta and Vimānavatthus, the Books of Stories of Heaven and Hell, seem to be, on the whole, two poetical offshoots of the Canonical Jātaka Book. These anthologies inculcating the Buddhist belief in Heaven and Hell, particularly the Book of Stories of Heaven, must be said to have, in some form or other, an important bearing on the Inscriptions of Aśoka. For instance, the expression *vimāna-dasana*⁷ in connected with the popular religious festivals, all Indian in origin, which were adopted by the Buddhists. The superstitious practice of Vimāna-

dassana condemned in one of the poems of the Aṭṭhaka group⁸ as a folly, found favour with the Buddhists of Aśokan age, and when we search for such practices in the Canon, we find that they are in the Book of Stories of Heaven (Vimānavatthu), where they are canonized on an extensive scale. The conflict between these two feelings naturally indicates a long interval of religious development separating the Vimāna-Vatthu from the Book of Octaves in the Sutta-Nipāta. Our presumption is intensified by the Canonical records in hand, which mark the progressive course of the belief in celestial mansions (vimānas). The old Indian current notion of the appearance of a god or an angel in celestial mansions glided as a belief into the Buddhist faith, and the earliest literary expression which this belief assumed is the Legend of Serissakavimāna in the Pāyāsi-Suttanta. In order to ascertain the probable date of the legend, it is essential that we must be aware of the relative position of the Legend and the main Dialogue of which the Suttanta is composed.

3. Pāyāsi-Suttanta :—The Dialogue is a philosophical controversy between Kumāra Kassapa and Pāyāsi on the future existence of man, which according to tradition, took place shortly after the death of Gotama. The Venerable Kumāra Kassapa enjoyed, even during Buddha's life-time, the reputation of a "Flower Talker" (Citrakathī).

and Pāyāsi, his disputant, was the chieftain of Setavya, who is said to have ruled with an iron hand and wielded an immense influence, and who was an unbeliever and a most cynical atheist. The interest of the controversy lies in this, that a professed atheist and unbeliever like Pāyāsi was at last thrown, by a bitter irony of fate, into a position where he had to appear as an ardent believer. Here ends the controversy as it occurs in the Pāyāsi Discourse, and what follows is a mythical supplement embodying a Vimāna-story, the Serissaka-vimāna,⁹ in which the transformed chieftain is made to appear as a god reassuring mankind, through the Venerable Gavampati, who happened to meet the god in his empty or lonely mansion, of a life hereafter and of heavenly glory as a reward for pious gifts here below. The god Pāyāsi is represented as heightening the effect of his message to mankind by a sad contrast between the heavenly rewards which he and his disciple Uttara obtained by dispensing charity with or without the humbleness¹⁰ of spirit. Can there be, we ask, a greater irony than this? The powerful chieftain, a veritable atheist, far famed throughout Northern India for his strong materialistic proclivities, to whom all the similes, legends and parables of the 'Flower-Talker' Kassapa, perfectly innocent of all philosophical reasonings, were through almost the whole of the controversy¹¹, unavailing as proofs of existence hereafter,

of reward and punishment in heaven and hell, and above all, of possibility, the physical possibility, of return from the other world, whether heaven or hell, is not only represented, at the abrupt end¹² of the controversy, as a sincere believer, but what is more, is made to die a believer and appear a god conversing with a Buddhist Thera in his lonely mansion, as if to prove to the world by his present condition how utterly unfounded and baneful was his previous disbelief. The irony of fate does not end here. The Serissaka legend which is strictly speaking a dialogue between Gavampati and Pāyāsi would have us perceive the difference between Pāyāsi and his disciple Uttara in their present conditions, proving the relative worth of gifts, to the priesthood, bestowed with or without the faith, which is the sole determining factor of values of gifts, irrespective of the question whether the bestower is himself the owner or an agent through whom the gifts are made.

The reason is not far to seek. The account of the controversy, if scrutinised, leaves a permanent impression that an able controversialist like the chieftain Pāyāsi could not have been convinced by mere similes, parables and legends used as arguments and persuasions, a procedure so common amongst the popular preachers of religion. The account of the controversy fills thirty-six pages in the Pali Text Society edition of the discourse, and

up to the 34th page the strong-minded chieftain avowed that he was not convinced while on the 36th page, he all on a sudden confesses to his conviction. This would seem to any impartial judge most unnatural, as there is nothing exceptionally striking and forcible in the parable between pages 34 and 36, that could persuade and convert the inexorable Pāyāsi, or to induce the critic to believe that the matter had, in fact, ended so triumphantly for the Flower-Talker.

4. Three Dialogues :—The Pāyāsi-Suttanta, as it is, weaves three distinct dialogues within the narrative frame of the Legend of Serissaka Mansion. These three dialogues forming three integral parts of the Suttanta in its present form are so interwoven as to indicate three well-defined stages in the growth of the Serissaka Legend and so arranged that the second part including the first or the third part including the first and the second presents a complete narrative of its own. The first part which is a dialogue between Pāyāsi and Kumāra Kassapa gives an account of the Philosophical controversy, consummated by the latter's religious discourse following the former's conversion.

The second part which is a sequel to the first is similarly a dialogue between Pāyāsi and his disciple Uttara, in which the latter succeeds in persuading the former to set up gifts in faith. The dialogue is brought to a close by a brief reference to the heavens where the teacher and the pupil

were reborn after death. The third part which is a sequel to the second is also a dialogue between the Venerable Gavampati and the god Pāyāsi, the scene of which is laid in the lonely Serissaka Mansion. The gist of their conversation has already been referred to. It is clear, then, that the three dialogues point to three periods of Pāyāsi's life on earth and in heaven. The first, for instance, is connected with the time, when the controversy took place ; the second with an intermediate period which dates from the controversy and extends up to his death and also to the death of his disciple Uttara ; and the third with a time, when the chieftain now a god, had to repent, long after his death and long after the death of Kassapa, over his present condition inferior, if compared with that of his disciple. Granting that the Pāyāsi-Suttanta, as we now have it, is a connected narrative of the prose legend of Serissaka Mansion, the occurrence of three dialogues can be best accounted for historically only by a theory of theological fabrication passing through two stages. Remembering that Kumāra Kassapa failed by all his flower-talking to convince the strong minded chieftain, of the future existence of man, a theological fabrication about Pāyāsi's conversion and pious gifts leading to his rebirth as a god in the Serissaka Mansion, would seem possible only when, after the death of Pāyāsi and after the death of Kassapa, people would have but faint memory of the controversy

ending in signal defeat for a popular theologian and flower-talker. Conceivably the legend had, at first, no reference exactly to the Serissaka Mansion, such particularisation being possible at a still later date. The earlier tradition probably was that the chieftain Pāyāsi was reborn after his death in the heaven of four guardian angels, while his disciple Uttara achieved greater reward as he was reborn among the gods of the Thirty-three. The legend in this earlier stage afforded a nucleus whereon the third dialogue, i. e., the Serissaka Legend proper was engrafted. The story of Pāyāsi's conversion and pious gifts with their heavenly reward seems to have been invented in order just to allay the fear caused in theological circles by athēistical propaganda of the powerful chieftain and philosopher. The tradition of theological defeat and discomfiture at controversy with an atheist like Pāyāsi could not be perpetuated in tact, as it would have been detrimental to the cause of popular religion.

5. Ajita and Pāyāsi :—It may be objected that such country which is, throughout her history, so remarkable for the freedom of thought, and that Pāyāsi was certainly not the first to promulgate dangerous atheism. Among Buddha's elder contemporaries Ajita was an avowed atheist with a large following. He was an able controversialist, a wandering sophist, held in high esteem by the people of Northern India. If it were necessary to

invent mendacious traditions, about the conversion of one atheist, the opponent would say that there would have been similar traditions also about others, while, as a matter of fact, Indian literatures preserve the memory of the atheist Ajita intact, and hence the supposition of theological invention of pious legends about Pāyāsi, who thought on the lines of Ajita, is untenable. To this our reply is that the analogy does not hold good. In identifying Pāyāsi's case with Ajita's one ought not to forget two facts of great importance: (1) that time had changed since Ajita and (2) that Pāyāsi, apart from being a philosopher occupied a high social position. While Ajita had flourished in the wake of powerful sophistic movements and counter movements, destructive of all established religions, Pāyāsi promulgated uncompromising atheism when under the influence of Brahmanism and side by side with the new creeds which arose out of the turmoil of earlier time. Thus Ajita had to combat the custodians of one religious tradition, viz., that of the Brahmin, while Pāyāsi found himself in the midst of other enemies, the theologians of other creeds, the Jainas, the Buddhists and others. Furthermore, Ajita was only a wandering teacher who was virtually out of touch with the common run of people. A sophist like Ajita with his followers might be allowed to hold any set of opinions. His views and actions might not be regarded with so much dread, especially when there were

counter-views and many counteractions to avert his influence in the wrong direction. But the case of Pāyāsi was different. The living memory and example of a ruling prince favoured, in spite of his dangerous atheism, with all the riches and honours which fall to the share of mortals would have a totally different effect on the popular mind. The tradition had to be altered so as to enable the theologians to appear before people to their best advantage. But the fact of their defeat at controversy could not at once be concealed ; it is echoed in the second dialogue where the chieftain is represented as bestowing gifts, even after his conversion, without faith. Another legend had to be created to hide, so to speak, this very concealment of facts as well as to avenge the cause of the theologians. The underlying motive of the Serissaka Legend proper was to let people hear from Pāyāsi himself how the neglect of the priesthood is punished in heaven. A similar theological motive seems to have been at work behind the Jaina Upāṅga, Rāya-Paseṇi which is a dialogue between two controversialists, viz., Pāesi, the king of Seyaviya (Setavya) in Kosala, and the Venerable Kumārasamaṇa Kesī, a follower of Pārśva. The text belongs to the second stage of the Jaina canon, and there are internal evidences, such as references to Ceylon, Arabia and Persia¹³ which go at once to assign a much later date to the Upāṅga. The classical prose style and the exaggerated novelic descrip-

tions of various vimānas¹⁴ point to the same conclusion. The Jaina account of the controversy¹⁵ is on the whole similar to that of the Buddhist, though not identical. Seeing that the two accounts agree in motive and execution, it may not be unreasonable to suspect that the Rāya-Paseni has a history of its own ; that it is a later recast of an earlier Jaina account now lost. The interest of the Jaina work is that it furnishes a fresh evidence, namely, that the atheistical propaganda of Pāyāsi proved dangerous to all the creeds of the time, Jaina or Buddhist.

6. Date of Serissaka Legend :—Now, if it be granted that the Serissaka legend, or the Sūriyābha-Vimāna story, as the Jaina would say, was engrafted on an earlier tradition of Pāyāsi's conversion and heavenly reward, we have to ask, what is the probable date of the legend proper ? Here we have to recall that the earlier tradition was possible only after the death of Kumāra-Kassapa and of Pāyāsi and Uttara. Hence the presumption arises that the date of the legend must have been many years after the deaths of these three personages ; but when was it ? The controversy itself took place, according to a reliable tradition just after the death of the Buddha. A reasonable interval must also be allowed between the controversy and the three deaths, to which we have to add the years separating the Serissaka legend from the earlier tradition. Prof. Rhys Davids places the date of the Pāyāsi-Suttanta,

by modest calculation, within fifty years of Buddha's death.¹⁶

7. Prose and Poetic versions of Serissaka Legend Contrasted :—In the Peta and Vimāna-Vatthu versions of the Serissaka Legend a statement is put into the mouth of Pāyāsi which indicates that the Vimāna-story came to be composed a hundred years after Pāyāsi's death, but no statement as to date is to be found in the earlier prose version of the legend in the Pāyāsi-Suttanta. There are so many notable points of difference in the two versions that they could not have been brought about in any very short period. The differences are as follows :—

- (i) The prose version of the Serissaka Legend is a dialogue between Pāyāsi and Gavampati, the express purpose of which is to bring out in bold relief the distinction between the teacher and the pupil by the difference of heavenly rewards they obtained. The poetic version which occurs in identical form in the "Book of Stories of Heaven and Hell" is on the contrary a dialogue between the angel Pāyāsi and the caravan merchants, which reveals altogether a different purpose, viz., the extolling of virtuous life on earth proceeding from right views of things.
- (ii) In the prose legend, the god Pāyāsi does not appear to come down to earth ; his message is communicated to mankind through the Venerable Gavampati who was

a frequent visitor of the Serissaka Mansion. In the poetic version, on the other hand, the angel Pāyāsi is represented as conversing on earth with the caravan merchants in distress whom he came down to succour in the midst of a vast sandy desert.

- (iii) The message of Pāyāsi in the prose version seeks to instruct mankind to cultivate right devotion to the priests, proving by his own existence in the lowest heaven as a lesser reward of pious gifts made without faith, how the gods avenged the cause of theological sectary. In the poetic version on the contrary, the guardian angel admonishes the distressed merchants in the principles of universal religion.
- (iv) The prose legend as part and parcel of the Pāyāsi Discourse is clothed in the same dull old fashioned diction of earlier Suttantas, while the narrative in verse is one of the finest specimens of the Buddhist ballads which the Canonical Jātaka Book and the Books of Stories of Heaven and Hell can boast of.
- (v) Pāyāsi's mansion in the prose version is described as *tuccha* or empty, i. e., lonely, whereas in the Peta and Vimāna anthologies it is characterised as a most magnificent mansion teeming with a retinue of heavenly nymphs and resounding with the symphony

of celestial music. This shows that the sharp distinction which was drawn in the prose legend between Pāyāsi and Uttara came to be effaced in course of time.

- (vi) This inference is well borne out by the fact that in the place of two earlier dialogues we have in the Book of stories of Heaven two Vimāna-stories, viz., that of Uttara and that of Pāyāsi, describing the glories of each god without implying any invidious distinction.

If we accept the statement of date in the poetic version of the Serissaka Legend, namely, that Pāyāsi met the caravan merchants a hundred years after his death, it follows that the date of the legend in verse cannot be earlier than the Second Council, and considering that Pāyāsi died some years after the Buddha, we must assign to the legend a date posterior to the Second Council. Taking other facts into consideration, e. g., the points of difference noticed above, we cannot but conceive a long interval of time, a century or more, between the prose legend and its poetic version.

Judging by the formal and material changes which the Serissaka Vimāna-story underwent, we cannot regard the poetic version of it as a mere prose story versified. If such is not the relation between the two versions of the story, how are we to account for these head long changes in form and matter? The first thing that strikes us is the

introduction of the caravan merchants as interlocutors of Pāyāsi in the poetic version.

In the earlier account of the controversy between Kumāra Kassapa and Pāyāsi we come across a parable of caravan merchants, whereby the former tried to persuade the later to abandon his heresies and there is no dialogue in the Pāyāsi-Suttanta between Pāyāsi and the caravan merchants. This parable, we find, is developed into two stories in the Jātaka-Commentary, viz., the Apaṇṇaka (No. 1) and the Vaṇṇupātha (No. 2). Considering that these Jātakas relate to one birth, they ought to be, according to the earlier principle of enumeration, counted as one Jātaka, and we need not be surprised if they were the outcome of one Birth-story in the earlier collection of 500 Jātakas, i. e., the Canonical Jātaka Book. This supposition presses upon our enquiry concerning the relative position of the Canonical Jātaka Book and the Books of Stories of Heaven and Hell.

8. Serissaka Legend Affording A Common Basis :—

We have seen that strictly speaking the Serissaka-Vimāna-story of the Pāyāsi Discourse in prose was a common historical basis of the poetic version of it, as it occurs in the Peta and the Vimāna Vatthu. It has also been indicated that the poetry version of the story summarizes on the whole the contents of the Pāyāsi-Suttanta considered as a complete narrative of Pāyāsi.

Many Birth stories, e. g., the Apanṇaka, the Vaṇṇupatha, the Litta and the rest developed from the similar legends and parables used as arguments and persuasions by Kumāra Kassapa. Thus it would appear that these Jātakas and the Books of Stories of Heaven and Hell, were two parallel growths from the same historical basis, viz, the Pāyāsi Discourse. But looking from another standpoint i. e., judging from their literary forms and contents, the Peta and Vimāna anthologies may justly be represented as two offshoots of, and developments from the Canonical Jātaka Book. The prose and poetic versions seem to have a direct connection with each other in so far as they seek to inculcate belief in heaven and hell. But the poetic version, as we have noticed, exhibits many new features of its own, which cannot be explained by a theory of direct development. Let us then enquire how these features came to be. These characteristic changes in the poetic version must have a history of their own, and we think that it is the history of the development of the Peta and the Vimāna Vatthu from the Pāyāsi Discourse through a somewhat different literary medium viz. the Canonical Jātaka Book.

9. Jātaka a medium for Peta-Vimāna-stories :—
The Peta and the Vimāna Vatthu, as we now have them, preserve two common stories, viz., the famous Serissaka story and the charming story of Maṭṭakundalī. The latter occurs in the same

ballad form in the Canonical Jātaka Book, as many be judged from the poetical extracts in the Jātaka-Commentary. The occurrence of the story in identical form in the Books of Stories of Heaven and Hell suggests a common source, which appears to us to be the larger anthology of ballads called the Jātaka Book. An objection may be raised that the ballad in the Jātaka Book might have been derived as well from the Peta and the Vimāna vatthu. We contend that the Books of Stories of Heaven and Hell cannot precede the Canonical Jātaka Book, and our position is defended by the evidence of the Serissaka ballad contrasted with its basis in the prose version as it occurs in the Pāyāsi-Suttanta. The difference of the two versions lies in their morals. While the message of Pāyāsi in the prose version is coloured by theological motive since it teaches mankind to make gifts in faith to the priesthood, the instruction of the angel Pāyāsi in the ballad is free from all theological narrowness, inculcating as it does a religion of universal moral precepts, which is the essential element of the Jātaka-cult. This feature is characteristic of all the ballads in the Peta and the Vimāna Vatthu which have developed a cult which is absent from their basis, the Serissaka Legend in prose, and when we discover that these lesser anthologies are kindred not only in morals but also in literary forms to the larger anthology, the Jātaka Book, we cannot

resist the only legitimate conclusion that the Jātaka Book was the medium through which passed the Serissaka-vimāna doctrine, and by which a fortiori the lesser anthologies were influenced in more ways than one.

Now we will enquire how the Serrissaka doctrine promulgating belief in heaven (and hell by implication) could be transmitted through the Jātaka-medium before these ideas of heaven and hell came to be distinctly pronounced in two separate though companion anthologies.

In dealing with the origin of the Jātakas we find that similes or parables were used by the Buddha only as illustrations of certain moral points irrespective of any reference to future existence, while similar illustrations were resorted to by Kumāra Kassapa in his controversy after Buddha's death as arguments in support of his belief in future existence, reward and retribution, expressed in current folktales. Kumāra Kassapa utilised the current fables and similes for establishing the popular Law of Karma, implying future existence, reward and retribution, and heaven and hell. At a certain later date the fables used by the Buddha and his disciple Kumāra Kassapa were transformed into Jātakas, or more properly, Suttanta-Jātakas, when a new element viz., the belief in incarnation crept into them, without losing their original purposes, viz., the inculcation of moral principles and the promul-

gation of the Law of Karma. Since the popular Law of Karma as expounded by Kumāra Kassapa contributed towards the Jātaka cult and remained an essential feature of it, we can easily understand how the special Vimāna-doctrine expressed in the Serissaka Legend in prose, viz., belief in heaven, proceeding from the implications of Kumāra Kassapa's arguments, could a fortiori flow through the medium of the Jātaka cult.

10. Transformation of Prose Legend :—But did the earlier Vimāna-doctrine of the Serissaka story in prose leave any trace in course of being transmitted through the Jātaka? Here, too, we say, Yes. The earlier the Jātaka the more prominent is the trace. All the four Suttantas, which among the earliest forms of Jātakas played a very important role in the development of later Jātaka literatures, viz., the Mahāpadāna, the Mahāsudassana and the rest, bear testimony to a close connection with the Serissaka legend, in language, form, and partly in purpose. The Mahāpadāna Book furnishes instances of communion between man and god, typified respectively by the Buddha and Brahma, while the Mahāsudassana reflects the grandeur of a celestial mansion in the description of Kusāvatī, an old idealised city. The Mahāgovinda dazzles the reader's vision with the sudden illumination which precedes the appearance of the Brahma-mansion, and which acts as signal for the gods of the

Thirty-three assembled in the Sudhammā-Council-Hall to hail the mysterious dweller of the Mansion, Brahmā Sanamkumāra alighting to participate in their rejoicings at the surpassing glory of the Buddhist newcomers who have merited abodes in the Tāvatisa Heaven. The Makhādeva relates how Sakka, king of the gods, came down in his chariot the Sudhamma-Hall to escort from the earth, in behalf of the gods of the Thirty-three, the pious king Nimi of Mithilā. And these oldest known Jātakas preserved these traces, even when they were transformed into ballads in the Canonical Jātaka Book, although these traces were eclipsed for a time by the grandeur of poetry, only to reappear in their fullness in the Peta and the Vimāna Vatthu. In other words, the Peta and the Vimāna Vatthu are not selections from the Canonical Jātaka Book, but rather a richer development of the earlier prose legend of Serissaka Mansion under the influence of the Jātaka. The partial independence of the Peta and the Vimāna Vatthu can be substantiated by the fact that these smaller anthologies contain but one story from the Jātaka Book viz. that of Maṭṭakuṇḍalī. Moreover that they had a common origin is proved by the Serissaka story preserved in identical form in both the Peta and the Vimāna Vatthu.

11. Serissaka Ballad in the Petavatthu :—

It remains to be explained how the Serissaka

Vimāna story could find a place in the Book of Stories of Hell. The only reasonable explanation is that in the earlier Serissaka Legend in prose, there is an idea of punishment implied in the distinction drawn between the heavenly rewards obtained by Pāyāsi and Uttara. The reminiscence of this older distinction is preserved in the two stories of the Vimāna Vatthu, the Uttarra-vimāna representing Uttara as a dweller of a magnificent abode in the Heaven of the Thirty-three, and the Serissaka-Vimāna representing Pāyāsi as the dweller of a mansion in a lower Heaven, viz., the Cātum-mahārājika. And it was perhaps to perpetuate the old idea of inferiority that Pāyāsi was made to appear also in the Petavatthu, the main purpose of which was to impress on the people the inevitability of punishment awaiting all wrong-doers in the other world. And since the idea of inferiority in the older Vimāna-doctrine of the prose Serissaka Legend developed into a full-fledged doctrine of Hell, the Vimāna-doctrine must be taken to be prior, at least logically, to the Peta.

12. Chronology of Jātaka and Vimāna Stories :—

To sum up, we get the following chronology of the Jātaka and Vimāna stories :—

- (i) Similes and parables used by the Buddha as illustrating of moral points.
- (ii) Similes and parables used by Kumāra Kassapa in his controversy, shortly after the

death of the Buddha as arguments and persuasions.

- (iii) The Serissaka Legend in prose in the Pāyāsi-Suttanta, the date of which is placed by Prof. Rhys Davids within 50 years of the Buddha's death.
- (iv) The Suttanta-Jātakas which can be dated not much later than the Second Council, i. e., a hundred years, more or less, after Buddha's death.
- (v) The Canonical Jātaka Book, which is earlier than the Vimāna and the Peta Vatthu, the typical Serissaka story of which cannot be assigned, according to tradition, a date exceeding a century after the death of Pāyāsi.

Even if we accept the traditional date of a century, and if we remember that Pāyāsi survived the Buddha, the Serissaka-vimāna story in verse, as it occurs in the Vimāna and the Petavatthu, must be assigned a date later than the Second Council, and as we have indicated, this date is later[†] not only than the Suttanta-Jātakas but also than the Canonical Jātaka Book. As to the lower limit of the date of the Serissakavimāna-ballad, and a fortiori of the Books of Stories of Heaven and Hell, a conception may be formed in the light of the following evidences.

13. Aśoka's Dhamma and Vimāna-Doctrine :—

| If we analyse Aśoka's religion in the light of his

inscriptions with the exception of a few special edicts, we are struck by its close resemblance with the Vimāna-doctrine as we find in the Book of Stories of Heaven, and it is most curious that the special doctrine of the Book of Stories of Hell has not played any part in it. The religion of Aśoka presents two aspects, moral and popular, the former representing a body of moral precepts applicable to all, and the latter comprising faith in the Triad, pilgrimage to holy places to worship the Buddhas, and such public and festive demonstrations as vimānadasana, hastidasana and illumination (agikhamdhāni). And these are nothing but the characteristic features of the Vimāna-Doctrine above referred to. Whether the Vimānavatthu in its present form existed then or not, it is clear that some Vimāna stories, in some form or other, were known, though not of course in the earlier prose form of the Serissaka story. The phases of belief which have found expression in the Vimānavatthu are characterised by a humanizing spirit rendering the abstract, concrete or practical. The Stories teach that the householders can become dwellers of celestial mansions which vary in glory and splendour according to the merits gained by the following acts of piety and religious observances (dhammacariyā) :—

- (a) Faith in the three Jewels (tiratanesu saddhā).

- (b) Buddhavandanā—Various modes of salutation to the Buddha, touching his feet (pāda-vandanā) or with folded hands (añjalikamma) with a mind transported with a joy (muditamano), and a heart serene (pasannacitto).
- (c) Buddhapūjā—Worshipping the Buddha with offerings of flowers and perfumes.
- (d) Cetiavandanā, Thūpa-pūjā, Dhātu-pūjā, Worship of shrines, topes and relics.
- (e) Uposatha—Observance of the Sabbath.
- (f) Silasamādāna—Keeping of the precepts.
- (g) Kiccāṇi—Fulfilment of duties by man and woman.
- (h) Āsana—Cordial reception of the Buddha and his followers.
- (i) Dāna—Liberal gifts of food and drink and other requisites to the Buddha and the Order.
- (j) Vihāradāna—Dedication of Vihāras to the Buddha and the Order.
- (k) Bhikkhādāna—Alms-giving.
- (l) Ārāma-ropā, Vana-ropā, Caṅkama, Pokkharāṇi—Laying out of gardens, planting of trees, construction of roads, and excavation of tanks.
- (m) Rathapadīpādi—Gifts of chariots and providing lights, etc.
- (n) Puññānumodanā—Participation in virtuous deeds.

14. Vimāna and Apadāna Stories Contrasted :—

These Vimāna ideas of piety were intensified later in the legends of the Apadāna which virtually did away with the precepts and duties of life, and emphasized only such formal aspects of religion as Pūjā, Vandana, Dāna and Dakṣiṇā. Among other differences, the following are the most noticeable :—

1. Like the inscriptions of Aśoka, the Vimāna stories hold out for the householder a promise of heavenly reward generally in the immediate future,¹⁷ while the Apadāna legends invariably illustrate by the lives of Theras and Theris how heavenly rewards thus obtained are continued through many cycles of existence and multiplied, until these lead to Arahatsip.

2. The Vimānavatthu sets out a religion for the house-holder, stripped of the idea of renunciation, whereas the Apadāna legends combine by a peculiar mythological device the pious life of the householder with the higher attainments of the recluse, the latter overshadowing the former a synthesis unknown in the time of Aśoka.

3. The Vimāna stories promulgate generally the worship of the present Buddha¹⁸ with his doctrine and followers, while the Apadāna legends by their Adhikāravāda exalt the past Buddhas and brings into prominence the worship of shrines, relics and topes.

4. The emphasis laid in the Vimāna stories is on the whole on individual morality and duty, while

the Apadāna legends emphasize mainly the aesthetic, charitable and humanitarian aspects of the faith.

It seems as if the Vimānavatthu and the Apadāna represent the two sides of Aśoka's religion. For the instructions in Aśoka's inscriptions are only a reproduction of the teachings of the Vimānavatthu¹⁹ and the Apadāna legends are nothing but the embodiment of Aśoka's personal practices. And the conflict between the Vimāna and Apadāna doctrines is the same as that between Aśoka's teachings and practices. What we find in Aśokan inscriptions is in spirit but a faithful reproduction of the Buddha idea of worship, which consists in following his instructions and not in personal homage and offerings, the foolish ways of common people. But in his personal practices Aśoka himself appears to have followed a mode of worship which the Buddha had denounced as vulgar. In the history of this conflict between the two forms of Buddha worship, the Apadāna marks a stage in the growth of the Buddhist creed when the ethical side practically disappeared yielding place to the popular. The result was that the emotional side of the faith overshadowed its previous rationality (paññānvayatā).

NOTES

1. Fausböll, Jātaka, No. 530.
2. Fausböll, Jātaka, No. 52.
3. See the Āyāraṃga-Sutta.
4. See the Majjhima-Nikāya.
5. Cunningham, Stūpa of Bharhut, Pl. XL. 2-5.
6. Preface to the Points of Controversy, (P. T. S.).
7. Rock Edict IV "Vimānadasanā ca hastidasanā ca agikhaṃdhāni ca añāni divyāni rūpāni dasayitpā" (Girnar).
8. Sutta-Nipāta IV No. 12, stanza 10 :—
 "Diṭṭhe sute sīlavate mute va ete ca nissāya vimāna-
 dassī, vinicchaye ṭhatvā pahassamāno 'bālo paro akusalo'
 ti cāha".
9. The reading adopted in the P. T. S. edition of the Dīgha is Sirisaka.
10. The chieftain Pāyāsi is said to have been reborn in the lonely Serissaka mansion of the lowest heaven in Buddhist cosmography as lesser reward of liberality without humility, while his disciple Uttara got admission to a higher heaven, the Heaven of the Thirty-Three as greater reward of gifts in faith made to Buddhist priests.
11. Dīgha II. pp. 319-349.
12. Ibid. p. 352, where the chieftain suddenly changes his views as a consequence of a parable of Kassapa, by no means more again but which proved futile.
13. Rāya-Paseṇi, ed. Dhanapati, p. 238 :
 Siṃhalihim Āravihim.....Pārasihim.
14. Ibid, pp. 1-205.
15. Ibid, pp. 241-296.
16. Dial. B., II. Pt. II.

17. The Vimāna story of Revatī (No. 52) which also occurs as a Peta story in the Petavatthu is one of the few exceptions.

18. The Vimāna story (No. 82) which mentions Sumedha, a past Buddha, is one of the few exceptions.

19. Notably the Vimāna story of Revatī (No. 52).

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